THE  ALBERT  SHAW  LECTURES  ON 
DIPLOMATIC  HISTORY,  1917 


The  Early  Diplomatic  Relations 


BETWEEN  THE 


United  States  and  Japan 
1853-1865 


BY 


PAYSON  JACKSON  TREAT,  PH.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  FAR  EASTERN  HISTORY  IN  STANFORD  UNIVERSITY 


BALTIMORE 

THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  PRESS 

1917 


Copyright,  1917 
By  THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  PRESS 


PRESS  OF 

THE  NEW  ERA  PRINTING  COMPANY 
LANCASTER,  PA. 


PREFACE 

The  invitation  to  deliver  the  Albert  Shaw  Lectures 
on  Diplomatic  History  at  the  Johns  Hopkins  Univer 
sity  afforded  an  opportunity  to  organize  the  first  part 
of  a  more  extensive  study  in  which  I  have  been  en 
gaged  for  a  number  of  years.  It  is  my  hope  to  com 
plete  eventually  a  survey  of  the  whole  period  of  Japa 
nese-American  diplomatic  relations.  The  present  lec 
tured  take  up  the  story  with  the  beginnings  of  American 
intercourse,  and  continue  it  through  the  negotiation 
of  the  Perry  and  Harris  treaties,  into  the  period  when, 
because  of  the  Mikado's  refusal  to  approve  of  the 
commercial  conventions,  the  foreign  relations  of  Japan 
became  apparently  inextricably  involved  with  the  tur 
bulent  domestic  politics  of  that  revolutionary  era. 
The  narrative  ends  with  the  Mikado's  sanction  of  the 
treaties  I'm  1865, [one  of  the  most  important  of  all  the 
events  which  occurred  in  the  period  between  the  real 
opening  of  Japan  in  1859  and  the  war  of  the  restora 
tion  in  1868. 

It  is  my  pleasant  duty  to  acknowledge  here  the  grati 
tude  owed  to  the  friends  and  colleagues,  in  America 
and  in  Japan,  who  have  given  help  and  encouragement 
in  these  investigations.  Their  very  number  precludes 
individual  mention.  I  cannot,  however,  fail  to  express 

vii 

3G5299 


Vlll  PREFACE 

a  very  deep  sense  of  obligation  to  Robert  C.  Pruyn, 
Esquire,  of  Albany,  New  York,  who  so  generously 
permitted  use  of  the  private  correspondence  of  his  dis 
tinguished  father,  and  added  many  valuable  sugges 
tions  from  his  own  recollections  of  life  in  the  capital 
of  the  Tycoon. 

PAYSON  J.  TREAT. 
STANFORD  UNIVERSITY,  CALIFORNIA, 
June  23,  1917. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGB 

I.  COMMODORE  PERRY:  PEACE  AND  AMITY.  . .  i 
II.  TOWNSEND   HARRIS,    FIRST   CONSUL-GEN 
ERAL    39 

III.  THE  COMMERCIAL  TREATY  OF  1858 71 

IV.  JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN   RELA 

TIONS  96 

V.  MUTUAL  RECRIMINATION   127 

VI.  HARRIS  STANDS  ALONE  158, 

VII.  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN,    SECOND    MINISTER 

RESIDENT    193 

VIII.  EXCLUSION  AGAIN  DECREED    238 

IX.  CHOSHIU  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE  280 

X.  THE  JOINT  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  CHOSHIU  327 

XL  THE  MIKADO  RATIFIES  THE  TREATIES...  374 

APPENDIX,  THE  SHIMONOSEKI  INDEMNITY 412 

BIBLIOGRAPHY    435 

INDEX    • 447 


CHAPTER   I 

COMMODORE   PERRY:   PEACE   AND   AMITY 

When  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  the  first 
American  treaty  with  Japan  took  place,  almost  a  year 
after  the  treaty  had  been  signed,  the  Japanese  com 
missioners  sent  this  message  to  the  American  com 
modore,  that  "his  name  would  live  forever  in  the 
history  of  Japan."1  Rarely  does  a  prophecy  stand  the 
test  of  half  a  century,  and  yet  after  sixty  years  the 
name  of  Perry  is  familiar  to  almost  every  schoolboy 
in  Japan,  although  in  his  own  country  his  fame  has 
not  fared  so  well.  [From  the  Japanese  standpoint  the 
American  treaty  of  1854  was  of  the  deepest  signifi 
cance.  It  marked  the  beginning  of  the  end,  not  only 
of  the  old  policy  of  seclusion  and  exclusion,  but  of  the 
far  older  system  of  dual  government,  and  it  was  the 
real  commencement  of  that  era  of  progress  and  world 
intercourse  which  has  placed  the  Island  Empire  among 
the  great  powers  of  the  world. ,  jjFrom  the  American 
point  of  view  it  was  an  interesting  episode,  reflecting 
honor  and  glory  upon  a  nation  which  had  hitherto 
played  but  a  small  part  in  the  world's  affairs ;  but  so 
absorbed  did  the  country  soon  become  in  the  Civil 

1  F.  L.  Hawks,  Narrative  of  the  Expedition  of  an  American 
Squadron  to  the  China  Seas  and  Japan,  etc.,  I,  512. 


COMMODORE   PERRY 

War  and  in  the  later  problems  of  reconstruction  and 
internal  development  that  the  passing  interest  in  Japan 
soon  waned.  The  American  government  continued  to 
be  the  unselfish  friend  of  Japan,  but  leadership  in 
Japanese  affairs  soon  passed  into  other  hands.  That 
it  was  American  diplomacy  which  brought  Japan  into 
peaceful  intercourse  with  the  civilized  world  remains 
to  the  credit  of  the  United  States^  no  matter  what 
efforts  were  made  then  and  later  to  minimize  the  con 
tribution.  And  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  Japan 
herself  has  cause  to  be  thankful  that  her  first  lessons 
in  international  law  were  learned  from  American 
representatives. 

i  For  more  than  two  centuries  Japan  had  been  closed 
to  all  foreign  intercourse,  save  only  a  strictly  regu 
lated  commerce  with  the  Dutch  and  the  Chinese  at 
Nagasaki.2  /  (The  adoption  of  this  policy  of  exclusion 
and  seclusion  had  cornel  after  a  century  of  friendly  and 
liberal  relations  witn  several  European  states.  Be 
ginning  in  1542  with  the  discovery  of  Japan  by  storm 
bound  Portuguese,  commercial  relations  developed 
first  with  Portugal,  carried  on  through  Macao  on  the 
China  coast;  then  with  Spain,  through  Manila  and 
even  directly  through  Acapulco;  and  later  with  Hol 
land  and  England,  conducted  by  their  great  East  India 
companies.  The  Japanese  with  their  "intelligent 

2J.  Murdoch  and  I.  Yamagata,  History  of  Japan   (1542- 
1651). 


COMMODORE   PERRY  3 

curiosity "  welcomed  the  foreign  traders  with  their 
new  wares  and,  especially,  their  firearms.  In  i6i33 
leyasu,  founder  of  the  Tokugawa  Shogunate,  gave  to 
the  English  a  charter  which  granted  them  privileges 
far  more  liberal  than  could  have  been  found  in  any 
western  state,  including  even  free  trade  and  extra 
territoriality.  That  the  Japanese  sought  commerce 
and  intercourse  with  other  states  during  this  period  is 
evident  from  the  record.  That  they  sacrificed  both 
in  order  to  free  themselves  from  the  political  menace 
of  the  western  religion  is  also  evident.  The  story  of 
missionary  propaganda  in  Japan  from  the  time  of 
Francis  Xavier  is  a  record  in  which  religious  zeal  and 
devotion  is  intermingled  with  individual  indiscretions 
and  national  rivalries.  It  is  difficult  today  to  unravel 
all  the  motives  from  the  skein  of  tangled  political, 
religious,  and  ^conomic  elements,  but  there  is  reason 
to  believe  that  irreligious  propagandajcould  have  been 
divorced  from  commercial  intercourse,  the  doors  of 
Japan  might  never  have  been  closed.  As  it  was,  the 
English  East  India  Company  abandoned  its  factory 
in  1623,  the  Spaniards  were  excluded  in  1624,  seclusion 
was  decreed  in  1636,  and  the  Portuguese  were  excluded 
in  1638.  The  Dutch,  who  professed  a  different  brand 
of  Christianity  and  who  were  not  interested  in  its 
propaganda,  were  transferred  to  Nagasaki  in  1641  and 
permitted  to  carry  on  their  trade,  under  the  strictest 

3  He  had  nominally  retired  in  1605. 


4  COMMODORE    PERRY 

regulations,  at  that  port.  The  Chinese  also  were 
allowed  to  trade  there  under  rigid  restrictions. 
Though  the  English  tried  in  1673  to  reestablish  their 
factory,  their  request  was  denied,  and  seclusion  and 
exclusion  remained  the  firm  policy  of  Japan. 

This  policy  was  inaugurated  by  lemitsu,  the  third 
of  the  Tokugawa  Shoguns,  who  administered  the 
country  from  1623  until  1651.  He  was  the  grandson 
of  the  great  leyasu,  who  had  retired  in  1605  and  yet 
virtually  ruled  the  country  until  his  death  in  1616. 
Seclusion,  therefore,  was  not  the  work  of  the  founder 
of  the  Tokugawa  Shogunate,  although  he  is  generally 
credited  with  its  establishment. 

The  government  of  Japan  throughout  this  period 
was  unique.  At  Kyoto  resided  the  Mikado,  or  Tenno, 
descendant  of  the  gods  and  supreme  monarch  of  the 
land.  But  from  the  earliest  historic  period  the 
Mikado  had  withdrawn  more  and  more  from  the 
actual  administration  of  affairs,  entrusting  it  at  first 
to  nobles  of  his  court,  represented  between  670  and 
T,  1156  by  the  great  Fujiwara  family,  and  after  that  date 
to  great  military  families  who  held  the  title  of  Sei-i-tai 
pVShogun  (Barbarian  Subjugating  Great  General).  The 
first  of  these  leaders  was  Minamoto  Yoritomo,  who 
became  Shogun  m  1192.  From  1199  until  1333,  mem 
bers  of  the  Ho  jo  family  served  as  regents  for  titular 
Shoguns.  In  1338  the  Ashikaga  family  was  estab 
lished  in  the  Shogunate,  holding  it  until  1573.  Then 


COMMODORE   PERRY  5 

out  of  thirty  years  of  civil  war  arose  the  three  great 
generals,  Nobunaga,  Hideyoshi,  and  leyasu,  the  latter 
of  whom  was  made  Shogun  in  1603.  His  descendants 
held  that  office  until  its  abolition  in  1868. 

Under  the  dual  system  of  government  the  Mikado 
resided  at  Kyoto,  surrounded  by  his  court  but  under 
the  watchful  eye  and  control  of  the  representative  of 
the  Shogun.  At  Yedo,  the  Tokugawa  capital,  resided 
the  Shogun,  invested  with  supreme  authority  in  polit 
ical  affairs.  To  him  the  feudal  lords,  daimyos,  swore 
allegiance,  and  his  power  over  them  was  real  and 
during  the  early  years  was  frequently  exercised.  The 
authority  of  the  Mikado  was  nominal,  though  present. 
He  invested  the  Shogun  with  his  office,  but  the  Shogun 
was  not  called  upon  to  secure  approval  for  his  ac 
tions.  The  momentous  decision  to  close  the  country 
was  taken  by  lemitsu  without  imperial  approval,  nor 
at  that  time,  when  the  Tokugawa  Shogunate  was  at  its 
height,  was  such  deemed  necessary.  It  was  easy,  there 
fore,  for  the  early  writers  on  Japan  to  speak  of  the 
Mikado  as  a  spiritual  emperor  and  the  Shogun  as  a 
temporal  ruler,  for  it  was  with  the  Shogun  that  all 
foreign  affairs  were  transacted. 

During  the  later  Tokugawa  period  the  actual  gov 
ernment  very  largely  passed  out  of  tl.z  hands  of  the 
Shoguns  and  was  exercised  by  the  Roju  (Gorogio), 
senior  ministers  or  council.  These  were  five  in  num 
ber,  chosen  from  the  more  important  of  the  fudai 


6  COMMODORE    PERRY 

daimyo,  and  at  times  one  of  them  was  given  the  office 
of  dairo  (tairo),  corresponding  very  nearly  to  that  of 
regent.  It  was  the  Roju  which  handled  foreign  affairs 
after  the  reopening  of  Japan.  Occasionally  members 
of  the  Waka-doshiyori,  or  junior  council,  composed  of 
five  junior  ministers,  were  called  upon  to  treat  with 
the  foreign  representatives  when  the  pressure  of  in 
ternal  and  foreign  affairs  proved  too  burdensome  on 
the  Roju. 

In  regard  to  the  feudal  system  it  is  necessary  to  note 
that  at  the  close  of  the  Tokugawa  period  there  were 
two  hundred  and  fifty-eight  daimyos.  Of  these 
twenty-one  were  related  to  the  Tokugawas,  one  hun 
dred  and  thirty-nine  were  known  as  fudai  (hereditary 
vassals),  or  descendants  of  those  who  had  come  to 
the  support  of  leyasu  early  in  his  career,  and  ninety- 
eight  were  tozama  lords,  descended  from  the  old  feudal 
nobility  which  had  either  come  reluctantly  to  the  sup 
port  of  the  Tokugawas  or  had  been  beaten  into  sub 
mission.  None  of  the  latter  lords  was  permitted  to 
hold  office  in  the  Yedo  administration,  and  among 
them  were  found  the  leaders  in  the  anti-Tokugawa 
movement  of  the  period  covered  by  this  study.  With 
in  their  fiefs  the  daimyos  exercised  aln.jst  unlimited 
power.  They  could  be  called  upon  to  maintain  troops 
in  the  field  in  time  of  need.  The  Shogunate  (some 
times  spoken  of  as  Bakufu)  exercised  a  measure  of 
control  over  the  feudatories  through  the  law  of  com- 


COMMODORE   PERRY  7 

pulsory  residence  at  Yedo,  the  exchange  of  fiefs,  and 
fines  disguised  as  orders  to  carry  out  some  costly  public 
work.* 

After  1641  Japan  was  closed  to  all  foreign  inter 
course  save  that  with  the  Dutch  and  the  Chinese  at 
Nagasaki.  The  Dutch  were  confined  to  the  artificial 
fan-shaped  islet  of  Deshima,  about  six  hundred  by 
two  hundred  and  forty  feet  in  size.5  The  whole  island 
was  surrounded  by  a  high  board  fence,  and  access  to 
the  mainland  was  over  a  stone  bridge,  carefully 
guarded.  No  Japanese  was  permitted  to  visit  the 
island  without  permission,  nor  could  a  Hollander  cross 
the  bridge  without  leave.  At  first  six  or  seven  Dutch 
ships  a  year  were  allowed  to  visit  Nagasaki ;  later  the 
number  was  reduced  to  two,  and  after  1790,  to  one. 
Before  that  date  the  head  of  the  factory  had  to  make 
a  visit  to  Yedo  annually  with  presents,  but  later  the 
visit  was  made  every  four  years.  Residence  at  De 
shima  was  permitted  under  regulations  both  strict  and 
humiliating,  and  the  annual  ships  had  to  observe  strin 
gent  rules.  Yet  because  of  the  profit  from  the  trade, 
which  was  great  down  to  the  nineteenth  century,  the 
Dutch  accepted  this  confinement.  During  the  two 

4  See  J.  H.  Gubbins,  The  Progress  of  Japan,  1853-1871,  pp. 
1-39;  F.  Brinkley,  History  of  the  Japanese  People,  592-595, 
632-637 ;  J.  H.  Gubbins,  "  The  Feudal  System  in  Japan  under 
the  Tokugawa  Shoguns,"  in  Transactions  of  the  Asiatic  So 
ciety  of  Japan,  vol.  15,  part  II. 

s  J.  H.  Longford,  The  Story  of  Old  Japan,  286. 


8  COMMODORE    PERRY 

centuries  much  information  concerning  Japan  was 
secured  and  published  by  officials  at  Deshima,  and  the 
works  of  Kaempfer,  Thunberg,  Titsingh,  and  Siebold 
were  the  great  sources  of  western  knowledge  during 
the  period.  On  the  other  hand,  in  spite  of  official  pro 
hibitions,  some  Japanese  gratified  their  love  of  learning 
by  studying  with  the  Dutch  agents,  and  thus  through 
Nagasaki  there  seeped  into  the  country  some  knowl 
edge  of  western  history,  politics,  science,  and  medicine. 
It  is  a  great  mistake  to  think  that  Japan  was  hermeti 
cally  sealed  during  her  centuries  of  seclusion.  Naga 
saki  was  a  keyhole  through  which  some  light  entered. 

The  Chinese  trade  was  governed  by  similar  regula 
tions.  Until  1684  seventy  junks  a  year  might  visit 
Nagasaki ;  then  the  number  was  reduced  to  twenty, 
and  after  1740  to  ten.  To  a  less  extent  than  in  the 
case  of  the  Dutch,  news  from  the  outer  world  filtered 
in  from  China,  and  some  also  came  through  the  junks 
of  Satsuma  which  were  allowed  to  trade  with  the  Loo- 
Choo  (Ryukyu)  Islands,  a  dependency  of  that  fief, 
but  also  in  touch  with  China. 

It  could  hardly  be  expected  that  with  the  develop 
ment  of  European  commerce  in  the  Far  East  such 
states  as  Japan  and  Korea  would  be  permitted  to  main 
tain  their  exclusive  systems.  In  the  very  year  that  the 
Portuguese  were  expelled  from  Japan  (1638)  the 
Russians  had  carried  their  standard  clear  across  Siberia 
to  Okhotsk,  on  the  Pacific,  and  the  next  two  centuries 


COMMODORE   PERRY  9 

saw  the  consolidation  of  their  control.  In  1792  Lieu 
tenant  Laxman  was  sent  to  return  some  Japanese  sea 
men  and  to  endeavor  to  open  friendly  relations.6  This 
attempt  failed,  as  did  a  more  elaborate  one  in  1804, 
under  Resanoff.  Other  Russian  expeditions  will  be 
mentioned  later.  The  Japanese  knew  of  the  growth 
of  Russian  power  to  the  north,  and  this  knowledge  was 
one  of  the  influences  in  arousing  interest  in  foreign 
affairs  during  the  early  nineteenth  century. 

Other  flags  were  occasionally  seen  in  Japanese 
waters.  French  and  British  explorers  visited  the 
northern  islands.  During  the  Napoleonic  Wars  the 
Dutch  trade  was  carried  on  under  the  American  flag, 
and  in  1807  an  American  ship,  chartered  by  the  Rus 
sian  American  Company,  and  under  the  Russian  flag, 
unsuccessfully  sought  trade  at  Nagasaki.  The  next 
year  a  British  frigate,  the  Phaeton,  put  in  at  Nagasaki 
in  search  of  the  Dutch  merchantman/  This  invasion 
resulted  in  the  suicide  of  several  of  the  Japanese  offi 
cials  who  were  responsible  for  allowing  the  ship  to 
enter  and  aroused  in  Japan  an  indignation  which  per 
sisted  until  Perry's  time.8  While  the  British  held 
Java,  1811-1816,  the  annual  ship  was  British,  but  the 
agent  at  Deshima  refused  to  surrender  his  post  to  the 

6  Hawks,  I,  45. 

7  W.  G.  Aston,  "  H.  M.  S.  Phaeton  at  Nagasaki  in  1808,"  in 
Trans.  As.  Soc.  Japan,  vol.  7,  part  IV,  pp.  329-344. 

8  S.   W.   Williams,   "  Journal  of   the   Perry   Expedition  to 
Japan,"  in  Trans.  As.  Soc.  Japan,  vol.  37,  part  II,  pp.  149,  220. 


10  COMMODORE   PERRY 

conquerors.  A  unique  attempt  was  that  of  the  Amer 
ican  ship  Morrison,  in  1837,  to  return  some  Japanese 
sailors  who  had  been  blown  clear  across  the  Pacific  to 
Vancouver.  This  humanitarian  attempt  failed;  and 
the  result  of  this  and  other  efforts  to  return  seamen 
and  open  commercial  relations  was  the  edict  of  1843 
to  the  effect  that  shipwrecked  Japanese  could  be  re 
turned  only  in  Dutch  or  Chinese  ships.9 

After  the  Napoleonic  Wars  the  trade  between  China 
and  the  "West  rapidly  developed.  In  this  commerce 
Americans  took  a  prominent  part.  With  the  end  of 
the  English  East  India  Company's  monopoly  of 
British  trade  came  a  great  increase  in  British  ship 
ping,  and  there  began  the  struggle  between  the  royal 
representatives  and  the  Chinese  officials  which,  com 
plicated  by  the  contraband  trade  in  opium,  led  to  the 
Anglo-Chinese  war  of  1839-1842,  which  will  ever  be 
known  in  China  as  the  Opium  War.  Its  great  result 
was  the  opening  of  five  ports  in  China  to  foreign 
trade,  and  America,  France,  and  other  countries 
secured  treaties  similar  to  that  of  Great  Britain. 

This  development  of  Chinese  commerce  led  to  in 
creased  interest  in  Japan.  In  the  forties  two  British 
surveying  ships  and  two  French  ships  of  war  visited 
Japanese  ports,  as  well  as  two  American  expeditions. 
One  of  the  latter,  under  Commodore  Biddle,10  went 

932d  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  59,  pp.  78-79- 
1032d  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  59,  pp.  64-66  (2 
ships). 


COMMODORE   PERRY  II 

in  1846  to  Yedo  to  ascertain  if  the  ports  were  open, 
and  the  other,  under  Commander  Glynn,11  in  1849, 
visited  Nagasaki,  to  receive  some  shipwrecked  Amer 
ican  seamen.  It  became  evident  that  Japan's  days  of 
seclusion  were  soon  to  end. 

/To  two  western  countries  the  opening  of  Japan  was 
of  prime  importance,  but  for  very  different  reasons. 
Russia,  on  the  north,  had  pushed  down  into  the  Kurile 
Islands,  and  to  round  out  her  illicit  occupation  of  the 
Amur  Valley  sought  the  possession  of  Karafuto 
(Saghalien).  Her  advance  was  feared  by  Japan,  for 
her  commercial  interests  were  small.  Japan  lay  be 
yond  the  route  of  the  usual  European  commerce  of 
the  time ;  but  in  the  case  of  the  United  States,  with  the 
development  of  direct  shipping  between  San  Fran 
cisco  and  Shanghai,  the  Japanese  islands  lay  right  in 
the  track. /The  interests  of  the  United  States  were 
primarily  commercial,  and  it  had  more  to  gain  imme 
diately  from  the  opening  of  the  Japanese  ports  than 
had  other  commercial  states.  With  the  development 
of  steam  navigation  the  necessity  for  coaling  stations 
somewhere  between  Honolulu  and  Shanghai  became 
important,  and  the  presence  of  American  whalers  in 
the  northern  waters  of  Japan  after  1820  made  it  neces 
sary  that  ports  of  refuge  and  supply  be  obtained, 
and  that  guarantees  for  the  humane  treatment  of  our 
shipwrecked  mariners  be  secured. 

11  Ibid.,  pp.  1-44  (i  ship). 


12  COMMODORE   PERRY 

These  were  the  reasons  which  led  to  active  Amer 
ican  interest  in  Japan  in  the  early  fifties.  Before 
then,  in  1832  and  in  1835,  Mr.  Roberts,  our  minister  to 
Siam  and  Muscat,  had  borne  letters  of  credence  to 
Japan,  but  had  not  gone  there;  and  in  1846  Com 
modore  Biddle  had  carried  the  letter  of  credence 
which  had  been  given  to  Mr.  Everett,  our  minister  to 
China.  '  But  in  the  fifties  more  serious  efforts  to  open 
intercourse  were  made.  )jn_i85i  Commodore  Aulick, 
who  had  been  placed  in  command  of  the  East  India 
squadron,  was  instructed  to  visit  Japan  and  secure, 
if  possible,  a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce  which  was 
to  include  the  right  to  obtain  coal,  the  opening  of  one 
or  more  ports  for  commerce,  and  protection  for  ship 
wrecked  seamen  and  property.12  After  his  recall  on 
November  18,  1851,  the  mission  was  entrusted  to 
Commodore  Matthew  Calbraith  PerryJ  brother  of  the 
well-known  Oliver  Hazard  Perry,~~the  hero  of  Lake 
Erie. 

So  much  has  been  written  concerning  the  mission 
of  [Commodore  Perryjthat  only  the  more  important 
phases  of  it  need  be  treated  here.13  '  Hi/instructions,14 

1232d  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  59,  PP-  81-82.  That 
Commodore  Aulick  was  not  well  qualified  for  such  a  mission 
may  be  inferred  from  the  ill-treatment  of  some  Japanese  sea 
men  on  the  Susquehanna  at  Hongkong  (J.  Heco,  Narrative 
of  a  Japanese,  I,  113-121). 

13  For  Perry's  expedition  see:  33d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Ex. 
Doc.  No.  34;  Hawks,  Narrative  of  the  Expedition  of  an  Amer- 


COMMODORE   PERRY  13 

were  drafted  by  Mr.  Conrad,  secretary  of  war 
and  acting  secretary  of  state,  set  forth  that  the  object 
of  his  mission  was  to  secure  protection  for  ship 
wrecked  American  seamen  and  property,  permission  to 
secure  supplies  (especially  coal),  and  the  opening  of 
one  or  more  ports  for  commercej  These  objects  were 
to  be  obtained  by  argument  and  persuasion;  but  if< 
unsuccessful  he  was  to  state  "  in  the  most  unequivocal 
terms"  that  American  citizens  wrecked  on  the  coasts 
of  Japan,  must  be  treated  with  humanity, 

and  that  if  any  acts  of  cruelty  should  hereafter  be  practised 
upon  citizens  of  this  country,  whether  by  the  government  or 
by  the  inhabitants  of  Japan,  they  will  be  severely  chastised. 

He  was  also  instructed  that, 

as  the  president  has  no  power  to  declare  war,  his  mission  is 
necessarily  of  a  pacific  character,  and  [he]  will  not  resort  to 
force  unless  in  self  defence  in  the  protection  of  the  vessels 
and  crews  under  his  command,  or  to  resent  an  act  of  personal 
violence  offered  to  himself,  or  one  of  his  crews. 


ican  Squadron  to  the  China  Seas  and  Japan ;  Williams,  "  Jour 
nal  of  the  Perry  Expedition  to  Japan/'  in  Trans.  As.  Soc. 
Japan,  vol.  37,  pt.'  II ;  C.  O.  Paullin,  Diplomatic  Negotiations 
of  Amerfcan  Naval  Officers,  1778-1883;  W.  E.  Griffis,  Matthew 
Calbraith  Perry;  I.  Nitobe,  Intercourse  between  the  United 
States  and  Japan;  J.  W.  Foster,  American  Diplomacy  in  the 
Orient. 

14  November  5,  1852.     See  33d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.'  Ex.  Doc. 
No.  34,  pp.  4-9- 


14  COMMODORE   PERRY 

He  was,  further,  to  be 

courteous  and  conciliatory,  but  at  the  same  time,  firm  and  de 
cided.  He  will  therefore,  submit  with  patience  and  forbear 
ance  to  acts  of  discourtesy  to  which  he  may  be  subjected,  by 
a  people  to  [sic]  whose  usages  it  will  not  do  to  test  by  our 
standards  of  propriety,  but,  at  the  same  time,  will  be  careful  to 
do  nothing  that  will  compromit,  in  their  eyes,  his  own  dignity, 
or  that  of  the  country.  He  will,  on  the  contrary,  do  every 
thing  to  impress  them  with  a  just  sense  of  the  power  and 
greatness  of  this  country,  and  to  satisfy  them  that  it's  past  for 
bearance  has  been  the  result,  not  of  timidity,  but  of  a  desire 
to  be  on  friendly  terms  with  them. 

The  history  of  the  expedition  shows  how  perfectly 
Perry  carried  out  these  instructions. 
/  The  appointment  of  a  naval  diplomat  was  due  to  the 
fact  that  much  depended  upon  the  wise  use  of  the 
naval  force  to  be  sent  to  Japan.  Perry  was  appointed 
to  the  command  of  the  East  India  squadron,  then 
consisting  of  three  ships  of  war  and  two  store  ships, 
which  was  to  be  reinforced  by  eight  additional 
vessels.15  During  the  nine  months  which  elapsed 
before  any  of  the  new  vessels  were  ready  for  sea,  he 
spent  as  much  time  as  possible  in  working  out  all  the 
details  connected  with  the  expedition,  and  in  gathering 
books,  charts,  presents,  and  all  manner  of  informa 
tion.  To  this  thorough  preparation  the  success  of  the 
expedition  was  in  large  part  due. 

On   November  24,   1852,   Perry   sailed   from   Nor 
folk,  Virginia,  in  the  steam  frigate  Mississippi.     His 

15  Only  one  of  the  additional  ships  arrived  in  time  for  the 
first  visit  to  Japan.    Two  did  not  arrive  at  all. 


COMMODORE   PERRY  15 

course  lay  via  Madeira,  St.  Helena,  Cape  Town, 
Mauritius,  Point  de  Galle,  Singapore,  Macao,  Hong 
kong,  to  Shanghai.  There  his  squadron  of  six  vessels 
was  assembled.  He  then  visited  the  Ryukyu  (Loo- 
Choo)  Islands,  owing  dependence  to  both  Japan  and 
China,  and  also  the  Bonin  Islands,  both  of  which  places 
he  considered  suitable  for  rendezvous  and  coaling  sta 
tions.  Finally,  on  the  8th  of  July,  1853,  with  only 
four  ships  of  war,  he  entered  the  Bay  of  Yedo  and 
anchored  off  the  town  of  Uraga. 

The  Japanese  were  not  unprepared  for  his  arrival, 
for  in  1844  the  king  of  Holland,  William  II,  had  ad 
dressed  a  letter  to  the  Shogun  warning  him  of  the 
impossibility  of  longer  maintaining  the  seclusion  pol 
icy  and  urging  him  to  open  friendly  commercial  rela 
tions  with  the  powers,  and  the  Shogun  had  replied  that 
Japan  would  not  alter  her  ancient  laws.16  Again,  in 
1852,  when  the  news  of  the  proposed  American  ex 
pedition  reached  the  Netherlands,  another  effort  was 
made,  and  a  draft  of  a  commercial  treaty  was  pre 
sented  for  Japanese  consideration.17  There  is  reason 
to  believe  that  the  Dutch  may  have  stressed  the  war 
like  nature  of  Perry's  enterprise.18 

16  D.  C.  Greene,  "  Correspondence  between  William  II  of 
Holland  and  the  Shogun  of  Japan,  A.D.  1844,"  in  Trans.  As. 
Soc.  Japan,  vol.  34,  part  IV. 

"  Hawks,  I,  65. 

18 "  The  American  expedition  has  not  always  been  repre 
sented  to  be  of  a  wholly  friendly  and  peaceful  character " 


16  COMMODORE   PERRY 

On  his  first  visit  to  Japan,  Perry  remained  for  ten 
days.  He  succeeded  in  impressing  the  Japanese  with 
the  strength  of  his  squadron,  containing  the  largest 
naval  force  and  the  first  steamers  ever  seen  in  Jap 
anese  waters,  and  with  his  own  good-will.  He  re 
fused  to  go  to  Nagasaki  or  to  deal  through  the  Dutch ; 
he  refused  to  accept  presents  unless  some  were  re 
ceived  by  the  Japanese  in  exchange ;  and  he  insisted 
upon  treatment  suitable  to  his  position  as  the  repre 
sentative  of  a  great  power.  His  mixture  of  "  firm 
ness,  dignity,  and  fearlessness"  made  a  deep  impres 
sion  on  the  Japanese.19  He  succeeded,  therefore,  in 
having  the  President's  letter20  received,  "  in  opposition 
to  the  Japanese  law,"  by  two  of  the  high  officials  of 
the  Shogun's  court,  Toda  Idzu-no-Kami,  and  Ido 
Iwami-no-Kami ;  and  he  sailed  away,  promising  to 
return  in  the  spring  for  an  answer.  His  reasons  for 

(Governor  General  Van  Twist  of  the  Netherlands  Indies  to 
Perry,  September  22,  1852,  in  33d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc. 
No.  34,  pp.  20-21. 

19  Bayard  Taylor,  Visit  to  India,  China  and  Japan,  417. 

20  This  letter,  signed  by  President  Fillmore,  countersigned 
by  Edward  Everett,  secretary  of  state,  and  dated  November 
13,  1852,  was  a  longer  document  than  that  entrusted  to  Com 
modore  Aulick  in  1851  (32d  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No. 
59,  p.  82).     In  brief,  it  asked  for  "friendship,  commerce,  a 
supply  of  coal  and  provisions,  and  protection  for  our  ship 
wrecked  people."     It  requested  that  the  Emperor  appoint  a 
convenient  port  "  in  the  southern  part  of  the  Empire  "  where 
the  supplies  might  be  obtained.    In  the  earlier  letter  there  was 
no  reference  to  the  protection  of  shipwrecked  seamen. 


COMMODORE   PERRY  17 

leaving  were  not  only  because  of  his  wish  to  allow 
the  Japanese  time  to  consider  so  revolutionary  a  pro 
posal  as  the  amendment  of  their  exclusion  laws,  but 
also  because  of  the  lack  of  supplies  for  a  long  stay 
on  the  coast,  the  non-arrival  of  the  gifts  for  the 
Japanese,  and,  above  all,  the  desirability  of  appear 
ing  with  a  larger  force  when  the  final  negotiations 
should  take  place.21 

The  presence  of  the  American  squadron  had  occa 
sioned  consternation  in  the  Shogun's  government. 
Its  appearance  was  anticipated ;  its  hostile  aspect  had 
been  stressed.  It  was  the  duty  of  the  Shogunate  to 
deal  wisely  with  this  crisis.  The  well-known  laws  of 
the  land  decreed  that  the  squadron  should  have  been 
ordered  away;  if  it  would  not  go,  the  armed  forces  of 
the  Shogunate  and  the  daimyos  should  compel  it  to 
retire.  But  among  the  Shogunate  officials  were  men 
who  were  more  or  less  informed  concerning  world 
movements,  and  who  knew  that  it  would  be  foolhardy 
to  precipitate  hostilities  with  a  power  represented  by 
four  of  the  greatest  vessels  ever  seen  in  Japanese 
waters.  It  was  their  knowledge  which  saved  the 
situation,  for  the  great  bulk  of  the  daimyos  and  their 
samurai  retainers  favored  the  immediate  expulsion  of 
the  foreigners.  And  yet  it  was  the  weakness  of  these 
same  officials  which  complicated  matters.  Without 
question  the  Yedo  government  should  have  dealt  with 

21 33^  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  34,  pp.  32,  53-54. 


1 8  COMMODORE   PERRY 

this  situation  on  its  own  responsibility.  But  Lord 
Abe,  president  of  the  Roju,  or  Cabinet,  was  unwilling 
for  the  Shogunate  to  act  alone.  The  weakening  of 
the  Tokugawa  administration  during  the  past  fifty 
years  had  sapped  the  initiative  and  the  fearlessness  of 
the  Cabinet.  An  unprecedented  step  was  taken  when 
the  President's  letter  was  transmitted  to  the  Mikado 
and  the  daimyos  for  their  consideration,  and  later 
^when  a  conference  of  daimyos  was  convened.22 

This  action  was  the  beginning  of  the  process  which 
eventually  undermined  the  Shogun's  power.  Almost 
to  a  man  the  daimyos  favored  the  maintenance  of  the 
exclusion  laws,23  and  the  imperial  court  instructed 
the  Shogun  to  drive  away  the  Americans.24  From 
the  beginning  the  opposition  was  led  by  the  senior 
prince  of  Mito,  member  of  one  of  the  Three  Fami 
lies  (Sanke)25  and  one  of  the  strongest  and  ablest 
daimyos  in  the  land.  Only  a  few  of  the  lords  favored 
a  policy  of  conciliation  and  intercourse,  and  among 
these  were  the  lords  of  Obama,  Tsuyama,  Uwajima, 
Fukuoka,  Nakatsu,  and  li  Naosuke,  Lord  of  Hikone.26 
One  clause  in  the  President's  letter  strengthened  their 
arguments:  "If  your  imperial  majesty  is  not  satis- 

22  J.  H.  Gubbins,  Progress  of  Japan,  91. 

23  H.  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  26. 

24  Gubbins,  Progress  of  Japan,  92. 

25  The  houses  of  Mito,  Owari,  and  Kii,  from  which  a  Shogun 
was  chosen  in  case  of  failure  of  issue  in  the  direct  line. 

26  Satoh,  27. 


COMMODORE   PERRY  19 

fied  that  it  would  be  safe  altogether  to  abrogate  the 
ancient  laws  which  forbid  foreign  trade,  they  might  be 
suspended  for  five  or  ten  years,  so  as  to  try  the  experi 
ment.  If  it  does  not  prove  as  beneficial  as  was  hoped, 
the  ancient  laws  can  be  restored.  The  United  States 
often  limit  their  treaties  with  foreign  States  to  a  few 
years,  and  then  renew  them  or  not,  as  they  please."27 
This  statement  of  the  President  was  remembered  by 
the  Yedo  officials  in  the  troubled  days  which  followed, 
li,  Hotta,  and  others  thought  that  if  the  experiment 
did  not  succeed,  at  the  end  of  a  few  years  Japan 
would  have  become  strong  enough  to  close  the  doors 
again.28  In  the  meantime,  although  the  Shogunate 
realized  that  a  war  could  not  be  successfully  main 
tained,  defensive  measures  were  taken.29 

27  Hawks,  I,  257. 

28  Satoh,  29;  Gubbins,  Progress  of  Japan,  287. 

29  "  Under  the  guidance  of  Abe  Masahiro,  one  of  the  ablest 
statesmen  that  Yedo  ever  possessed,  batteries  were  built  at 
Shinagawa  to  guard  the  approaches  to  Yedo ;  defensive  prepa 
rations  were  made  along  the  coasts  of  Musashi,  Sagami,  Awa, 
and  Kazusa ;  the  veto  against  the  construction  of  ocean-going 
ships  was  rescinded,  and  the  feudatories  were  invited  to  build 
and  arm  large  vessels ;  a  commission  was  given  to  the  Dutch 
at  Deshima  to  procure  from  Europe  a  library  of  useful  books ; 
cannon  were  cast;  troops  were  drilled,  and  everyone  who  had 
acquired  expert  knowledge  through  the  medium  of  the  Dutch 
was  taken  into  official  favour.     But  all  these  efforts  tended 
only  to  expose  their  own  feebleness,  and  on  the  2nd  of  Novem 
ber,  1853,  instructions  were  issued  that  if  the  Americans  re 
turned,  they  were  to  be  dealt  with  peacefully  "  (Brinkley,  666). 


2O  COMMODORE   PERRY 

After  leaving  Japan,  Perry  visited  Ryukyu,  and 
then  made  his  way  to  Hongkong  and  to  Macao, 
which  was  his  headquarters  during  the  winter.  The 
great  Taiping  rebellion  was  raging  in  China,  and  it 
was  felt  by  the  American  merchants  there,  and  espe 
cially  by  the  American  commissioner,  Humphrey  Mar 
shall,  that  Perry  should  have  used  his  squadron  for 
the  protection  of  established  American  interests  in 
China  rather  than  for  the  opening  of  relations  of 
doubtful  value  with  Japan.30  But  in  this  case  Perry 
was  right,  for  during  the  absence  of  the  squadron  in 
both  1853  and  1854  American  interests  did  not  suffer 
during  the  civil  commotion  in  China. 

The  argument  of  the  President  and  of  Perry,  that 
Japan  should  open  her  doors  to  trade  because  of  the 
changed  state  of  the  world,  was  strengthened  by  the 
visits  to  Nagasaki  of  a  Russian  squadron  under  Ad 
miral  Poutiatine,  in  August,  1853,  and  again  early  in 
i854.31  In  November,  1853,  Poutiatine  had  suggested 
"  mutual  co-operation "  to  Perry,  which  the  latter 
courteously  declined.32  It  was  the  belief  that  both  the 
French  and  Russian  squadrons  were  about  to  visit 
Japan  and  seek  treaties  that  caused  Perry  to  hasten 
his  return,33  and  on  January  14,  1854,  he  sailed  again 
from  Hongkong  for  Japan. 

30  Correspondence,  in  33d  Cong.,  1st  sess.,  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No. 
123,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  34. 

31  Hawks,  I,  62,  63, 

32  33d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  34,  pp.  80-82. 

33  Hawks,  I,  303. 


COMMODORE   PERRY  21 

Once  more  the  squadron  rendezvoused  at  Ryukyu. 
There  Perry  received  a  letter  from  Duymaer  Van  Twist, 
governor-general  of  Netherlands  India,  advising  him  of 
the  death  of  the  Emperor  fShogun)  of  Japan  shortly 
after  he  had  left  Uraga,  and  transmitting  the  request 
of  the  Japanese  authorities  that  Perry  postpone  his 
promised  visit  because  of  the  impossibility  of  trans 
acting  any  important  business  during  the  period  of 
mourning.34  This  news  did  not  alter  the  commodore's 
plans.  On  the  I3th  of  February  the  American  squad 
ron  anchored  off  Gorihama  in  the  Bay  of  Yedo.  Al 
though  two  of  the  promised  vessels  had  not  been  sent 
out  from  home,  Perry  was  able  to  muster  a  re 
spectable  force  of  seven,  and  later  nine,  ships,  three 
of  them  being  steamships,  although  three  of  the  sail 
ing  craft  were  only  store  ships.35  The  enlarged  force 
caused  the  Japanese  at  first  to  question  his  peaceful 
intentions. 

The  first  difficulty  arose  over  the  place  where  the 
conference  concerning  the  President's  letter  should  be 

84  Ibid.,  I,  p.  322. 

85  The  squadron  consisted  of  the  steamships  Susquehanna, 
Mississippi,  and  Powhatan,  the  sloops  of  war  Vandalia,  Mace 
donian,  and  Saratoga,  and  the  armed  store  ships  Southamp 
ton,  Lexington,  and  Supply.     The  Southampton  arrived  on 
February  10,  the  Susquehanna,  Mississippi,  Powhatan,  Van 
dalia,  Macedonian,  and  Lexington  on  February  13,  the  Sara 
toga  on  March  4,  and  the  Supply  on  March  19.    The  Susque 
hanna  left  for  China  on  March  24,  one  week  before  the  treaty 
was  signed. 


22  COMMODORE   PERRY 

held.  The  Japanese  insisted  upon  either  Uraga  or 
Kamakura.  Perry  objected  to  both  places  because 
of  the  unfavorable  harbors,  and  declared  that  Yedo, 
the  capital,  was  the  proper  place.  Finally  both  sides 
yielded,  and  the  village  of  Yokohama  was  agreed  upon. 
Then  came  the  conferences,  formal  and  informal, 
over  the  terms  of  the  proposed  treaty.  Three  times 
Perry  landed,  with  all  formality,  to  discuss  the  matter 
with  the  imperial  commissioners.  Perry  offered  as  a 
basis  for  discussion  the  American  treaty  with  China 
of  1844,  but  the  Japanese  replied  that  they  certainly 
were  not  ready  for  the  opening  of  such  a  trade.  The 
commissioners  then  presented  a  series  of  propositions, 
based  on  Perry's  letters.  These  became  the  real  basis 
of  the  treaty.30  The  negotiations  were  carried  on 
with  the  utmost  friendliness.37  During  their  progress 
gifts  were  exchanged,  those  from  the  United  States 
including  two  telegraph  instruments,  a  miniature  loco 
motive,  tender,  cars,  and  rails,  a  number  of  books, 
various  weapons,  quantities  of  spirits,  and  many  ob- 

36  There  is  no  evidence  that  the  Japanese  made  use  of  the 
draft  treaty  submitted   by  the   Dutch   in    1852.     Commodore 
Perry  had  not  seen  the  text,  although  Dr.  Nitobe  believes  that 
Perry  "  availed  himself  of  this  draft,"  and  "  finds  but  little  in 
Perry's  treaty  that  is  original"  (Nitobe,  Intercourse  between 
the  United  States  and  Japan,  56-57).    Williams,  Journal  of 
the  Perry  Expedition,  viii;  Hawks,  I,  66. 

37  Hawks,  I,  367- 


COMMODORE   PERRY  23 

jects  of  unusual  interest  to  the  Japanese.38  A  state 
dinner  was  held  on  the  flagship  at  which  the  Japanese 
showed  their  appreciation  of  the  champagne  and  other 
wines. ..and  spirits.  It  must  have  been  a  rare  sight 
when  "the  jovial  Matsusaki  threw  his  arms  about 
the  Commodore's  neck,  crushing,  in  his  tipsy  embrace, 
a  pair  of  brand  new  epaulettes,  and  repeating,  in  Jap 
anese,  with  maudlin  affection,  these  words,  as  inter 
preted  into  English :  '  Nippon  and  America,  all  the 
same  heart/"39  On  the  3ist  of  March  a  treaty  of 
peace  and  amity  was  signed,  the  text  being  in  English 
and  Japanese,  with  translations  in  Dutch  and  Chinese. 
This  epoch-making  treaty  consisted  of  twelve  ar 
ticles.40  The  first  article  established  a  "perfect,  per 
manent,  and  universal  peace,  and  a  sincere  and  cordial 
amity  "  between  the  United  States  and  Japan.  The 
second  provided  for  the  opening  of  the  ports  of 
Shimoda  at  once,  and  Hakodate  a  year  later,  for  sup 
plies.  The  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  articles  assured 
good  treatment  for  shipwrecked  Americans  in  Japan 
and  freedom  from  the  restrictions  and  the  confinement 

38  A  complete  list  in  Williams,  Journal  of  the  Perry  Expe 
dition,  131-134-    The  illustrations  in  Kendall,  War  in  Mexico, 
and  Ripley,  History  of  the  Mexican  War,  were  said  to  have 
made  a  profound  impression  on  Lord  Abe  and  the  Roju  (Japan 
Weekly  Mail,  August  I,  1914). 

39  Hawks,  I,  376. 

40  In  this  and  the  other  early  treaties  the  Shogun  is  spoken 
of  as  the  Taikun.    For  the  Japanese  explanation  of  this  term, 
see  Hawks,  II,  207-208. 


24  COMMODORE   PERRY 

suffered  by  the  Dutch  and  the  Chinese  at  Nagasaki. 
The  sixth  article  called  for  careful  deliberation  be 
tween  the  parties  in  case  any  other  goods  were  wanted 
or  any  business  had  to  be  arranged.41  The  seventh 
permitted  trade  under  temporary  Japanese  regula 
tions.  The  eighth  required  the  agency  of  Japanese 
officers  when  supplies  were  required.  '  The  ninth  was 
the  "  most  favored  nation  "  clause.42  The  tenth  lim 
ited  the  visits  of  American  ships  to  Shimoda  and 
Hakodate  except  in  distress  or  when  forced  by  bad 
weather.  The  eleventh  permitted  the  appointment  by 
the  United  States  of  consuls  or  agents  at  Shimoda 
after  eighteen  months,  provided  either  of  the  two 
governments  deemed  such  arrangement  necessary.43 
The  twelfth  dealt  with  the  approval  and  the  exchange 
of  ratifications.44 

Such  were  the  terms  of  Japan's  first  modern  treaty ; 

41  This  was  inserted  by  Perry  to  pave  the  way  for  a  later 
commercial  treaty. 

42  Dr.  S.  Wells  Williams,  the  first  interpreter,  is  given  credit 
for  the  inclusion  of  the  "  most  favored  nation  clause "  and 
the  absence  of  an  extraterritorial  provision  (Williams,  Journal 
of  the  Perry  Expedition,  vii).     W.  E.  Griffis,  Life  of  Town- 
send  Harris,  258  n.     Griffis,  Perry,  366  n.,  cites  letter  of  Wil 
liams,  February  8,  1883,  as  to  "  most  favored  nation  clause." 

43  The  Japanese  agreed  to  this  as  a  means  of  controlling 
American  citizens  in  Japan. 

44  Additional  regulations  were  signed  at  Shimoda,  June  17, 
1854.    Article  I  stated  that  any  Americans  "  who  are  found 
transgressing  Japanese  laws  may  be  apprehended  by  the  police 
and  taken  on  board  their  ships." 


COMMODORE   PERRY  25 

such  was  the  first  breach  in  her  walls  of  exclusion. 
In  comparison  with  the  ordinary  intercourse  between 
western  powers  the  treaty  secured  very  little,  and  as 
such  was  a  source  of  disappointment  in  certain  quar 
ters.  But  when  viewed  in  the  light  of  Japanese  his 
tory  for  two  hundred  years  it  was  a  real  achievement. 
Century-old  laws  had  been  set  aside.  Ports  were 
opened  for  American  shipping.  Shipwrecked  mari 
ners  were  no  longer  to  be  treated  as  criminals,  and 
the  beginnings  of  commerce  were  to  be  tolerated. 
Commodore  Perry  had  carried  out  his  instructions 
well.  Without  the  use  of  force  he  had  secured  all 
that  could  have  been  hoped  for,  and  far  more  than 
many  dared  expect. 

This  study  would  be  incomplete  if  some  effort  were 
not  made  to  discover  the  reasons  for  Perry's  success. 
They  lie  deeper  than  the  surface.  Much  credit  is 
certainly  due  to  the  commodore  himself.  As  Dr. 
Paullin  has  so  excellently  said :  "  Perry's  success  was 
in  no  small  measure  the  result  of  a  rare  combination 
of  strong  qualities  of  character — firmness,  sagacity, 
tact,  dignity,  patience,  and  determination."45  It  is 
easy  to  imagine  how  such  an  enterprise  might  have 
turned  out  if  its  commander  had  not  possessed  some 
or  all  of  these  qualities.  The  story  of  the  contact 
between  western  and  eastern  peoples  is  not  always 
such  pleasant  reading  as  is  the  narrative  of  Perry's 
voyage. 

45  Paullin,  281. 


26  COMMODORE   PERRY 

Much  importance  has  been  placed  upon  the  impos 
ing  armament  which  supported  Perry's  demands,  and 
a  false  interpretation  has  been  given  to  it.  Typical 
of  this  attitude  is  Douglas's  statement :  "  At  Yedo  the 
consternation  was  not  less  than  at  Uraga ;  and  it  was 
further  accentuated  by  the  announcement  that,  if 
Commodore  Perry's  request  met  with  a  refusal,  he 
should  open  hostilities."46  But  Perry  had  no  such 
instructions  or  intentions.  His  instructions  stressed 
the  point  that  he  was  engaged  in  a  pacific  mission,  and 
that  he  was  to  resort  to  force  only  in  self-defence. 
He  was  to  secure  concessions  by  argument  and  per 
suasion;  but  if  no  assurance  was  given  for  the  good 
treatment  of  our  seamen,  he  was  to  state  that 
for  future  acts  of  cruelty  the  Japanese  would  be 
severely  chastised.  When,  on  the  way  to  the  East, 
Perry  outlined  a  plan  for  seizing  one  of  the  Ryukyu 
Islands  as  a  port  of  refuge,  he  was  again  instructed 
that  he  must  not  use  force,  except  for  defence  and 
self-preservation.47  On  the  way  to  Japan  the  men 
were  thoroughly  drilled  and  the  ships  kept  in  perfect 
readiness,  and  as  they  entered  the  bay  "the  decks 
were  cleared  for  action,  the  guns  placed  in  position 
and  shotted,  the  ammunition  arranged,  the  small  arms 
made  ready,  sentinels  and  men  at  their  posts,  and,  in 
short,  all  the  preparations  made,  usual  before  meet- 

*6  Europe  and  the  Far  East,  153. 

*7  33d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  34,  pp.  12-14. 


COMMODORE   PERRY  27 

ing  an  enemy."48  But  these  were  measures  for 
defence,  and  were  based  upon  the  hostile  reception 
•of  the  Morrison  in  1837  and  the  character  of  the  ex 
clusion  laws.  During  the  negotiations  no  threat  of 
opening  hostilities  was  made.  At  most,  Perry  in 
formed  the  Japanese  that  he  would  land  and  deliver 
the  President's  letter  if  it  was  not  properly  received, 
would  consider  his  country  insulted  if  the  letter  was 
not  received  and  duly  replied  to,  and  would  not  hold 
himself  accountable  for  the  consequences.  Perry  also 
let  the  Japanese  know  that  he  would  return  with  a 
larger  squadron  in  the  spring.49 

In  his  despatch  to  the  secretary  of  the  navy  of 
August  3,  1853,  Perry  mentioned  the  fortifications 
which  had  been  erected,  probably  in  order  to  expel 
the  Americans  from  Japan,  but  stated  that  with  his 
augmented  force  he  could  penetrate  to  within  three 
or  four  miles  of  Yedo.  In  reply  to  this  the  Presi 
dent  warned  him  "  that  the  great  .end  should  be  at 
tained,  not  only  with  credit  to  the  United  States,  but 
without  wrong  to  Japan ; "  and  the  secretary  of  the 
navy  reminded  him  that  his  mission  was  of  a  peaceful 
character,  "  and  that,  although  in  consideration  of 
the  peculiar  character  of  the  Japanese  much  impor 
tance  may  well  be  attached  to  the  exhibition  of  im 
pressive  evidences  of  the  greatness  and  power  of  our 

48  Hawks,  I,  231. 

49  33d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  34,  pp.  47-49. 


28  COMMODORE   PERRY 

country,  no  violence  should  be  resorted  to  except  for 
defence."50 

On  his  return  voyage  to  Japan,  Perry  outlined,  while 
at  Ryukyu,  his  course  of  action.51  He  again  decided 
to  take  the  island  of  "  Great  Lew-Chew "  under  the 
"  surveillance  of  the  American  flag "  should  the  Jap 
anese  refuse  to  assign  a  port  of  resort  for  our  mer 
chant  and  whaling  ships.  His  former  visit  had  con 
vinced  him  that  this  could  be  done  without  bloodshed, 
nor  would  he  use  force  save  in  self-defence.  Happily 
the  successful  outcome  of  the  treaty  negotiations  re 
lieved  Perry  from  taking  this  step,  for  his  conduct 
would  certainly  have  been  disavowed,  as  the  Presi 
dent  replied  that  he  would  not  act  without  the  author 
ity  of  Congress.52 

During  the  second  visit  of  the  expedition  there  was 
one  episode  which  contained  a  suggestion  of  the  use 
of  force  at  some  future  time.  After  receiving,  on 
March  8,  the  reply  to  the  President's  letter  which 
granted  the  requests  for  the  kind  treatment  of  sea 
men,  the  furnishing  of  provisions,  supplies,  and  coal, 
and  the  opening  of  Nagasaki  (which  was  a  port  "in 
the  southern  part  of  the  Empire"),  Perry  believed 
that  "  something  still  more  advantageous  might  be 
gained,"  and  considered  it  good  policy  "to  hold  out 

50  33d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  34,  p.  57. 

61  Ibid.,  p.v  109. 

62  Ibid.,  pp.  112-113. 


COMMODORE    PERRY  29 

for  a  specific  treaty,"53  as  he  had  been  instructed.54 
He  therefore  replied  that,  "though  the  propositions 
set  forth  in  the  communication  of  your  highness  fur 
nish  strong  evidence  of  the  enlightened  spirit  with 
which  the  Imperial  commissioners  are  disposed  to 
meet  the  suggestions  which  I  have  had  the  honor  to 
submit,  they  fall  far  short  of  my  anticipations,  and  I 
do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  they  would  not  satisfy  the 
views  of  the  President."  His  instructions,  he  said, 
required  him  to  look  "  for  an  intercourse  of  a  more 
enlarged  and  liberal  character,"  and  he  urged  the 
necessity  of  opening  as  many  ports  as  were  open  in 
China  (five)  free  from  any  restrictions  "not  recog 
nized  by  the  usages  of  free  and  independent  nations." 
He  urged,  furthermore,  the  need  of  a  written  com 
pact  "that  will  be  binding  as  well  upon  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States  as  the  subjects  of  Japan;"  and 
he  expressed  the  sincere  desire  of  his  heart  to  bring 
these  negotiations  to  an  amicable  and  satisfactory  ter 
mination,  "as  well  to  save  time  as  to  prevent  the 
necessity  of  sending  from  America  more  ships  and 
men,  and  possibly  with  instructions  of  more  stringent 
import."55 

This  was  a  threat,  and  as  such  it  aroused  the  indig 
nation  of  Dr.  S.  Wells  Williams,  the  missionary-in- 

63  33d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  34,  p.  127. 

5*  Ibid.,  p.  8. 

65  33d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Ex,  Doc.  No.  34  pp.  138-139. 


3O  COMMODORE   PERRY 

terpreter,  who  had  to  translate  the  letter.66  But  it 
referred  to  possible  future  action,  over  which  the 
commodore  could  have  no  control;  and  so  well  had 
he  estimated  the  situation  that  the  negotiation  of  a 
treaty  was  soon  in  process,  without  further  reference 
to  additional  ships  and  men.  The  five  ports  were  re 
duced  to  two,  but  the  matter  of  unrestricted  trade  was 
postponed  for  an  indefinite  period. 

These  facts  have  been  narrated  to  show  that  the 
American  government  had  no  hostile  intention  in  fur 
nishing  Perry  with  a  respectable  naval  force,  that 
the  commodore  was  repeatedly  reminded  that  his  mis 
sion  was  one  of  peace  and  that  force  was  to  be  used 
only  in  self-defence,  and  that  he  neither  threatened 
the  Japanese  nor  considered  using  force  against  them. 
On  this  point  we  have  the  testimony  of  the  outspoken 
critic,  Dr.  S.  Wells  Williams :  "  The  appointment  of 
a  naval  man  as  the  envoy  was  wise,  as  it  secured  unity 
of  purpose  in  the  diplomatic  and  executive  chief, 
and  probably  Perry  is  the  only  man  in  our  navy  ca 
pable  of  holding  both  positions,  which  has  been  proved 
by  the  general  prudence  and  decision  of  his  proceed 
ings  since  he  anchored  at  Uraga  last  July."57  It  was 

56  Williams,  Journal  of  the  Perry  Expedition,  129.     But  he 
soon  realized  that  Perry  was  right  in  trying  to  secure  a  treaty. 

57  Williams,  Journal  of  the  Perry  Expedition,  222.     "  The 
best  friend  the  Japanese  had  in  the  squadron  became  convinced 
that  they  would  suffer  no  evil  from  a  man  of  Perry's  prin 
ciples,  and  he  maintained  through  his  life  a  feeling  of  pro- 


COMMODORE   PERRY  3! 

the  evidence  of  force,  not  in  the  fleet  but  in  the  mod 
ern  nation  behind  the  fleet,  which  worked  upon  the 
minds  of  the  Japanese  observers.58 

But  back  of  the  commodore  and  his  "  black  ships  " 
there  lay  other  causes  which  entered  into  the  sum  total 
of  achievement.  Prominent  among  these  must  be 
reckoned  the  presence  of  the  Dutch  at  Nagasaki. 
For  two  hundred  years,  while  the  great  gates  of  Japan 
were  closed,  they  held  open  a  wicket  through  which 
some  knowledge  of  the  western  world  entered,  and 
out  of  which  passed  most  of  the  information  con 
cerning  Japan  which  the  West  obtained.  It  was  the 
Dutch  who  called  to  the  attention  of  the  Japanese  the 
changes  which  were  going  on  in  the  world  at  large : 
the  use  of  steam  in  navigation,  with  its  shortening  of 
trade  routes  and  its  indifference  to  the  formerly  all- 
important  monsoons;  the  increase  in  world  commerce 
with  China,  and  the  insistence  of  Britain  that  her 
merchants  be  decently  treated  and  that  national  inter 
course  be  on  terms  of  equality;  and  finally  the  news 
that  a  single  western  power  had  opened  hostilities 
with  the  Middle  Kingdom  and  in  a  brief  campaign 

found  gratitude  that  such  a  man  had  been  providentially  de 
signed  to  perform  this  difficult  mission.  If  he  was  one  who 
admitted  none  to  his  councils,  he  at  least  needed  no  prompting 
to  be  just"  (F.  W.  Williams,  editor,  in  Williams,  Journal  of 
the  Perry  Expedition,  v). 

58  Biddle  in  1846  had  two  imposing  ships,  Perry  in  1853  had 
but  four. 


32  COMMODORE   PERRY 

humbled  the  old  giant  of  the  East.59  These  were 
tidings  of  immense  import,  and  there  were  some  Jap 
anese  who  were  able  to  appreciate  their  significance. 

The  letter  of  William  II  to  the  Shogun  in  1844, 
and  the  draft  treaty  submitted  in  1852  by  Mr.  Cur- 
tius,  a  special  agent  from  Java,  indicate  the  interest 
taken  by  Holland  in  opening  Japan  to  general  inter 
course  on  better  terms  than  she  herself  enjoyed. 
After  Perry's  successful  mission  the  Dutch  minister 
of  the  colonies  issued  an  official  report60  pointing  out 
"  the  persevering  and  disinterested  efforts "  which 
the  Dutch  government  had  made  to  cause  Japan  to 
mitigate  her  system  of  exclusion.  No  one  would 
deny  the  influence  exerted  by  the  Dutch ;  and  yet  the 
fact  remains  that  it  was  not  Holland,  with  her  cen 
turies  of  intercourse,  which  succeeded  in  breaking 
down  the  barriers,  but  the  United  States.  And  it 
may  at  least  be  doubted  whether  the  Dutch,  with 
their  long  record  of  subserviency,  could  have  secured 
so  great  a  change  in  the  Japanese  system  as  Perry, 
insisting  upon  the  rights  and  the  dignity  of  his  na 
tion,  was  able  to  obtain. 

Another  European  factor  to  be  considered  is  Rus- 

59  While  Perry's  squadron  was  at  Shimoda  in  1854  some  of 
the  officers  saw  a  Japanese  book  describing  the  Anglo-Chinese 
war  of  1839-42  (Williams,  Journal  of  the  Perry  Expedition, 
182). 

eo  Hawks,  I,  64-69. 


COMMODORE    PERRY  33 

sia.61  '  It  was  the  Russian  advance  which  really 
alarmed  the  Japanese  in  the  nineteenth  century.  By 
1713,  Russian  explorers  had  passed  down  the  Kurile 
Islands  from  Kamchatka  almost  to  Hokkaido.  In 
1739  and  1768  Russian  vessels  reached  Awa  Province, 
not  far  from  Yedo,  and  in  1778  they  visited  Hok 
kaido.62  The  Japanese  now  took  alarm,  and  on  in 
vestigation  found  that  Kamchatka  and  some  of  the 
Kurile  Islands,  hitherto  claimed  by  Japan,  had  been 
occupied  by  the  Russians.  This  discovery  led  to  the 
publication  of  a  remarkable  book  on  coast  defence 
(Kai-koku  Hei-dan)  by  Hayasahi  Shibei,  who  had 
associated  with  the  Dutch  at  Deshima,  in  which  he  ad 
vocated  the  building  of  ocean-going  vessels  and  the 
fortifying  and  strengthening  of  the  defences  of  Yedo 
Bay.  He  was  imprisoned  for  his  audacity ;  but  when 
Lieutenant  Laxman  arrived  at  Hakodate  in  1792,  os 
tensibly  to  return  some  shipwrecked  Japanese  sea 
men  but  really  to  seek  the  opening  of  trade  between 
Japan  and  Russia,  his  foresight  was  recognized.  Just 
at  this  time  commissioners  from  Yedo  were  investi 
gating  the  situation  in  the  North.  Their  report  and 
the  visit  of  the  Russians  caused  steps  to  be  taken  for 
the  establishment  of  Japanese  control  over  Hokkaido. 
The  western  half  was  entrusted  to  the  Daimyo  of 

81  Renewed  interest  in  early  Russo-Japanese  relations  is 
indicated  in  an  interview  with  Count  Okuma  in  Shin-Nippon, 
August,  1916. 

62  Brinkley,  658. 


34  COMMODORE   PERRY 

Matsumae,  and  the  eastern  half  was  taken  under  the 
direct  control  of  the  Shogunate.63  Furthermore  the 
coast  daimyos  were  to  reestablish  the  forces  for  the 
defence  of  the  seacoast.64 

In  1804  came  the  formal  but  unsuccessful  attempt 
of  ResanofF,  sent  to  Nagasaki  as  a  special  ambassa 
dor.  This  was  followed  by  the  raid  on  Saghalien  and 
some  of  the  Kurile  Islands  by  the  Russians  in  i8o6.65 
Annually,  between  1811  and  1814,  Russian  ships  vis 
ited  the  northern  islands,  the  first  being  the  ship  of 
Captain  Golownin,  who  was  taken  prisoner.  Efforts 
were  also  being  made  in  each  country  to  learn  about 
the  other.  Catherine  II  established  a  Japanese  pro 
fessorship  at  Irkutsk,  and  there,  in  1805  and  1806, 
Klaproth,  the  Orientalist,  studied  under  a  Japanese 
professor  who  had  embraced  the  Greek  religion.66 
In  Japan,  scholars  translated  some  Russian  works. 
'  The  Japanese,  therefore,  knew  something  of  the 
Russians,  and  were  alarmed  at  their  advance,  so  that 
the  appearance  of  Admiral  Poutiatine  at  Nagasaki, 
on  August  22,  1853,  w^h  a  squadron  of  four  vessels, 
must  have  lent  weight  to  the  President's  letter  deliv 
ered  by  Perry  the  month  before.  Yet  the  Russians 
were  unable  to  secure  the  treaty  they  desired.  They 

"  Ibid. 

64  S.  Akimoto,  Lord  li  Naosuke  and  New  Japan,  92. 

65  W.  G.  Aston,  "  Russian  Descents  in  Saghalien  and  Itorup 
in  the  years  1806-1807,"  in  Trans.  As.  Soc.  Japan,  vol.  I. 

66  R.  Hildreth,  Japan  as  it  Was  and  Is,  II,  199. 


COMMODORE   PERRY  35 

sailed  away  and  returned  to  Japan  the  next  spring  be 
fore  Perry  arrived,  but  were  again  unsuccessful. 
Commander  Adams,  who  was  present  at  Shimoda  in 
1855,  when  Admiral  Poutiatine  finally  negotiated  a 
treaty,  records  that  the  Japanese  "appeared  to  enter 
tain  no  good  will  toward  the  Russians."67  The  lat 
ter,  however,  served  to  stimulate  thought  among  the 
Japanese  concerning  coast  defence  and  maritime  in 
tercourse,  and  must  have  contributed  to  the  state  of 
mind  which  brought  success  to  Perry. 

Finally,  credit  is  certainly  due  to  those  Japanese 
who,  in  spite  of  the  oppressive  laws  of  the  time, 
sought  to  obtain  all  available  information  concern 
ing  the  West.  Such  were  Watanabe  and  Takano, 
who  in  1838  advocated  foreign  intercourse,  only  to 
be  arrested  and  punished.  Finally  both  committed 
suicide.68  Others  were  the  early  students  of  Dutch 
medicine,  whose  reading  led  them  to  a  knowledge  of 
other  western  subjects;69  and  there  were  some  who 

67  Hawks,  I,  511. 

68  "  That  the  Restoration  should  have  been  combined  with 
the  opening  of  the  country  and  the  adoption  of  a  policy  of 
enlightened  progress  was  a  surprise  to  all.  .  .  .  No  inconsid 
erable  amount  of  credit,  however,  must  in  this  respect  be  given 
to  patriots  and  servants  like  Sihei  Hayashi,  Kwazan  Wata 
nabe,   Choei  Takano,   Shozan   Sakuma  and  others "    ( Prince 
Ito,  quoted  in  S.  Ballard,  "  Sketch  of  the  Life  of  Watanabe 
Noboru,"  in  Trans.  As.  Soc.  Japan,  vol.  32,  p.  i).     See  also  K. 
Mitsukuri,  "  The  Early  Study  of  Dutch  in  Japan,"  in  Trans. 
As.  Soc.  Japan,  vol.  5,  part  I,  pp.  207-216. 

69  See  Professor  Ukita  in  S.  Okuma,  Fifty  Years  of  New 
Japan,  II,  134-160. 


36  COMMODORE   PERRY 

strove  to  master  the  history,  philosophy,  military  art, 
and  government  of  the  West.70  Some  of  these 
scholars  were  officials  in  the  various  fiefs,  and  were 
able  to  exert  a  liberal  influence  upon  their  lords. 
In  other  cases  the  daimyos  themselves  encouraged 
western  studies,  in  the  face  of  the  restrictive  laws  of 
the  time.  For  instance,  Lord  Hotta,  who  later  nego 
tiated  the  commercial  treaty  of  1858,  had  long  en 
couraged  the  study  of  western  science  and  foreign 
affairs  among  his  clansmen.71  In  1841  he  sent  two 
physicians  to  study  Dutch  medicine  at  Nagasaki,  and 
the  next  year  opened  a  medical  institution  at  his 
capital,  Sakura.  He  also  encouraged  the  study  of 
the  Dutch  language,  science,  and  military  art,  and  he 
revised  the  military  regulations  of  his  clan,  introduc 
ing  muskets  in  the  place  of  flint-locks,  and  creating 
cavalry  forces.  His  liberal  attitude  in  1858  was, 
therefore,  based  on  long  conviction.  As  Nagasaki 
was  an  imperial  city,  under  the  direct  rule  of  the 
Shogunate,  it  happened  that  Tokugawa  officials  who 
had  gained  some  knowledge  of  foreign  affairs  through 
their  intercourse  with  the  Dutch  were  frequently 
transferred  to  Yedo,  and  were  able  to  voice  their 
opinions  there.  It  was  but  natural  that  among  the 
officials  at  Yedo  there  should  be  a  better  understand- 

70  About  1740  the  importation  of  foreign  books  was  allowed 
except  those  relating  to  Christianity  (Brinkley,  614). 

71  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  21-24. 


COMMODORE   PERRY 


37 


ing  of  the  spirit  of  the  age  than  among  many  of  the 
daimyos  who  held  no  position  in  the  administration 
and  who  spent  only  half  their  time  in  the  capital.72 

With  these  facts  in  mind  it  becomes  evident  that 
there  were  favoring  agencies  at  work  which  Commo 
dore  Perry  little  understood.  And  yet  this  fact  should 
not  lead  us  to  underestimate  the  services  of  the  naval 
diplomat.  Captain  Brinkley  adopts  a  dubious  tone  in 
his  latest  work.  "  Much  has  been  said  about  Perry's 
judicious  display  of  force  and  about  his  sagacious 
tact  in  dealing  with  the  Japanese,  but  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  the  consequences  of  his  exploit  did 
not  invest  its  methods  with  extravagant  lustre."73 
But  after  due  credit  is  given  to  Holland  and  to  Rus 
sia  and  to  the  Japanese  pioneers  in  western  educa 
tion,  the  fact  remains  that  neither  Holland  nor  Russia 
was  able  to  secure  a  treaty  of  any  sort,  nor  were  the 
liberals  able  to  persuade  the  Shogunate  to  repeal  vol 
untarily  the  exclusion  laws.  The  treaty  was  won  by 
America  because,  at  a  time  when  many  elements  were 
favorable,  she  sent  out  a  special  mission,  well 
equipped,  and  led  by  a  man  well  qualified  for  the 
work  at  hand.  It  requires  little  imagination  to  con 
ceive  of  some  of  the  errors  in  judgment  which  might 

72  Dr.  Williams  remarked  on  the  courtesy,  decorum,  open- 
mindedness,  and  general  good  sense  of  the  officials  (Williams, 
Journal  of  the  Perry  Expedition,  226). 

"  Brinkley,  666. 


38  COMMODORE   PERRY 

have  brought  the  expedition  to  disaster.  That  lie  suc 
ceeded  where  others  had  failed,  and  that  he  left  be 
hind  a  reputation  for  courtesy  as  well  as  dignity,  and 
for  good-will  as  well  as  strength,  will  always  remain 
to  the  credit  of  Commodore  Matthew  Calbraith  Perry, 


CHAPTER   II 

TOWNSEND   HARRIS,   FIRST   CONSUL-GENERAL 

The  news  that  Commodore  Perry  had  succeeded  in 
concluding  a  treaty  with  Japan  was  received  with 
mingled  feelings  among  western  peoples.  Those  who 
realized  best  the  situation  in  Japan  appreciated  the  im 
portance  of  Perry's  work.  But  there  were  others  who 
believed  that  he  had  not  gone  far  enough,  and  that  a 
commercial  treaty  should  have  been  secured.  On  this 
point  the  commodore  had  no  illusions. 

O^didThe  treaty  with  Japan  professes  to  be  nothing  more  than  a 
compact,  establishing  between  the  United  States  and  that 
empire  certain  obligations  of  friendly  intercourse  with,  and 
mutual  protection  to,  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  the  contract 
ing  powers,  and  granting  to  American  citizens  rights  and  privi 
leges  never  before  extended  to  strangers.  /  This  treaty,  in  its 
concessions  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese,  far  exceeds  the  most 
sanguine  expectations,  even  of  those  who,  from  the  first,  ad 
vocated  the  policy  of  the  Japan  expedition.  It  purports  to  be 
a  preliminary,  and  surely  a  most  important  step,  in  advance  of 
a  commercial  arrangement  to  be  agreed  upon  when  the  Japa 
nese  government  may  be  better  prepared  by  a  more  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  usual  requirements  of  international  law  and 
comity  to  enter  upon  additional  pledges.1 

The  commodore  believed  that  the  reasons  advanced  by 
the   Japanese    for  postponing   open   commerce   were 

1  Hawks,  II,  185. 

39 


40  TOWNSEND   HARRIS 

good,  and  he  also  felt,  and  rightly  too,  that  if  the 
growth  of  liberal  views  were  not  destroyed  by  the 
conduct  of  merchants  who  sought  to  secure  advantages 
not  specified  by  the  treaty,  there  would  soon  come 
commercial  treaties  and  the  development  of  a  valuable 
trade.  From  every  point  of  view  it  was  desirable 
to  make  haste  'slowly  in  bringing  Japan  into  inter 
course  with  the  world  at  large. 

The  success  of  Perry  incited  the  powers  most  con 
cerned  to  renewed  efforts  to  secure  treaty  rights  in 
Japan.  'An  additional  stimulus  was  present  in  the 
breaking  out  of  the  Crimean  War  and  the  alliance  of 
England  and  France  with  Turkey  against  Russia  in 
March,  1854.  It  was  at  once  planned  to  carry  the 
war  into  the  East,2  and  an  allied  expedition  against 
the  Russian  naval  station  of  Petropavlovsk,  in  Kam 
chatka,  was  considered.8  This  plan  made  it  more  de 
sirable  than  ever  that  |he  ships  of  the  warring  powers 
might  take  refuge  and  find  supplies  in  Japanese  waters. 
The  Japanese,  however,  who  promptly  learned  of  the 
war,  were  anxious  to  avoid  aggression  by  either  party, 
so  that  when  Admiral  Sir  James  Stirling,  with  a 

2  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  North  American  posses 
sions  of  the  Russian  American  Company  and  the  Hudson's 
Bay  Company  were  protected  by  a  convention  of  neutrality 
(H.  H.  Bancroft,  History  of  Alaska,  57O-572). 

3  Petropavlovsk  was  unsuccessfully  attacked  in  August,  1854, 
and  was  abandoned  by  the  Russians  the  next  year,  before  the 
allied  squadron  arrived  in  June. 


TOWNSEND    HARRIS  4! 

squadron  of  four  vessels,  entered  Nagasaki  on  Sep 
tember  7,  1854,  he  had  little  difficulty  in  obtaining  a 
treaty.4  This  treaty  was  somewhat  less  liberal  than 
Perry's,  although  it  contained  a  "most  favored  na 
tion  "  clause  which  secured  for  the  British  all  that 
Perry  had  gained.  This  convention  of  October  14, 
1854,  opened  the  ports  of  Nagasaki  and  Hakodate  to 
British  ships  for  effecting  repairs  and  for  obtaining 
fresh  water,  provisions,  "  and  other  supplies  of  any 
sort  they  may  absolutely  want  for  the  use  of  the  ships." 
Ships  in  distress  might  enter  other  ports.  "  British 
ships  in  Japanese  ports  shall  conform  to  the  laws  of 
Japan.  If  high  officers  or  commanders  of  ships  shall 
break  any  such  laws,  it  will  lead  to  the  ports  being 
closed.  Should  inferior  persons  break  them,  they  are 
to  be  delivered  over  to  the  Commanders  of  their  ships 
for  punishment."  This  was  a  crude  sort  of  extra 
territoriality,  the  last  sentence  being  similar  to  a  por 
tion  of  Article  I  of  the  additional  regulations  to  the 
American  treaty.  In  the  "most  favored  nation" 
clause  an  exception  was  made  for  "the  advantages 
accruing  to  the  Dutch  and  Chinese  from  their  exist 
ing  relations  with  Japan."  The  last  clause  contained 
this  remarkable  statement:  "When  this  Convention 
shall  be  ratified,  no  high  officer  coming  to  Japan  shall 
alter  it."  Gubbins  thinks  that  "this  was  evidently 

4  Parliamentary  Papers,  1856,  Com.  61    (cited  as  P.P.)  ;  J. 
M.  Tronson,  Voyage  of  the  Barracouta. 


42  TOWNSEND    HARRIS 

intended  to  place  on  record  the  high-water  mark  of 
Japanese  concessions."5  The  brief  and  rather  in 
formal  nature  of  the  document  would  lead  one  to  be 
lieve  that  the  admiral  was  primarily  interested  in  the 
work  at  hand, — the  opening  of  ports  to  British  war 
ships,  and  that  he  was  willing  to  allow  the  question 
of  further  concessions  to  be  left  to  a  more  suitable 
time.  Thus  when  the  admiral  returned  the  next  year 
to  exchange  the  ratifications,  an  exposition  of  the 
treaty  was  agreed  to  which  considerably  broadened  its 
meaning.  This  exposition  will  be  noted  later. 

Two  months  after  Stirling  had  signed  this  treaty, 
his  antagonist,  Vice-Admiral  Poutiatine,  appeared  at 
Shimoda  with  a  single  vessel,  the  Diana.  This  was 
his  fourth  visit  to  Japan.  His  earlier  visits,  with  a 
more  imposing  force,  had  been  unsuccessful.  This 
time  he  lost  the  only  ship  that  he  had,  and  yet,  ma 
rooned  and  powerless,  he  was  able  to  negotiate  the 
wished-for  treaty.6  This  indicates  perhaps  better 
than  anything  else  that  the  Japanese  concessions  were 
not  based  on  the  presence  of  force. 

5  Gubbins,  The  Progress  of  Japan,  62,  232-235. 

6  The  Diana  was  severely  damaged  in  the  great  earthquake 
and  tidal  wave  of  December  23,  1854.    She  later  foundered 
while  on  the  way  to  a  harbor,  about  sixty  miles  from  Shimoda, 
where  she  could  be  heaved  down.     Captain  McCluney,  of  the 
Powhatan,  furnished  the  Russians  with  such  supplies  as  he 
could  spare,  and  they  finally  reached  Petropavlovsk  in  the 
American  schooner  C.  E.  Foots  (Hawks,  I,  390,  511). 


TOWNSEND    HARRIS  43 

The  Russian  treaty  of  February  7,  1855,  was  more 
like  Perry's  treaty.  Three  ports  were  opened  to  Rus 
sian  ships,  Shimoda,  Hakodate,  and  Nagasaki;  ship 
wrecked  men  were  to  receive  good  treatment;  trade 
was  to  be  permitted  at  Shimoda  and  Hakodate;  a 
consul  would  be  named  by  Russia  at  one  of  the  latter 
ports  if  she  deemed  it  necessary;  and  the  "most 
favored  nation"  clause  was  inserted.  '  New  clauses 
were  those  which  defined  the  Russo-Japanese  boundary 
in  the  Kurile  Islands  but  left  the  boundary  in  Sagha- 
lien  unmarked,  and  which  introduced  the  full  principle 
of  extraterritoriality  in  these  words:  "Tout  individu 
qui  aurait  commis  un  crime  peut  etre  arrete,  mais  il 
ne  peut  etre  juge  que  selon  les  lois  de  son  pays."  The 
unrestricted  trade  at  Shimoda  and  Hakodate,  permitted 
by  the  fifth  article,  was  reduced  to  a  regulated  trade 
by  the  explanatory  articles  which  accompanied  the 
treaty,  so  that,  as  under  the  American  treaty  and  regu 
lations,  no  trade  could  take  place  save  through  the 
mediation  of  Japanese  officials.7 

The  next  statement  of  foreign  rights  in  Japan  came 
with  the  exposition  of  the  British  treaty,  which  was 
agreed  to  at  Nagasaki  on  October  18,  1855,  when  Ad 
miral  Stirling  returned  with  the  ratified  treaty.  This 
document  rounded  out  the  brief  terms  of  the  earlier 
convention.  But  in  connection  with  the  third  article 
it  was  agreed  that  "  ships  of  war  have  a  general  right 

7  Texts  in  Gubbins,  The  Progress  of  Japan,  235-237. 


44  TOWNSEND    HARRIS 

to  enter  the  ports  of  friendly  powers  in  the  unavoid 
able  performance  of  public  duties,  which  right  can 
neither  be  waived  nor  restricted;  but  her  Majesty's 
ships  will  not  enter  any  other  than  open  ports  without 
necessity,  or  without  offering  proper  explanations  to 
the  Imperial  authorities."  And  this  proviso  was  at 
tached  to  the  fourth  article :  "  It  is  not  intended  by  this 
Article  that  any  acts  of  individuals,  whether  high  or 
low,  previously  unauthorized  or  subsequently  disap 
proved  by  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  Great  Britain, 
can  set  aside  the  Convention  entered  into  with  Her 
Majesty  alone  by  His  Imperial  Highness  the  Emperor 
of  Japan."  An  interesting  provision  was  to  the  effect 
that  "all  official  communications  will  hereafter,  when 
Japanese  shall  have  time  to  learn  English,  be  made  in 
that  language."8 

While  these  various  negotiations  were  in  progress 
the  Dutch  continued  to  trade  under  the  old  regulations 
at  Nagasaki.  So  irksome  were  the  restrictions  there 
that  Commodore  Perry  had  deliberately  refused  to  ac 
cept  Nagasaki  as  an  open  port ;  and  although  the  port 
was  to  be  open  to  British  and  Russian  ships,  no  provi 
sion  was  made  for  trade.  The  Dutch  naturally  desired 
to  improve  their  status  and  to  be  .freed  from  the  re 
straints  which  they  had  so  long  endured.  On  No- 

8  Article  VII  of  additional  regulations  to  the  American 
treaty,  June  17,  1854,  provided  that  the  Chinese  language 
should  not  be  employed  in  official  communications,  except 
when  there  was  no  Dutch  interpreter. 


TOWNSEND   HARRIS  45 

vember  9,  1855,  the  Netherlands  commissioner  in 
Japan,  Mr.  J.  H.  Donker  Curtius,  signed  a  preliminary 
convention,  which  was  to  become  void  if  a  treaty  were 
signed  soon  after,  but  which  would  remain  in  force  if 
ratified  by  both  rulers.9  The  convention  provided, 
however,  that  of  the  twenty-nine  articles  all  but  eight 
were  to  go  into  immediate  operation,  and  of  those  ex- 
cepted,  one  was  to  date  from  December  first  and  the 
others  from  January  first.  This  preliminary  conven 
tion  was  followed  by  a  treaty  signed  on  January  30, 
i856,10  the  ratifications  being  exchanged  on  October 
16,  1857.  All  the  stipulations,  however,  came  into 
operation  on  its  signature.  A  comparison  between  the 
preliminary  convention  and  the  formal  treaty  shows 
that  aside  from  a  few  slight  changes  the  only  im 
portant  difference  was  the  withdrawal  of  the  article 
providing  for  the  sale  of  dwellings  and  warehouses  and 
the  lease  of  the  ground  at  Deshima  to  the  Dutch.  The 
change  in  status  of  the  Dutch  really  came,  therefore, 
with  the  signature  of  the  preliminary  convention. 

The  terms  of  this  convention  indicate  the  sort  of 
regulations  which  the  Dutch  had  to  endure,  and  froro 
which  they  were  now  freed.  From  December  i,  1855, 
the  Netherlanders  would  enjoy  full  personal  freedom 

9  Gubbins,  The  Progress  of  Japan,  245-250.    Townsend  Harris 
believed  that  he  saw  a  copy  of  the  ratified  Japanese  text  in 
October,  1856.    The  Japanese  officials  denied  that  it  had  been 
ratified  (Griffis,  Harris,  125). 

10  Gubbins,  The  Progress  of  Japan,  250-255. 


46  TOWNSEND    HARRIS 

and  would  be  allowed  to  leave  Deshima  at  all  times 
without  an  escort.  Salutes  from  small  arms  and  even 
from  cannon  might  be  fired  at  the  funeral  of  Dutch 
soldiers  and  seamen.  The  Dutch  ships  need  no  longer 
give  hostages  on  entering  the  harbor.  The  crews 
might  row  from  ship  to  ship  or  to  Deshima  or  around 
the  bay  for  recreation  (when  a  captain  or  mate  was 
with  them),  but  they  could  land  at  no  place  but  the 
water  gate  of  Deshima.  Building  and  repairs  might  be 
done  by  Japanese  workmen  after  previous  notice  to 
the  governor  of  Nagasaki.  The  land  gate  of  Deshima 
was  still  to  be  guarded  by  Japanese,  and  merchant 
sailors  were  to  be  searched  there.  In  matters  of 
courtesy  the  Japanese  would  follow  Japanese  forms, 
and  the  Netherlanders  their  national  forms.  The 
Dutch  might  now  send  letters  by  Chinese  junks  or 
foreign  ships,  and  they  might  communicate  by  letter 
with  the  commanders  of  ships  of  friendly  nations  in 
the  bay.  Their  merchant  ships  might  now  retain  their 
gunpowder  and  arms.  The  presents  to  the  Emperor 
(Shogun)  and  the  annual  presents  to  the  local  officials 
were  to  be  continued.  Finally  no  alteration  was  to  be 
introduced  in  the  manner  in  which  the  trade  with  the 
factory  was  carried  on.  So  far  these  articles  were 
concerned  with  freeing  the  Dutch  from  century-old  re 
strictions,  and  the  work  was  not  finished.  Two  clauses 
were  of  importance.  One  provided  for  extraterri 
toriality,  and  the  other  granted  the  "  most  favored  na 
tion"  privileges. 


TOWNSEND    HARRIS  47 

Such  were  the  treaties  of  1854  and  1855.  By  the 
use  of  the  "  most  favored  nation  "  clause  the  sum  total 
of  foreign  rights  in  Japan  was  the  privilege  of  re 
sorting  to  Shimoda,  Hakodate,  and  Nagasaki  for 
supplies;  of  carrying  on  trade  at  these  ports  under 
Japanese  regulations  and  through  Japanese  officials  ;n 
of  residing  at  Nagasaki,  a  right  which  did  not  apply  to 
women  and  children ;  and  of  appointing  consuls  at 
Shimoda  and  Hakodate. 

While  Commodore  Perry  and  other  observers 
feared  that  the  foreign  merchants  would  endeavor 
to  take  advantage  of  their  status  and  insist  upon  com 
mercial  rights  not  conferred  by  the  treaties,  thus  stir 
ring  up  trouble  and  delaying  the  negotiation  of  true 
treaties  of  commerce,12  the  Japanese  were  quite  as 
anxious  to  grant  no  more  than  the  letter  of  the  trea 
ties. 

In  February,  1855,  a  French  ship  appeared  at  Shi 
moda  with  the  object  of  returning  two  Japanese  ship 
wrecked  seamen.  But  the  authorities  would  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  ship,  refused  to  accept  the 
seamen,  and  ordered  the  vessel  away.  They  insisted 
that  they  had  "no  treaty  with  France,  and  French 
vessels  had  no  right  to  come  there  under  any  pre 
text."  The  seamen  were  finally  landed  by  way  of  the 

11  No  trade  at  Nagasaki  was  attempted  under  these  treaties 
by  any  save  the  Dutch. 

12  Hawks,  II,  187. 


48  TOWNSEND    HARRIS 

American  ship  Powhatan,  thus  seeming  to  come  from 
the  ship  of  a  treaty  power.13  In  March  an  American 
merchant  ship  put  into  Shimoda,  the  owner's  intention 
being  to  proceed  to  Hakodate  as  soon  as  that  port 
was  opened  and  establish  there  a  store  for  supplying1 
whalers  with  ship  chandlery ;  but  the  Japanese  pro 
tested  successfully  against  the  residence  of  Americans 
at  either  port.1*  In  August  an  American  schooner, 
the  Wilmington,  visited  Shimoda  and  later  Hakodate, 
but  was  unable  to  trade  at  either  place.15  The  Amer 
ican  ships  of  war  which  visited  these  ports  during 
this  period  were  hospitably  received  and  well  treated.18 
It  would  be  well  now  to  note  the  attitude  of  -the 
Japanese  in  regard  to  these  changed  relations.  As 
far  as  the  foreigners  were  able  to  meet  the  people 
near  the  ports  they  were  impressed  with  their  gen 
eral  friendliness.  This  attitude  was  evident  during 
the  brief  excursions  about  Yokohama  and  Shimoda, 
and  it  was  in  striking  contrast  to  the  attitude  of  the 

"Hawks,  I,  511. 

14  Ibid.,  I,  390-391.    Griffis,  Perry,  133-134.    The  first  Amer 
ican  ship  to  visit  Japan  after  the  treaty  was  the  Lady  Pierce, 
of  San  Francisco,  which  visited  Yedo  Bay  and  Shimoda  in 
July,  1854  (Hildreth,  II,  312-313). 

15  Nitobe,  Intercourse  between  the  United  States  and  Japan, 
64;  U.  S.  Commercial  Relations,  1855,  voL  I,  p.  508. 

16  Susquehanna  and  Mississippi  visited  Shimoda  in  Septem 
ber,  1854,  Powhatan,  with  the  ratified  treaty,  January-February, 
1855.     Vincennes  visited  Shimoda  and  Hakodate,  May-June, 
1855  (Hildreth,  II,  314). 


TOWNSEND   HARRIS  49 

Chinese  about  the  treaty  ports.17  The  officials  also 
made  an  excellent  impression,  which  was  again  in 
contrast  to  the  experience  which  western  representa 
tives  had  had  in  China.18  Bayard  Taylor  records  that 
"  it  was  the  unanimous  opinion  of  all  our  officers  that 
they  were  as  perfect  gentlemen  as  could  be  found  in 
any  part  of  the  world,"19  and  Wells  Williams  said 
that  "  in  no  country  could  more  agreeable  and  kind- 
hearted  men  be  found  than  old  Yendo  and  Fuzhiwara 
at  Hakodadi."  To  be  sure  the  Americans  spoke  of 
the  "  well  known  duplicity  "20  of  the  Japanese,  and  of 
their  "artful  and  dissimulating  policy;"  but  suspi 
cion  is  a  natural  element  of  relations  between  strange 
peoples,  and  doubtless  the  Japanese  were  quite  as 
suspicious  of  American  cunning,  duplicity,  and  dis 
simulation.21  The  use  of  censors  or  spies  to  report 
on  the  conduct  of  their  own  officials  impressed  the 

17  For  the  comparison  between  Japan  and  China  see  Hawks; 
Williams,  Journal  of  the  Perry  Expedition,  and  "  Lecture  on 
Japan,"  in  Journal  of  North-China  Branch  of  Royal  Asiatic 
Society,  No.  II,  May,  1859;  L.  Oliphant,  Narrative  of  the 
Earl  of  Elgin's  Mission  to  China  and  Japan;  E.  B.  De  Fon- 
blanque,  Niphon  and  Pe-che-li ;  Griffis,  Harris. 

"  Williams,  226. 

19  Taylor,  434. 

20  Some  of  these  early  statements  were  revised  when  Hawks 
compiled  the  narrative  of  Perry's  mission. 

21  For  early  Japanese  suspicions  see  Clement,  "  British  Sea 
men  and  Mito  Samurai  in  1824,"  in  Trans.  As.  Soc.  Japan, 
vol.  33,  part  I. 


5O  TOWNSEND    HARRIS 

Americans,22  and  the  surveillance  to  which  they  were 
subjected  on  shore  was  the  occasion  for  protest. 
When  Captain  Adams  visited  Shimoda  in  1855  he 
wrote : 

I  found  the  Japanese  during  my  visit  much  more  disposed 
to  be  friendly  and  sociable  than  formerly.  Our  officers  roamed 
where  they  pleased  over  the  country  and  the  villages,  and 
were  welcomed  everywhere.  There  was  no  attempt  to  watch 
or  follow  them.  .  .  .  An  anxious  wish  was  expressed  by  these 
people  that  trading  vessels  from  America  would  soon  begin 
to  visit  them,  and  the  governor  of  Simoda  intimated  to  me 
that  it  would  be  very  agreeable  to  him  personally  if  a  consul 
from  the  United  States  should  be  appointed  to  reside  at  Si 
moda.  They  were  eager  to  obtain  books  on  medical  or  sci 
entific  subjects,  and  many  valuable  works  were  presented  to 
them  by  Dr.  Maxwell  and  others.  Indeed,  they  were  glad  to 
receive  books  on  any  subject  except  religion.  They  told  me 
they  had  learned  how  to  manage  the  locomotive  engine  sent 
to  the  Emperor  by  the  United  States  government,  but  the 
magnetic  telegraph  was  too  hard  for  them.23 

The  Americans  were  impressed  on  all  sides  by  the 
eagerness  of  the  Japanese  to  learn  about  the  new  and 
strange  things  in  use  among  the  foreigners.  The 
visitors  to  Perry's  flag-ship  studied  with  interest  the 
weapons,  from  Colt  revolvers  to  Paixhan  cannon ; 
they  descended  into  the  engine-room  and  watched  the 

22  Captain  Brinkley  compares  this  to  the  secret-service  force 
employed  by  all  European  states  (635n). 

23  Hawks,  II,  209.     The  governor  of  Shimoda  sent  off  to 
Captain  Adams  a  bundle  of  religious  books  left  clandestinely 
by  Chaplain  Bittinger,  of  the  Susquehanna,  in  1854  (ibid.,  I. 
512). 


TOWNSEND    HARRIS  5! 

machinery  in  motion;  and  they  observed  keenly  the 
manoeuvres  of  the  crew  at  general  quarters.24  Many 
of  the  Japanese  were  engaged  in  sketching  the  Amer 
icans  and  their  belongings  and  in  taking  copious  notes. 
In  the  library  of  the  Imperial  University  at  Tokyo  are 
some  of  the  original  drawings,  portraying  with  re 
markable  exactness  ships,  sailors,  armament,  and 
equipment,  down  to  details  of  the  wearing  apparel  of 
the  crew.  These  drawings  were  prepared  for  the  use 
of  the  Yedo  officials  and  certain  of  the  daimyos.  On 
the  second  visit  Wells  Williams  saw  a  book  of  twenty 
pages  giving  neat  and  accurate  drawings  and  dia 
grams  of  cannons,  guns,  revolvers,  swords,  and  other 
arms.25  It  was  printed  in  Yedo  in  October,  after  the 
first  visit,  and  he  believed  it  was  a  digest  of  what 
was  seen  aboard  the  Susquehanna,  "  though  the  author 
must  have  had  some  European  work  on  gunnery  to 
copy  his  drawings  from."  Later  at  Shimoda  some  of 
the  officers  saw  a  pictorial  representation  and  descrip 
tion  of  the  squadron,  and  an  account  of  the  war  be 
tween  England  and  China.28  Nitobe  sums  up  the 
period  as  follows: 

Immediately  after  Perry's  squadron  had  left  the  Japanese 
waters,  the  rulers  of  the  country,  whether  actuated  by  clear 

24  Ibid.,  I,  248,  358.    Harris  was  told  in  1857  that  the  Japa 
nese  had  cast  looo  brass  howitzers  like  those  given  them  by 
Perry  (Griffis,  Harris,  112). 

25  Willh.ms,  Journal  of  Perry  Expedition,  no. 
28  Ibid.,  182. 


52  TOWNSEND   HARRIS 

foresight  and  comprehension  of  the  moment,  or  whether  im 
pelled  by  that  mental  confusion  which  attends  sudden  awak 
ening  from  slumber  and  apprehension  of  the  next  moment, 
were  aroused  to  immediate  activity.  Schools  were  opened  for 
the  study  of  foreign  languages ;  academies  shot  up,  where 
youths  could  receive  instruction  in  military  and  naval  tactics ; 
raw  recruits  were  drilled;  foundaries  and  smithies  sprang 
into  existence,  and  belfries  were  molested  to  furnish  metal 
for  arsenals.27 

Japan  was  torn  between  two  lines  of  action.  One 
was  respect  for  the  long-standing  laws  of  the  realm, 
the  other  was  obedience  to  the  appeal  of  new  ideas. 
The  first  was  negative,  but  the  second  called  for  posi 
tive  action ;  and  although  the  pressure  came  from 
without,  yet  the  Japanese  themselves  eventually  ac 
cepted  the  second  course. 

The  officials  at  the  open  ports  were  by  no  means 
representative  of  the  ruling  classes  at  this  time.  They 
were  acquainted  with  the  foreigners,  and  could  un 
derstand  the  necessity  of  dealing  fairly  with  them, 
but  in  the  interior  few  of  the  daimyos  or  their  re 
tainers  possessed  such  knowledge,  and  among  them 
respect  for  the  old  laws  and  hostility  to  foreign  inter 
course  were  strong. 

At  the  capital  of  the  Shogunate  the  situation  was 
complicated  by  other  questions.  The  treaties  had 

27  Nitobe,  Intercourse  between  the  United  States  and  Japan, 
62.  Two  steam  vessels  were  purchased  in  Holland  and  ship 
yards  were  established  at  Nagasaki  (Griffis,  Harris,  69)'.  See 
also  Trans.  North-China  Branch  of  Roy.  As.  Soc.,  II,  211-221. 


TOWNSEND   HARRIS  53 

been  concluded  without  the  Mikado's  sanction,  but 
that  difficulty  was  removed  when  in  February,  1855, 
the  Mikado  approved  the  first  treaties  with  America, 
Great  Britain,  and  Russia.28  The  influence  of  the 
Shogunate  at  Kyoto  was  still  supreme,  although  for 
some  sixty  years  ill-feeling  had  persisted,29  and  the 
opponents  of  the  Shogun's  foreign  policy  had  not  yet 
realized  the  importance  of  causing  a  breach  between 
the  two  courts  on  this  question.  The  majority  of  the 
councillors  of  the  Shogunate  were  convinced  of  the 
wisdom  of  foreign  intercourse.  The  Roju,  or  Cabi 
net,  was  presided  over  by  Lord  Abe,  who  had  di 
rected  the  treaty  negotiations.  A  second  council,  of 
increasing  importance,  was  the  Tamarizume,  or  lords 
of  the  ante-chamber,  a  majority  of  whose  nine  mem 
bers  also  favored  the  treaties,  under  the  influence  of 
Lords  li  and  Hotta.30  But  the  Sanke,  the  three  noble 
Tokugawa  houses,  led  by  the  senior  prince  of  Mito 
(Lord  Nariaki),31  were  bitter  opponents  of  the  new 
policy.  It  was  a  serious  thing  for  a  small  group  of 
officials  to  oppose  not  merely  the  imperial  court  and 
the  great  mass  of  the  daimyos,  but  also  the  Three 
Families,  which  were  supposed  to  be  the  strongest  sup 
porters  of  the  Tokugawa  Shogunate.  All  the  more 
credit,  therefore,  is  due  to  Hotta  and  li  and  their  as- 

28  Gubbins,  Progress  of  Japan,  100. 

29  Brinkley,  630. 

80  Brinkley,  636 ;  Akimoto,  125-127. 

81  He  had  resigned  his  fief  in  1853. 

5 


54  TOWNSEND    HARRIS 

sociates  for  risking  their  all  in  order  to  Ibring  the 
nation  peaceably  into  contact  with  the  rest  of  the 
world. 

A  struggle  now  developed  between  the  Sanke  and 
the  Tamarizume  for  the  control  of  the  Cabinet,  and 
in  August,  1855,  Lord  Nariaki  gained  the  upper  hand 
and  succeeded  in  having  two  of  the  pro-foreign  min 
isters  dismissed.  In  November,  however,  Lord  Hotta, 
one  of  the  leaders  of  the  pro-foreign  party,  was  ap 
pointed  to  the  presidency  of  the  Cabinet,  and  Lord 
Abe  stepped  down  to  the  second  place.32  This  was  a 
great  blow  to  Lord  Nariaki  and  the  exclusion  party, 
and  Nariaki  could  not  fathom  its  meaning,  but  others 
realized  that  Lord  li  and  the  Tamarizume  had  been 
able  to  wield  enough  influence  to  checkmate  the 
Sanke.33  By  this  time  a  well  developed  feud  was  <on 
between  Lord  Nariaki  and  his  followers  and  Lord  li 
and  his.  "  The  foreign  question  was,  however,  but  one 
of  many  points  of  difference,  and  it  could  not  stand 
upon  its  own  footing  when  state  decisions  had  to  be 
made.  In  addition  a  bitter  controversy  was  brewing 
as  to  the  appointment  of  an  heir  to-  the  Shogu-n, 
lesada.  Lord  Nariaki  urged,  the  claims  of  his  son, 
Lord  Hitotsub'ashi,  and  a  powerful  party  supported 
them.  But  the  Shogun  and  his  confidential  officials, 
including  Lord  li,  favored  the  young  Lord  of  Kii 

32  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  30. 
33Akimoto,  138. 


TOWNSEND    HARRIS  55 

(Kishiu).     We  shall  see  how  this  decision  became  in 
volved  with  the  later  treaty  negotiations. 

Even  among  daimyos  and  officials  who  were  recon 
ciled  to  the  necessity  of  negotiating  the  first  treaties 
there  was  a  strong  feeling  that  enough  concessions  had 
been  made,  and  that  it  would  be  possible  to  hold  the 
foreigners  aloof,  with  only  three  points  of  very  lim 
ited  contact.  'It  w  a  si  the  arrival  of  the  first  consul  to 
be  appointed  under  the  treaties  which  precipitated  a 
new  crisis  in  foreign  affairs.34 

/^Once  again  the  United  States  was  most  fortunate 
in  tHe  choice  of  its  representative^  Townsend  Har 
ris3^/  was  born  on  October  3,  1804,  at  Sandy  Hill, 
Washington  County,  New  York.36  From  1817  until 
1848  he  was  engaged  in  business  in  New  York,  and 
among  other  civic  duties  served  for  two  years  as 

34  Although  Donker  Curtius  had  resided  at  Nagasaki  since 
1852  he  was  looked  upon  by  the  Japanese  as  a  commercial 
agent  in  charge  of  the  Dutch  post  at  Deshima     His  title  of 
factory  superintendent  had  been  raised  by  his  government  to 
that  of  Netherlands  commissioner  in  Japan,  and  he  was  given 
full  powers  to  negotiate  treaties   (Gubbins,  Progress  of  Ja 
pan,  65). 

35  His   journal    is    printed    in    Griffis,    Life   of    Townsend 
Harris. 

36  His  grandfather's  home  was  burned  during  Burgoyne's 
expedition,  and  his  grandmother  brought  him  up  " '  to  tell  the 
truth,  fear  God,  and  hate  the  British/  and  all  three  things  he 
did  all  his  life"    (Griffis,  Harris,  4).     This  injunction  may 
furnish  a  partial  explanation  of  his  troubled  relations  later 
with  Rutherford  Alcock,  the  British  minister. 


56  TOWNSEND   HARRIS 

president  of  the  Board  of  Education.  Later  he  was 
instrumental  in  founding  the  Free  Academy,  which 
has  developed  into  the  splendid  College  of  the  City 
of  New  York.  In  1848  he  embarked  upon  a  trading 
voyage  to  California  and  the  Far  East,  and  for  the 
next  seven  years  he  was  engaged  in  the  eastern  trade, 
gaining  a  useful  knowledge  of  the  countries  and  the 
peoples  of  Eastern  Asia,  Malaysia,  and  the  Pacific. 
While  in  China  he  made  a  study  of  the  resources  of 
Formosa,  and  advocated  the  purchase  of  the  island 
in  a  letter  to  the  secretary  of  state,  March  24,  1854. 
When  it  was  determined  to  appoint  a  consul  for 
Japan,  (Tpwnsend  Harris  was  selected  upon  the  joint 
recommendation  of  Commodore  Perry  and  Senator 
William  H.  Seward/^J  He  returned  to  the  United 
States  from  China,  and  received  his  formal  appoint 
ment  on  August  4,  1855,  later  being  commissioned  to 
negotiate  a  commercial  treaty  with  Siam.  Harris  left 
New  York  on  October  17  and  proceeded  by  the 
"overland  route"  to  Penang,  where,  after  a  delay  of 
seventy-six  days,  the  U.  S.  steam  frigate  San  Jacinto 
arrived,  bearing  his  interpreter,  Mr.  Henry  C.  J. 
Heusken,  of  New  York,  and  the  presents  for  the 
rulers  of  Siam  and  Japan.  Reaching  Bangkok  on 
April  13,  1856,  Mr.  Harris  succeeded  in  signing  a  new 
treaty  with  Siam,  based  on  the  British  treaty  of 

"  For/  Rel.,  1862,  p.  816. 


TOWNSEND    HARRIS 


57 


i855.38     It  was  not   until  August  21   that  the  San 
Jacinto  entered  the  harbor  of  Shimoda. 

"There  now  began  a  struggle  between  the  Japanese 
officials,  eager  to  whittle  away  the  concessions  already 
granted,  and  the  American  consul,  anxious  to  com 
plete  the  process  of  opening  wide  the  doors  of  Japan. 
Fortunately  Harris  possessed  an  open  mind  and  a 
kindly  disposition,  so  that  in  spite  of  early  disagree 
ments  he  was  able  to  retain  the  opinion  formed  at 
his  first  interview:  "We  were  all  much  pleased  with 
the  appearance  and  manners  of  the  Japanese.  I  re 
peat  they  are  superior  to  any  people  east  of  the  Cape 
of  Good  Hope."  'His  journal  records  the  steps  in 
his  work  of  enlightenment  and  shows  how  he  was 
able  to  win  the  confidence  of  the  Japanese,  and  then, 
without  bluster  or  threat,  break  down  the  barriers 
which  their  suspicions  and  fears  had  raised. 

First  of  all  the  Japanese  did  not  wish  to  receive 
him.  /  They  protested  that  Shimoda  had  not  recovered 
from  the  disastrous  earthquake  of  1855,  and  there 

38  Harris's  treaty  with  Siam  was  based  almost  exactly  upon 
the  British  treaty  of  April  18,  1855.  While  Harris1  was  at 
Bangkok  Sir  Harry  Parkes  exchanged  the  ratifications  of 
that  treaty  and  secured  some  supplementary  articles,  May  13, 
1856.  These  treaties  included  a  clear  statement  of  extra 
territoriality,  the  free  importation  of  opium  but  the  confining 
of  its  sale  to  the  opium  farmer  or  his  agents,  open  trade  at 
all  ports,  but  residence  only  at  Bangkok,  freedom  of  religion 
and  the  right  to  build  places  of  worship,  and  low  import  and 
export  duties. 


58  TOWNSEND    HARRIS 

Was  no  place  ready  for  him ;  he  had  better  go  away 
and  return  in  about  a  year.  Then  they  asserted  that 
a  consul  was  to  come  if  both  nations  wished  it,  not 
merely  the  United  States  alone.  Finally  they  offered 
him  a  temporary  residence  at  Kakizaki,  on  the  out 
skirts  of  Shimoda.  All  the  while  they  assured  him 
that  they  had  no  intention  of  breaking  the  treaty  or 
of  refusing  to  receive  him. 

The  question  of  his  reception  and  place  of  resi 
dence  once  settled,  other  difficulties  promptly  arose. 
Harris  objected  to  the  presence  of  Japanese  officers 
in  his  temple-residence,  and  after  four  months  of  re 
peated  protests  they  were  removed.  He  also  resented 
the  presence  of  censors  or  spies  during  official  con 
ferences,  and  these  also  were  dispensed  with.  He 
found  that  the  Japanese  were  discounting  American 
money  heavily;  he  was  unable  to  secure  Japanese 
servants,  and  the  shopmen  were  apparently  ordered 
not  to  deal  with  his  Chinese  servants ;  and  the  offi 
cials  would  not  send  written  replies  to  his  communi 
cations,  nor  would  they  return  his  social  visits.  All 
these  points  were  eventually  cleared  up.  '  Throughout 
the  early  entries  in  his  diary  Harris  frequently  com 
plains  of  the  untruthfulness  of  the  officials.  On  Sep 
tember  1 1  the  journal  records : 

Had  a  flare  up  with  the  officials,  who  told  me  some  egre 
gious  lies,  in  answer  to  some  request's  I  made.  I  told  them 
plainly  I  knew  they  lied ;  that  if  they  wished  me  to  have  con- 


TOWNSEND    HARRIS 


59 


fidence  in  them,  they  must  always  speak  the  truth;  that  if  I 
asked  anything  they  were  not  authorized  to  grant,  or  about 
which  they  wished  to  consult,  let  them  simply  say  they  were 
not  prepared  to  answer  me;  but  that  to  tell  lies  to  me  was 
treating  me  like  a  child,  and  that  I  should  consider  myself  as 
insulted  thereby;  that  in  my  country  a  man  who  lied  was  dis 
graced,  and  that  to  call  a  man  a  liar  was  the  grossest  insult 
could  be  given  him ;  that  I  hoped  they  would  for  the  future — 
if  they  told  me  anything — simply  tell  me  the  truth,  and  that  I 
should  then  respect  them,  which  I  could  not  do  when  they  told 
me  falsehoods.39 

From  this  time  friendly  relations  steadily  increased. 
On  October  30  the  two  governors  and  the  vice-gov 
ernor- called  upon  him  at  his  residence,  and  the  process 
of  instruction  in  western  affairs — beginning  with  an 
account  of  the  coast-surveying  operations  of  the  mari 
time  powers — commenced.  To  be  sure  the  attempts 
at  deception  did  not  entirely  cease,  and  on  January 
8  he  bitterly  wrote:  "They  are  the  greatest  liars  on 
earth."40  But  this  was  a  "  sweeping  generalization  " 
which  was  only  "more  or  less"  correct.  In  certain 
cases  where  he  believed  the  Japanese  were  deceiving 
him  he  was  himself  in  error.41  And  when  we  make 
allowance  for  the  inexperience  of  the  officials  in  deal 
ing  with  a  foreign  representative,  their  desire  not  to 
give  offense,  their  fear  of  incurring  the  displeasure 
of  the  Yedo  administration,  and  the  difficulties  of 

39  Griffis,  Harris,  63, 

40  Ibid.,  105 ;  May  26,  "  However  to  lie  is,  for  a  Japanese, 
simply  to  speak"  (ibid.,  158). 

41  Note  in  re  Dutch  treaties,  ibid.,  136,  137,  47n. 


6O  TOWNSEND   HARRIS 

carrying  on  communications  through  the  use  of  three 
languages,  it  is  easy  to  discount  these  early  observa 
tions  of  one  who  later  became  one  of  the  staunchest 
friends  and  admirers  of  the  Japanese.42  |  As  the  offi 
cials  gained  more  confidence  in  Harris  and  found  that 
he  spoke  the  truth  and  kept  faith,  their  dealings  be 
came  more  straightforward. 

•  I  Harris  had  two  important  missions  to  perform. 
One  was  to  present  his  credentials  at  Yedo,  and  the 
other  was  to  secure,  if  possible,  a  real  commercial 
treaty.)  On  the  first  subject  he  carried  on  a  corre 
spondence  with  the  Council  of  State,  and  engaged  in 
countless  interviews  with  the  local  officials  from  Oc 
tober  25,  1856,  until  September  25  of  the  next  year, 
when  information  came  that  his  reception  would  be 
granted.  As  to  the  second,  he  received  much  en 
couragement  from  some  of  the  officials:  "all  agree 
that  it  is  only  a  question  of  time,  and  Moriyama 
Yenoske  [the  interpreter]  goes  so  far  as  to  place  it 
less  than  three  years  distant;"43  and  later  he  was 
told  that  the  first  commercial  treaty  would  be  nego 
tiated  with  him.44  In  the  meantime  he  determined  to 
remedy  certain  defects  in  the  existing  treaty,  even 
though  a  new  and  broader  one  could  not  be  obtained. 

42  Harris's  early  opinions  must  be  considered  in  the  light 
of  his  mature  convictions  (Griffis,  Harris,  I05n).  See  also 
Oliphant,  345 ;  De  Fonblanque,  105. 

48  November  14,  1856.    Griffis,  88. 

44  April  15,  1857.    'Ibid.,  146. 


TOWNSEND    HARRIS  6 1 

The  first  question  was  that  of  the  currency.  Per 
ry's  treaty  contained  no  provision  for  exchange  of 
currency,  and  the  Japanese  insisted  upon  receiving 
silver  (Mexican)  dollars  at  their  bullion  value,  which 
meant  a  discount  of  sixty-six  and  two  thirds  per  cent 
on  their  currency  value.45  When  Harris  found  this 
rate  of  exchange  still  in  force,  he  promptly  asked 
that  the  coins  be  exchanged  by  weight.  His  argu 
ments  were  supported  by  Commodore  Possiet,  of  the 
Russian  corvette  Olivoutsa,  who  brought  the  ratified 
Russian  treaty.  On  leaving,  Commodore  Possiet  paid 
only  one  third  of  the  Japanese  bill  for  pilotage  and 
boat  hire,  and  left  the  balance  in  Harris's  hands  to 
await  the  settlement  of  the  account  when  a  Russian 
consul  should  arrive.46  In  reply  to  Harris's  offer 
to  allow  five  per  cent  for  recoinage,  the  Japanese  as 
sured  him  that  it  cost  twenty-five  per  cent,  and  of 
course  refused  his  offer  to  bring  out  coiners  from 
America  who  would  do  the  work  for  five  per  cent  or 
even  less.47  As  on  this  point  there  seemed  to  be  a 
deadlock,  Harris  wisely  proceeded  to  the  other  topics 
he  wished  to  open. 

As  the  Russians  had  stipulated  for  the  opening  of 

45  The  silver  dollar  was  worth  4800  sen  or  cash,  but  was 
received  at  only  1600  (Hawks,  I,  47gn).     One  ichibu  worth 
34  cents  (based  on  Chinese  tael  at  $1.36)  was  exchanged  for 
a  dollar  Mexican  (Griffis,  Harris,  65). 

46  Griffis,  Harris,  96. 

113. 


62  TOWNSEND   HARRIS 

Nagasaki,  Harris  asked  for  this,  and  promptly  ob 
tained  it.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Perry  distinctly 
refused  to  accept  Nagasaki  as  an  open  port.  'Harris 
also  asked  for  extraterritoriality,  and  "  to  my  great 
and  agreeable  surprise  this  was  agreed  to  without 
demur."48  '  The  right  to  lease  ground  and  to  buy, 
build,  and  repair  buildings  was  a  difficult  question. 
Harris  based  the  demand  upon  the  Dutch  treaty  of 
November  9,  i855.49  He  did  not  know  of  the  treaty 
of  January  30,  1856,  which  withdrew  the  clause  re 
garding  the  sale  of  buildings  and  the  lease  of  land  at 
Deshima.  This  was  an  instance  in  which  the  Jap 
anese  were  not  so  untruthful  as  Harris  believed,  and 
the  Japanese  stood  by  their  refusal  to  grant  this  new 
right.  He  later  saw  the  new  Dutch  treaty  on  Novem 
ber  18,  iSs;.50 

The  currency  question  was  now  reopened,  and  the 
Japanese  offered  to  exchange  gold  and  silver  coins 
with  a  fifteen  per  cent  discount.  Harris  again  stood 
out  for  five  per  cent,  and  when  his  three  propositions 
had  been  rejected  he  played  his  last  card: 

At  last  I  told  them  I  had  something  of  great  importance  to 
communicate  confidentially  and  to  them  alone.  To  my  sur- 

48  Griffis,  Harris,  124.     It  had  already  been  granted  to  the 
Russians  and  the  Dutch. 

49  Ibid.,  136-137.     One  of  the  interpreters  told  Heusken  that 
the  buildings  at  Deshima  had  been  sold  to  the  Dutch  (ibid., 
141). 


TOWNSEND   HARRIS  63 

prise  the  room  was  at  once  cleared  of  all  but  the  two  Gover 
nors  and  Moriyama. 

I  then  read  to  them  an  extract  from  a  letter  to  me  from 
the  Secretary  of  State,  which  was  to  the  effect  that,  if  the 
Japanese  sought  to  evade  the  treaty,  the  President  would  not 
hesitate  to  ask  Congress  to  give  him  power  to  use  such  argu 
ments  as  they  could  not  resist. 

The  fluttering  was  fearful,  the  effect  strong.51 

Three  days  later  the  discount  rate  was  reduced  to  six 
per  cent,  and  Harris  eventually  accepted  this,  on  their 
plea  that  if  less  were  taken  the  government  would 
lose,  through  the  recoinage.52  It  should  be  clearly 
borne  in  mind  that  this  "  warning  "  was  concerned  with 
an  interpretation  of  the  existing  treaty,  not  with  an 
attempt  to  secure  some  new  concession  from  the  Jap 
anese. 

"The  last  questions  to  be  settled  were  those  concern 
ing  the  residence  of  Americans  and  the  rights  of  con 
suls.  For  two  months  these  were  the  subject  of  fre 
quent  conferences.  During  this  period  Harris  felt  the 
weakness  of  his  isolation.  •  He  had  received  no  word 
from  Washington  since  he  left  there  in  October, 
i855.53  The  San  Jacinto,  which  was  to  return  in  six 
months,  was  long  overdue.  The  Russian  consul,  who 
would  have  supported  him  in  his  arguments,  had  not 
arrived,  nor  had  any  French  or  British  vessels  visited 
the  port.  '  Although  only  nine  days  distant  from 

61  Ibid.,  129^-130. 

52  Griffis,  Harris,  132. 

"  Ibid.,  152. 


64  TOWNSEND   HARRIS 

Hong-kong,  he  was  "more  isolated  than  any  Amer 
ican  official  in  any  part  of  the  world."  He  believed 
at  this  time  that  "the  absence  of  a  man-of-war  'also 
tends  to  weaken  my  influence  with  the  Japanese. 
They  have  yielded  nothing  except  from  fear,  and  any 
future  ameliorations  in  our  intercourse  will  only  take 
place  after  a  demonstration  of  force  on  our  part."54 
In  this  respect  he  was  wrong,  for  without  the  pres 
ence  of  any  of  the  aids  which  he  so  much  desired,  he 
was  able  to  carry  all  his  points,  through  friendly  ar 
gument  alone,  and  on  June  8,  1857,  he  records  the 
agreement  of  the  Japanese  to  all  the  material  re 
quests.55  It  took  some  nine  days  to  settle  the  word 
ing  of  the  articles,  because  of  the  poor  knowledge  of 
Dutch  possessed  by  the  Japanese  interpreters  and 
their  desire  to  have  the  words  in  the  Dutch  version 
stand  in  the  exact  order  in  which  they  were  found  in 
the  Japanese,56  'but  on  June  17  the  convention  was 
signed  with  due  formality  by  Harris  and  the  two 
governors  of  Shimoda. 

This  was  a  convention  "  for  the  purpose  of  further 
regulating  the  intercourse  of  American  citizens  with 
in  the  Empire  of  Japan."  It  contained  nine  articles. 

5*  Ibid,  153. 

85  Griffis,  Harris,  159.  The  first  ship  to  visit  Shimoda  was 
the  Portsmouth,  September  8,  1857.  See  Captain  Foote's  ac 
count  in  Journal  of  the  Shanghai  Literary  and  Scientific  So 
ciety,  June,  1858. 

58  Griffis,  Harris,  161. 


TOWNSEND   HARRIS  65 

The  first  article  opened  the  port  of  Nagasaki  for  sup 
plies.  The  second  permitted,  after  July  4,  1858,  the 
residence  of  Americans  at  Shimoda  and  Hakodate.67 
The  third  dealt  with  the  currency  and  established  the 
exchange  of  coins  by  weight,  with  a  discount  of  six 
per  cent  allowed  the  Japanese  for  recoinage.  Harris 
was  quite  unaware  of  the  disastrous  effect  of  this  ar 
rangement  in  a  country  where  the  ratio  of  gold  to 
silver  was  so  much  lower  than  in  the  neighboring 
countries.  The  fourth  established  American  extra 
territoriality.  The  fifth  restated  the  seventh  clause  of 
Perry's  treaty,  to  the  effect  that  American  ships  could 
pay  for  their  supplies  and  repairs  with  goods,  if  they 
had  no  money.  The  sixth  and  seventh  articles  dealt 
with  consular  rights,  recognizing  the  right  of  the  con 
sul  to  travel  beyond  the  treaty  limits  of  seven  ri, 
coupled  with  Harris's  consent  not  to  exercise  it  "ex 
cept  in  cases  of  emergency,  shipwreck,  &c.,"  and 
permitting  the  direct  purchase  of  goods  for  the  con 
sul's  use  without  the  intervention  of  any  Japanese 
officials  and  with  Japanese  money  furnished  for  the 
purpose.  The  eighth  article  established  the  Dutch  as 
the  true  version  of  the  convention,  and  the  ninth  de- 

57  As  no  classes  of  Americans  were  named,  missionaries 
could  come  and  reside  in  Japan,  a  proceeding  which  would 
have  occasioned  a  conflict  between  the  treaty  and  Japanese 
municipal  law. 


66  TOWNSEND    HARRIS 

clared   all   the   articles   to  be   in   effect,   except   the 
second.58 

Thus  after  nine  months  of  education  and  persua 
sion  Harris  was  able  to  secure  some  improvement  in 
the  status  of  Americans  in  Japan.  *The  important 
clauses  were  those  which  dealt  with  the  currency,  resi 
dence  at  Shimoda  and  Hakodate,  and  consular  privi 
leges,  for  the  others  were  already  covered  by  the 
Russian  and  Dutch  treaties.  But  he  well  realized 
that  he  had  made  only  a  beginning.  "Am  I  elated 
by  this  success?"  he  wrote.  "Not  a  whit;  I  know 
my  dear  countrymen  but  too  well  to  expect  any  praise 
for  what  I  have  done,  and  I  shall  esteem  myself 
lucky  if  I  am  not  removed  from  office;  not  for  what 
I  have  done,  but  because  I  have  not  made  a  commer 
cial  treaty  that  would  open  Japan  as  freely  as  Eng 
land  is  open  to  us.  Besides,  it  is  so  easy  to  criticise, 
and  so  agreeable  to  condemn ;  it  is  much  more  pleas 
ant  to  write  '  imbecile/  '  ass/  or  '  fool,"  than  to  say 
'able/  'discreet/  and  'competent/"59  Yet  in  these 
months  he  had  laid  the  foundations  for  his  greater 
successes.  He  had  established  a  reputation  for  frank 
ness  and  fair  dealing,  for  sympathy  and  understand 
ing,  which  made  him  persona  grata  to  the  Japanese. 
'  While  Harris  was  negotiating  at  Shimoda,  Mr. 
Donker  Curtius  was  at  work  at  Nagasaki,  and  on  Oc- 

58  Gubbins,  Progress  of  Japan,  266-268. 
69  Griffis,  Harris,  160. 


TOWNSEND    HARRIS  67 

tober  1 6,  1857,  he  was  able  to  sign  additional  articles 
to  the  Dutch  treaty  of  January  30,  i856.60  This  docu 
ment  contained  forty  articles,  and  was  longer  than  the 
original  treaty.  It  was  concerned  with  removing 
more  of  the  restrictions  which  hampered  the  Dutch 
trade,  but  it  was  by  no  means  a  treaty  of  commerce. 
Among  other  things  it  removed  the  limit  on  the  num 
ber  of  merchant  ships  trading  in  Japan  and  on  the 
amount  of  trade,  fixed  a  temporary  import  duty  of 
thirty-five  per  cent,  made  the  treasury  the  clearing 
house  for  all  commercial  transactions,  prohibited  the 
purchase  and  exportation  of  Japanese  gold  and  silver 
coins,  created  a  government  monopoly  in  the  sale  of 
various  food-stuffs,  coal,  books,  maps,  brass-work, 
copper,  weapons,  and  silk,  and  restated  the  extra 
territorial  and  "  most  favored  nation  "  clauses.  *  Two 
clauses  were  especially  interesting:  one  forbade  the 
introduction  of  opium  into  Japan,  and  the  other  per 
mitted  the  Netherlanders  to  practise  "their  own  or 
the  Christian  religion  "  within  their  buildings  or  bury- 
ing-places. 

In  a  supplement  to  these  additional  articles  the  long 
established  practice  of  giving  presents  to  the  Shogun 
and  the  local  officials  was  abolished,  "  considering  that 
the  Company  trade  ceases  from  henceforth,  and  no 
copper  may  be  exported,  except  by  the  Imperial  Gov 
ernment  alone,  in  payment  of  goods  required."61  In 

60  Gubbins,  Progress  of  Japan,  255-264. 

61  Gubbins,  264. 


68  TOWNSEND   HARRIS 

written  communications  the  Dutch  commissioner  was 
advised62  that  his  countrymen  might  now  have  their 
wives  and  children  reside  with  them  in  Japan;  that 
negotiations  concerning  an  audience  of  the  highest 
Dutch  official  with  the  Emperor  (Shogun)  would  take 
place ;  that  negotiations  concerning  the  exportation  of 
Japanese  coins  were  already  in  progress;  that  Japan 
had  no  idea  of  concluding  a  treaty  of  friendship  and 
commerce  with  Portugal;  and  that  the  trampling  on 
images  was  abolished,  but  that  the  introduction  of  the 
Christian  worship  and  the  importation  of  Christian 
and  other  foreign  religious  books,  prints,  and  images 
would  not  be  allowed. 

.  To  the  Dutch  belongs  the  credit  of  inserting  in  a 
foreign  treaty  a  prohibition  of  the  introduction  of 
opium.  The  Japanese  did  not  use  opium,  and  were 
aware  of  its  evil  influence  in  China,  but  in  none  of  the 
earlier  treaties  was  the  prohibition  found.  Dr.  Wells 
Williams  in  1853  dreaded  the  introduction  of  opium  by 
merchants  from  the  China  coast,  but  could  think  of  no 
way  to  prevent  it.63  Harris  had  an  example  of  the 
strength  of  the  habit  when  his  Chinese  servants  seized 
the  opium  in  two  drugshops  in  Shimoda.6*  If  the 
Japanese  had  desired  to  introduce  a  prohibitory  clause, 

"  Ibid.,  265-266. 

63  Williams,  Journal  of  the  Perry  Expedition,  5. 

64  Griffis,  Harris,  90. 


TOWNSEND   HARRIS  69 

Harris  would  certainly  have  accepted  it.65  In  fact  the 
introduction  of  this  clause  by  the  Dutch  could  hardly 
be  credited  to  humanitarian  reasons  alone  when  their 
attitude  toward  opium  in  Java  is  considered.  No 
doubt  a  good  deal  of  interest  lay  in  the  fact  that  an 
anti-opium  clause  might  not  only  seriously  affect  the 
profits  but  also  disturb  the  balance  of  the  trade  which 
would  be  established  under  the  British  flag  in  Japan. 
"The  Russians,  in  their  treaty  of  the  next  week,  ac 
cepted  this  prohibition  of  the  "pernicious  trade,"  and 
the  next  year  Harris  wrote  the  clause  into  his  great 
commercial  treaty. 

The  Russian  supplementary  treaty66  was  signed  at 
Nagasaki  on  October  24,  1857,  by  Vice-Admiral 
Count  Poutiatine.  It  contained  many  of  the  provi 
sions  of  the  Dutch  treaty  of  1856  and  the  supple 
mentary  articles  just  signed,  as  well  as  Harris's  agree 
ment  for  the  exchange  of  coins  with  a  discount  of  six 
per  cent.  New  clauses  provided  that  the  communica 
tions  between  the  governments  should  be  exchanged 
through  the  hands  of  the  local  governor,  and  that 
Russia  would  respect  the  neutrality  of  Japan  in  case 
she  was  involved  in  a  foreign  war. 

The  American,  Dutch,  and  Russian  conventions  of 
1857,  in  fact  and  in  name  supplementary  to  the  first 

66  Note  Harris's  advice  to  the  Japanese  in  1857,  in  For.  Rel., 
1879,  P.  629. 

66  Gubbins,  Progress  of  Japan,  239-245. 
6 


70  TOWNSEND   HARRIS 

treaties,  mark  the  second  phase  of  the  partial  opening 
of  Japan.  *  General  trade,  without  the  intervention  of 
Japanese  officials,  was  still  forbidden,  and  in  other 
respects  the  privileges  of  foreigners  were  circum 
scribed.  But  some  advance  had  been  made  in  the 
three  years,  and  the  time  when  a  real  commercial 
treaty  could  be  negotiated  was  at  hand. 


CHAPTER   III 

THE  COMMERCIAL  TREATY  OF  1858 

While  Townsend  Harris  was  toilfully  working  out 
the  details  of  the  convention  of  1857,  he  also  kept  in 
mind  the  more  important  object  of  his  mission,  which 
was  to  secure,  if  possible,  an  audience  of  the  Shogun 
and  to  open  negotiations  in  Yedo  for  a  real  treaty  of 
commerce.  He  therefore  requested  an  interview  in 
order  to  present  a  letter  from  the  President  of  the 
United  States  and  to  make  certain  communications, 
with  which  he  was  charged,  to  the  proper  minister. 
The  Japanese  insisted  that  the  letter  be  delivered  at 
Shimoda  and  the  communication  made  to  the  gov 
ernors  there,  and  even  presented  an  imperial  mandate 
to  that  effect,  only  to  be  dumbfounded  at  Harris's 
refusal  to  yield.1  In  Yedo  there  was  much  opposition. 
The  Lord  of  Mito  led  the  conservatives,  but  even  Lord 
Abe,  recently  head  of  the  Roju,  was  opposed.  Lord 
Hotta  favored  intercourse  and  won  over  the  Cabinet.2 
Finally,  on  September  25,  Harris  was  informed  that 
his  request  had  been  granted,  permission  being  based 
on  the  precedent  of  Captain  Saris  in  1613,  and  that  he 

1  Griffis,  Harris,  161.    The  letter  was  his  letter  of  credence. 

2  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  42-47. 

7i 


72  THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858 

was  to  go  to  Yedo  in  the  most  honorable  manner  and 
have  an  audience  of  the  Shogun.3  With  the  memory 
of  the  experience  of  foreign  diplomats  in  China  over 
the  "  kowtow  "  in  mind,  Harris  feared  that  some  ob 
jectionable  proposition  would  be  made.  But  a  "  faint 
request  that  I  would  prostrate  myself  and  'knock- 
head  ' "  was  the  only  reference  to  the  ceremony,  and 
on  Harris's  statement  that  the  very  mentioning  of  such 
a  thing  was  offensive  the  matter  was  definitely 
dropped. 

Two  months  were  now  occupied  in  preparing  for 
the  visit,  and  on  November  23  the  start  was  made. 
Harris  was  accompanied  by  the  vice-governor  of 
Shimoda,  the  mayor  of  Kakizaki,  and  the  private 
secretary  of  the  governor.  His  own  train  consisted 
of  some  eighty  men,4  arid  the  whole  party  numbered 
about  three  hundred  and  fifty.  Three  days  were  spent 
in  crossing  the  mountain  range  which  isolated 
Shimoda,  but  after  the  Tokaido,  or  highway,  was 
reached  the  road  was  wide  and  good.  Most  careful 
preparations  had  been  made  for  his  coming  and  he  was 
treated  like  a  lord  Of  the  land.  On  November  30  the 
journey  of  one  hundred  and  eighty  miles  was  ended, 
and  Harris  was  installed  in  one  of  the  buildings  of 

3  Griffis,  Harris,  172. 

4  "  I  shall  not  take  any  of  my  Chinese  with  me,  as  the  Japa 
nese  have  a  great  dislike  to  the  Chinese,  and  I  do  not  wish 
to  be  associated  in  their  minds  with  the  Chinese  or  any  other 
people"  (Griffis,  Harris,  173). 


THE   COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858  73 

the  "  Office  for  the  Examination  of  Barbarian  Books," 
near  the  castle  and  within  the  aristocratic  quarter  of 
the  city.5 

After  a  week  of  hospitality  and  exchange  of  cour 
tesies,  in  which  Harris  was  in  charge  of  eight  noble 
men  appointed  as  "  Commissioners  of  the  voyage  of 
the  American  Ambassador  to  Yedo,"  he  was  received 
on  December  7  in  a  most  dignified  manner  by  the 
Shogun.  While  princes  of  the  blood  and  members  of 
the  Great  Council  were  prostrate  on  their  faces  in  the 
presence  of  the  Tycoon,  Harris  alone  stood  erect,  and 
addressed  the  ruler.  "  After  a  short  silence  the  Tai- 
kun  began  to  jerk  his  head  backward  over  his  left 
shoulder,  at  the  same  time  stamping  with  his  right 
foot.  This  was  repeated  three  or  four  times.  After 
this,  he  spoke  audibly  and  in  a  pleasant  and  firm  voice 
what  was  interpreted  as  follows : — 

1  Pleased  with  the  letter  sent  with  the  Ambassador 
from  a  far  distant  country,  and  likewise  pleased  with 
his  discourse.  Intercourse  shall  be  continued  for 
ever/"6  Mr.  Heusken,  the  interpreter,  then  stepped 

6  Harris  has  given  an  account  of  this  trip  in  his  Journal,  and 
in  two  letters  reprinted  in  Littell's  Living  Age,  vol.  60,  pp. 
567-574-  In  1879  a  Japanese  record  of  the  arrangement  for 
Harris's  journey  and  reception  was  turned  over  to  Dr.  David 
Murray  by  the  successor  of  Hotta  Bitchiu-no-Kami.  The 
documents  were  translated  and  published  in  U.  S.  For.  Rel., 
1879,  PP-  620-636.  They  show  the  careful  arrangements  for 
and  the  honor  accorded  the  American  representative. 

6  Griffis,  Harris,  229. 


74  THE  ^COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858 

forward  with  the  President's  letter,  which  Harris 
showed  to  the  Tycoon  and  then  handed,  in  its  box,  to 
Lord  Hotta,  the  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  who 
placed  it  on  a  lacquered  stand  before  the  Shogun. 
This  ended  the  audience.  Harris  retreated,  made  his 
three  bows,  and  was  received  by  the  ministers,  who 
later  said  that  they  were  filled  with  admiration  to  see 
him  stand  erect,  "  look  the  awful  *  Tycoon '  in  the  face, 
speak  plainly  to  him,  hear  his  reply — and  all  this  with 
out  any  trepidation,  or  any  '  quivering  of  the  muscles 
of  the  side/"7  An  elaborate  banquet  was  spread 
before  Harris,  but  he  refused  to  partake  of  it  unless  a 
member  of  the  royal  family  or  the  prime  minister 
would  eat  with  him.  As  Harris  had  already  an 
nounced  this  decision  at  Shimoda,  the  Japanese  were 
prepared  for  his  refusal,  and  the  orders  of  the  day 
called  for  the  sending  of  all  the  food  to  his  lodging 
place,  where  he  distributed  it  among  his  retainers. 
But  every  arrangement  about  the  feast,  the  height  of 
the  trays  and  the  unvarnished  cypress  of  which  they 
were  made,  testified  to  the  honor  in  which  Harris  was 
held. 

-  Once  again  the  unexpected  had  happened.  The 
American  flag  had  been  borne  through  the  streets  of 
Yedo  and  the  American  consul-general  had  stood  in 
the  presence  of  the  Shogun.  '  Precedents  were  estab 
lished  which  were  to  govern  the  reception  of  other 

,  7  Littell's  Living  Age,  vol.  60,  p.  570. 


THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858  75 

representatives  of  the  western  powers.  But  although 
Harris  had  obtained  the  desired  audience,  yet  the  "  real 
object"  of  his  mission  was  not  yet  attained.8  The 
first  move  in  this  direction  was  taken  when  on  De 
cember  12  he  visited  Lord  Hotta,  to  make  the  com 
munication  which  accompanied  the  President's  letter. 
In  his  journal9  he  has  given  a  summary  of  this  most 
important  two-hour  conversation,  but  fortunately  the 
Japanese  records  contain  a  much  fuller  account.10 
The  object  which  Harris  had  in  view  was  to  impress 
the  Japanese  with  the  wisdom  of  voluntarily  abandon 
ing  the  remaining  features  of  their  exclusive  system 
and  of  coming  into  full  intercourse  with  the  world  at 
large.  Happily  Harris  was  dealing  with  one  of  the 
most  enlightened  of  the  Shogun's  officials,  one  who 
had  already  determined  to  place  foreign  relations  on  a 
firm  basis,11  and  who  considered  the  communication 
"the  most  important  matter  ever  brought  before  the 
government."12 

Harris  began  by  pointing  out  the  disinterestedness 
of  the  United  States.  It  had  no  possessions  in  the 
East  and  it  made  no  annexations  by  force  of  arms. 
Improved  means  of  communication,  the  steamship  and 
the  electric  telegraph,  had  brought  distant  countries 

8  Littell's  Living  Age,  vol.  60,  p.  568. 

9  Griffis,  Harris,  237-239. 

10  For.  Rel,  1879,  PP-  627-631. 

11  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  32. 

12  Griffis,  Harris,  239. 


76  THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858 

near  at  hand.  "  The  nations  of  the  West  hope  that  by 
means  of  steam  communications  all  the  world  will 
become  as  one  family.  Any  nation  that  refuses  to 
hold  intercourse  with  other  nations  must  expect  to  be 
excluded  from  this  family.*  No  nation  has  the  right 
to  refuse  to  hold  intercourse  with  others."  Two 
things  were  desired  in  connection  with  this  intercourse : 
a  minister  or  agent  resident  at  the  capital,  and  free 
commerce  between  countries.  •  Misfortunes  were 
threatening  Japan.  England,  dissatisfied  with  Ad 
miral  Stirling's  treaty,  was  ready  to  make  war.  She 
feared  Russia's  advance  to  the  Amur  and  Saghalien, 
which  would  threaten  Manchuria  and  China,  as  well 
as  her  own  interests  in  the  East.  If  Russia  should 
take  possession  of  Manchuria  and  China  and  attack 
England's  possessions,  then  England  would  desire  to 
seize  Saghalien,  Yezo,  and  Hakodate,  in  order  to  de 
fend  herself.  China  had  been  involved  in  two  wars 
with  England,  and  with  France  in  the  latter  case,  pri 
marily  because  there  was  no  foreign  agent  at  Peking. 
France  wanted  Korea,  and  England  desired  Formosa. 
The  United  States  would  not  join  these  powers  in 
their  war ;  and  when  the  American  flag  was  fired  upon 
at  Canton  Commodore  Armstrong  retaliated,  but  after 
an  explanation  was  made  the  hostilities  were  stopped. 
He  then  pointed  out  the  great  danger  from  the  intro 
duction  of  opium,  stated  that  the  English  desired  to 
introduce  it  into  Japan,  and  urged  that  its  importation 


THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858  77 

be  prohibited  by  treaty.13  After  congratulating  Japan 
on  its  long  period  of  peace,  he  pointed  out  that  one 
result  of  it  was  to  leave  the  country  weak  and  ineffi 
cient;  therefore  war  should  be  avoided  until  Japan 
could  become  strong. 

If  Japan  had  been  near  to  either  England  or  France,  war 
would  have  broken  out  long  ago.  The  great  distance  between 
the  countries  is  the  reason  why  peace  has  been  preserved  thus 
long.  In  case  of  war,  a  treaty  would  have  to  be  made  at  the 
end  of  the  war.  The  President  wants  to  make  a  treaty  with 
out  any  war,  and  with  mutual  goodwill  and  respect.  .  .  . 
•The  President  is  of  opinion  that  if  Japan  makes  a  treaty 
with  the  United  States,  all  other  foreign  countries  will  make 
the  same  kind  of  a  treaty,  and  Japan  will  be  safe  thereafter. 

The  President  wants  to  make  a  treaty  that  will  be  honor 
able  to  Japan,  without  war,  in  a  peaceful  manner,  after  delib 
erate  consultation.  If  Japan  should  make  a  treaty  with  the 
ambassador  of  the  United  States,  who  has  come  unattended 
by  military  force,  her  honor  will  not  be  impaired.  There  will 
be  a  great  difference  between  a  treaty  made  with  a  single  indi 
vidual,  unattended,  and  one  made  with  a  person  who  should 
bring  fifty  men-of-war  to  these  shores.  We  were  sent  to  this 
country  by  the  President,  who  desires  to  promote  the  welfare 
of  Japan,  and  are  quite  different  from  the  ambassadors  of 
other  countries.  We  do  not  wish  to  open  your  ports  to  for 
eign  trade  all  at  once.  It  will  be  quite  satisfactory  if  you  open 
them  gradually,  as  the  circumstances  may  require ;  'but  the 
President  assures  you  that  this  will  not  be  the  case  if  you 
make  a  treaty  with  England  first.  .  .  .  When  the  ambassadors 
of  other  foreign  countries  come  to  Japan  to  make  treaties, 
they  can  be  told  that  such  and  such  a  treaty  has  been  made 

13  Harris  dwelt  at  length  upon  this  matter.  But  the  impor 
tation  of  opium  had  been  prohibited  by  the  Dutch  and  Russian 
treaties  of  1857. 


78  THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858 

with  the  ambassador  of  the  United  States,  and  they  will  rest 
satisfied  with  this. 

Harris  then  pointed  out  the  religious  tolerance  exist 
ing  in  the  United  States  and  the  West.  He  dwelt 
upon  the  desirability  of  general  trade,  which  increases 
friendly  intercourse  and  tends  toward  peace  between 
nations.  Then  he  told  of  the  use  of  import  taxes. 
*He  showed  how  Siam  had  protected  herself  from 
England  by  making  treaties  with  America  and  France, 
and  he  asserted  that  the  independent  states  of  India 
were  conquered  by  England  because  they  had  no 
treaties  with  other  powers.  He  pledged  the  good 
offices  of  the  President  in  case  of  any  difficulty  be 
tween  Japan  and  a  foreign  country,  and  gave  the 
promise  point  by  saying  that  Sir  John  Bowring,  gov 
ernor  of  Hong-kong,  had  told  him  that  he  intended  to 
bring  a  large  fleet  to  Japan  and  either  secure  the  open 
ing  of  several  ports  and  the  right  to  have  a  minister- 
resident  or  else  declare  war.14  His  last  letter  stated 
that  he  would  have  more  than  fifty  steamers.  The 
Chinese  war  would  soon  be  over;  then  the  English 
ambassador  would  come,  and  it  was  to  be  hoped  that 
matters  would  be  arranged  before  he  came.  "  If  I 
write  in  my  name  to  the  agents  of  England  and  France 
residing  in  Asia  and  inform  them  that  Japan  is  ready 
to  make  a  commercial  treaty  with  their  countries,  the 

14  The  Dutch  at  Nagasaki  had  already  given  warning  of 
Bowring's  proposed  expedition  (Akimoto,  141). 


THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858  79 

number  of  steamers  will  be  reduced  from  fifty  to  two 
or  three."  In  closing  he  said :  "  I  have  today  told  you 
what  is  the  opinion  of  the  President  and  the  intention 
of  the  English  Government.  Today  will  be  the 
happiest  day  of  my  life  if  what  I  have  said  is  attended 
to  so  as  to  secure  the  welfare  of  Japan.  I  hope  you 
will  consider  what  I  have  advanced  and  communicated 
to  your  associates  in  office.  What  I  have  told  you  are 
the  unadorned  facts  acknowledged  in  all  the  world." 

Such,  in  brief,  were  the  statements  which  Harris 
presented  for  the  consideration  of  Lord  Hotta.  Many 
of  them  were  doubtless  already  familiar  to  this  en 
lightened  daimyo,15  but  the  treatment  of  the  whole 
subject  was  bound  to  be  impressive.  The  effect  of 
this  conference  upon  the  whole  foreign  question 
cannot  be  overestimated.  Copies  of  Harris's  remarks 
were  later  placed  before  all  the  daimyos  and  the  im 
perial  court,  and  thus  his  arguments  reached  all  the 
important  personages  in  the  land.16  Of  Harris's  good 
will  for  Japan  and  his  desire  to  help  her  to  avoid  the 
evils  of  foreign  complications  there  can  be  no  doubt. 
His  argument  that  she  could  negotiate  with  better 
grace  with  him,  alone  and  unsupported,  than  with  an 
ambassador  at  the  head  of  a  mighty  squadron,  was 
absolutely  true.  '  His  frequent  references  to  the  ag 
gressive  designs  of  Britain,  to  which  exception  might 

15  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  33-35. 
"  Ibid.,  64,  73- 


8O  THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858 

be  taken,  were  justified  by  all  too  recent  events.  The 
conquest  of  India,17  the  first  and  second  wars  with 
China,  and  many  other  episodes  in  Britain's  inter 
course  with  the  East  seemed  to  indicate  what  might  be 
the  fate  of  Japan.  But  the  march  of  events,  in  this  as 
in  so  many  other  cases,  proved  how  unwise  it  is  to 
prophesy  regarding  developments  in  the  Far  East. 
Russia  has  not  yet  overrun  China,  nor  even  all  of 
Manchuria.  England,  instead  of  seizing  Saghalien 
and  Yezo  as  defensive  measures  against  Russia,  has 
found  in  her  old  enemy  a  staunch  ally  in  her  greatest 
war.  Finally  England  and  France,  instead  of  send 
ing  large  squadrons  over  to  Japan  to  extort  treaties 
at  the  cannon's  mouth,  actually  sent  only  a  few  vessels 
and  disavowed  any  intention  of  using  force. 

It  might  be  well  here  to  point  out  certain  effects 
which  the  experience  of  the  West  in  China  had  upon 
the  new  relations  with  Japan.  The  haughty  and  un 
yielding  attitude  of  the  Chinese  government  toward 
foreign  representatives  caused  Perry  and  Harris  to 
stand  on  their  dignity  and  to  brook  no  insult,  and  in 
turn  they  had  the  greater  satisfaction  when  they  re 
ceived  far  more  liberal  treatment  in  Japan.  At  great 
expense  of  life  and  treasure  China  had  become  an 
object  lesson  of  the  inability  of  an  eastern  people  to 

17  During  the  administration  of  Lord  Dalhousie,  1848-1856, 
more  than  200,000  square  miles  were  annexed  to  British  India, 
including  the  kingdoms  of  the  Punjab,  Nagpur,Oudh, and  some 
smaller  states,  and  the  Burmese  province  of  Pegu. 


THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858  8 1 

oppose  the  armaments  of  Europe.  The  Japanese  knew 
of  the  two  recent  wars  in  China,  and  those  who  read 
their  lessons  aright  realized  that  Japan  was  in  no  con 
dition  to  adopt  China's  attitude  toward  the  powers. 
On  the  other  hand,  Britain's  share  in  those  wars  had 
not  been  altogether  a  glorious  one.  Although  trade 
relations  had  been  bettered,  a  feeling  of  wrong-doing 
remained  in  many  minds.  It  is  very  doubtful  if  any 
British  cabinet  would  have  approved  the  use  of  force 
in  order  to  open  wider  the  doors  of  Japan.  Surely 
Lord  Elgin,  who  felt  so  strongly  the  unrighteousness 
of  the  second  Chinese  war,  would  never  have  adopted 
a  highhanded  attitude  at  Yedo. 

In  spite,  therefore,  of  his  friendliness,  Harris  felt 
that  he  should  base  his  arguments  on  fear  rather  than 
on  expediency.  *But  instead  of  making  threats  in  the 
name  of  the  United  States  he  used  England  and 
France  as  the  ogres  to  frighten  the  Japanese.  In  this 
way  he  brought  the  good-will  of  the  United  States  into 
stronger  relief.  Although  all  the  diplomats  and  naval 
officers  of  the  time  believed  in  the  efficacy  of  fear  in 
bringing  about  improved  relations  with  Japan,  we  may 
at  least  wonder  what  would  have  happened  if  Harris 
had  emphasized  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  world 
commerce  rather  than  the  dangers  which  would  follow 
seclusion/  Certainly  Hotta,  li,  Echizen,  Satsuma,  and 
other  daimyos  could  have  understood  such  arguments. 
Perhaps  as  many  samurai  were  driven  into  opposition 


82  THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858 

because  of  the  threats  which  were  from  time  to  time 
used  as  were  converted  to  a  belief  in  foreign  inter 
course  through  fear. 

A  few  days  after  this  remarkable  interview  Harris 
recorded  in  his  journal :  "  I  may  be  said  to  be  now 
engaged  in  teaching  the  elements  of  political  economy 
to  the  Japanese,  and  in  giving  them  information  as  to 
the  working  of  commercial  regulations  in  the  West."1* 
This  task  was  a  tedious  one,  for  the  ideas  were  new 
and  it  was  difficult  to  find  terms  in  which  to  translate 
them.  Moreover  Harris  had  no  library  to  refer  to, 
but  could  rely  only  on  his  well  stored  mind  and  his 
commercial  training.  The  Japanese  records  contain  a 
detailed  account  of  an  interview  between  Harris  and 
five  of  the  "  Commissioners  of  the  voyage  of  the  Amer 
ican  Ambassador  to  Yedo"  on  December  2i.19  This 
interview  consisted  of  questions  by  the  commissioners 
and  answers  by  Harris.  It  was  concerned  with  the 
two  points  which  he  insisted  should  be  covered  by  a 
new  treaty, — a  resident  minister  and  unrestricted 
trade,  as  well  as  some  questions  regarding  China  and 
her  wars.  Concerning  the  first  they  inquired  as  to  his 
duties,  rank,  rights,  services,  ceremonies,  status,  and 
residence,  and  as  to  trade  they  wished  to  know  about 
customs  duties  and 'freedom  from  restrictions.  Harris 
again  used  England  as  an  example,  saying:  "When 

18  Griffis,  Harris,  243. 

19  For.  Rel.,  1879,  pp.  631-634. 


THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858  83 

the  English  ask  for  trade,  they  say  they  will  come  with 
men-of-war  and  demand  that  ports  be  opened  at  once. 
If  opened,  well;  if  not,  war  will  at  once  be  declared. 
There  will  be  a  great  difference  between  granting  their 
demands  and  making  a  treaty  with  me,  who  am  con 
sulting  the  advantage  of  both  countries.  It  will  be 
greatly  to  the  honor  of  Japan  to  do  as  I  say."  He 
closed  by  quoting  from  a  recent  letter  from  Sir  John 
Bowring  to  the  effect  that  England  could  not  endure 
the  present  management  of  affairs  in  Japan.  In  this 
interview  Harris  also  mentioned  the  important 
features  of  a  new  treaty. 

He  now  waited  for  some  official  notice  concerning 
all  he  had  said.  But  the  ministers,  who  agreed  with 
him,  were  engaged  in  endeavoring  to  convert  the 
hostile  daimyos  and  the  leaders  of  the  military  and 
literary  classes.  After  almost  a  month's  anxiety 
Harris  brought  matters  to  a  head  on  January  9,  1858, 
by  bluntly  telling  Shinano-no-Kami  "that  such  treat 
ment  could  not  be  submitted  to,"  and  that  "their 
treatment  of  me  showed  that  no  negotiations  could 
be  carried  on  with  them  unless  the  Plenipotentiary  was 
backed  by  a  fleet  and  offered  them  cannon-balls  for 
arguments."20  He  closed  by  threatening  to  return  to 
Shimoda  if  nothing  were  done. 

This  procedure  was  successful,  and  a  week  later 
Harris  had  an  interview  with  Lord  Hotta  in  which  he 

20  Griffis,  Harris,  247. 


84  THE   COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858 

was  told  that  the  Shogun  had  assented  to  the  two 
major  points  in  a  commercial  treaty — unrestricted 
trade  and  a  resident  minister — and  that  commissioners 
would  be  appointed  to  arrange  the  details.21  These 
proved  to  be  his  "good  friends,"  Inouye,  Lord  of 
Shinano,  and  Iwase,  Lord  of  Higo.  They  met  for 
the  first  time  on  the  i8th  and  exchanged  their  full 
powers,  and  Harris  offered  a  draft  of  a  commercial 
treaty,  but  it  took  five  days  to  translate  it  into 
Japanese. 

A  brief  account  of  the  subsequent  negotiations  is 
given  in  Harris's  journal.  The  record  is  prefaced 
by  this  statement: 

In  this  journal  I  shall  confine  myself  to  the  leading  facts  of 
actual  transactions,  omitting  the  interminable  discourses  of 
the  Japanese,  where  the  same  proposition  may  be  repeated  a 
dozen  times ;  nor  shall  I  note  their  positive  refusal  of  points 
they  subsequently  grant,  and  meant  to  grant  all  the  while; 
nor  many  absurd  proposals  made  by  them,  without  the  hope, 
and  scarcely  the  wish,  of  having  them  accepted :  for  all  such 
proceedings  are  according  to  the  rule  of  Japanese  diplomacy, 
and  he  who  shows  the  greatest  absurdity  in  such  matters  is 
most  esteemed.  They  do  not  know  the  value  of  a  straight 
forward  and  truthful  policy;  at  least  they  do  not  practice  it. 
They  never  hesitate  at  uttering  a  falsehood,  even  where  the 
truth  would  serve  the  same  purpose.22 

This  indictment  sounds  not  unlike  one  of  diplomacy 
in  the  West,  even  among  representatives  far  more 

21  For.  Rel.,  1879,  pp.  635-636. 

22  Griffis,  Harris,  256. 


THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858  85 

versed  in  the  intricacies  of  the  game  than  were  the 
commissioners  who  dealt  with  Harris.  But  it  was 
a  long  and  wearisome  task  to  thresh  out  the  details 
of  the  treaty  of  commerce.  Twenty  sessions  were 
held,  clauses  were  discussed  time  and  time  again,  and 
even  those  which  had  been  accepted  were  considered 
anew.  At  first  the  commissioners  wished  to  open 
trade,  not  on  an  unrestricted  basis,  but  according  to 
the  latest  Dutch  and  Russian  treaties.  But  this  Har 
ris  successfully  opposed.  Articles  which  he  thought 
might  cause  trouble  were  readily  granted,  such  as  the 
right  to  build  churches  and  to  export  Japanese  money ; 
but  others,  such  as  opening  new  ports,  caused  re 
peated  interviews.  Finally,  when  the  treaty  was 
almost  agreed  upon,  the  commissioners  reported  that 
such  was  the  uproar  in  the  castle  over  the  concessions 
about  to  be  granted  that  bloodshed  would  surely  fol 
low  an  immediate  signing  of  the  treaty.  A  delay  was 
asked  in  order  that  an  ambassador  might  proceed  to 
the  "  Spiritual  Emperor "  at  Kyoto  to  get  his  ap 
proval,  and  the  statement  was  made  "that  the  mo 
ment  that  approval  was  received,  the  daimyos  must 
withdraw  their  opposition."  Harris  naturally  asked 
what  they  would  do  if  the  Mikado  refused  his  assent, 
and  the  commissioners  replied,  "  in  a  prompt  and  de 
cided  manner,  that  the  government  had  determined 
not  to  receive  any  objections  from  the  Mikado/'23  He 

23  Griffis,  Harris,  288. 
7 


86  THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858 

then  asked  what  was  the  use  of  delaying-  the  treaty 
"  for  what  appears  to  be  a  mere  ceremony,"  and  he 
was  told  that  "  it  was  this  solemn  ceremony  that  gave 
value  to  it."  He  proposed,  therefore,  that  they  com 
plete  the  drafting  of  the  treaty,  but  postpone  signing 
it  until  the  end  of  sixty  days.  This  proposition  was 
finally  accepted,  the  details  were  agreed  upon,  the 
tariff  was  worked  out,  and  on  February  26  Harris 
was  able  to  give  a  clean  copy  of  the  treaty  to  the  Jap 
anese  commissioners. M  On  March  10  he  returned  to 
Shimoda  on  a  government  steamer  to  await  the  out 
come  of  the  reference  to  Kyoto  and  the  promised 
signing  of  the  treaty  on  April  21. 

Harris  had  ample  reason  for  satisfaction  in  this 
achievement,  and,  as  he  wrote,  "the  pleasure  I  feel 
in  having  made  the  treaty  is  enhanced  by  the  reflec 
tion  that  there  has  been  no  show  of  coercion,  nor  was 
menace  in  the  least  used  by  me  to  obtain  it.  There 
was  no  American  man-of-war  within  one  thousand 
miles  of  me  for  months  before  and  after  the  nego 
tiations.  I  told  the  Japanese  at  the  outset  that  my 
mission  was  a  friendly  one ;  that  I  was  not  authorized 
to  use  any  threats;  that  all  I  wished  was  that  they 
would  listen  to  the  truths  that  I  would  lay  before 
them."25  It  was,  indeed,  a  triumph  of  reason ;  and 
yet,  in  the  background,  there  was  fear  of  the  two 

2*  Ibid.,  306. 

25  Littell's  Living  Age,  vol.  60,  p.  573. 


THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858  87 

'ern  powers  whose  record  in  the  East  gave  force 
to  any  misgivings. 

/The  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce  which  was  thus; 
Completed  but  not  yet  signed  consisted  of  fourteen 
rticlesj   A  summary  of  its  terms  indicates  what  a 
;eat  advance  it  was  over  the  treaties  of  the  preced- 
,ig  years.     Article  I  provided  for  the  reciprocal  right 
)f  residence  of   a  diplomatic  agent  at  each  capital 
md  of  consuls  or  consular  agents  at  the  open  ports  of 
apan  or  at  any  or  all  of  the  ports  of  the  United 
States.     Article  II  stated  that  "the  President  of  the 
United  States,  at  the  request  of  the  Japanese  Gov 
ernment,  will  act  as  a  friendly  mediator  in  such  mat 
ters  of  difference  as  may  arise  between  the  Govern 
ment  of  Japan  and  any  European  Power,"  and  it  also 
promised  the  friendly  aid  of  American  ships  of  war 
and  consuls  to  Japanese  vessels  on  the  high  seas  or 
;  in    foreign    ports.     Article    III,    which    caused    the 
greatest  difficulty  in  negotiating,  opened,  in  addition 
f-to  Hakodate,  the  ports  of  Kanagawa  and  Nagasaki, 
from  July  4,  1859,  Niigata  from  January  i,  1860,  and 
Hiogo  from  January  I,  1863.     Kanagawa  was  opened 
in  place  of  Shimoda,  which  had  been  found  unde 
sirable  soon  after  it  was  opened.     The  harbor  was 
small  and  ill  protected  and  the  port  was  on  a  penin 
sula,  cut  off  from  the  mainland  by  a  difficult  moun 
tain  range.     It  was  now  provided  that  if  Niigata  were 
found  unsuitable  another  port  would  be  chosen.     In 


88  THE   COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858 

these  open  ports  the  right  to  lease  land  and  erect 
buildings  was  granted.  It  was  also  provided  that 
after  January  i,  1862,  Americans  might  reside  in 
Yedo  and  after  the  first  of  the  next  year  in  Osaka. 
This  article  also  provided  for  open  trade  without  the 
intervention  of  Japanese  officers,  with  these  limita 
tions, — that  munitions  of  war  should  be  sold  only  to 
the  Japanese  government  and  foreigners,  that  no  rice 
or  wheat  should  be  exported  as  cargo,  and  that  the 
government  would  sell  at  public  auction  any  surplus 
copper. 

Article  IV  provided  for  customs  duties  according 
to  the  appended  tariff,  and  gave  the  United  States  the 
right  to  land  naval  stores  at  Kanagawa,  Hakodate, 
and  Nagasaki,  without  the  payment  of  duty,  and  to 
keep  them  there  in  warehouses  in  the  custody  of  an 
officer  of  the  American  government.26  It  also  for 
bade  the  importation  of  opium,  and  permitted  the  gov 
ernment  to  seize  and  destroy  any  amount  over  four 
pounds  found  on  any  American  trading  ship.  Ar 
ticle  V  permitted  foreign  coins  to  pass  current  in 

26  "  By  this  I  have  secured  the  choice  of  three  good  harbors 
for  our  naval  depot  in  the  East,  in  a  country  that  has  the 
most  salubrious  climate  in  the  world,  where  the  men  cannot 
desert,  and  with  a  power  that  is  sufficiently  civilized  to  respect 
our  rights;  and,  above  all,  not  a  power  with  whom  we  might 
have  a  rupture,  like  England.  I  consider  this  clause  of  im 
mense  importance,  as  now  the  depot  can  be  removed  from 
that  wretched  place,  Hong-Kong,  and  the  stores  out  of  the 
power  of  England"  (Griffis,  Harris,  280). 


THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858  89 

Japan  for  the  corresponding  weight  of  Japanese  coins 
of  the  same  description;  until  the  Japanese  became 
familiar  with  foreign  coins  the  Japanese  government 
would  exchange,  without  discount,  their  coin  for 
American  coins.  Coins  of  all  descriptions,  except 
copper  coins,  might  be  exported  from  Japan.  Ar 
ticle  VI  defined  the  extraterritorial  rights  of  Amer 
icans  in  civil  as  well  as  criminal  matters.  Article 
VII  defined  the  limits  at  the  various  ports  within 
which  Americans  might  travel.  Article  VIII  granted 
to  Americans  the  free  exercise  of  their  religion  and 
the  right  to  erect  suitable  buildings  of  worship.  It 
also  stated  that  Japan  had  abolished  the  practice  of 
trampling  on  religious  emblems.  Article  IX  prom 
ised  the  assistance  of  the  Japanese  authorities  in  the 
arrest  and  imprisonment  of  offenders  on  the  request 
of  the  American  consul.  Article  X  related  to  the 
purchase  in  the  United  States  by  the  Japanese  gov 
ernment  of  ships  of  war,  munitions,  and  other  things, 
and  to  the  employment  of  experts.  Article  XI  stated 
that  the  trade  regulations  attached  to  the  treaty  should 
be  considered  equally  binding  with  it.  Article  XII 
revoked  conflicting  provisions  of  the  treaties  of  1854 
and  1857.  Article  XIII  should  be  quoted  in  full: 

After  the  4th  of  July,  1872,  upon  the  desire  of  either  the 
American  or  Japanese  Governments,  and  on  one  year's  notice 
given  by  either  party,  this  Treaty,  and  such  portions  of  the 
Treaty  of  Kanagawa  as  remain  unrevoked  by  this  Treaty, 
together  with  the  regulations  of  trade  hereunto  annexed,  or 


90  THE   COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858 

those  that  may  be  hereafter  introduced,  shall  be  subject  to 
vision  by  commissioners  appointed  on  both  sides  for  this  t 
pose,  who  will  be  empowered  to  decide  on,  and  insert  ther 
such  amendments  as  experience  shall  prove  to  be  desirable 

.Article  XIV  fixed  July  4,  1859,  as  the  date  when 
treaty  should  go  into  force,  and  designated  Wa 
ington  as  the  place  where  the  ratifications  should 
exchanged.  The  treaty  was  executed  in  quadru 
cate,  each  copy  being  written  in  the  English,  Japan- 
and  Dutch  languages,  but  the  Dutch  version  was  c 
sidered  to  be  the  original. 

Accompanying  the  treaty  were  the  regulations 
der  which  American  trade  was  to  be  conducted 
Japan.  The  details  are  of  little  interest,  except  \ 
we  may  note  that  the  regulations  were  more  lib 
than  before,  the  penalties  reduced,  and  tonnage 
ties  given  up.  But  the  tariff  provisions  were  of  g 
importance.  Under  the  Dutch  and  Russian  com 
tions  of  1857  a  temporary  import  duty  of  thirty* 
per  cent  was  in  effect,  pending  the  negotiation 
import,  export,  and  transit  duties.  Harris  explai 
the  operation  of  customs  duties  to  the  commissior 
and  eventually  was  able  to  write  the  tariff  article 
the  regulations.  The  Japanese  had  intended  to 
a  twelve  and  a  half  per  cent  duty  on  both  imp 
and  exports.  Harris  tried  to  have  them  do  a 
with  the  export  duties,  but  had  to  accept  a  redic 
in  their  amount.  As  accepted,  the  tariff  on  imp 
was  levied  on  goods  in  four  classes.  Class  i,  vj 


THE    COMMERCIAL    TREATY    OF    1858  9! 

was  free  of  duty,  consisted  of  gold  and  silver,  coined 
and  uncoined,  wearing  apparel  in  actual  use,  house 
hold  furniture,  and  printed  books  not  intended  for 
sale.  Class  2,  consisting  of  food-stuffs,  ship's  ar 
ticles,  and  certain  metals,  paid  five  per  cent.  Class  3, 
including  all  intoxicating  liquors,  paid  thirty-five  per 
cent,  and  class  4,  including  all  other  articles,  paid 
twenty  per  cent.  The  export  duty  was  fixed  at  five 
per  cent  on  all  articles  except  gold  and  silver  coin  and 
copper  in  bars.  Five  years  after  the  opening  of 
Kanagawa  the  import  and  export  duties  were  subject 
to  revision,  if  the  Japanese  government  so  desired. 
As  the  terms  of  this  treaty,  with  few  modifications, 
governed  the  international  relations  of  Japan  until 
1894,  it  is  proper  to  dwell  upon  some  of  its  signifi- 
;  cant  provisions^  Every  important  concession  which 
,  Harris  desired  was  granted ;  in  only  a  few  minor  par- 
\ticulars  was  he  forced  to  yield.  In  China  the  right  to 
appoint  a  minister-resident  was  one  of  the  points  at 
issue  in  the  war  which  was  then  in  progress,  and  it 
was  conceded  only  in  the  treaties  of  Tientsin  signed 
in  June  of  this  year,  five  months  after  Harris  had  se 
cured  the  Shogun's  approval.  In  his  draft  treaty 
Harris  had  asked  that  eight  ports  and  two  cities  be 
opened,  but  the  Japanese  absolutely  refused  to  open 
Kyoto.  They  were  positively  right  in  this  step,  for  the 
imperial  capital  had  become  the  center  of  the  anti- 
foreign  party.  After  much  discussion  the  ports  of 


92  THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858 

Hakodate,  Nagasaki,  Kanagawa,  Niigata,  and  Hiogo 
were  agreed  upon  (which  made  the  number  asked 
for  by  Commodore  Perry  in  1854),  and  the  cities  of 
Yedo  and  Osaka  were  opened  for  residence.  *  The 
right  to  conduct  trade  without  official  intervention 
opened  Japan  to  the  fullest  commercial  development. 
This  was  the  most  important  commercial  article  in 
the  treaty.  •  The  right  to  lease  ground  and  erect  build 
ings,  which  Harris  had  failed  to  secure  in  1857,  was 
now  granted.  To  the  eighth  article  Harris  attached 
too  much  importance.27  The  Dutch  had  already  se 
cured  the  right  to  practice  their  religion,  and  the 
Japanese  had  given  up  the  practice  of  trampling  on 
religious  emblems.  The  only  new  provision  was  the 
right  to  erect  suitable  places  of  worship.  As  we 
have  seen,  the  prohibition  of  opium  was  already  found 
in  the  Dutch  and  Russian  treaties. 

"In  after  years  Harris  received  undeserved  cen 
sure  for  having  inserted  the  extraterritorial  clause  in 
this  treaty.  But  his  critic's  did  not  realize  that  this 
clause  had  already  found 'its  way  into  the  first  Rus 
sian  and  Dutch  treaties  and  into  Harris's  conven 
tion  of  1857.  Great  Britain  also-  enjoyed  this  right 
under  the  "most  favored  nation"  clause.  Even  if 
Harris  had  given  it  up,  as  he  would  have  liked  to  do, 
it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  any  of  the  European 
ambassadors  would  have  followed  him  in  this  step. 

27  Littell's  Living  Age,  vol.  60,  p.  572. 


THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858  93 

Indeed  the  feeling  of  the  time  is  evident  from  the 
fact  that  Mr.  Marcy,  the  secretary  of  state,  had  told 
Harris  that  although  he  considered  it  an  unjust  pro 
vision,  yet  no  treaty  with  an  oriental  country  could 
secure  ratification  without  its  presence.*8  Harris 
always  considered  it  a  temporary  measure,  and  as 
serted  that  he  introduced  it  "  against  his  conscience." 
Although  there  can  be  no  question  of  Townsend 
Harris's  desire  to  serve  not  only  the  needs  of  his 
countrymen  but  also  the  best  interests  of  Japan,  weak, 
ignorant,  and  at  the  mercy  of  all  comers,  yet'three 
of  his  stipulations  proved,  in  the  event,  to  be  disas 
trous.  The  first  was  that  permitting  the  export  of 
Japanese  gold  and  silver  coin,  which  produced  the 
first  ill  effects  of  the  new  commerce.  The  second  was 
the  conventional  tariff;  for,  although  Harris  drew  up 
very  favorable  terms,  he  could  not  prevent  other  diplo 
mats  from  altering  them,  as  we  shall  see,  and  Japan 
was  bound  fast  by  a  treaty-made  tariff  until  the  re 
vision  of  1894.  Finally  'he  provided  for  the  revision 
of  the  treaty,  on  the  desire  of  either  party,  after  July 
4,  1872,  and  on  one  year's  notice.  His  intention  was 
that  after  the  Japanese  had  gained  experience  in 
foreign  affairs  they  should  take  up  the  question  again 
and  work  out  a  nw  treaty  in  the  light  of  experience. 
And  this  was  what  the  Japanese  believed;  but  they 
were  disillusioned  in  1872  when  they  found  that  revi- 

28  Atlantic  Monthly,  vol.  47,  p.  610. 


94  THE   COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858 

sion  could  come  only  with  the  consent  of  all  the 
treaty  powers ;  and  it  actually  was  accomplished,  not 
in  1872^  but  twenty-two  years  later.  It  would  have 
been  better  had  this  treaty  expired  in  1872  rather  than 
remain  subject  to  revision.29  But  in  spite  of  these 
unforeseen  errors  in  judgment,  the  Japanese  have 
ever  been  grateful  to  Townsend  Harris  for  framing 
an  honorable  treaty  on  which  their  enlarged  inter 
course  was  to  be  based. 

After  his  return  to  Shimoda,  in  March,  Harris 
passed  through  a  serious  nervous  breakdown,  during 
which  he  was  the  recipient  of  many  tokens  of  friend 
ship  and  esteem  from  the  Japanese.  The  Shogun 
sent  down  two  of  his  best  physicians  from  Yedo  and 
daily  messages  and  presents  of  food  and  fruit.80  This 
solicitude  was  manifested  also  on  his  return  to  Yedo 
in  April.  But  instead  of  being  able  to  sign  the  treaty: 
on  the  2 1st,  as  had  been  promised,  Harris  was  told 
that  Lord  Hotta  had  not  returned  from  Kyoto.  For 
more  than  a  month  he  waited,  anxious  and  impatient. 
He  was  disgusted,  and,  according  to  a  Japanese  his- 
torian,  threatened  to  go  himself  to  Kyoto'  and  con- 
-^xlude  the  treaty  there.31'  On  the  first  of  June  Hotta 
returned,  defeated.  The  treaty  could  not  be  signed  in 
the  face  of  imperial  and  daimyo  opposition.  Harris^ 

29  Atlantic  Monthly,  vol.  47,  p.  610. 

30  Littell's  Living  Age,  vol.  60,  p.  571. 
81  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  92. 


THE    COMMERCIAL   TREATY   OF    1858  95 

finally  agreed  to  a  second^  postponement,  j  until  Sep 
tember  4,  on  condition  that  me  Japanese  Would  sign  no 
treaty  or  convention  with  any  power  until  thirty  days 
after  the  signing  of  the  American  treaty.82  This  tlelay 
was  insisted  upon  because  of  the  presence  in  Yedo  of 
Mr.  Curtius  seeking  a  new  treaty  for  Holland.  On 
June  18  Harris  returned  to  Shimoda,  bearing  a  letter 
from  the  Grand  Council  agreeing  to  his  terms,  and  also 
a  letter  from  the  Shogun  to  the  President,  the  first  sent 
to  any  foreign  ruler  in  two  hundred  and  forty  years.33 
Mr.  Curtius  also  returned  overland  to  Nagasaki,  con 
vinced  that  no  liberal  terms  could  be  secured  at  this 
time.34 

32  Griffis,  Harris,  316. 

33  The  letter  addressed  to  the  king  of  Holland  in  1845  had 
been  written  by  the  Council  of  State  (ibid.,  316). 

3*  Oliphant,  307. 


CHAPTER   IV 

JAPANESE  POLITICS  AND  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

It  now  becomes  necessary  to  consider  the  effect  upon 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  Shogunate  of  the  political 
situation  within  the  empire,  for,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
question  of  foreign  affairs  could  not  stand  upon  its 
own  footing  but  was  involved  in  a  maze  of  conflicting 
interests.  The  concessions  granted  in  the  treaties  of 
1854-57  had  strengthened  the  opposition  among  the 
daimyos,  and  the  fact  that  the  Shogunate  seemed  firmly 
convinced  of  the  wisdom  of  a  pro-foreign  policy  served 
to  unite  in  the  opposition  party  all  those  elements  which 
had  reasons  for  hostility  to  the  Tokugawa  rule. 
Harris  was  told  in  February  by  the  Lord  of  Shinano 
that 

of  the  eighteen  great  daimios,  four  were  in  favor  and  four 
teen  opposed  to  the  treaty;  that,  of  the  three  hundred  daimios 
created  by  lyeyasu,  thirty  out  of  every  hundred  were  in  favor, 
and  the  remainder  opposed;  that  the  government  was  con 
stantly  working  on  these  men,  and  when  they  could  get  them 
to  listen  they  frequently  convinced  them;  but  many,  like  the 
obstinate  of  more  enlightened  countries,  refused  to  listen  to 
a  word  of  reason,  argument,  or  explanation.  This  last  class 
will  only  yield  to  the  opinion  of  the  Mikado  when  it  shall  be 
promulgated.1 

1  Griffis,  Harris,  293-295. 

96 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS       97 

Although  Lord  Hotta  had  taken  office  as  prime 
minister  and  later  as  minister  for  foreign  affairs  with 
the  intention  of  settling,  once  for  all,  the  uncer 
tainty  concerning  the  Shogunate's  foreign  policy,  even 
he  dared  not  accept  the  responsibility  of  signing  the 
new  treaty.  First  the  great  daimyos  and  high  officials 
were  consulted,  and  copies  of  the  treaty  as  well  as  of 
Harris's  statement  to  Hotta  were  circulated  among 
them.2  In  the  covering  letter  attention  was  called  to 
the  fact  that  "  the  present  time  offers  a  new  foundation 
for  enhancing  the  power  of  the  country."  Of  the 
memorials  presented  in  reply  most  were  strongly  op 
posed  to  further  concession  to  the  foreigners.  Again 
the  leader  was  Lord  Nariaki,  the  retired  Daimyo  of 
Mito.  A  little  before  this,  while  the  negotiations  with 
Harris  were  still  under  way,  he  had  replied  to  a  dele 
gate  of  the  Shogunate:  "Let  Bitchu  and  Iga  commit 
hara  kiri,  and  decapitate  Harris  at  once."3  A  few  of 
the  daimyos,  however,  favored  the  new  treaty  pro 
posals,  notably  the  powerful  lords  of  Echizen  and 
Satsuma.4  But  among  these  there  was  a  feeling  that 
the  imperial  consent  should  first  be  secured. 

Thus  originated  the  mission  to  Kyoto,  which  it  was 
thought  would  secure  the  Mikado's  approval  as  a 

2  Gubbins,  The  Progress  of  Japan,  289-290. 

3  Bitchu,  i.  e.,  Hotta  (Akimoto,  147). 
*  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  66. 


\ 

98       JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

matter  of  course,  and  then  the  opposition  would  cease.5 
The  first  mission,  composed  of  Hayashi  Daigaku-no- 
Kami,8  with  Tsuda  Hanzaburo  as  deputy  delegate, 
arrived  in  Kyoto  on  February  5,  1858.  Hayashi  laid 
before  the  imperial  court  a  letter  from  Hotta  which 
gave  the  reasons  for  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Shogun- 
ate  ;7  but  instead  of  winning  the  imperial  approval  his 
visit  served  to  widen  the  breach  between  the  two 
capitals.  At  Kyoto  the  opponents  of  the  Shogunate 
cried  out  that  the  mission  of  such  minor  officials  as 
Hayashi  and  Tsuda  was  an  insult  to  the  throne,  and  in 
this  way  they  gained  adherents  to  their  party.  The 
first  mission,  therefore,  proved  to  be  a  complete  failure, 
and  at  the  same  time  it  weakened  the  prestige  of  the 
Shogunate  in  Kyoto. 

The  seriousness  of  the  situation  was  at  once  recog 
nized  in  Yedo,  and  the  prime  minister  himself,  Lord 
Hotta,  who  was  more  familiar  than  anyone  else  with 
the  general  international  situation  and  with  the  argu- 

5  "  It  must  be  remembered  in  this  connection  that  according 
to  some  historians,  Lord  Abe  while  in  office  as  the  Dean  of 
the  Ministerial  Council  of  the  Shogunate  committed  the  Yedo 
Government  to  an  understanding  with  Prince  San  jo  Sanet- 
sumu,  a  High  Councillor  of  the  Court  of  Kioto,  to  conduct 
foreign  affairs  subject  to  the  Imperial  sanction"  (ibid.,  69). 

6  Hayashi  was  one  of  the  signers  of  the  Perry  treaty,  and 
he  had  served  as  one  of  the  commissioners  for  the  reception 
of  Harris  in  Yedo. 

7  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  70;  E.  M.  Satow,  translator,  Japan, 
1853-1864,  pp.  17-20.     Cited  as  Japan,  1853-64. 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS       99 

ments  advanced  by  Harris,  determined  to  proceed  to 
Kyoto  to  overcome  the  opposition  which  was  develop 
ing  there.  With  Lord  Hotta  went  the  accountant- 
general,  Kawaji,  and  the  censor,  Iwase  Higo-no-Kami, 
the  latter  of  whom  had  been  one  of  the  negotiators  of 
the  treaty  under  discussion.  Arriving  in  Kyoto  on 
March  19,  Lord  Hotta  first  won  the  support  of  the 
prime  minister  of  the  imperial  court,  Prince  Kujo 
Hisatada,  and  two  of  the  high  councillors.  He  also 
prepared  an  address  to  the  throne  which  was  presented 
through  the  prime  minister.  'This  was  a  remarkable 
document.8  It  pointed  out  the  changed  conditions  in 
international  affairs,  the  increasing  relations  between 
the  world  powers,  their  mutual  dependence,  and  the 
impossibility  of  any  country's  remaining  secluded. 
This  statement  led  to  the  conclusion  that  "  either  a  war 
has  to  be  fought,  or  amicable  relations  have  to  be 
established."/  But  Japan  was  threatened  from  all 
sides,  as  she  lay  in  the  midst  of  the  ocean  routes  con 
necting  the  different  countries.  The  issue  of  such  a 
war  was  obvious,  and  its  evils  were  portrayed.  Then 
he  developed  an  argument  which  should  have  had  great 
weight  among  the  courtiers  of  Kyoto:  "Among  the 
rulers  of  the  world  at  present,  there  is  none  so  noble 
and  illustrious  as  to  command  universal  vassalage,  or 
who  can  make  his  virtuous  influence  felt  throughout 
the  length  and  breadth  of  the  whole  world.  To  have 

8  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  74. 


IOO    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

such  a  Ruler  over  the  whole  world  is  doubtless  in  con 
formity  with  the  Will  of  Heaven."  But  before  such  a 
world  empire  could  be  created  international  relations 
must  be  established,  by  treaties  of  alliance  or  of  amity ; 
reciprocal  relations  should  be  encouraged,  ministers 
should  be  sent  and  received,  no  effort  should  be  spared 
to  become  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  affairs  of 
the  treaty  powers,  "  and  in  establishing  relations  with 
foreign  countries,  the  object  should  always  be  kept  in 
view  of  laying  a  foundation  for  securing  the  hegemony 
over  all  nations."  Shipping  should  be  encouraged, 
defects  remedied,  the  national  resources  developed,  and 
military  preparations  carried  out. 

When  our  power  and  national  standing  have  come  to  be 
recognized,  we  should  take  the  lead  in  punishing  the  nation 
which  may  act  contrary  to  the  principle  of  international  inter 
ests ;  and  in  so  doing,  we  should  join  hands  with  the  nations 
whose  principles  may  be  found  identical  with  those  of  our 
country.  An  alliance  thus  formed  should  also  be  directed 
towards  protecting  harmless  but  powerless  nations.  Such  a 
policy  could  be  nothing  else  but  the  enforcement  of  the  power 
and  authority  deputed  (to  us)  by  the  Spirit  of  Heaven.  Our 
national  prestige  and  position  thus  ensured,  the  nations  of  the 
world  will  come  to  look  up  to  our  Emperor  as  the  Great 
Ruler  of  all  the  nations,  and  they  will  come  to  follow  our 
policy  and  submit  themselves  to  our  judgment. 

In  conclusion  he  urged  that 

now  is  the  opportune  moment  offered  us  by  the  changed  con 
dition  of  the  world  to  throw  off  the  traditional  policy  three 
centuries  old,  and  make  a  united  national  effort  to  seize  the 
opportunity  for  realizing  the  great  destiny  awaiting  our  coun- 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS     IOI 

try,  as  stated  above.  For  this  purpose,  speedy  permission  is 
respectfully  and  humbly  solicited  for  opening  intercourse  with 
foreign  countries. 

Such  an  appeal  should  have  struck  the  imagination 
of  every  loyalist,  with  its  vision  of  a  world  empire 
under  the  benign  sway  of  the  Son  of  Heaven.  And 
it  is  probable  that  if  the  question  of  opening  inter 
course  had  stood  alone  the  court  would  have  yielded  a 
ready  assent,  but  the  issue  was  now  involved  with  the 
whole  question  of  the  relation  between  the  Mikado 
and  the  Shogun.  At  first  Hotta  was  successful.  The 
prime  minister  and  the  high  councillors  drafted  an  im 
perial  reply  which,  although  desiring  that  the  opinions 
of  the  Three  Houses  of  the  Tokugawa  family  and  of 
the  daimyos  be  consulted,  still  conferred  on  the  Sho- 
gunate  authority  to  use  its  own  discretion  in  dealing 
with  foreign  relations.9  Before  this  reply  could  be 
officially  presented,  the  opposition  forces  had  succeeded 
in  winning  over  most  of  the  court  officials  to  their 
views.  The  first  move  was  for  seven  of  the  high 
officials  to  present  to  the  imperial  court  on  April  20  a 
memorial  which  denounced  friendship  with  the  for 
eigners  as  a  stain  upon  the  country,  and  fear  of  them 
as  an  everlasting  shame.10  Here  were  two  arguments 
which  also  appealed  to  conservative  patriots,  assured, 
in  their  ignorance,  of  the  superiority  of  Japan.  This 

9  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  79. 

10  Text  in  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  Japan  No.  I,  p.  40. 

8 


IO2    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

memorial  was  followed  five  days  later  by  an  address 
signed  by  eighty-eight  court  officials  urging  the  with 
drawal  of  the  clause  granting  discretionary  power  to 
the  Shogunate.  These  memorials,  as  well  as  threats 
of  personal  violence  against  his  two  fellow  councillors, 
failed  to  move  Prince  Kujo.  On  the  night  of  the  29th, 
however,  the  eighty-eight  signers,  armed  with  swords, 
appeared  in  a  body  at  the  prime  minister's  house,  and 
insisted  that  if  the  clause  were  not  expunged  they 
would  go  to  the  temple  where  Hotta  was  lodged  and 
compel  him  to  commit  seppuku  (hara-kiri).  Fearing 
for  his  own  life,  Prince  Kujo  finally  yielded,  and 
promised  that  the  reply  would  be  changed  as  they 
demanded.11 

This  was  another  victory  for  the  anti-Tokugawa 
forces,  and  it  was  followed  by  the  formal  presentation 
of  quite  a  different  reply,  on  May  I,  which  denounced 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  Shogunate  and  demanded 
that  the  opinions  of  the  Three  Houses  and  of  the 
daimyos  be  consulted  before  asking  for  imperial  sanc 
tion.12  ( Lord  Hotta,  realizing  the  necessity  for  action 
in  dealing  with  the  foreign  treaties,  again  urged  that 
the  Shogunate  be  given  authority  to  act  in  the  emer 
gency,  but  a  second  reply  denied  the  request  and  stated 
that  three  things  should  be  done:  "(i)  Permanent 
safety  should  be  secured  whereby  the  Imperial  anxiety 

11  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  83. 

12  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  84. 


JAPANESE    POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS     IO3 

could  be  removed ;  (2)  measures  should  be  taken  so 
as  to  uphold  the  national  dignity  and  save  the  country 
from  future  calamities;  (3)  the  national  defences 
should  be  placed  on  an  efficient  footing,  lest  the  refusal 
to  grant  any  more  than  the  concession  made  in  the 
Shimoda  Treaty  be  made  a  cause  of  war."  If  the 
replies  of  the  daimyos  were  not  sufficiently  clear,  an 
imperial  messenger  would  be  sent  to  the  Great  Shrine 
at  Ise.  Finally,  on  May  6,  a  third  reply  stated  that  if 
the  American  envoy  insisted  upon  his  treaty  and  re 
sorted  to  any  act  of  violence,  war  should  be  declared.  \ 

The  opponents  not  only  of  the  pro- foreign  policy 
but  of  the  Shogunate  itself  were  now  in  control  of  the 
situation  at  Kyoto.  Lord  li,  who  in  the  absence  of 
Lord  Hotta  was  the  dominant  'figure  in  Yedo,  learned 
that  the  Mito  party  was  urging  not  only  that  the  court 
take  the  strongest  position  against  foreign  intercourse, 
but  also  that  it  appoint  one  of  the  Mito  princes,  Lord 
Hitotsubashi,  as  heir  to  the  Shogun,  and  confer  on 
the  Daimyo  of  Mito  the  duty  of  guarding  Kyoto.13 
The  struggle  between  Lord  li  and  Lord  Nariaki  had 
thus  been  transferred  to  Kyoto,  and  the  control  of  the 
imperial  court  was  the  prize  to  be  won.  Lord  Hotta 
returned,  baffled,  on  June  i. 

A  crisis  had  now  been  reached  in  the  affairs  of  the 
Shogunate.  'For  the  first  time  since  its  establishment 
the  Tokugawa  Bakufu  had  failed  to  secure  the  ap- 

"Akimoto,  148. 


IO4    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN   RELATIONS 

proval  of  the  Mikado  for  one  of  its  desired  measures, 
and  the  throne  had  asserted  control  over  its  policies. 
At  Kyoto  and  in  the  provinces  a  strong  party  had  been 
formed  in  opposition  to  its  administration.  Among  its 
own  houses  a  bitter  controversy  was  raging  over  the 
selection  of  an  heir,  and  at  its  doors  might  be  expected 
the  great  western  powers  prepared  to  fight  for  treaty 
rights  if  longer  denied.  In  this  emergency  the  Shogun 
resorted  to  the  old  precedents  and  appointed  a  tairo, 
or  regent,  with  full  powers  to  meet  the  issue  at  hand. 
Lord  li  Kamon-no-Kami  was  selected  for  this  power 
ful  office.  The  reasons  for  this  appointment  differ. 
Of  his  loyalty  to  the  Shogun  and  of  his  courage  there 
could  be  no  doubt.  His  family  was  one  of  the  oldest 
supporters  of  the  Tokugawas.  But  the  issue  which  he 
was  especially  called  upon  to  meet  was  the  question  of 
the  heirship;  and  whether  the  Shogun  realized  for 
himself  the  strong  character  of  Lord  li,  or  whether  the 
ladies  of  his  court  urged  the  appointment,  it  meant 
that  a  strong  opponent  of  the  Mito  claims  had  been 
designated.14  On  the  4th  of  June  he  was  publicly 
installed,  and  he  at  once  took  over  the  conduct  of 
affairs.15 

To  him  the  matter  of   vital   importance  was  the 
American  treaty;  the  question  of  the  heirship  might 

14  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  55 ;  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  91 ;  Brink- 
ley,  668. 
15Akimoto,  152. 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND    FOREIGN    RELATIONS     1 05 

wait.  He  at  once  sent  Lord  Hotta  to  reason  with 
Harris,  as  we  have  seen,  and  secure  his  consent  to  a 
postponement  of  the  formal  signing  until  September  4. 
He  next  convened  a  meeting  of  the  heads  of  the  Three 
Houses  and  of  the  daimyos  resident  in  Yedo,  and  in 
formed  them  of  the  imperial  reply,  stating  that 
although  the  Shogun  was  convinced  that  the  new 
foreign  policy  was  the  only  possible  one,  yet,  in  obedi 
ence  to  the  imperial  commands  he  now  laid  the  matter 
before  the  lords  for  their  most  careful  and  prudent 
consideration.  Finally,  he  sent  a  representative  to  ex 
plain  the  situation  anew  to  the  court  at  Kyoto.16 

Then  came  the  question  of  the  heirship.  The 
Shogun,  lesada,  who  had  succeeded  in  1853,  just  after 
Perry's  first  visit,  was  now  dying,  without  an  heir. 
Two  claimants  were  presented  for  the  office,  lemochi, 
son  of  Nariyuki,  Lord  of  Kii,  and  Yoshinobu17 
(Keiki),  son  of  Lord  Nariaki  of  Mito,  but  adopted 
into  the  Hitotsubashi  family.  The  former  was  a  boy 
of  twelve,  while  Hitotsubashi  was  a  man  of  twenty- 
one.  In  support  of  Hitotsubashi  were  found  many  of 
the  great  feudatories,  including  Satsuma  and  Echizen, 
as  well  as  Lord  Hotta,  recently  the  prime  minister. 

16  Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  93-94;  Akimoto,  153. 

17  The   Hitotsubashi   family   was   one   of   the    Sankyo,   or 
branch    families    from   which   a    Shogun   might   be   chosen. 
Although  often  spoken  of  as  Keiki,  the  name  Hitotsubashi 
will  be  used  throughout  this  study,  as  it  was  generally  em 
ployed  by  the  foreign  ministers  at  this  time. 


106    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

Some  favored  him  because  of  his  maturity,  others  be 
cause  he  belonged  to  the  great  house  of  Mito,  and  still 
others  because  he  was  believed  to  be  anti-foreign,  as 
was  his  father.  But  the  Shogun  was  opposed  to  his 
appointment,  for  it  meant  his  own  virtual  abdication, 
and  the  Prince  of  Kii  represented  the  nearer  line  of 
descent.  Lord  li  agreed  with  his  master,  but  stressed 
the  fact  that  Hitotsubashi  would  support  the  opponents 
of  the  Shogun's  foreign  policy.  The  controversy  had 
also  been  carried  up  to  the  imperial  court,  where  the 
claims  of  Hitotsubashi  were  popular,  but  where  the 
Kii  party  was  able  to  have  the  words  "  full-grown  and 
enlightened  "  expunged  from  the  formal  imperial  order 
for  the  appointment  of  an  heir.18  The  preliminary  an 
nouncement  of  the  appointment  of  lemochi  was  made 
in  Yedo  on  July  n,  and  the  formal  approval  of  the 
throne  was  sought.19 

Thus  matters  stood  when,  on  July  23,  the  U.  S.  S. 
Mississippi  arrived  at  Shimoda  with  news  of  the  suc 
cess  of  the  British  and  the  French  in  China  and  of  the 
Tientsin  conventions,  between  China  and  Russia,  the 
United  States,  England,  and  France,  signed  on  June 
13,  18,  26,  and  27.  Two  days  later  Commodore  Tatnall 
arrived  in  the  Powhatan.-0  The  news  brought  by 

18  May  8.     Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  100. 

19  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  63. 

20  Commodore  Tatnall  did  not  rush  off  to  Japan  "  to  take 
advantage  of  the  consternation  certain  to  be  created  by  the 
first  news  of  recent  events  in  the  Peiho."    As  a  matter  of  fact 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS     IO7 

these  ships  was  of  great  significance.  *  China  had  again 
been  beaten  to  her  knees;  greater  concessions  than 
ever  before  had  been  demanded  and  granted;  and  it 
was  reported  that  the  victorious  squadrons  of  the  allies 
would  soon  appear  in  Japanese  waters.  The  next  day 
a  Russian  ship  brought  similar  information.  Harris 
believed  that  there  was  no  time  to  be  lost,  and  he  at 
once  started  for  Yedo.  'Arriving  at  Kanagawa  on  the 
27th,  he  sent  a  message  to  Lord  Hotta  urging  that  the 
treaty  be  signed  before  the  fleets  arrived,  so  that  Japan 
might  grant  peacefully  and  with  honor  some  of  the 
things  wrested  from  China  after  a  humiliating  war.  * 
This  news  created  a  profound  sensation  in  the  castle 
at  Yedo.  A  special  conference  was  called  of  the 
higher  officials,  and  the  majority  favored  signing  the 
treaty  at  once.  But  now  Lord  li  advocated  delay  until 
the  imperial  approval  could  be  obtained.21  He  real 
ized  what  grounds  for  criticism  would  be  given  if  he 
acted  in  opposition  to  the  imperial  will,  and  he  also  did 
not  despair  of  obtaining  the  Mikado's  sanction. 
Perhaps  this  might  have  been  secured  if  the  full  period 
until  September  4  had  been  available.  But  the  affair 
seemed,  to  the  majority  of  the  Cabinet,  to  be  pressing, 
and  they  reasoned  against  the  objections  of  the  Tairo. 
Lord  li  finally  accepted  their  arguments,  and  agreed  to 

he  delayed  for  eleven  days  at  Nagasaki  before  proceeding  to 
Shimoda  (Griffis,  Perry,  415). 
21Akimot'o,  157. 


IO8    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

send  Iwase  and  Inouye,  the  two  commissioners  of  the 
negotiations,  to  Kanagawa,  to  prevail  upon  Harris,  if 
possible,  to  accept  a  further  postponement,  but  if  un 
successful,  to  sign  the  treaty.  "  The  conference  oc 
curred  on  board  the  Powhatan  early  on  the  morning 
of  the  29th.  Harris  repeated  the  reasons  why  it  would 
be  to  the  interests  of  Japan  to  sign  the  treaty  at  once, 
and  he  personally  agreed  to  act  as  a  friendly  negotiator 
should  trouble  arise  with  the  English  and  the  French.22 
This  promise  seemed  to  satisfy  the  commissioners,  and 
the  treaty  was  signed.23 

22  Griffis,  Harris,  321. 

28  For  an  unjust  interpretation  of  the  work  of  Townsend 
Harris  see  F.  V.  Dickins  in  Dickins  and  Lane-Poole,  Life  of 
Sir  Harry  Parkes,  II,  20-21.  "At  this  juncture,  before  the 
buke  and  kuge  could  be  duly  consulted — and  there  existed  no 
constitutional  rule  or  precedent  requiring  the  Shogun  to  con 
sult'  with  them  generally  on  any  subject  whatever — the  Yedo 
court  was  terrorized  by  the  American  envoy  Townsend  Harris 
into  compliance  with  his  demands.  That  astute  diplomatist 
made,  in  the  words  of  Admiral  Sir  James  Hope,  an  'adroit 
use  of  the  (then  recent)  success  of  the  English  and  French 
forces  in  China/  warning  the  Shogun  of  the  dire  consequences 
likely  to  result  from  a  persistence  in  the  policy  of  exclusion. 
The  action  of  the  American  envoy  was  crafty  but  not  wise. 
At  that  time  the  prestige  of  the  Shogun  was  scarcely  impaired, 
and  the  Regent  li  Kamon  no  Kami  (for  the  Shogun  had  died 
during  the  negotiations  and  his  sucessor  was  a  minor),  a  man 
of  intelligence  and  courage,  would  have  known,  had  time  been 
afforded  him,  how  to  smooth  over  difficulties  at  Kioto  and 
bring  the  Imperial  Court  into  harmony  with  his  own  views. 
[It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  to  Harris's  ill-advised  and  self 
ish  policy  were  due  many  of  the  troubles  that  attended  the 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS     IO9 

In  this  decision  of  the  tairo,  li  Naosuke  Kamon- 
no-Kami,  we  have  a  key  to  the  developments  of  the 
next  seven  years,  but  one  which  the  foreign  ministers 
did  not  appreciate  until  almost  the'  end  of  the  period. 
•The  treaty  had  been  signed  without  the  imperial  ap 
proval.  In  those  days  of  increasing  respect  for  the 
throne  and  growing  criticism  of  the  Tokugawa 
Shogunate.  this  fact  involved  the  whole  question  of 
foreign  relations  in  the  turmoil  ofdomestic  politics. 
It  gave  the  rallying  cry  to  the^Jo-i/(6r)Aanti- foreign 
party,  of  "  Honor  the  Emperor  and  expel  the  barba 
rians."  As  the  imperial  party  gathered  strength  the 
Shogunate  was  driven  to  desperate  devices  in  order  to 
keep  faith  with  the  powerful  foreigners  and  also  to 
appease  the  hostility  of  the  court  party  and  its  sup 
porters.  »As  we  shall  see,  the  foreign  representatives 
had  no  appreciation  of  the  difficulty  in  which  the 
Shogunate  was  involved.  Few  of  them  had  the 

emergence  of  Japan  from  her  long  isolation."  Aside  from 
the  errors  in  fact  which  may  be  noted  in  the  above  quotation, 
there  is  a  complete  ignorance  of  the  real  work  of  Harris. 
His  treaty  was  signed  but  a  few  days  before  Count  Poutiatine 
and  Lord  Elgin  arrived,  each  supported  by  ships  of  war.  Was 
it  not  better  for  the  Japanese  to  negotiate  with  a  man  whom 
they  had  learned  to  know  and  to  trust,  unsupported  by  ships 
of  war,  and  under  no  visible  duress,  rather  than  with  cannon- 
supported  envoys  fresh  from  their  diplomatic  victories  in 
China?  The  opinions  of  recent  Japanese  historians  concern 
ing  the  work  of  Townsend  Harris  could  hardly  be  cited  by 
Dickins  in  support  of  his  charges. 


IIO    JAPANESE    POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

slightest  sympathy  for  the  perplexed  officials  who  were 
struggling  against  hitherto  unfamiliar  forces.  It  was 
not  until  the  imperial  approval  was  finally  obtained  in 
1865  that  foreign  affairs  could  be  viewed  in  their  own 
light,  and  from  that  date  the  unreasoned  opposition  to 
foreign  intercourse  rapidly  waned. 

In  making  the  momentous  decision  to  conclude  the 
treaty  without  the  imperial  approval  Lord  li  acted 
against  his  own  wishes  and  out  of  no  disrespect  for 
the  throne.  A  profound  student  of  Japanese  litera 
ture  and  history,  he  held  in  loftiest  reverence  the  im 
perial  house,  even  though  he  was  Tairo  of  the  Shogun's 
court.  In  his  student  days  he  wrote :  "  The  first  and 
most  important  feature  of  the  Yamato  spirit  is  rever 
ence  and  loyalty  to  the  throne,"24  and  in  this  great 
crisis  he  hoped,  in  spite  of  the  failure  of  Hayashi  and 
Lord  Hotta,  to  be  able  to  convince  the  court  and  win 
the  imperial  approval.  But  with  the  unexpected  re 
opening  of  the  question  on  July  27,  and  with  the  gen 
eral  belief  among  the  Cabinet  that  a  decision  must  at 
once  be  made,  he  was  resolute  enough  to  take  the  re 
sponsibility  of  action,  even  though  he  realized  fully 
the  attacks  which  would  be  hurled  against  him.  It 
was  well  for  Japan  that  such  a  man  held  dictatorial 
powers  in  such  a  crisis.  If  the  decision  had  lain  with 
more  conservative  or  more  ignorant  leaders,  Japan 
might  have  entered  upon  the  course  which  China  had 

24Akimoto,  115. 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN   RELATIONS     III 

taken,    a    course    which    led    to    war,    defeat,    and 
humiliation. 

In  recent  years  the  work  of  Lord  li  has  been  studied 
anew  in  Japan,  and  his  fame  has  been  rescued  from 
the  opprobrium  which  had  been  heaped  upon  it.25  His 
biographers  point  out  that  in  signing  the  treaty  Lord 
li  did  not  act  in  defiance  of  the  imperial  will,  in  that  he 
"was  only  compelled  to  omit  the  formality  of  report 
ing  the  matter  to  the  throne  before  he  carried  it  into 
practice."26  In  other  words,  "the  Cabinet  of  Kioto 
never  expressly  gave  orders  that  the  country  should 
be  closed  to  foreign  nations.  All  the  instruction  given 
went  no  farther  than  to  require  further  conference 
among  the  Princes,  Officers,  and  Barons  of  the  land," 
and  Mr.  Shimada  points  out  that  "  failure  to  carry  out 
an  instruction  and  wilful  disobedience  are  two  things 
that  must  never  be  confounded."27  These  conclusions 
are  premised  on  the  belief  that  the  imperial  court  was 
not  really  hostile  to  foreign  intercourse,  and  that  Lord 
li  had  to  act  in  an  emergency  unknown  to  the  court 
when  its  instructions,  which  meant  delay,  were  given. 
But  whether  Lord  li's  conduct  be  deemed  wilful  dis 
obedience  or  not,  the  fact  remains  that  it  was  so  con 
sidered  by  the  opposition  at  the  time,  and  it  proved  to 

25  Satoh,   Agitated   Japan,   based   on    Shimada's    "  Kaikoku 
Shimatsu  " ;  Akimoto,  Lord  li  Naosuke,  based  on  Nakamura's 
"  li  Tairo  To  Kaiko." 

26  Akimoto,  154. 

27  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  89. 


112    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

be  the  most  vulnerable  point  of  attack  in  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  Shogunate  until  the  imperial  approval  was 
finally  gained. 

The  storm  soon  broke.  On  July  31  Lord  Nariaki 
addressed  the  Tairo,  as  if  he  did  not  know  that  the 
treaty  had  already  been  signed,  warning  him  of  the 
irreverence  of  disregarding  the  imperial  orders,  and 
urging  that  a  delegate  be  despatched  to  Kyoto  to  learn 
His  Majesty's  will.28  His  letter,  however,  gave  in 
dication  that  even  he  realized  that  freer  intercourse 
was  bound  to  come.  The  next  day  a  messenger  was 
despatched  to  Kyoto  to  advise  the  court  of  what  had 
been  done  and  to  assure  it  of  the  Shogunate's  intention 
to  do  its  utmost  to  protect  the  coasts  and  defend  the 
empire.29  On  that  day,  in  Yedo,  the  officials  and  the 
daimyos  were  summoned  to  the  castle  and  advised  of 
.-the  whole  treaty  proceedings,  and  once  more  their 
opinions  were  requested.30  Then,  in  order  to  con 
solidate  his  position  against  his  opponents — not  only 
those  who  opposed  his  foreign  policy  but  those  who 
criticized  his  conduct  in  the  matter  of  the  Shogun's 
heir — Lord  li  dismissed  Lord  Hotta  and  Lord  Mat- 
sudaira  (Iga-no-Kami)  because  they  favored  the  ap 
pointment  of  Lord  Hitotsubashi.31  This  action  brings 
out  clearly  the  involved  state  of  Yedo  politics  at  this 

28  Akimoto,  163 ;  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  73. 

29  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  75. 

80  Text  in  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  Japan,  No,  i,  p.  39. 

81  August  2.     Satoh,  Lord  Hotta,  105. 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS     113 

time.  Lord  Hotta  was  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  pro- 
foreign  party.  His  course  had  been  a  consistent  one, 
and  it  was  due  to  his  enlightenment  that  Harris  had 
been  able  to  negotiate  his  great  treaty.  In  favoring 
foreign  intercourse  Lord  Hotta  had  been  a  doughty 
adversary  of  Lord  Nariaki  ever  since  the  appearance 
of  Perry.  In  the  matter  of  the  heirship,  however, 
Hotta  favored  the  Mito  claimant,  because  he  desired 
to  see  a  man  of  some  experience  and  education  suc-N 
ceed  as  Shogun.  "In  dismissing  him  from  office,  Lord 
li  lost  a  champion  of  his  foreign  policy  in  order  to 
weaken  the  party  opposed  to  his  policy  regarding  the 
heirship.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  foreign  rep 
resentatives  who  visited  Japan  soon  after  this  Cabinet 
change  believed  that  Hotta  was  dismissed  because  of 
his  enlightened  foreign  policy,  and  that  members  of 
the  "  Tory  party  "  were  in  control.32 

On  the  same  day  the  imperial  approval  of  the  ap 
pointment  of  the  Prince  of  Kii  was  received,  and 
the  4th  of  August  was  designated  as  the  date  for 
the  formal  announcement.33  This  fact  inspired  the 
opposition  to  a  last  and  desperate  effort  to  set 
aside  the  choice.  Lord  Nariaki,  accompanied  by  the 
lords  of  Mito,  Owari,  and  Echizen,  appeared  at  the 
Shogun's  court,  and  a  famous  interview  took  place  be- 

32Oliphant,  378;  Alcock,  July  28,  1859,  in  P.P.  1860,  Com. 
69  (2648),  p.  27. 

33  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  76. 


114    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

tween  the  three  former,  members  of  two  of  the  Three 
Families  of  the  Tokugawa,  and  the  Tairo.34  The 
first  point  of  attack  was  the  signing  of  the  treaty 
without  the  imperial  sanction,  and  in  defence  Lord  li 
argued  that  what  he  did  was  in  accord  with  the  Em 
peror's  will  and  in  view  of  the  immediate  crisis.  Then 
the  claims  of  Hitotsubashi  to  the  heirship  were  ad 
vanced,  and  Lord  li  maintained  that  this  decision 
rested  with  the  Shogun  alone.  Lord  Nariaki  then 
demanded  that  the  choice  of  an  heir  should  be  post 
poned  until  the  imperial  sanction  had  been  obtained 
for  the  treaty.  li  replied  that  he  fully  believed  the 
sanction  would  be  granted  when  all  the  facts  were 
known,  and  announced  that  Lord  Manabe,  of  the 
Cabinet,  would  soon  go  to  Kyoto.  The  interview, 
which  was  a  protracted  one,  resulted  in  the  victory  of 
Lord  li  and  his  supporters.  Yet  the  situation  was 
a  most  embarrassing  one,  for  against  li  were  arrayed 
three  of  the  great  lords  of  the  Tokugawa  houses.35 
In  spite  of  this  powerful  opposition  the  appoint 
ment  of  the  youthful  lemochi  was  proclaimed  on 
August  4,  and  on  the  loth  the  daimyos  presented  their 

34  August  3.    Akimoto,  166-170 ;  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  79-86. 

35  Brinkley   states   that   "  the   three   feudatories   offered   to 
compromise;  in  other  words,  they  declared  their  willingness 
to  subscribe  the  commercial  convention  provided  that  Keiki 
was  appointed  Shogun ;  the  important  fact  being  thus  estab 
lished  that  domestic  politics  had  taken  precedence  of  foreign  " 
(668). 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS     115 

formal  congratulations  to  the  Shogun  and  his  heir.38 
On  that  night  the  Shogun  was  suddenly  taken  ill,  but 
on  the  I2th  he  had  recovered  sufficiently  to  call  the 
Tairo  and  the  Cabinet  into  his  presence  and  take 
measures  against  the  hostile  lords.  It  was  decided  to 
confine  Lord  Nariaki  to  his  house,  to  require  the  lords 
of  Owari  and  Echizen  to  turn  over  their  fiefs  to  their 
heirs,  and  to  deny  the  Lord  of  Mito  and  Lord  Hitotsu- 
bashi  the  privilege  of  appearing  at  the  Shogun's  court. 
These  penalties  were  announced  the  next  day,  and 
they  brought  down  upon  Lord  li  the  denunciation  of 
the  retainers  of  these  powerful  houses.  On  the  I4th 
the  Shogun  died.37 

36  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  92. 

37  The  sudden  death  of  the  Shogun  gave  rise  to  many  theo 
ries  at  the  time.     Some  believed  he  had  been  poisoned  by  Mito 
adherents  in  order  that  Lord  Hitotsubashi  might  seize  the 
throne.    The  Dutch  reported  that  he  had  committed  suicide 
because  of  the  difficulties  due  to  the  foreign  situation.    Town- 
send  Harris  described  him  as  "  a  wretchedly-delicate-looking 
man,  and  a  victim  of  apoplexy"  (Oliphant,  459).    The  death 
of  the  Shogun  was  not  publicly  announced  until  September 
14.    Lord   Elgin   was  told  that  the   Shogun   was   unable   to 
see  him  but  that  an  audience  with  his  "  son  "  might  be  ar 
ranged,  which  he  did  not  deem  it  expedient  to  accept  (ibid., 
418).    Oliphant  states  that  the  British  did  not  know  of  the 
death  of  the  Shogun  until  after  the  French  mission  returned 
to  Shanghai  at  the  end  of  October  (ibid.,  459).    But  Chassiron 
asserts   that  Baron   Gros  learned   of   the  event   from   Lord 
Elgin  in  China  (Notes  sur  Le  Japon,  La  Chine  et  L'Inde,  59). 
See  also  P.P.  1859,  II,  Com.  33,  "  Correspondence  relating  to 

'arl  of  Elgin's  special  mission  to  China  and  Japan,  1857-1859." 


Il6    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

In  the  midst  of  these  momentous  events,  which  in 
the  eyes  of  nobles  and  officials  loomed  larger  than 
did  the  foreign  problem,  came  the  not  unexpected  de 
mands  of  other  powers  for  treaty  rights  similar  to 
those  which  Harris  had  obtained.  Mr.  Donker  Cur- 
tius  hurried  back  from  Nagasaki.  The  three  ambas 
sadors  who  had  won  treaties  at  Tientsin  now  turned 
their  attention  toward  Japan.  Admiral  Count  Poutia- 
tine  was  the  first  to  arrive.  Then  came  the  Earl  of 
Elgin  and  Kincardine,  convoying  the  yacht  which  the 
Queen  had  sent  out  as  a  present  to  the  Shogun,  and 
a  month  later,  Baron  Gros.  None  of  them  brought 
a  large  force,  the  English  and  French  squadrons  com 
prising  only  three  ships  each. %  The  first  to  arrive 
were  amazed  to  find  that  the  lonely  American  consul- 
general  had  won,  unsupported,  all  that  they  well 
could  ask. 

The  negotiation  of  three  of  the  treaties  was  in  prog 
ress  at  the  same  time.  The  American  treaty  was 
used  as  a  basis,  and  few  changes  were  introduced. 
The  Dutch  treaty  was  signed  on  August  18,  the  Rus 
sian  on  the  I9th,  the  British  on  the  26th,  and  the 
French  on  October  7. 

Two  changes  were  introduced  by  Lord  Elgin,  one 
fixing  the  date  on  which  the  treaty  would  go  into 
effect  as  July  i,  instead  of  4,  1859,  and  the  ether 
removing  cotton  and  woollen  manufactured  good: 
from  the  class  which  paid  twenty  per  cent  duty  t 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS     117 

the  five  per  cent  class.  As  Baron  Gros  later  told  the 
Japanese  commissioners,  Lord  Elgin  did  not  wish  to 
mention  a  date  "which  would  recall  a  painful  epoch 
for  England."38  He,  in  turn,  selected  August  15,  the 
festival  of  Napoleon  III.  As  Lord  Elgin  had  secured 
a  valuable  concession  in  the  reduction  of  the  duty  on 
cotton  and  woollen  goods,  so  he  endeavored  to  have 
French  wines  removed  from  the  thirty-five  per  cent 
to  the  twenty  per  cent  class.  He  argued  that  the 
other  envoys  had  failed  to  mention  wines  because 
their  states  did  not  produce  any,  and  that  Harris, 
who  had  proposed  the  duty,  was  "  probably  a  member 
of  some  temperance  society."39  But  in  this  respect 
the  Japanese  refused  to  yield,  assuring  Baron  Gros 
that  if  the  Japanese  perceived  the  need  of  wine  they 
could  change  the  tariff  at  the  revision  of  the  schedule 
five  years  later.  Lord  Elgin,  therefore,  had  made  the 
first  breach  in  the  reasonable  tariff  which  Harris  had 
drawn  up.  Under  the  "  most  favored  nation  "  clause 
all  the  treaty  powers  enjoyed  this  tariff  reduction, 
but  Britain  most  of  all  because  of  her  preeminence  in 
cotton  and  woollen  manufacturing. 

The  negotiation  of  these  later  treaties,  important 
as  they  seemed  to  the  European  diplomats,  was  but  a 
troublesome  detail  to  the  harassed  officials  of  the 
Shogunate.  Of  far  more  importance  was  the  curb- 

88Chassiron,  157. 
39  Chassiron,  163. 


118    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN   RELATIONS 

ing  of  the  increasing  hostility  to  the  administration 
which  was  evident  both  at  Yedo  and  at  Kyoto.  Lord 
li  had  already  announced  that  it  was  the  intention  of 
government  to  send  Lord  Manabe,  of  the  Cabinet,  to 
explain  matters  to  the  imperial  court,  but  the  illness  of 
the  Shogun  and  the  arrival  of  the  Russian  and  British 
envoys  had  compelled  him  to  remain  in  Yedo.  On 
the  day  the  Shogun  died,  however,  an  imperial  order 
was  received,  requiring  that  either  the  Tairo  or  one 
of  the  Princes  of  the  Three  Houses  present  himself 
at  the  court  with  an  explanation  of  the  foreign  situa 
tion.40  To  this  demand  Lord  li  replied  that  he  was 
too  much  occupied  with  affairs  of  state,  while  two  of 
the  Sanke,  Mito  and  Owari,  were  undergoing  domi 
ciliary  confinement,  and  the  third  was  but  a  boy.41 
Instead,  he  forwarded  another  written  explanation  of 
the  course  pursued  by  the  Shogun's  government, 
which  differed  little  from  the  earlier  statements  save 
for  its  suggestion  that  the  policy  might  be  tried  for 
ten  or  fifteen  years  and  then  the  question  finally  de 
cided  as  to  whether  the  country  be  closed  or  opened 
to  foreign  trade  and  residence.42  In  the  main  it 
favored  an  open-door  policy,  and  presented  argu 
ments  in  support  of  the  opening  of  Hiogo,  which  was 
especially  objectionable  to  the  court. 

40  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  93. 

41  Ibid.,  103;  Gubbins,  Progress  of  Japan,  112. 

42  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  96-98. 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS     119 

At  Kyoto  a  bitter  feud  was  now  in  progress  be 
tween  the  two  factions  of  the  court.  One,  led  by 
Prince  Kujo,  the  Kwambaku  or  prime  minister,  sup 
ported"  the  policies  of  the  Shogunate.  The  other,  led ' 
by  the  nobles  Takadzukasa,  Konoye,  and  San  jo,  stood 
with  the  Mito  party,  and  were  stout  exclusionists. 
But  as  long  as  Prince  Kujo  was  Kwambaku  the  Sho 
gunate  was  assured  of  imperial  favor,  for  no  legal 
document  could  be  transmitted  from  the  throne  with 
out  his  approval.  The  exclusionists  now  sought  to 
remove  from  his  influential  office  a  prince  who  op 
posed  them.  On  September  15,  during  the  absence 
of  Prince  Kujo,  six  of  the  hostile  kuge  (court  nobles) 
signed  an  imperial  decree  which  censured  the  Shogu 
nate  for  its  presumption  in  signing  the  treaty  in  de 
fiance  of  the  imperial  will  and  for  the  failure  to  obey 
the  summons  to  send  one  of  the  princes  or  the  Tairo 
to  Kyoto,  and  once  more  called  for  an  expression  of 
opinion  from  the  daimyos.43  This  instruction  was  ac 
companied  by  a  document  asserting  that  no  contro 
versy  existed  between  the  two  courts.4*  A  copy  of  the 
former  document,  with  a  covering  letter  instructing 
the  Prince  of  Mito  to  make  the  contents  known  to 
the  other  daimyos,  was  sent  to  the  prince  as  senior 
feudatory.  These  documents  reached  him  on  Sep 
tember  23,  a  day  before  the  copies  reached  the  castle 

43  Gubbins,  Progress  of  Japan,  113. 

44  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  106. 


I2O    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN   RELATIONS 

at  Yedo.  He  replied  to  the  court  that  he  would  act 
for  the  best,  and  then  informed  the  Shogunate  that 
he  had  been  honored  with  direct  instructions  from  the 
throne.45 

This  act  was  another  shock  to  the  Yedo  officials. 
It  was  contrary  to  all  law  and  precedent  for  an  im 
perial  communication  to  be  directed  to  any  but  the 
Shogun.  In  this  crisis  the  act  also  served  both  to 
humiliate  the  Shogunate  and  to  support  the  hostile  in 
fluence  of  Mito.  To  the  Tairo,  the  thing  to  be  done 
was  plain.  He  must  strike  at  the  roots  of  the  con 
spiracy  in  Kyoto  which  was  undermining  the  prestige 
of  the  Tokugawa  administration.  The  foreign  ques 
tion  could  bide  its  time. 

On  the  9th  of  October,  Lord  Manabe,  of  the  Cabi 
net,  set  out  for  Kyoto  to  act  in  this  emergency.  While 
he  was  on  the  way — for  he  did  not  arrive  in  Kyoto 
until  the  i6th46 — the  exclusionist  party  was  able  to  per 
suade  Prince  Kujo  to  resign  from  office,  and  he  so 
notified  the  throne.  Lord  li,  when  news  of  this  coup 
•d'etat  reached  him,  sent  word  that  the  resignation 
could  not  be  recognized  without  the  Shogun's  ap 
proval,  and  on  his  arrival  Lord  Manabe  was  able  to 
persuade  Prince  Kujo  to  withdraw  his  application. 
Then  the  Shogun's  emissary  proceeded  to  ferret  out 

45  Ibid.,  105. 

48  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  112.  E.  M.  Satow,  Japan,  in  Cam 
bridge  Modern  History,  XI,  838,  gives  this  date  as  the  23d. 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS     121 

and  arrest  the  two-sword  men  who  were  implicated 
in  the  despatch  of  the  letter  from  the  Emperor  to 
Mito.  These,  principally  retainers  of  the  hostile  kuge 
(although  it  is  said  that  even  peasants  and  towns 
people  were  arrested),  were  sent  to  Yedo,  in  sedan 
chairs  covered  with  nets  and  in  bamboo  cages,  to  be 
imprisoned  with  those  who  had  been  arrested  there.47 
With  the  atmosphere  cleared  in  this  manner, 
Manabe  took  up  the  question  of  foreign  affairs,  and 
on  November  29  made  his  explanations  at  the  im 
perial  court.48  The  way  in  which  this  controversy 
had  been  crowded  to  one  side  by  the  greater  issues 
arising  from  the  internal  commotion  is  evident  from 
the  position  taken  by  the  Shogun's  representative. 
Instead  of  seeking  the  imperial  approval  because  of 
the  absolute  wisdom  and  necessity  of  breaking  down 
the  exclusion  laws,  Lord  Manabe  took  the  position 
that  the  treaties  were  temporary  evils  which  could 
not  be  avoided,  that  the  Shogunate  did  not  desire  to 
cultivate  friendly  relations  with  the  foreign  powers, 
and  that  as  soon  as  adequate  armaments  were  pre 
pared  the  barbarians  would  be  expelled.49  In  fact 
the  author  of  the  Bakumatsu  Gwaikodan,  The  Story 
of  Foreign  Relations  in  the  last  days  of  the  Shogun 
ate,  believed  that "  the  Shogunate's  agents  were  directed 

47  Japan,  1853-64,  pp.  31-32. 

48  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  114. 

49  Cambridge  Modern  History,  XI,  838. 


122    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

to  make  no  difficulties  in  regard  to  wording,  but  to 
accept  any  decree  which  clearly  established  the  fact 
that  an  understanding  between  the  Court  and  the 
Shogunate  had  been  effected."50  This  was  not  easy 
to  obtain.  Shimada  states  that  the  "  highest  order  of 
eloquence  and  wisdom  "  was  engaged,  for  more  than 
three  months,  until,  on  the  2d  of  February,  1859,  the 
imperial  answer  was  delivered  to  Lord  Manabe.51 
This,  in  brief,  approved  the  resolution  of  the  Shogun, 
the  Tairo,  and  the  Council  of  State  to  keep  the  bar 
barians  at  a  distance  and  eventually  restore  the  old 
policy  of  exclusion,  and  authorized  the  Shogun  to 
take  temporary  measures  to  this  end.52 

This  impractical  edict  was  considered  a  great  vic 
tory  for  the  Shogunate  party.  Lord  Manabe  re 
turned  to  Yedo  in  April.  There  the  conspirators  had 
been  tried  by  a  special  court;  some  were  beheaded, 
including  retainers  of  Mito,  Echizen,  and  Choshiu, 
and  others  banished  to  the  penal  colonies.  At  Kyoto 
some  of  the  kuge  of  highest  rank  were  compelled  to 
enter  monasteries  and  others  were  punished  with 
domiciliary  confinement,  and  the  leaders  of  the  anti- 
foreign  party  were  compelled  to  resign  their  offices  at 
the  court.53  *  Although  these  rigorous  penalties  curbed 
the  opposing  faction  for  the  time,  they  also  served  to 

50Gubbins,  Progress  of  Japan,  114. 

61  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  116. 

62  Ibid.,  115;  Gubbins,  Progress  of  Japan,  115. 
"  Japan,  1853-64,  PP-  33~34- 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS     123 

embitter  the  partisans  who  believed  that  their  friends 
had  been  executed,  exiled,  and  dishonored  because  of 
loyalty  to  the  throne. 

Lord  li  recognized  that  only  a  temporary  recon 
ciliation  between  the  two  courts  had  been  effected, 
and  he  bent  his  great  energies  toward  gaining  an  un 
equivocal  endorsement  of  the  Shogunate's  foreign 
policy.54  He  endeavored,  therefore,  to  arrange  a 
marriage  between  the  Shogun  and  a  younger  sister  of 
the  Mikado,  and  he  succeeded  in  securing  an  order 
from  the  throne  requiring  Mito  to  return  the  imperial 
instruction  of  the  preceding  year.  Before  either 
event  was  consummated,  however,  the  Tairo  had  paid 
with  his  life  for  his  courageous  loyalty  to  his  master. 

This  brief  survey  of  the  involved  political  develop 
ments  of  the  period  is  absolutely  essential  to  any 
study  of  the  foreign  relations  of  Japan.  It  is  evi 
dent  that  the  great  question  as  to  whether  Japan") 
should  abandon  her  old  policy  of  seclusion  and  ex-k  I 
elusion  could  not  be  decided  on  its  merits  alone.  \  The 
foreign  representatives  were  unable  to  fathom  the 
mysteries  of  the  political  situation  and  could  not,  for 
several  years,  understand  the  hidden  forces  which 
were  working  so  powerfully  against  the  maintenance 
of  the  new  treaties.  From  their  point  of  view,  and 
according  to  -established  law,  the  treaties  had  been 
negotiated  and  concluded  by  the  proper  authorities. 

54  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  119. 


124    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

*  Harris,  who  knew  more  about  Japanese  politics  than 
any  other  foreigner  at  the  time,  perceived  the  rising 
influence  of  the  Mikado  at  Kyoto,  but  he  did  not  fully 
realize  how  important  his  power  had  suddenly  be 
come.  The  hostile  edicts  from  Kyoto  were  not  made 
known  to  the  envoys,  nor  was  the  latest,  temporizing 
one  published.  It  was  not  until  1863  that  the  Amer 
ican  minister,  Mr.  Pruyn,  was  able  to  point  out  the 
absolute  necessity  of  securing  the  Mikado's  approval 
of  the  treaties,  which  indicates  how  far  at  sea  the 
representatives  were  in  the  intervening  years.  Even 
when,  in  1864,  some  of  the  documents  of  1858  came 
to  light,  they  were  taken  to  confirm  the  power  of  the 
Shogun  to  act  on  his  own  responsibility  in  foreign  af 
fairs.55 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Shogunate  the  period 
was  one  of  tremendous  embarrassment.  It  had 
signed  the  treaties.  Without  doubt  Lord  Hotta  and 
Lord  li  and  most  of  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  and 
the  higher  officials  had  considered  that  it  was  not 
only  necessary  but  eminently  proper  for  Japan  grad 
ually  to  emerge  from  her  seclusion  and  take  her  part 
in  the  affairs  of  the  world.  Fear  of  the  foreigners, 
though  a  powerful  factor,  was  not  the  only  reason 
for  their  forward-looking  decision.  Through  the 
stress  of  many  hostile  forces,  however,  they  had  been 
compelled  to  act  without  the  imperial  approval.  That 

65  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  Japan,  No.  i,  pp.  37-41. 


JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS     125 

act  placed  them  on  the  defensive  at  once,  and  involved 
the  whole  foreign  question  in  the  turmoil  of  internal 
politics.  It  became  the  weapon  near  at  hand  for  all 
the  critics  and  opponents  of  the  Yedo  administration, 
All  loyal  Japanese,  at  a  time  when  loyalty  to  the 
Mikado  was  being  preached  by  students  of  Japanese 
history,  denounced  this  irreverent  act.  Daimyos  and 
their  retainers,  court  nobles  and  their  followers,  all 
who  were  opposed  to  foreign  intercourse,  or  angered 
at  the  high-handed  conduct  of  Lord  li,  or  embittered 
because  of  the  decision  regarding  the  succession  to 
the  Shogunate,  or  hostile  to  the  Tokugawas,  or  even 
opposed  to  the  Shogunate  itself /all  these  'opposition 
forces  could  unite  on  a  common  basis  of  denuncia 
tion  of,  as  they  deemed  it,  li's  impious  and  cowardly 
act  in  signing  the  treaties  in  opposition  to  the  imperial 
will  and  because  of  fear  of  the  "  foreign  barbarians." 
Then  when  the  Shogunate,  in  order  to  heal  the 
breach  with  the  court  and  gain  support  in  its  cam 
paign  against  its  enemies,  receded  from  its  former 
sound  position  regarding  foreign  intercourse,  and 
practically  promised  to  eventually  close  the  doors 
against  the  western  peoples,  it  made  for  itself  a  Pro 
crustean  bed.  Its  temporizing  policy  was  bound  to 
be  assailed,  and  demands  were  sure  to  be  made  that 
the  period  of  intercourse  be  brought  to'  an  end.  Lord 
li  hoped  that  he  would  be  able  to  secure  complete 
recognition  of  his  foreign  policy,  but  he  was  struck 


126    JAPANESE   POLITICS   AND   FOREIGN    RELATIONS 

down  too  soon,  and  his  successors  were  unable  to 
carry  out  his  plans.  On  the  one  hand  they  faced  the 
foreigners,  who  insisted  that  the  treaties  be  lived  up 
to  in  spirit  and  in  letter,  and  on  the  other  they  faced 
the  rising  power  of  the  court,  which  demanded  that 
the  old  law  of  exclusion  be  enforced. 

The  careful  student  of  the  events  of  the  next  six 
years  will  be  impressed,  not  with  the  infrequent  at 
tacks  upon  foreign  nationals  and  the  occasional  viola 
tion  of  treaty  provisions,  but  with  the  way  in  which 
the  Shogunate  struggled  to  keep  its  plighted  faith  in 
the  presence  of  a  bitter  and  general  anti-foreign  feel 
ing.56 

56  It  must'  be  recognized  that  much  of  this  feeling  was  di 
rected  not  so  much  against  foreigners  as  against  the  Sho 
gunate  and  its  foreign  policy. 


CHAPTER  V 

MUTUAL  RECRIMINATION 

Although  the  new  treaties  would  not  go  into  effect 
until  the  following  July,  one  clause  in  the  American 
treaty  called  for  immediate  attention.  It  was  the 
fourteenth,  which  provided  for  the  exchange  of  rati 
fications  at  Washington,  on  or  before  the  4th  of  July, 
1859,  although  the  treaty  would  still  go  into  effect 
even  if  the  ratifications  were  not  exchanged  by  that 
time.  This  clause  had  been  proposed  by  the  Jap 
anese,1  and  gladly  welcomed  by  Harris  in  order  that 
the  United  States,  the  first  of  the  treaty  powers, 
might  welcome  the  first  Japanese  embassy.2  In  Sep 
tember  the  Japanese  government  formally  applied  for 
the  use  of  an  American  -steamer  to  convey  the  mis 
sion  to  Washington,  by  way  of  San  Francisco  and 
Panama,  and  it  was  suggested  that  December  7  be  the 
date  of  departure.3  Owing  to  the  slow  and  uncertain 
means  of  communication  at  this  period  (a  letter  from 
Commodore  Tatnall  to  Harris,  dated  Nagasaki,  Oc 
tober  27,  1858,  did  not  arrive  until  February  14,  1859) 
no  American  vessel  appeared  at  the  appointed  time. 

1  Suggested  by  li  to  Hotta  (Akimoto,  180). 

2  Griffis,  Harris,  281. 

8  36th  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  25,  p.  3. 
127 


128  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

During  these  months  the  effort  to  secure  imperial  ap 
proval  of  the  treaties  was  in  process  at  Kyoto,  and 
the  Yedo  authorities  were  loath  to  pour  oil  upon  the 
flames.  In  January,  Harris's  old  friend,  Shinano-no- 
Kami,  proposed  that  the  mission  be  postponed  for  not 
more  than  a  year,  on  the  ground  that  some  of  the 
hostile  daimyos  were  demanding  the  enforcement  of 
the  ancient  death  penalty  upon  any  Japanese  who 
might  leave  the  country.4  He  suggested  that  a  con 
vention  be  executed  agreeing  to  the  postponement  and 
fixing  a  new  date,  and  to  this  Harris  agreed.  Noth 
ing,  however,  was  done  until  February  27  when  the 
U.  S.  S.  Mississippi  arrived  at  Shimoda,  prepared  to 
receive  the  embassy.  Harris  proceeded  in  it  to  Kana- 
gawa  and  tendered  it  to  the  government.  On  the  next 
day,  March  3,  four  commissioners  appeared  at  Kana- 
gawa  to  negotiate  a  convention  for  the  postponement 
of  the  embassy.  This  could  easily  have  been  done, 
but  Harris  took  this  opportunity  to  secure,  if  possible, 
a  new  and  important  treaty  concession.  It  was  none 
other  than  a  clause  securing  full  religious  toleration 
among  the  Japanese  themselves.5  'The  Japanese  com- 

4  36th  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  25,  p.  5. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  8.    Articles  securing  toleration  for  the  practice  of 
the  Christian  religion  had  been  inserted  in  the  several  Tientsin 
treaties  of  June,  1858.    The  right  of  the  Chinese  to  practice 
this  foreign  faith  was  thus  based  on  treaty  provisions,  and 
any  interference  with  Chinese  Christians  became  a  treaty  vio- 
Jation.    The  Japanese  never  accepted  such  an  article,  and  tol 
eration  came  a  few  years  later  as  an  act  of  their  own  govern 
ment. 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  129 

missioners,  however,  refused  to  accept  this  new  ar 
ticle,  although  the  negotiatgnswere  protracted  for 
fifteen  days.  [On  March  19  tfre  convention  was  signed. 
It  provided  thatS*  ratified  copy  of  the  treaty  should 
be  placed  in  the  hands  of  Harris  pending  the  ex 
change  of  ratifications  in  Washington;  that  no  em 
bassy  should  leave  Japan  for  any  foreign  nation  until 
the  mission  bearing  the  Japanese  ratification  had  ar 
rived  in  Washington;6  that  the  article  of  the  treaty 
relating  to  freedom  of  trade  between  Americans  and 
Japanese  should  be  published  in  all  parts  of  the  Em- 
pirekon  July  fii&tAand  that  the  embassy  would  be 
ready  to  leave  Yecfo  on  February  22,  i86o.7 

lifter  this  satisfactory  agreement  had  been  reached 
Harris  returned  to  Shimoda  until  early  in  May,  when, 
under  a  sick  certificate,  he  took  his  first  and  only 
leave  from  his  post.  For  a  month  he  remained  in 
Shanghai,  enjoying  the  society  of  this  growing  sea 
port  after  his  long  years  of  isolation.  |Acfi^Ae  his 
achievement  had  been  everywhere  acclaimed,  and  on 
January  JJLthe  Senate  unanimously  confirmed  his 
nomination  as  minister  resident  of  the  United  States 


n 
On  the  1  5th  of  June  Harris  sailed  from  Shanghai 

8  This  provision  was  introduced  because  Harris  believed  that 
the  English  would  renew  the  efforts  made  by  Lord  Elgin  to 
have  a  Japanese  mission  visit  their  land. 

7  36th  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  25,  pp.  Q/-IO. 

8  Griffis,  Harris,  322. 


130  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

on  the  Mississippi  to  take  up  his  duties  in  Japan  under 
the  new  treaties  and  with  his  new  rank.  At  Naga 
saki  he  found  H.  M.  S.  Sampson,  bearing  the  new 
British  consul-general,  Mr.  Rutherford  Alcock.  After 
remaining  a  few  days  at  Shimoda  he  arrived  at  Kana- 
gawa  on  the  3Oth,  the  day  before  that  port  was  to  be 
opened  under  the  British  treaty. 

The  Japanese,  on  their  part,  had  made  serious  prep 
arations  for  the  inauguration  of  the  new  commercial 
relations. /  The  first  ffvfstTpn  was  that  of  the  loca 
tion  of  the  new  port  at  Kanagawa.  This  matter  had 
been  taken  up  by  the  Japanese  commissioners  with 
Harris,  and  he  had  insisted  upon  the  town  of  Kana 
gawa,  which  was  named  in  his  treaty.  Lord  li,  how 
ever,  favored  the  little  fishing  village  of  Yokohama, 
three  miles  distant,  where  Perry's  treaty  had  been 
signed.  The  Tairo's  reasons  were  of  the  best,  for 
Yokohama  not  only  possessed  an  excellent  harbor, 
but  was  also  removed  from  the  great  highway,  the 
Tokaido,  along  which  passed  the  daimyo  processions 
and  where  unsuspecting  foreigners  might  come  to 
grief  at  the  hands  of  hostile  two-sword  men.  But 
Harris  saw  in  this  squalid  fishermen's  hamlet  on  the 
swampy  shores  of  the  bay,  accessible  to  Kanagawa 
only  by  a  raised  causeway,  a  second  Deshima,  where 
the  foreigners  would  be  isolated  and  trade  with  them 
strictly  controlled.  He  protested  so  strongly  against 
the  selection  of  Yokohama — in  fact,  pointing  out  two 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  13! 

sites  on  the  Kanagawa  side — that  the  commissioners 
recommended  that  his  views  be  accepted.  The  Cabi 
net  also  endorsed  this  opinion,  but  the  Tairo  refused 
to  consent.9  He  determined  to  make  ready  a  port  at 
Yokohama  in  the  belief  that  the  merchants  would  rec 
ognize  the  desirability  of  the  site.  So  when  the  for 
eign  representatives  arrived  in  June  they  found  a  new 
port  ready  for  trade,  with  residences  for  the  consuls 
and  merchants,  shops,  a  custom-house,  a  governor's 
office,  and  two  "  really  imposing  and  beautifully  con 
structed  landing-places,  with  flights  of  well-laid 
granite  steps  of  great  extent."10 

In  another  respect  the  Japanese  had  made  ready,  to 
the  amazement  of  the  newcomers.  The  treaties  pro 
vided  for  the  circulation  of  foreign  coins  in  Japan, 
weight  for  weight,  and  the  exchange  of  these  coins  for 
Japanese  coins  during  the  first  year.  Hitherto  three 
silver  ichibus  were  equal  intrinsically  to  a  Mexican 
dollar,  but  now  the  government  issued  a  new  coin, 
the  half-ichibu,  which  was  equal  in  weight  and  value 
to  a  half-dollar.  Although  larger  than  the  old  ichibu, 
the  new  coin  had  a  token  value  of  only  half  the  old 
one.  It  is  easy  to  realize  the  effect  upon  trade  of  this 
innovation. 

When  Harris  reached  Kanagawa  on  the  3Oth,  he 
found  that  Alcock  had  arrived  four  days  before  and 

9Akimoto,  180. 

10  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2648),  p.  9. 


132  MUTUAL  RECRIMINATION 

had  proceeded  to  Yedo  to  arrange  for  the  exchange 
of  the  ratified  British  treaty.  Akock  returned  that 
day  in  order  to  take  part  in  the  formal  opening  of 
Kanagawa  on  the  first  of  July.  Harris,  in  turn, 
raised  the  American  flag  over  the  consulate,  at  the 
temple  of  Hongakuji,  on  the  4th  of  July.  On  the  6th 
Akock  took  up  his  residence  at  the  temple  of  Tozen- 
gee,  in  Yedo,  and  the  next  day  Harris  established  the 
American  legation  there  at  the  temple  of  Zempukuji.11 
The  first  two  foreign  representatives  had  taken  up 
their  residence  in  "the  capital  of  the  Tycoon." 

As  Mr.  Alcock  aptly  remarked,  it  was  one  thing  for 
the  ambassadors  to  secure  their  treaties  in  1858  from 
the  alarmed  Japanese,  and  quite  another  for  their  suc 
cessors  to  make  the  treaties  "  practical,  every-day  reali 
ties  "  in  the  presence  of  the  aroused  hostility  of  the 
country.12  He  failed  to  mention  that  Mr.  Harris, 
who  had  negotiated  the  master  treaty  of  1858,  was  the 
only  one  of  the  envoys  to  remain  and  endeavor  to  make 
the  treaties  work.  Rutherford  Alcock  was  appointed 
British  consul-general  in  Japan  after  a  service  of  four 
teen  years  as  consul  at  the  Chinese  treaty  ports.  This 
service  was  not  the  best  sort  of  training  for  a  respon 
sible  post  in  Japan,  although  Alcock  never  carried  the 
masterful  ways  of  the  Chinese  service  to  the  extreme 
reached  by  his  successor,  Sir  Harry  Parkes.  In  addi- 

11  Griffis,  Harris,  322. 

12  R.  Alcock,  Capital  of  the  Tycoon,  I,  xvi-xvii. 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  133 

tion  to  the  many  laudable  qualities  portrayed  by  his 
biographer,13  Alcock  had  two  failings  which  affected 
his  usefulness  in  Japan.  He  possessed  too  ready  a 
pen,  which  led  him  into  the  writing  of  despatches  and 
minutes  which  were  wordy  in  the  extreme,  and  in 
which  the  meaning  was  at  times  almost  obscured  by 
the  veil  of  verbiage.  As  the  ideal  of  Japanese  official 
correspondence  is  brevity,  and  as  the  difficulties  of 
translating  were  very  great  at  this  time,  it  may  be 
doubted  if  the  perplexed  Japanese  ministers  for  foreign 
affairs  were  at  times  able  to  fathom  the  voluminous 
despatches  which  were  poured  in  upon  them.  With 
this  readiness  to  write  came  a  tendency  to  hasty  judg 
ments  which  frequently  had  to  be  soon  revised, 
although  at  times  they  persisted  in  all  their  pristine 
inaccuracy. 

[  tCfiwnsend  Harris,Jon  the  other  hand,  {entered  upon 
his  ministerial  duties  with  a  very  different  training 
and  temperament.  He  had  lived  in  Japan  for  three 
years,  and  his  admiration  for  the  people  and  his  sym 
pathetic  understanding  of  the  problems  before  the 
government  were  pronounced.  He  was  slow  to  come 
to  a  conclusion,  but  once  decided  he  rarely  altered  his 
position^)  In  his  correspondence  |he  was  a  man  of 
few  words,  but  of  absolute  clarity  of  phrase]  No 
wonder  one  of  the  Japanese  officials  who  had  to  deal 
with  him  could  say :  "  I  admired  him  because  £ie  did 

18  A.  Michie,  The  Englishman  in  China. 
10 


134  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

not  change  his  views  frequently,  for  he  always  spoke 
deliberately.]'14  These  differences  between  the  repre 
sentatives  of  the  English-speaking  peoples  must  be 
pointed  out  if  we  are  to  understand  the  strained  rela 
tions  which  later  developed.) 

The  inauguration  of  the  new  treaties  was  apparently 
marked  by  two  violations  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese 
because  of  the  way  in  which  they  had  tried  to  make 
ready  for  the  foreigners.  Against  the  choice  of  Yoko 
hama  as  the  open  port  both  Harris  and  Alcock  pro 
tested.  But  the  question  was  really  decided  by  the 
merchants,  who  promptly  realized  the  commercial 
advantages  of  Yokohama  no  matter  what  the  political 
disadvantages  might  be.  It  was  a  great  disappoint 
ment  for  Mr.  Alcock  when  the  representative  of  the 
great  British  firm  of  Jardine,  Matheson  and  Company 
established  himself  at  Yokohama,  in  spite  of  Alcock's 
protest,15  and  when  some  Dutch  merchants  did  like 
wise.  It  was  finally  settled  that  the  foreigners  could 
reside  at  Kanagawa,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  only  the 
consuls  and  a  few  missionaries  did  so.16  The  mer 
chants  preferred  the  site  which  Lord  li  had  chosen, 
and  to  him,  and  not  to  the  foreign  representatives, 
should  be  given  the  credit  for  the  choice  of  this  excel 
lent  port.  In  a  few  years  the  consuls  also  moved  over 

14  Griffis,  Harris,  30711. 

15Heco,  I,  217;  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2648),  p.  25. 

«  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2648),  p.  54. 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  135 

to  Yokohama,  although  the  British  consul  was  still 
designated  as  at  Kanagawa.17 

The  currency  question  proved  more  difficult  of  solu 
tion  than  that  of  the  location  of  the  open  port.  That 
the  Japanese  had  the  sovereign  right  to  alter  their  cur 
rency  could  hardly  be  doubted,  and  they  did  not  con 
sider  that  they  had  parted  with  this  prerogative  when 
they  signed  the  Harris  treaty;18  but  the  circulation  of 
a  special  form  of  currency  designed  apparently  for  the 
foreign  trade  alone  might  be  considered  a  clear  in 
fraction  of  the  treaty,  and  Harris  and  Alcock  both  pre 
sented  formal  protests  to  the  ministers  for  foreign 
affairs.  The  result  was  that  the  Japanese  withdrew 
the  new  coinage,  and,  as  provided  by  treaty,  agreed  to 
the  free  circulation  of  dollars,  and  to  the  exchange  of 
dollars  for  ichibus  to  the  capacity  of  their  mint,  or 
16,000  a  day.19  The  evils  from  which  they  suffered, 
however,  which  were  far  greater  than  those  of  the 
foreign  merchants,  persisted.  Because  of  the  ab 
normal  ratio  of  silver  to  gold  in  Japan,  which  was  only 
five  to  one  instead  of  fifteen  to  one  as  in  the  world  at 
large,  it  was  tremendously  profitable  for  the  foreign 
merchants  to  import  dollars,  secure  ichibus,  exchange 
them  for  gold  kobangs,  and  export  the  latter.  Neither 
the  Japanese  nor  Harris  had  any  idea  that  this  business 

17  F.  C.  Adams,  History  of  Japan,  I,  118. 

"  Alcock,  II,  415. 

19  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2648),  pp.  48,  53. 


136  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

would  follow  from  the  treaty  which  they  negotiated, 
but  if  it  continued  it  would  perhaps  drain  Japan  of  all 
her  gold  coins.  To  alter  the  ratio  of  gold  and  silver 
would  have  disturbed  all  financial  transactions  in 
Japan,  and  it  seemed  easier  to  introduce  a  new  cur 
rency  which  would  take  up  the  impact  of  the  new  com 
mercial  relations.  When  this  was  denied  to  the 
Japanese  they  resorted  to  other  means  to  protect  their 
supply  of  gold,  and  in  doing  so  legitimate  trade  was 
bound  to  suffer.  It  must  always  be  borne  in  mind, 
however,  that  the  Japanese  were  real  sufferers  under 
these  new  relations,  and  that  the  export  of  gold  was  the 
first  of  many  grievances.20 

That  a  hostile  element  existed  among  the  Japanese 
had  long  been  known.  Mr.  Harris  had  noted  threaten 
ing  incidents  at  Shimoda,  and  during  his  visit  to  Yedo, 
in  1857,  he  had  several  times  been  warned  of  possible 
danger.  He,  in  turn,  had  done  his  part  by  taking 
every  precaution  against  possible  assaults.21  When 
Lord  Elgin  and  Baron  Gros  visited  Yedo  only  rare 
evidences  of  ill  will  were  met  with.  With  the  arrival 

20  A  gold  kobang  was  worth  by  assay  from  175.  6d.  to  i8s. 
6d.,  but  was  exchangeable  for  four  silver  ichibus,  equivalent 
to  a  dollar  and  a  third  Mexican  (P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2648), 
p.  15) .  Government  forbade  the  sale  of  kobangs,  but  they  could 
be  had  for  6l/2-7l/2  ichibus  ($2.17-2.73  Mex.)  and  sold  in  China 
for  $3.50-3.85  (Heco,  I,  234)-  See  H.  A.  Tilley,  Japan,  The 
Amoor,  and  the  Pacific,  131-135;  J-  R-  Black,  Young  Japan, 
I,  41-42. 
.  21  Griffis,  Harris,  291. 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  137 

of  the  foreign  ministers  and  consuls,  merchants  and 
sailors,  trouble  developed.  In  August,  1859,  complaints 
were  made  that  members  of  the  two  missions  were 
pelted  with  stones  and  threatened  by  two-sword  men,22 
and  on  the  25th  of  that  month  the  first  assassination 
occurred. 

Early  in  the  month  Count  Muravieff-Amursky,  gov 
ernor-general  of  Eastern  Siberia,  appeared  in  Yoko 
hama  with  a  squadron  of  seven  vessels  carrying  one 
hundred  and  five  guns.23  A  few  days  later  two  more 
ships  joined  him.  He  had,  the  year  before,  negotiated 
a  treaty  with  China  which  won  for  Russia  the  left 
bank  of  the  Amur  River  (whence  his  title)  and  gave 
her  equal  rights  to  the  Manchurian  sea-coast.  His 
present  mission  was  to  secure  the  cession  of  Saghalien 
by  Japan.  Before  he  took  up  his  residence  in  Yedo 
some  of  his  men,  wandering  through  the  city,  had  been 
jostled  and  stoned  by  a  mob.  They  were  protected 
by  some  native  officers  and  escorted  back  to  their 
residence.2*  On  Count  Muravieff's  complaint  the 
Japanese  officer  in  charge  of  the  district  and  his  lieu 
tenant  were  dismissed.  Muravieff  landed  in  state  on 
the  22d  and  proceeded  three  days  later  to  open  his 
negotiations.  On  that  day,  however,  at  Yokohama,  a 
lieutenant  and  two  seamen  from  the  Russian  fleet  were 

22  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2648),  p.  32. 
23Tilley,  144. 
"  Ibid.,  153. 


138  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

cut  down  by  two-sword  men.  One  of  the  seamen  was 
instantly  killed,  and  the  lieutenant  expired  during  the 
night.25 

This  crime  filled  the  foreign  community  with  horror 
and  alarm,  and  many  persons  promptly  armed  them 
selves  against  a  general  attack.  Speculation  was  rife 
as  to  the  cause  of  the  assault,  the  best  explanation 
being  that  the  attack  grew  out  of  the  punishment  of 
the  Yedo  officials,  but  whether  made  by  them  or  by 
their  friends  could  never  be  learned.26  That  it  was  a 
deliberate  attempt  on  the  part  of  hostile  daimyos  to 
provoke  hostilities  seems  less  evident.  Then  came  the 
question  of  reprisals. 

Each  had  his  own  plan  of  what  ought  to  be  done:  some 
were  for  burning  the  town  down,  others  for  attacking  Yedo ; 
one  or  two  sensible  ones  proposed  that  the  authorities  should 
forbid  their  officials  to  wear  their  swords  within  the  districts 
opened  to  foreigners.  All  expected  that  some  severe  act  of 
retribution  would,  of  course,  be  inflicted  on  the  murderers  if 
caught,  but  if  not,  on  the  Government,  by  the  large  Russian 
squadron  in  the  neighbourhood,  as  a  warning  and  a  lesson  that 
it  would  be  called  to  account  for  the  life  of  every  foreigner 
by  all  European  governments  combined.27 

None  of  these  reprisals  occurred.  The  Japanese  ex 
pressed  their  sorrow  and  regret  and  promised  to  do 
all  they  could  to  arrest  and  punish  the  murderers,  and 
one  of  the  governors  of  Kanagawa  attended  the 

25  Tilley,  162-166. 

26  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2648),  p.  44;  Tilley,  173. 

27  Tilley,  169. 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  139 

funeral  of  the  victims, — much  against  his  wishes,  for 
it  was  contrary  to  custom  and  would  necessitate  ob 
servances  for  purification.  Count  Muravieff  and  Com 
modore  Popoff  were  satisfied  with  the  efforts  made  by 
the  Japanese,  and  they  sailed  away,  leaving  Captain 
Ounkovsky  and  the  Askold  to  settle  the  matter  and 
protect  the  foreign  community.  On  September  26  the 
Japanese  accepted  Ounkovsky's  proposals,  which 
called  for  an  expression  of  regret  by  a  deputation  of 
the  highest  dignitaries  on  the  frigate,  the  dismissal  of 
the  governors  of  Yokohama,  and  the  apprehension  of 
the  murderers  and  their  execution  in  the  presence  of 
Russian  officers  on  the  spot  where  the  murders  oc 
curred.28  In  addition,  the  Japanese  agreed  to  guard 
the  mortuary  chapel  in  perpetuity.  No  indemnity  was 
demanded,  for,  as  Count  Muravieff  proudly  said, 
"Russia  did  not  sell  the  blood  of  her  subjects."29 

This  solution  of  the  affair  was  a  great  disappoint 
ment  to  those  who  favored  a  strong  policy.  A  feeling 
of  the  greatest  insecurity  prevailed;  and  not  only  did 
all  the  residents  of  Yokohama,  with  the  exception  of 
the  Americans,  go  about  armed,  but  the  English  and 
Dutch  consuls  wore  their  weapons  when  holding  inter 
views  with  the  Japanese  officials.30  Before  the  excite 
ment  could  pass  away,  a  Chinese  servant  in  the  employ 

28  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69,  p.  77. 

29  Alcock,  I,  342. 
30Tilley,  175. 


I4O  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

of  the  French  consular  agent  was  struck  down  on 
November  5.31  As  the  victim  had  come  from  Hong 
kong,  the  British  consul  at  Kanagawa  believed  that 
he  was  called  upon  to  move  in  this  matter;  and  so 
distraught  was  he  that  he  not  only  determined  to  turn 
the  murderers,  if  caught,  over  to  Alcock  for  punish 
ment,  which  would  have  been  a  violation  of  the  treaty, 
but  he  issued  a  notification  to  all  British  subjects  to  go 
about  armed  as  much  as  possible,  and  gave  them  free 
permission  to  use  a  revolver  or  other  deadly  weapon, 
on  any  reasonable  provocation,  on  any  Japanese  official 
or  non-official.32  Mr.  Alcock,  in  Yedo,  was  able  to 
preserve  a  sense  of  proportion,  and  he  ordered  the 
immediate  withdrawal  of  the  notification.  For  this 
murder  the  best  explanation  seems  to  be  that  as  the 
Chinese  wore  European  dress  he  was  killed  by  a 
native  who  had  been  insulted  by  a  European;33  or,  as 
seems  even  more  probable,  some  Japanese  could  not 
tolerate  Chinese,  whom  they  despised,  aping  the  lordly 
foreigners  and  finding  shelter  under  their  flag. 

On  the  day  that  this  murder  occurred  in  Yokohama, 
Townsend  Harris  had  his  second  audience  of  the 
Shogun,  in  order  to  present  his  new  credentials  as 
minister  resident.34  The  growing  bitterness  occa- 

31  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2648),  p.  81.    A  Japanese  was  exe 
cuted  for  this  murder  on  September  30,  1865  (P.P.  1866,  Com. 
76,  p.  61). 

32  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2648),  p.  82. 
83  Adams,  I,  124. 

34  P.P.  1861,  Lords  18,  p.  56. 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  14! 

sioned  by  the  ill  effects  of  the  new  commerce  mani 
fested  itself  in  a  reception  which  was  far  less  cordial 
and  honorable  than  that  in  1857.  Against  this  Harris 
protested  for  months,  and  successfully,  until  a  third 
and  satisfactory  audience  was  held.  This  episode,  and 
the  restrictions  upon  trade,  caused  Harris  to  despair. 
On  November  15  he  wrote:  ""Our  affairs  here  are  in 
an  unsatisfactory  state.  The  Japanese  evade  the  faith 
ful  observance  of  the  most  important  of  the  treaty 
stipulations  or  meet  them  with  a  passive  resistance."35 
He  tried  in  every  way  to  convince  them  of  the  danger 
which  such  a  course  involved.  About  the  same  time 
Alcock  sent  a  gloomy  despatch  to  Lord  Russell :  "  I 
may  begin  by  stating,  that  at  this  hour  all  Treaties 
recently  concluded  with  Japan  are  virtually  annulled."36 
The  annullment,  however,  consisted  mainly  in  certain 

85  36th  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  25,  p.  12. 

36  December  6,  1859.  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69,  p.  89.  In  reply 
to  this  despatch  Lord  John  Russell  approved  Alcock's  gen 
eral  conduct,  but  said :  "  It  were  to  be  wished  that  you  had 
not  threatened  war."  "  If  war  is  made  to  enforce  the  ob 
servance  of  a  Commercial  Treaty,  we  run  the  risk  of  engag 
ing  in  protracted  hostilities,  and  of  earning  a  reputation  for 
quarrelling  with  every  nation  in  the  East.  Time  and  patience 
may  remove  many  of  the  difficulties  of  which  you  complain. 
The  Japanese,  on  their  side,  may  well  be  jealous  of  Europeans, 
who  insult  their  usages  and  carry  away  their  gold.  You  should 
endeavour  rather  to  soothe  differences  than  to  make  and  insist 
upon  peremptory  demands.  Our  intercourse  is  but  merely 
begun:  it  should  not  be  inaugurated  by  war"  (February  28, 
1860,  ibid.,  98). 


142  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

interference  with  trade,  which  could  not  have  been 
very  serious,  for  a  few  months  later  Alcock  was  able 
to  report  that  the  progress  of  trade  at  Kanagawa  and 
Nagasaki  during  these  six  months,  "  in  spite  of  every 
obstacle,  whether  in  currency,  monopolies,  or  official 
interference  .  .  .  must  be  a  matter  of  surprise  as  well 
as  congratulation."37 

On  the  same  day  Alcock  addressed  a  "  strong  letter  " 
to  the  ministers  for  foreign  affairs  requesting  a  con 
ference  ^d^-emphasizing  the  importance  of  this  inter 
view,  for  on  it  the  question  of  peace  or  war  between 
the  two  countries  would  depend.38  The  interview  took 
place  on  December  7.  Alcock  found  the  ministers 
"  quite  unconscious  of  any  disregard  of  Treaties,"  and 
in  a  four-hour  conference  he  proceeded  to  enlighten 
them.  \Harris  and  De  Bellecourt,  the  French  minister, 
supported  Alcock  in  his  complaints,  and  when  Harris 
had  an  interview  with  the  ministers  on  the  I3th,  he 
tried  a  new  argument,  assuring  them  that  if  because  of 
treaty  violations  war  should  result,  "the  Representa 
tives  of  the  foreign  Powers  would  only  negotiate  with 
the  Representatives  of  the  Mikado,  and  that  this  would 
overthrow  the  governing  power  then  exercised  by  the 
Daimios,  with  the  Tycoon  as  their  Representative."39' 
For  the  second  time  Harris  had  put  his  ringer  upon 

37  March  6,  1860.     P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2694),  p.  8. 

38  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2648),  p.  91. 
89  P.P.  1861,  Lords  18,  p.  56. 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  143 

the  weakest  point  in  the  Shogunate  regime,  but  it  may 
be  doubted  if  he  fully  realized  the  growing  influence 
of  the  formerly  almost  mythical  Mikado. 

The  new  year  brought  no  relief  to  the  nerve-racked 
foreign  residents.40  In  spite  of  government  regula 
tion  and  restriction  a  profitable  trade  was  rapidly  de 
veloping,  and  the  merchant  colony  at  Yokohama  grew 
with  it.  But  the  presence  of  sudden  death  at  the  hands 
of  some  two-sword  fanatic  was  never  forgotten.  On 
January  30,  1860,  the  Japanese  interpreter  of  the 
British  legation,  Dankirche  (Denkichi),  was  struck 
down  in  broad  daylight  close  to  the  gate  of  the  lega 
tion.41  Dan,  as  he  was  generally  called,  had  had  a 
remarkable  career.  He  was  a  sailor  on  a  junk  which 
had  been  blown  to  sea  early  in  December,  1850.  One 
of  his  companions  was  the  well-known  Joseph  Heco.42 
On  January  22,  when  all  hope  of  ever  reaching  Japan 
had  waned,  they  were  picked  up  by  an  American  bark 
and  carried  into  San  Francisco.  A  year  later  they 
were  sent  to  Hongkong  to  be  returned  to  Japan  by 
Perry's  expedition,  but  Heco  returned  to  the  United 
States  before  Perry  arrived.  Dan  joined  the  expedi 
tion,  where  he  was  known  as  Dan  Ketch,  but  he  was 
afraid  to  land  in  Japan  lest  he  be  beheaded  under  the 

40  A  Chinese  coolie  was  murdered  in  Yokohama  about  this 
time  (Heco,  I,  236). 

41  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2694),  pp.  1-4. 

42  Author  of  Narrative  of  a  Japanese. 


144  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

law  forbidding  Japanese  to  leave  the  country.43  He 
was  taken  back  to  America  and  lived  there  under  the 
commodore's  protection  until  his  return  to  Japan  in 
1858,  as  linguist  for  Mr.  Alcock.  His  residence  in 
America  had  ill  prepared  him  for  life  in  his  native 
land,  especially  in  those  parlous  times.  Mr.  Alcock 
described  him  as  "  ill-tempered,  proud  and  violent."44 
He  was  accustomed  to  wear  European  clothes,  and, 
counting  upon  the  protection  of  the  British  flag  and  the 
Colt  revolver  which  he  wore  in  his  belt,  "to  swagger 
and  to  defy  his  countrymen."45  The  reaction  of  such 
conduct  upon  the  Japanese  samurai  and  ronins46  may 
easily  be  imagined.  So  hated  had  he  become  that  the 
governors  of  foreign  affairs  urged  Alcock  to  send  Dan 
to  the  consulate  at  Kanagawa  for  safety,  but  the 
British  minister  announced  that  he  would  see  to  it  that 
his  servant  was  protected.47  Again  the  ministers  ex 
pressed  their  regret  and  promised  to  make  every  effort 
to  secure  the  assassins,  but  they  were  never  appre 
hended.  Alcock  then  demanded  that  two  of  the  gov 
ernors  of  foreign  affairs  attend  the  funeral.  They 
agreed,  but  later  refused  as  contrary  to  Japanese  cus- 

*3  Hawks,  I,  486. 

44  Alcock,  I,  332.  O.n  ( 

45  De  Fonblanque,  77. 

46  Samurai,  a  warrior  who  could  wear  two  swords,  aiv5-  'gen 
erally  received  a  pension  from  his  daimyo;  ronin,  a  fi^e  lance, 
a  samurai  who  had  left  his  clan. 

47  Heco,  I,  237. 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  145 

torn.  Alcock  insisted  and  they  complied,  "to  the 
astonishment  and  dismay  of  the  assembled  thousands 
who  lined  the  streets  of  Yedo."48 

Within  a  month  came  a  more  brutal  and  less  ac 
countable  onslaught.  Two  Dutch  merchant  captains 
were  "literally  hacked  to  pieces"  on  the  evening  of 
February  26,  in  Yokohama.  No  reason  could  be  as 
signed  for  this  deed,  for  the  captains  were  known  to 
be  "remarkably  quiet,  inoffensive  men."  The  feeling 
prevailed  that  this  was  but  another  attempt  of  the  anti- 
foreign  party,  perhaps  led  by  Mito,49  to  precipitate  a 
general  collision,  for  this  time  there  was  both  a  British 
and  a  Russian  ship  of  war  in  the  harbor.  Captain 
Vyse,  the  British  acting  consul,  however,  in  his  warn 
ing  to  the  British  community  suggested  that  the  unruly 
conduct  of  drunken  sailors  may  have  brought  about 
the  assassination  of  the  captains.50 

Once  more  were  some  Japanese  officials  compelled 
to  attend  the  funeral  services,  at  which  marines  and 
blue-jackets  from  the  two  warships  served  as  escorts. 
A  collective  protest  was  made  to  the  Japanese  min 
isters  for  foreign  affairs  on  the  part  of  the  three 

48  De  Fonblanque,  79. 

49  M*' ^  was  believed  by  the  foreigners  to  be  the  evil  spirit 
of  the  times.    He  was  accused  of  having  poisoned  the  Shogun 
in  if   ""   and  of  having  set  fire  to  the  palace  at  Yedo  on  No 
vember  12,  1859  (Alcock,  I,  357;  Heco,  I,  246;  P.P.  1860,  Com. 
69  (2694),?.  6). 

50  P.I .  i860,  Com.  69  (2694),  p.  9. 


146  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

foreign  ministers,  and  the  demand  of  the  Dutch  con 
sul  for  an  indemnity  was  supported.  Alcock  believed 
that  if  every  life  should  cost  the  government  from 
twenty  to  fifty  thousand  dollars  it  would  take  better 
precautions  to  protect  the  foreigners.  Yet  the  for 
eigners  were  loath  to  accept  the  protection  which  the 
Japanese  offered,  believing  that  it  was  more  designed 
to  isolate  than  to  protect  them.  But  of  the  good  faith 
of  the  government  and  of  its  eagerness  to  do  all  it 
could  to  protect  the  foreigners  there  can  be  little 
doubt. 

These  sporadic  assassinations,  six  in  seven  months, 
loomed  large  in  the  thoughts  of  the  little  group  of 
foreigners  at  Yedo  and  Yokohama,  but  they  little 
realized  the  number  of  Japanese  who  were  losing 
their  lives  during  these  troubled  days.  The  serious 
ness  of  the  political  situation  was,  however,  brought 
home  to  them  when  on  the  24th  of  March  the  Tairo 
himself,  Lord  li  Kamon-no-Kami,  was  assassinated 
and  his  head  taken,  at  the  very  entrance  to  the  Shogun's 
castle.51  Lord  li  was  on  his  way  to  the  palace  to  pay 
his  respects  on  that  festival  day.  Seated  in  his  palan 
quin  surrounded  by  his  retainers — who  unhappily,  be 
cause  of  a  belated  snow-storm,  wore  their  clumsy 
raincoats  and  had  their  swords  wrapped  in  cloths — he 
had  almost  reached  the  Sakurada  Gate  when  a  band 
of  eighteen  ronins  sprang  into  the  procession.  A  shot 

51  Akimoto,  185 ;  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  129-142. 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  147 

was  fired,  the  Tairo  was  stabbed  to  death  through  the 
sides  of  his  palanquin,  and  then  dragged  out  and  be 
headed,  and  the  survivors  fled  with  their  prize. 

Of  the  assassins,  seventeen  were  Mito  samurai  and 
one  was  from  Satsuma,  but  before  embarking  on  this 
bloody  enterprise  they  had  dissolved  their  clan  con 
nection  and  become  ronins.  Eight  were  killed  or 
mortally  wounded  in  the  encounter,  and  eight  more 
surrendered  later.  As  was  the  custom,  the  Mito  men 
had,  before  the  attack,  drawn  up  a  statement  of  their 
reasons  for  this  deed,  and  their  indictment  against 
the  Tairo  signalled  out  his  foreign  policy. 

While  fully  aware  of  the  necessity  for  some  change  in  policy  j 
since  the  coming  of  the  Americans  to  Uraga,  it  is  entirely 
against  the  interest  of  the  country  and  a  shame  to  the  sacred 
dignity  of  the  land  to  open  commercial  relations,  to  admit  for 
eigners  into  the  castle,  to  conclude  a  treaty,  to  abolish  the 
established  custom  of  trampling  on  the  picture  of  Christ,  to 
permit  foreigners  to  build  places  of  worship  of  their  evil 
religion,  Christianity,  and  to  allow  the  three  Ministers  to 
reside  in  the  land.  Under  the  excuse  of  keeping  the  peace, 
too  much  compromise  has  been  made  at  the  sacrifice  of  na 
tional  honor.  Too  much  fear  has  been  shown  in  regard  to 
the  foreigners'  threatenings.  Not  only  has  the  national  cus 
tom  been  set  aside,  and  national  dignity  injured,  but  the  policy 
followed  by  the  Shogunate  has  no  Imperial  sanction.  For  all 
these  acts  the  Tairo  Baron  li  Kamon-no-Kami  is  responsible.52 

Then  followed  a  protest  against  li's  conduct  in  con 
fining  some  of  the  loyal  princes  and  barons,  and  even 
in  interfering  with  the  imperial  succession : 

52  Satoh,  Agitated  Japan,  137-140. 


148  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

Therefore  we  have  consecrated  ourselves  to  be  the  instru 
ments  of  Heaven  to  punish  this  wicked  man,  and  we  have 
assumed  on  ourselves  the  duty  of  putting  an  end  to  a  serious 
evil  by  killing  this  atrocious  autocrat.  *  Our  conduct,  however, 
does  not  indicate  the  slightest  enmity  to  the  Shogunate.  We 
swear  before  Heaven  and  earth,  gods  and  men,  that  our  action 
is  entirely  built  on  our  hope  of  seeing  the  policy  of  the  Sho 
gunate  resume  its  proper  form  and  abide  by  the  holy  and  wise 
will  of  His  Majesty,  the  Emperor.  '  We  hope  to  see  our  na 
tional  glory  manifested  in  the  expulsion  of  foreigners  from 
the  land.  Thus  will  the  whole  nation  be  established  on  a  basis 
as  firm  and  unmovable  as  Mount  Fuji  itself.53  \ 

Although  in  the  minds  of  his  assailants  Lord  li's 
foreign  policy  was  a  great  offense,  yet  it  must  not  be 
forgotten  that  loyal  samurai  of  Mito  had  grievances 
nearer  their  heart  than  that.  The  feud  between  the 
Ex-lord  of  Mito  and  Lord  li  had  continued  for  seven 
years,  and  li  had  gained  the  upper  hand.  Not  only 
had  he  confined  the  ex-lord  to  his  mansion  and 
humbled  the  present  lord  and  Lord  Hitotsubashi,  but 
he  had  secured  an  imperial  order  for  the  return  of 
the  Mikado's  letter  to  Mito.  This  had  occasioned  a 
brief  civil  war  between  clansmen  who  would  obey  the 
order  and  those  who  would  have  refused  to  deliver 
up  the  Mikado's  letter.  It  was  seventeen  of  the 
latter  who  made  their  way  to  Yedo  to  destroy  the  man 
whom  they  considered  a  swaggering  despot  and  the 

53  This  feeling  of  personal  responsibility  for  the  punish 
ment  of  public  servants  whose  policy  did  not  prove  acceptable 
was  very  troublesome,  and  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  sev 
eral  of  the  most  valued  leaders  of  new  Japan. 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  149 

enemy  alike  of  the  Emperor,  the  daimyos,  and  the 
good  old  customs  of  Japan.54 

The  foreign  ministers  in  Yedo  now  realized  that  if 
the  Tairo  himself  could  not  secure  his  own  protection, 
they  stood  little  chance  should  a  determined  assault 
be  made.  However,  the  authorities  doubled  their  pro 
tective  measures.  The  legation  guards  were  in 
creased,  cannon  were  installed,  and  every  precaution 
known  to  the  Japanese  was  taken. 

From  these  scenes  of  bloodshed  it  is  a  relief  to 
turn  to  a  brighter  episode.  On  February  13  the  Jap 
anese  embassy  to  the  United  States  sailed  from  Yoko 
hama  on  board  the  Powhatan,  accompanied  by  the 
Japanese  war  steamer  Kanriu  Maru.55  The  ambas 
sadors  consisted  of  the  two  hatamoto,  Shimmei  Buzen- 
no-Kami  and  Muragake  Awaji-no-Kami,  and  the  cen 
sor  Oguri  Bungo-no-Kami,  while  fifteen  officers  and 
fifty- three  servants  completed  the  party.56  In  com 
mand  of  the  Kanriu  Maru  was  Captain  Katsu,  better 
known  as  Count  Katsu  Awa,  the  organizer  and  his 
torian  of  the  modern  Japanese  navy,  while  in  the 

B*  Brinkley,  671 ;  E.  W.  Clement,  "  The  Mito  Civil  War,"  in 
Trans.  As.  Soc.  Japan,  vol.  19,  part  II. 

55  P.  DuBois,  "  The  Great  Japanese  Embassy  of  1860,"  in 
Proceedings  of  the  American  Philosophical  Society,  vol.  xlix, 
pp.  243-266;  36th  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  25,  p.  12; 
J.  B.  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  V,  742-744. 

58  The  censor,  Oguri,  was  not  named  in  the  Shogun's  letter 
to  the  President.    The  Hatamoto  were  direct  vassals  of  the 
Shogun,  ranking  below  the  daimyo. 
ii 


150 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 


envoys'  suite  was  Fukuzawa  Yukichi,  who  became 
one  of  the  most  influential  leaders  of  new  Japan  as 
founder  of  the  Jiji  Shimpo  newspaper  and  the  Keiogi- 
juku  University.  The  journey  was  made  by  way  of 
San  Francisco  and  Panama ;  at  the  latter  place  the  U. 
S.  S.  Roanoke  was  waiting  to  convey  the  party  to 
Hampton  Roads.  There,  on  May  12,  the  party  were 
officially  received  and  transferred  to  the  Philadelphia, 
on  which  they  were  carried  to  Washington.  On  the 
1 7th  the  ambassadors  were  presented  to  President 
Buchanan  and  the  ratifications  were  exchanged.  Af 
ter  three  weeks  in  the  capital  there  followed  a  brief 
tour  of  the  eastern  cities,  in  which,  in  every  case,  the 
mission  was  received  with  lavish  hospitality  and  wide 
spread  interest.  At  Philadelphia  the  ambassadors 
were  especially  interested  in  the  working  of  the  Mint, 
for  they  sought  light  on  the  currency  problem  which 
so  embarrassed  their  government.  As  they  travelled 
they  received  as  presents  or  purchased  all  manner  of 
American  tools,  instruments,  and  articles  new  or 
strange  to  them,  and  their  artists  were  constantly  en 
gaged  in  sketching  scenes  of  interest  and  their  secre 
taries  in  taking  notes.  On  June  30  they  sailed  from 
New  York  in  the  Niagara,  largest  of  our  warships, 
arriving  at  Yokohama  on  November  9. 

The  first  Japanese  mission  to  the  treaty  powers  had, 
therefore,  sailed  to  the  United  States.  It  is  impos 
sible  to  estimate  the  effect  of  this  visit  upon  some  of 


MUTUAL    RECRIMINATION  15! 

the  keen-eyed  Japanese,57"  and  the  welcome  the  mem 
bers  received  strengthened  the  good  impression  of 
America  which  Harris  had  labored  so  hard  to  create. 
•  Within  a  year  after  the  opening  of  Kanagawa  it  was 
evident  to  Townsend  Harris  that  he  had  been  too 
optimistic  regarding  the  readiness  of  Japan  for  gen 
eral  foreign  intercourse.  Instead  of  the  anti-foreign 
feeling  dying  down,  it  had  apparently  gained  strength, 
and  showed  itself  in  the  assassinations  of  foreigners 
and  of  the  Tairo.  Although  he  had  confidence  in  the 
desire  of  the  Shogunate  to  protect  foreigners,  he  also 
realized  the  difficulty  of  the  task,  especially  in  Yedo, 
where  the  streets  were  filled  with  two-sworded  re 
tainers  of  the  resident  daimyos,  arrogant,  aggressive, 
and  many  of  them  bitterly  anti-foreign.  Therefore, 
on  August  i,  1860,  he  advised  his  government  that 
the  opening  of  Yedo  to  foreign  residence  on  January 
i,  1862,  might  lead  to  conflict  between  some  of  the 
merchants  and  the  Japanese  retainers,  and  thus  jeop 
ardize  the  promising  trade  which  had  already  been 
established.58  On  this  matter  the  British  and  the 
French  minister  were  in  agreement,  and  each  wrote 
to  his  government  requesting  discretionary  power  to 
postpone  the  opening  for  one  year  and  to  renew  it 
from  time  to  time  if  it  seemed  necessary.  In  this  re 
spect  they  anticipated  the  broader  request  of  the  Sho 
gunate  a  few  months  later. 

"Heco,  1,261. 

58  For.  Rel.,  1862,  pp.  793-794 


152  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

(At  this  point  it  might  be  well  to  point  out  some  of 
the  more  recent  aspects  of  the  anti-foreign  feeling. 
With  the  general  Japanese  opposition,  based  on  the 
violation  of  the  ancient  traditions  of  the  land  and  the 
disobedience  of  the  imperial  will,  we  are  quite  fa 
miliar.  But  with  the  opening  of  unregulated  trade 
at  Kanagawa  and  the  other  ports  certain  immediate 
evils  had  been  impressed  upon  the  Japanese.  In  the 
first  place,  such  was  the  demand  for  export  articles 
that  their  prices  rose  from  one  hundred  to  three  hun 
dred  per  cent,  and  this  rise  in  turn  affected  other  ar 
ticles.59  The  temporary  introduction  of  a  new  coinage 
also  demoralized  prices.  This  rise  in  prices  was  es 
pecially  felt  by  persons  on  fixed  salaries,  such  as  offi 
cials  and  retainers,  and  it  was  most  evident  near  the 
treaty  ports. 

Then,  it  must  be  confessed,  the  conduct  of  many  of 
the  foreigners  was  not  such  as  to  cause  the  Japanese 
to  welcome  more  intimate  relations  with  them.  On 
this  point  much  suggestive  material  may  be  found  in 
the  state  papers  and  the  contemporary  narratives. 
Many  of  the  merchants  had  come  over  from  China, 
where  since  the  Opium  War  they  had  conducted  them 
selves  much  as  they  pleased,  with  little  respect  for  the 
feelings  or  the  rights  of  the  Chinese.60  This  was 
hardly  a  good  preparation  for  life  in  Japan. 

59  For.  Rel,  1862,  p.  795. 

co  In  November,  1859,  there  were  only  twenty  resident'  for 
eign  merchants  at  Yokohama  (P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2617),?.  2). 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  153 

The  so-called  pioneers  of  civilization  are,  like  other  pioneers, 
more  noted  for  physical  energy  than  for  gentler  or  more  re 
fined  qualities.  It  is  not  the  skilled  or  scientific  farmer,  but 
the  strong-armed  labourer,  who  cuts  down  the  forest;  nor  is 
it  the  liberal,  enlightened,  prudent,  and  educated  merchant,  but 
the  daring,  money-seeking  adventurer,  who  clears  the  way  for 
commerce.  What  have  the  Japanese  to  learn  from  such  men  ? 
Do  they  set  them  a  profitable  example  in  morality,  in  decency, 
in  religion,  in  probity,  in  intelligence,  in  industry,  or  even  in 
the  outward  forms  of  social  intercourse?  .  .  .  We  say  the 
Japanese  are  false;  but  did  we  teach  them  truthfulness  or 
honesty  when  we  bought  their  gold  weight  for  weight  with 
silver,  and  drained  their  treasury  of  native  currency  by  false 
representations?  We  call  them  a  semi-barbarous  race;  but 
contrast  the  courteous,  dignified  bearing,  and  the  invariable 
equanimity  of  temper  of  the  lowest  official  or  smallest  trades 
man,  with  the  insolent  arrogance  and  swagger,  the  still  more 
insolent  familiarity,  or  the  besotted  violence,  of  many  an  Euro 
pean  resident  or  visitor.61 

Mr.  Alcock  made  frequent  S'evere  strictures  on  the 
conduct  of  the  foreigners,62  and  Mr.  Harris  reported 
that 

unfortunately,  a  portion  of  them  are  neither  prudent  nor  dis 
creet,  and  they  are  numerous  enough  to  imperil  the  safety  of 
the  orderly  and  well-disposed,  and  seriously  endanger  the 
amicable  relations  that  have  been  established  with  so  much 
difficulty  and  labor  with  this  government.63 

Before  1859  only  a  few  ships  touched  at  Japanese 

81  De  Fonblanque,  69-70 ;  C.  P.  Hodgson,  A  Residence  at 
Nagasaki,  xxix-xxxii. 

62  P.p.  1860,  Com.  69  (2648),  pp.  67,  78,  83,  88;  P.P.  1860, 
Com.  69  (2617),  pp.  i,  3-7. 

63  For.  Rel.,  1862,  p.  793. 


154  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

ports,  but  in  that  year  ships  were  constantly  passing 
in  and  out  of  Yokohama.  Heretofore  the  crews  had 
been  kept  in  fairly  good  control;  but  now  drunken 
sailors,  assaulting  Japanese  and  entering  their  shops 
and  houses,  frequently  gave  offence.64  Perhaps  it  was 
some  outrage  of  this  nature  which  brought  down 
vengeance  on  quite  innocent  foreigners  like  the  Rus 
sian  sailors  and  the  Dutch  captains. 

When  it  is  remembered  also  that  of  all  the  con 
sular  representatives  only  the  British  were  de  carriere, 
while  those  of  the  United  States,  France,  and  Holland 
were  merchants,  unsalaried,  and  "  mixed  up  with  the 
practices  objected  to  in  others,"  it  is  easy  to  under 
stand  why  their  influence  on  their  nationals  was 
small.65  Thus,  in  violation  of  law,  foreigners  en- 

64  "The  foreigners,  subjects  of  the  various  Treaty  Powers, 
at  Kanagawa,  have  done  their  best  to  justify  the  policy  and 
confirm  the  fears  of  the  Japanese  authorities,  as  to  the  course 
foreign  trade  would  take,  and  its  result's.  Nothing  could  well 
have  been  worse  than  the  conduct  of  the  body  generally;  and 
the  acts  of  many  individuals  are  altogether  disgraceful"  (Al- 
cock  to  Lord  Russell,  November  23,  1859,  in  P.P.  1860,  Com. 
69  (2617), p.  i).  "There  have  been,  unfortunately,  very  many 
instances  where  Japanese  have  been  grossly  maltreated  by  for 
eigners,  and  no  indemnity  asked  or  paid.  Indeed,  it  admits  of 
some  question  whether  it  would  be  safe,  in  view  of  the  char 
acter  of  the  floating  population  of  the  treaty  powers,  at  the 
open  ports,  to  establish  the  principle  of  the  liability  of  a  gov 
ernment  for  the  acts  of  its  individual  citizens  or  subjects" 
(Pruyn  to  Seward,  February  29,  1864,  in  For.  Rel.,  1864,  part 
HI,  p.  485). 

es  RP.  1860,  Com.  69  (2617),  P.  2;  Tilley,  120.    The  United 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  155 

gaged  in  the  sale  of  firearms  to  Japanese,  and  in  hunt 
ing  within  the  proscribed  limits.60  This  led  to  the 
cause  celebre  in  which  an  Englishman,  Moss,  shot  ,/ 
down  a  Japanese  officer  who  attempted  to  arrest  his 
servant.67  In  the  consular  court  Moss  was  found 
guilty  and  sentenced  to  a  fine  of  $1000  and  deporta 
tion.  Alcock,  on  reviewing  the  case,  added  imprison 
ment  for  three  months,  and  ordered  the  fine  to  be 
paid  to  the  wounded  man  as  an  indemnity.  The  su 
preme  court  at  Hongkong,  however,  released  the 
prisoner  and  awarded  him  $2000  damages  for  false 
imprisonment,  on  the  ground  that  Alcock  could  only 
fine  and  deport  or  imprison.  The  Japanese  could 
hardly  understand  such  technicalities.  If  one  would 
know  the  pressure  which  might  be  exerted  by  the 
foreign  community  to  prevent  justice  being  done  in 
cases  where  a  white  man  was  the  defendant,  let  him 
read  Alcock Js  comments  on  consular  jurisdiction  in 
the  East.68 

The  exportation  of  gold  coin  has  already  been  men 
tioned.  Much  was  shipped  without  manifest  or  dec 
laration  at  the  custom  house  in  violation  of  the  trea- 

St'ates  did  not  provide  salaried  consuls  at  Kanagawa  and 
Nagasaki  until  July  I,  1861.  No  provision  was  made  for  car 
rying  into  effect  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  until  the  Act  of 
Congress  of  June  22,  1860. 

66  Alcock,  I,  330;  Heco,  I,  262-264. 

<"  Alcock,  II,  14-17. 

68  Alcock,  II,  25-29. 


156  MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION 

ties.  In  September,  1859,  after  the  forced  withdrawal 
of  the  new  silver  currency,  the  government  ordered 
that  the  sale  of  gold  coins  to  foreigners  should  cease.69 
Such  was  the  profit  on  both  sides,  however,  that  illicit 
trade  continued.  In  order  to  buy  these  coins,  and,  in 
fact,  to  carry  on  any  trade,  it  was  necessary  to  secure 
ichibus  in  exchange  for  dollars.  The  mint  was  able 
to  coin  only  16,000  daily,  which  proved  too  few  for 
the  demand.  By  notification  British  subjects  were 
permitted  to  request  'exchange  for  not  more  than 
$5000  nor  less  than  $1000,  and  when  the  total  de 
manded  exceeded  the  supply  the  Japanese  tried  to 
prorate  the  allotments.70  This  attempt  caused  some 
of  the  merchants  to  send  in  false  requisitions  for 
enormous  amounts  in  the  hope  of  receiving  a  liberal 
issue.  Even  Mr.  Keswick,  of  Jardine,  Matheson  and 
Company,  applied  for  $4,000,000  (in  spite  of  the  limit 
of  $5000),  and  a  Mr.  Telge,  who  had  complained  to 
the  British  consul  concerning  the  insulting  conduct  of 
a  Japanese  custom-house  officer,  asked  for  the  ex 
change  of  $250,000,000.  Other  instances  are  noted  in 
the  special  Blue-book  dealing  with  this  episode.71  The 

«» Heco,  I,  234 

70  P.P.  1860,  Com.  60  (2648),  p.  53. 

71  P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2617).    Lord  John  Russell  forwarded 
Alcock's   despatches   regarding  the  conduct  of   British   mer 
chants  to  the  East  India  and  China  Association  with  the  hope 
that  its  members  would  use  their  influence  on  their  corre 
spondents  in  China  and  Japan  to  induce  them  to  put  a  stop  to 
such  proceedings. 


MUTUAL   RECRIMINATION  157 

climax  was  reached  by  Thomas  Tatham,  who  asked 
exchange  for  "$1,200,666,777,888,999,222,321."  In 
November  the  Japanese  found  in  the  burning  of  the 
Shogun's  palace  an  excuse  for  closing  the  mint,  stop 
ping  the  sale  of  copper,  and  restricting  the  sale  of 
all  produce  desired  by  the  foreigners ;  but  it  was  cer 
tainly  the  difficulties  at  Yokohama  which  drove  them 
to  this  measure. 

With  these  outstanding  occasions  for  friction,  in 
addition  to  the  prevailing  hostility  to  foreign  inter 
course,  it  would  be  too  much  to  expect  the  new  year 
to  open  upon  greatly  improved  relations,  while  the 
problem  before  the  Shogunate  officials  of  maintaining 
the  treaties  in  the  face  of  growing  opposition  was 
bound  to  be  increasingly  perplexing. 


CHAPTER  VI 

HARRIS  STANDS  ALONE 

The  new  year  did  indeed  dawn  ominously  on  both 
sides  of  the  Pacific. j_In  the  United  States  the  seces 
sion  movement  had  commenced,  which  was  soon  to 
plunge  the  States  into  the  horrors  of  civil  war, — a  war 
which,  among  its  other  effects,  served  to  hurry  the 
decline  of  American  influence  and  commerce  in  the 
Far  East.  Townsend  Harris  was  a  "  far-seeing  War 
Democrat,"  and  yet,  in  spite  of  his  belief  in  the  suc 
cess  of  his  cause,  he  roust-  iiave  kn<$wn  many  hours 
of  bitter  anxiety  in  those  days  of  long  delayed  com 
munication. 

i         ~ 

In  Japan  the  foreign  community  was  threatened  as 

never  before.)  The  first  warning  was  given  by  the 
government  to  Mr.  Harris,  who  in  turn  warned  Al- 
cock,  De  Wit,  the  Dutch  consul-general,  and  De  Belle- 
court.  |lt^  was  to  the  effect  that  some  six  hundred 
ronins  from  Mito  were  on  their  way  to  burn  the 
foreign  settlement  at  Yokohama  and  to  attack  the 
legations  at  Yedo^  The  Japanese  authorities  pro 
posed  that  the  foreign  consuls  move  over  from  Kana- 
gawa  to  Yokohama,  where  they  could  be  better  pro- 

1  P.P.  1861,  Lords  18,  pp.  1-6. 
158 


HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE  159 

tected,  and  that  the  ministers  move  for  a  time  within 
the  castle  moats  at  Yedo.  Again  there  was  some 
question  as  to  the  good  faith  of  the  government,  the 
consuls,  for  instance,  refusing  to  move,  lest  they  seem 
to  abandon  their  right  to  reside  at  Kanagawa.2  The 
ministers  also  remained  in  their  legations,  while  Al- 
cock  suggested  that  the  British  admiral  leave  at  least 
two  ships  in  the  bay  after  his  departure.  For  a  few 
days  the  alarm  was  great,  but  on  January  8  Alcock 
believed  that  the  crisis  had  passed,  and  expressed  the 
opinion  that  the  Japanese  were  taking  all  the  precau 
tions  they  deemed  necessary.  Large  patrols  o>f  armed 
men  were  guarding  the  whole  road  from  Yedo  to 
Yokohama,  and  a  daimyo  with  two  hundred  of  his 
men  and  two  field  pieces  was  in  charge  of  the  British 
legation. 

On  the  evening  of  the  I4th  the  swords  of  the  ronins 
flashed  again,  and  this  time  one  of  the  most  popular 

/  and  useful  of  the  foreign  officials  was  brought  down. 

I  The  deed  struck  close  to  Mr.  Harris,  for  it  was  his  in 
terpreter,  Mr.  Heusken,/who  fell/tjHe  had  accom 
panied  Harris  to  Japan  in  1856,  as  interpreter,  be 
cause  of  his  knowledge  of  Dutch.  In  the  interven 
ing  years  he  had  mastered  Japanese  so  well  that  he 
was  said  to  know  more  of  Japan  and  the  Japanese 
and  to  speak  their  language  with  more  fluency  than 
any  living  European.3  He  had  acted  not  only  at  all 

2  Heco,  I,  266. 

3  De  Fonblanque,  89. 


I6O  HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE 

of  Mr.  Harris's  conferences  with  the  Japanese,  but 
he  had  also  assisted  Lord  Elgin  in  1858,  and  was  then 
aiding  Count  Eulenburg  to  negotiate  a  treaty  for 
Prussia.!  It  was  on  his  return  from  the  Prussian 
legation,  on  a  d'ark  and  rainy  night,  that  the  blow  was 
struck.  The  assassins  were  able  to  escape  in  the 
darkness.  Much  as  Harris  mourned  the  loss  of  his 
faithful  attache,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  point  out  that 
Heusken  lost  his  life  through  failure  to  heed  the  re 
peated  warnings  which  had  been  given.4  To  go 
abroad  at  night,  in  these  troubled  times,  was  a  dan 
gerous  proceeding  for  any  man.  Harris  endeavored, 
by  running  no  needless  risks,  not  merely  -to  save  his 
own  life  but  to  cooperate  with  the  Shogunate  officials 
in  their  endeavors  to  protect  him. 

In  this  case  the  Japanese  did  all  that  could  be  ex 
pected  of  them  in  order  to  arrest  the  guilty  and  punish 
the  yaconins  who  had  been  remiss  in  their  duty.  The 
funeral  was  attended  by  the  three  ambassadors  who 
had  recently  returned  from  the  United  States, — an  un 
usual  token  of  respect.  When  the  diplomatic  and  con 
sular  corps  gathered  to  follow  the  body  to  the  grave, 
a  warning  was  received  that  they  might  be  attacked 

4  For.  Rel.,  1862,  p.  805.  See  Adams,  I,  130,  for  the  story 
that  this  murder  was  due  to  the  enmity  of  Hori  Oribe-no- 
Kami.  The  chief  of  this  band  of  ronins  was  said  to  have 
been  murdered  on  May  30,  1863.  He  had  taken  part  also  in 
the  murder  of  Lord  li,  the  first  attack  on  the  British  legation, 
and  the  attack  on  Lord  Ando  (For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  noi). 


HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE  l6l 

on  the  way.     They  did  not  flinch,  and  happily  no  at 
tack  was  made.5 

This  was  the  seventh  assassination6  in  the  foreign 
community  since  Yokohama  was  opened,  eighteen 
months  before;  and  coming  as  it  did  after  the  recent 
alarms,  it  seemed  to  possess  a  most  ominous  import. 
On  the  day  after  the  funeral  all  the  foreign  minis 
ters  met  at  the  British  legation  to  consider  what  posi 
tion  and  course  they  should  take.7  A  difference  of 
opinion  promptly  developed.  Mr.  Alcock,  after  sum 
marizing  the  events  of  the  past  year  and  a  half,  stated 
his  conviction  that  the  murder  of  Heusken  was  not  a 
"mere  fortuitous  recontre  with  a  band  of  bravos," 
but  rather  an  incident  in  the  recent  course  of  ter 
rorism  and  intimidation  inaugurated  with  the  alarm 
of  the  threatened  ronin  attack.  He  furthermore  be 
lieved  that  "  measures  were  being  taken  which  had  for 
their  object  the  removal  of  foreigners  out  of  the  Em 
pire,  either  by  intimidation  or  by  murde£,"  but  there 
were  no  facts  to  show  whether  the  offtc/als  were  par 
ties  to  it,  or  only  reluctant  witnesses.  He  felt  that 
the  representatives  of  the  treaty  powers  should  take 
"  some  action  so  decided  and  significant "  that  it  would 
arouse  the  ministers  to  a  sense  of  danger,  and  also 

s  P.P.  1861,  Lords  18,  p.  6. 

6  Two  of  the  victims  were  Orientals  in  the  employ  of  west- 
'rners. 

7  P.P.  1861,  Lords  18,  pp.  6-24. 


162  HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE 

their  colleagues  and  possibly  the  daimyos  who  hired 
the  assassins  to  kill  Mr.  Heusken.  Such  an  action  he 
believed  would  be  the  withdrawal  of  the  foreign  rep 
resentatives  to  Yokohama,  under  the  protection  of  the 
fleet,  where,  free  from  menace,  they  could  call  upon 
the  government  to  reconsider  its  policy  and  to  give 
satisfaction  for  past  breaches  and  guarantees  for  the 
future,  especially  as  to  security  of  life  and  property. 
The  French,  Dutch,  and  Prussian  representatives 
agreed  with  Alcock  in  his  plan  of  withdrawing  from 
Yedo.  Mr.  Harris  was  unable  to  concur. 

[He  was  the  oldest  foreign  resident  in  Japan;  he  had  enjoyed 
'  long  and  intimate  relations  with  the  Japanese  authorities  and 
Government,  and  he  still  retained  his  faith  in  their  good-will 
and  desire  to  carry  out  honestly  the  Treaties  they  had  entered 
'nto.  But  they  had  many  difficulties  to  contend  with,  and  the 
foreign  Representatives  could  not  desire  them  to  do  impossi 
bilities.  They  had  shown  no  backwardness  in  taking  measures 
of  precaution  for  the  protection  of  all ;  but  it  was  out  of  their 
power  to  prevent  such  murders  as  that  of  Mr.  Heusken,  who 
had  exposed  himself  by  going  out  at  night,  contrary  to  the 
repeated  counsels  and  remonstrances  received  both  from  the 
Government  and  himself.  He,  for  his  part,  felt  perfectly  safe, 
so  long  as  he  complied  with  the  conditions  which  circum 
stances  imposed,  and  could  not  agree  in  the  policy  of  leaving 
Yeddo.  On  the  contrary  he  thought  such  a  step  fraught  with 
danger,  that  if  they  once  left  it  they  would  never  return,  and 
that  an  attempt  to  occupy  any  portion  of  Yokohama  with 
foreign  troops  would  create  such  an  alarm  and  outburst  of 
national  feeling  that  conflict  and  war  would  be  inevitable. 
He  recommended  that  they  should  unite  in  urging  upon  the 
Government  more  vigorous  measures,  and  trust  to  their  good 
faith  to  give  effect  to  these. 


HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE  163 

•This  statement  showed  that  the  American  minister 
had  a  far  better  understanding  of  the  difficulties  which 
confronted  the  Shogun's  government  than  any  of  his 
colleagues  possessed,  and  in  urging  a  sympathetic  and 
conciliatory  policy  he  was  again  trying  to  serve  the 
best  interests,  not  only  of  his  own  land  but  of  Japan. 
The  conference  of  the  I9th  was  followed  by  a  second 
on  the  2 ist  whic'h  Harris  failed  to  attend,  and  con 
cerning  which  a  sharp  exchange  of  letters  took  place 
between  him  and  Alcock.  *  Harris  took  a  position 
which  was  sound  at  the  time  and  which  was  endorsed 
by  later  events,  and  which,  if  recognized,  would  have 
averted  much  bloodshed  and  ill-will : 

It  strikes  me  that  all  the  arguments  at  the  conferences  re 
ferred  to,  are  based  upon  the  assumption  that  the  Japanese 
Government  represented  a  civilization  on  a  par  with  that  of 
the  Western  world;  that  is  a  grave  error.  The  Japanese  are 
not  a  civilized,  but  a  semi-civilized  people,  and  the  condition 
of  affairs  in  this  country  is  quite  analogous  to  that  of  Europe 
during  the  middle  ages.  To  demand,  therefore,  of  the  Japa 
nese  Government  the  same  observances,  the  same  prompt  ad 
ministration  of  justice,  as  is  found  in  civilized  lands,  is  simply 
to  demand  the  impossibility;  and  to  hold  that  Government 
responsible  for  the  isolated  acts  of  private  individuals,  I  be 
lieve  to  be  wholly  unsustained  by  any  international  law.8 

After  arguing  against  the  withdrawal  to  Yokohama, 
which  Harris  believed  would  not  produce  any  bene 
ficial  effect,  and  would  be  an  important  step  toward  a 
war  with  Japan,  he  added : 

8  P.P.  1861,  Lords  18,  p.  43.  Alcock  finally  adopted  this 
view  in  1865.  See  Chapter  XL 


164  HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE 

I  had  hoped  that  the  page  of  future  history  might  record 
the  great  fact  that  in  one  spot  in  the  Eastern  world  the  advent 
of  Christian  civilization  did  not  bring  with  it  its  usual  at 
tendants  of  rapine  and  bloodshed ;  this  fond  hope,  I  fear,  is 
to  be  disappointed. 

I  would  sooner  see  all  the  Treaties  with  this  country  torn 
up,  and  Japan  return  to  its  old  state  of  isolation,  than  witness 
the  horrors  of  war  inflicted  on  this  peaceful  people  and  happy 
land.9 

On  January  26  the  representatives  of  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  the  Netherlands  retired  to  Yokohama,  and 
the  Prussian  envoy  followed  soon  after  his  treaty 
was  signed.10  On  the  day  of  the  withdrawal  Alcock 
addressed  a  long  and  querulous  letter  to  the  ministers 
of  foreign  affairs  protesting  against  the  many  mur 
ders,  the  failure  to  arrest  and  punish  the  assassins, 
and  the  general  insecurity  of  life.  He  announced  his 
withdrawal,  and  stated  that  he  was  ready  to  return  to 
Yedo  "  whenever  I  can  see  such  material  guaran 
tee  for  redress  in  respect  to  past  grievances,  and  se 
curity  for  the  future  as  may  warrant  the  step."11  It 
is  of  interest  to  note  that  when  the  news  of  this  deci 
sion  reached  England,  Lord  Russell  again  warned  Al- 

9  P.P.  1861,  Lords  18,  p.  44. 

10  The   signing  of  the   Prussian  treaty,   January  24,   1861, 
was,  of  course,  in  violation  of  the  orders  from  the  Mikado 
which  permitted  only  temporary  relations  with  the  foreigners 
and  looked  to  their  ultimate  expulsion.     This  treaty  omitted 
any  reference  to  the  opening  of  other  ports  than  Kanagawa, 
Nagasaki,  and  Hakodate  (J.  J.  Rein,  Japan,  347). 

II  P.P.  1861,  Lords  18,  pp.  7-10. 


HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE  165 

cock  not  to  break  off  relations  with  the  Japanese, 
and  added,  "  Except  in  a  case  where  immediate  action 
is  required  to  preserve  the  lives  and  properties  of 
British  subjects,  or  of  the  subjects  of  foreign  powers 
in  amity  with  Her  Majesty,  it  is  the  desire  of  Her 
Majesty's  Government  that  the  employment,  or  even 
the  menace  of  force  should  not  be  resorted  to."12 

Certain  inconsistencies  in  this  policy  are  at  once 
evident.  If,  as  Alcock  had  asserted,  the  Japanese 
authorities  desired  to  force  the  ministers  out  of  Yedo, 
was  not  this  retirement  playing  right  into  their  hands  ? 
And  why  should  the  Japanese,  who  were  already 
under  heavy  expense  for  guarding  the  legations,  offer 
any  further  guarantees  in  order  to  induce  the  minis 
ters  to  return,  especially  if  they  considered  their  pres 
ence  a  source  of  trouble?  Harris  pointed  out  the 
difficulty  he  had  met  with  in  securing  the  article  pro 
viding  for  the  residence  of  a  minister  in  Yedo,  and 
he,  at  least,  would  not  endanger  the  exercise  of  that 
right.  So  he  held  his  post,  amid  the  many  dangers, 
confident  that  he  would  be  safe  if  he  observed  rea 
sonable  measures  of  precaution. 

For  more  than  a  month  Harris  remained  in  Yedo, 
alone  and  undisturbed.  At  Yokohama  his  colleagues 
must  have  been  surprised  at  the  failure  of  the  Jap 
anese  immediately  to  meet  their  demands.  A  week 
passed  before  even  an  informal  inquiry  was  made, 

12  Ibid.,  il. 
12 


1 66  HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE 

and  it  was  not  until  February  8  that  the  ministers 
for  foreign  affairs  formally  acknowledged  the  de 
spatch  of  January  26,  stating  that  repeated  delibera 
tions  were  necessary  in  order  to  take  proper  meas 
ures.13  In  the  meantime  Alcock  instructed  the  British 
consul  at  Kanagawa  to  gather  all  possible  informa 
tion  concerning  official  interference  with  trade  at 
Yokohama.  A  public  meeting,  attended  by  sixteen 
persons,  was  held  on  the  7th,  and  a  committee  which 
was  appointed  to  gather  the  desired  information  re 
ported  two  days  later.14  From  that  report  it  is  evi 
dent  that  the  one  real  difficulty  was  the  currency. 
The  merchants  desired  the  free  circulation  of  dollars 
throughout  the  Empire.  Of  the  non-enforcement  of 
contracts,  however,  only  one  case  was  found ;  of  offi 
cial  interference  with  trade,  only  two  instances ;  as  to 
want  of  system  at  the  custom-house  and  inadequate 
wharfage  accommodation,  there  was  no  specific  com 
plaint,  nor  was  there  any  as  to  the  occupation  of  land 
at  Yokohama.  As  to  security  of  life  and  property, 
on  this  point  the  committee  agreed  that  the  govern 
ment  was  apparently  anxious  to  protect  the  foreign 
community. 

From  this  report,  drawn  up  by  a  representative 
committee  of  merchants,  it  is  evident  that  the  sweep 
ing  charges  of  treaty  violation  could  not  be  substan- 

"  Ibid.,  70. 
14  Ibid.,  58. 


HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE  167 

tiated  at  this  time.  In  fact,  Alcock  reported  to  Lord 
Russell,  on  March  3,  that  the  trade  of  Yokohama 
more  than  realized  the  most  sanguine  anticipations.15 
In  order  to  hasten  the  deliberations  of  the  min 
isters,  Alcock  advised  them  on  February  13  that  he 
proposed  to  travel  through  the  country  and  visit  all 
the  open  ports.16  Knowing  how  loath  the  govern 
ment  was  to  have  the  foreign  representatives  travel 
in  the  interior,  he  believed  that  this  suggestion  would 
have  some  effect,  and  the  event  convinced  him  that 
he  had  "made  no  miscalculation  as  to  the  effective 
ness  of  the  new  weapon  brought  to  bear."17  A  week 
later  Sakai  Wookionoske,  a  member  of  the  Second 
Council,  arrived  in  Yokohama  as  an  envoy  of  the 
Tycoon  to  consult  with  Alcock  and  De  Bellecourt. 
Conferences  were  held  on  February  21,  22,  and  27, 
to  the  complete  satisfaction  of  the  foreign  represen 
tatives,  and  on  March  2  they  returned  to  Yedo.18 

An  analysis  of  the  agreement  made  at  this  time, 
which  was  confirmed  by   the  ministers   for   foreign 
affairs,  does  not  convince  one  that  the  drastic  measure 
of  striking  the  flags  and  withdrawing  from  the  capi 
tal   was   by   any   means   necessary.      The   most   im 
portant  clause  was  as  follows :  "  The  Tycoon,  by  and 
with  his  Council  of  State,  formally  engages  to  pro- 
is  ibid.,  82. 
16  Ibid.,  70. 
"Alcock,  II,  61. 
18  P.P.  1861,  Lords  18,  pp.  71-82. 


168  HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE 

vide  effectively  for  their  security,  together  with  that 
of  the  members  of  their  respective  Legations,  and 
their  exemption  alike  from  menace  and  violence;  and 
under  this  assurance  invites  them  to  return."19  To  be 
sure  there  had  been  no  "  formal  engagement "  to  this 
effect  in  the  past,  but  the  Shogun's  government  had 
done  everything  in  its  power  to  protect  the  legations ; 
and,  as  we  shall  see,  even  this  formal  engagement 
could  not  prevent  the  onslaughts  of  desperate  anti- 
foreign  fanatics.  Then  followed  certain  details  as  to 
the  measures  for  defence,  notably  the  substitution  of 
mounted  guards,  from  the  Tycoon's  troops,  for  the 
yaconins  who  had  proved  so  unsatisfactory.  Vigorous 
measures  were  pledged  for  the  arrest  and  punishment 
of  murderers,  and,  after  much  difficulty,  the  Japanese 
agreed  to  fire  a  royal  salute  of  twenty-one  guns  for 
each  flag  as  it  was  raised  in  Yedo,  the  salute  to  be 
returned  from  the  foreign  war-ships.20 

19  P.P.  1861,  Lords  18,  p.  73- 

20  "  After  Mr.  Heusken's  murder  all  the  Ministers  but  Mr. 
Harris  left  Yedo.     One  of  the  conditions  of  their  return  was 
that  a  national  salute  should  be  fired  when  they  returned. 
They  accordingly  went  up.    On  that  day  all  the  forts  at  Yedo 
commenced  firing  early  in  the  morning  at  sunrise  and  fired  all 
morning.     When  the  ministers  arrived  they  stopped   for  a 
few  minutes  and  then  the  fort  at  Shinagawa  fired  the  salute 
and  then  in  a  few  minutes  all  the   forts  fired  away  again 
till  sunset.     The  consequence  was  no  one  in  Yedo  but  those 
in  the  secret  knew  that  any  salute  had  been  fired"   (Pruyn 
MSS.,  November  20,  1862). 


HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE  169 

At  the  same  time  certain  complaints  regarding  af 
fairs  at  Yokohama  were  brought  forward  and  a  prom 
ise  was  made  that  they  would  be  remedied.  One  of 
these  provisions  called  for  the  removal  of  the  con 
sulates  from  Kanagawa  to  Yokohama.  Thus  the  pro 
posal  of  Lord  li,  of  two  years  ago,  was  finally  ac 
cepted.  It  was  stipulated  by  Alcock  and  De  Belle- 
court  that  the  consuls  should  not  reside  within  the 
foreign  settlement,  but  on  the  "Bluff,"  as  "an  ef 
fective  innovation  on  the  stereotyped  '  Decima '  pol 
icy  of  this  Government."21  As  a  matter  of  fact  they 
eventually  were  located  in  the  heart  of  the  foreign 
settlement,  where  they  should  have  been  from  the 
very  beginning  had  not  the  unreasoning  suspicion  of 
the  foreign  ministers  outweighed  the  necessities  of 
the  case. 

While  twenty-one  cannon  roared  out  a  "  royal 
salute"  the  flags  of  the  two  treaty  powers  were  un 
furled  in  Yedo,  and,  as  Alcock  affirmed,  "  thus  ended 
the  grave  crisis — ostensibly  to  the  satisfaction  of  all 
parties."22  *  But  there  can  be  little  doubt  today  that 
in  remaining  in  Yedo  and  placing  confidence  in  the 
good  faith  of  the  Japanese  government,  in  recognizing 
the  difficulties  under  which  it  labored,  and  in  endeav 
oring  to  cooperate  with  it,  Townsend  Harris  more 
adequately  met  the  needs  of  the  hour.  And  his  cour- 

21  P.P.  1861,  Lords  18,  p.  73. 

22  Alcock,  II,  62. 


170  HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE 

age  and  confidence  was  not  wasted  upon  the  Jap 
anese.  One  young  samurai  volunteered  as  a  body 
guard  for  this  undaunted  foreigner,  ready  to  lay  down 
his  life  should  some  fanatic  attack  his  master.  He 
was  Ebara  Soroku,  who  became  a  leader  in  modern 
Japanese  education  and  later  a  member  of  the  House 
of  Peers.  Baron  Shibusawa,  the  financial  genius  of 
new  Japan,  then  an  officer  of  the  Shogunate,  has  tes 
tified:  "This  incident  won  for  America  the  good 
will  of  Japan."23 

While  Harris,  on  the  ground,  had  adopted  so  con 
ciliatory  an  attitude,  his  government,  unknown  to  him, 
stood  forth  as  the  advocate  of  a  strong  policy.  On 
learning  of  the  murder  of  Heusken,  Mr.  Seward,  sec 
retary  of  state,  on  May  14  addressed  a  circular  note24 
to  the  ministers  of  Prussia,  Great  Britain,  France, 
Russia,  and  Holland,  proposing  a  joint  naval  demon 
stration  in  Japanese  waters.  Instead  of  postponing 
the  opening  of  Yedo,  as  Harris  had  suggested,  the 
President  believed  that  no  concession  should  be  made, 
and  he  proposed 

that  those  powers  should  announce  to  the  government  of  Japan 
their  willingness  and  their  purpose  to  make  common  cause 
and  co-operate  with  this  government  in  exacting  satisfaction, 
if  the  Japanese  government  should  not  at  once  put  forth  all 
possible  effort  to  secure  the  punishment  of  the  assassins  of 

23  N.  Masaoka,  editor,  Japan  to  America,  10. 

24  Seward  to  Baron  Gerolt,  Prussian  minister,  May  14,  in 
For.  Rel,  1862,  p.  547.    Moore,  V,  747,  cites  letter  to  Mr. 
Stoeckle,  Russian  minister,  May  20. 


HARRIS    STANDS    ALONE  1 7! 

Mr.  Heusken,  and  also  in  making  requisitions  with  signal 
vigor  if  any  insult  or  injury  should  be  committed  against  any 
foreigner  residing  in  Yedo,  after  the  opening  of  the  city  in 
January  next,  according  to  the  treaty. 

With  these  suggestions  was  submitted  a  form  of  a 
convention  for  carrying  them  into  effect :  "  This  pro 
jected  convention  contemplated  the  despatch  of  a  fleet 
of  steamers  adequate  to  impress  the  Japanese  govern 
ment  with  the  ability  and  the  determination  of  the 
states  engaged,  to  secure  a  performance  of  its  treaty 
stipulations."25  The  ministers  forwarded  the  pro 
posals  and  the  convention  to  their  respective  govern 
ments,  but  before  any  answers  were  received  Harris's 
later  despatch  of  May  8  cleared  up  the  situation  and 
the  matter  was  happily  dropped. 

This  proposition  was  a  remarkable  one,  not  merely  I 
in  view  of  America's  traditional  policy,  which  was  op 
posed  to  joint  operations  with  European  states,  but 
also  when  the  situation  in  the  United  States  at  the 
time  was  considered.  The  Civil  War  had  begun,  the 
intention  to  blockade  the  southern  ports  had  been 
declared;  surely  the  Federal  Government  could  ill 
afford  to  spare  any  steamers  to  take  part  in  a  demon 
stration  against  Japan.  The  unusual  nature  of  this 
suggestion  inclines  one  to  believe  that  it  was  due  to 
foreign  complications  quite  remote  from  Japan. 
These  were  weeks  of  great  uncertainty  in  WTashing- 
ton,  and  of  great  stress  in  foreign  affairs.  Seward, 

25  For.  Rel.,  1862,  pp.  814-816. 


172  HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE 

especially,  was  at  a  loss  how  best  to  proceed.  In  his 
famous  letter  to  the  President  of  April  I  he  had  out 
lined  a  foreign  policy  of  amazing-  vigor.  Explana 
tions  of  certain  acts  were  to  be  demanded  of  Great 
Britain,  Russia,  Spain,  and  France,  and  if  the  two 
latter  did  not  give  immediate  satisfaction,  war  was 
to  be  at  once  declared.26  This  proposal  has  been  in 
terpreted  as  a  measure  for  turning  the  minds  of  the 
people  away  from  threatened  civil  war  to  the  excite 
ment  of  a  foreign  contest.  Yet  a  few  weeks  later, 
Seward  proposed  the  convention  for  a  joint  demon 
stration  in  the  Orient  to  three  of  these  very  powers. 
Perhaps  at  this  time  he  was  anxious  to  strengthen  the 
relations  of  the  North  with  the  European  states  by 
advocating  a  policy  toward  Japan  which  he  felt  sure 
they  would  endorse.27  *  During  his  administration  Mr. 
Seward  consistently  instructed  the  American  ministers 
in  Japan  and  China  to  act  in  concert  with  their  col 
leagues,  and  these  instructions  were  carried  out  by  Mr. 
Pruyn  and  Mr.  Burlingame.  But  never  again  did 

26  F.  Bancroft,  Life  of  William  H.  Seward,  II,  133. 

27  On  May  21,  however,  Seward,  irritated  at  Great  Britain's 
proclamation  of  neutrality,  drafted  his  despatch  No.  10  to  Mr. 
Adams,  minister  to   St.   James,   "which,   if   transmitted   and 
delivered  in   its  original   form,  could  hardly  have  failed  to 
endanger  the  peaceful  relations  of  the  two  countries  "  (J.  G. 
Nicolay  and  J.  Hay,  Abraham  Lincoln,  IV,  269).     President 
Lincoln  revised  the  despatch  so  as  to  remove  the  needlessly 
brusque  statements. 


HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE  173 

the  United  States  take  the  lead  in  proposing  joint 
operations  against  Japan.* 

Harris's  despatch  of  May  8,  which  caused  Seward 
to  alter  his  policy  toward  Japan,  covered  a  letter  from 
the  Tycoon  to  the  President  and  one  from  the  min 
isters  for  foreign  affairs  to  the  secretary  of  state.28 
The  purpose  of  these  was  to  request  the  postponement 
of  the  opening  of  the  remaining  treaty  ports  and 
cities.  The  ministers  pointed  out  that  the  present 
commerce  "  has  led  to  a  result  generally  experienced 
and  very  different  from  what  was  anticipated:  no 
benefit  has  been  derived,  but  the  lower  class  of  the 
nation  has  suffered  from  it  already."  Prices  had 
risen,  they  asserted,  and  this  fact  had  augmented  the 
ancient  opposition  to  foreign  intercourse.  They 
pleaded  for  delay,  for  seven  years  in  fact,  until  "  pub 
lic  opinion  should  be  reassured  and  gradually  pre 
pared,  commerce  organized  by  degrees,  prices  of 
things  find  their  level,  and  the  old  custom  changed  in 
such  a  manner  that  a  prosperous  intercourse  with 
foreign  countries  may  become  the  wish  of  the  na 
tion."  Harris  reported  that  this  might  seem  to  be  a 
retrograde  action,  but  it  would  not  be  considered  such 
in  view  of  the  facts.  Prices,  he  said,  of  all  articles 
of  exports  had  risen  in  the  past  two  years  from  one 
hundred  to  three  hundred  per  cent,  and  complaints 
from  officials  of  fixed  and  limited  salaries  were  loud. 

28  For.  Rel,  1862,  pp.  794-797. 


174  HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE 

He  had  already  advised  postponing  the  opening  of 
Yedo,  and  he  now  realized  that  the  residence  of  for 
eigners  in  Osaka,  which  was  located  near  Kyoto, 
might  occasion  hostility.  Hiogo  was  merely  the  sea 
port  of  Osaka,  and  Niigata  was  of  little  value  as  a 
port.  He  requested,  therefore,  discretionary  power 
to  act  in  concert  with  his  colleagues  as  might  seem 
advisable  for  the  interests  of  both  countries.  This 
request  was  granted  by  the  President,  and  the  discre 
tion  was  conferred,  while  Seward  urgently  insisted 
that,  except  in  the  extremest  necessity,  no  postpone 
ment  be  consented  to  unless  satisfaction  of  some 
marked  kind  was  received  for  the  murder  of  Mr. 
Heusken.29 

Ever  since  that  unhappy  outrage  Harris  had  been 
kept  informed  of  the  efforts  of  the  authorities  to  punish 
the  assassins.  He  was  convinced  that  they  were  act 
ing  in  good  faith  and  earnestly  desired  to  discover  and 
punish  them.  A  large  number  of  Japanese  had  been 
arrested  on  suspicion  and  some  executed  for  other 
crimes.30  Three  of  Heusken's  mounted  escort  and 
four  of  the  guards  at  the  guard-house  were  dismissed 
for  neglect  of  duty,  and,  as  he  said,  "to  a  Japanese 
official  such  a  punishment  is  next  to  a  death  penalty ; 
for  it  deprives  him  of  all  means  of  support,  except 
beggary,  as  he  would  prefer  suicide  to  what  he  would 

29  August  i.    For.  Rel.,  1862,  p.  815. 

30  For  Rel.,  1862,  pp.  797-798. 


HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE  175 

consider  as  the  degradation  of  labor."31  But  the  gov 
ernment  was  never  able  to  arrest  and  convict  the  real 
offenders,  and  before  the  incident  was  settled  a  far 
greater  outrage  had  been  perpetrated. 

For  the  past  three  months  the  utmost  quiet  had 
prevailed  in  Yedo.  During  that  time  Mr.  Alcock  had 
visited  China  and  on  his  return  had  travelled  over 
land,  in  company  with  Mr.  de  Wit,  the  Dutch  consul- 
general,  from  Nagasaki  to  Yedo.  On  July  4  he  re 
turned  to  the  British  legation,  and  on  the  next  night  a 
"  daring  and  murderous  "  attack  was  made.32  A  band 
of  fourteen  ronins,  sworn  to  drive  out  the  hated  bar 
barians,  flung  themselves  upon  the  Japanese  guards  at 
the  legation,  burst  into  the  temple  residence,  and 
wounded  two  of  the  Englishmen,  Mr.  Oliphant,  the 
secretary  of  the  legation,  and  Mr.  Morrison,  British 
consul  at  Nagasaki,  who  was  a  guest.  This  time  the 
guards,  when  they  had  recovered  from  the  first  shock 
of  the  attack,  fought  desperately,  killing  three  of  the 
ronins  on  the  spot  and  wounding  one.  Of  the  Japanese 
at  the  legation  two  were  killed,  and  five  severely  and 
ten  slightly  wounded. 

Such  an  attack  upon  the  representative  of  one  of  the 
great  powers  aroused  the  profoundest  indignation. 
Mr.  Alcock  was  inclined  to  believe  that  the  attack,  if 

si  Ibid,  805. 

32  P.P.  1862,  Com.  64,  pp.  1-25;  For.  Rel,  1862,  pp.  79^-803; 
For.  Rel,  1861,  pp.  437-441 ;  Alcock,  II,  151-170. 


176  HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE 

not  instigated  by  the  government,  was  at  least  made 
with  the  knowledge  of  some  or  all  of  the  Great  Council, 
for  "  these  acts  of  violence  are  all  in  perfect  accord 
ance  with  the  desire  they  do  not  conceal,  to  extricate 
the  country  from  the  obligations  of  Treaties,  and  re 
vert  to  the  ancient  policy  of  isolation,  even  at  the  price 
of  a  violent  rupture."33  He  also  placed  no  confidence 
in  the  Japanese  guards,  and  secured  a  guard  of  twenty- 
five  men  from  the  British  war-ship  Ringdove  the  next 
day.  In  notifying  his  colleagues  of  the  attack  he  re 
quested  their  views  as  to  what  should  be  done. 

On  his  part,  Harris  considered  "the  present  as  a 
crisis  in  the  foreign  affairs  of  Japan."  If  the  govern 
ment  was  too  weak  to  punish  the  guilty  parties,  then 
Great  Britain  might  take  some  decided  action.  But 
he  found  one  reason  for  encouragement  in  the  stiff 
fight  put  up  by  the  guards :  "  This  is  the  first  instance 
in  which  a  blow. has  been  struck  in  defence  of  a 
foreigner  in  this  country,  and  may  be  considered  as 
proof  of  the  desire  of  the  government  to  give  us  pro 
tection."34 

33  P.P.  1862,  Com.  64,  p.  5. 

34  For.  Rel.,  1861,  p.  437.    "  There  is  a  party  in  this  country 
who  are  opposed  to  the  presence  of  any  foreigners  in  Japan, 
and,  in  addition  to  this,  there  is  a  very  strong  dislike  to  the 
English  in  particular,  which  feeling  seems  to  attach  especially 
to  Mr.  Alcock.    He  was  absent  from  this  city  for  some  three 
months,  during  which  time  the  utmost  quiet  prevailed;  yet 
within  thirty-six  hours  after  his  return  the  attack  in  question 
was  made  on  him  "(Harris,  in  For.  Rel.,  i86i,p.  437).  *  Alcock 


HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE  177 

On  the  8th  Harris  addressed  the  ministers  for 
foreign  affairs,  and  pointed  out  that  any  failure  to 
arrest  and  punish  the  authors  of  the  most  recent  crime 
would  result  in  the  "  most  lamentable  consequences."35 
For  the  preceding  attacks  no  one  had  been  arrested  or 
punished,  but  this  time  a  prisoner  had  been  taken  and 
a  list  of  fourteen  accomplices  had  been  found.  From 
these  two  sources  enough  information  should  be  ob 
tained  to  ferret  out  the  guilty  and  adequately  punish 
them.  Three  days  later  Harris  had  an  interview  with 
the  ministers  for  foreign  affairs  in  which  he  pressed 
home  the  advice  given  in  his  letter.  They  told  him 
that  the  attack  had  been  delivered  by  fourteen  men, 
belonging  to  a  band  of  desperate  outlaws,  "  willing  to 
make  themselves  the  exponents  of  the  national  feel 
ings,  and  who  glorified  in  sacrificing  their  lives  in  such 
a  cause.  They  attacked  the  British  legation,  hoping 
not  only  to  distinguish  themselves  by  slaying  all  the 
members  of  the  mission,  but  also  to  bring  about  a  war 
with  the  foreigners,  and  thereby  a  return  to  their  old 
state  of  isolation."  The  ministers '  furthermore  said 
that  the  desperadoes  were  men  of  low  degree,  and  were 

replied  to  this  by  stating  that  if  it  were  true  it  might  be  more 
naturally  accounted  for  by  the  statements  made  by  Harris 
concerning  the  English  during  his  negotiation  of  1858  (Alcock, 
I,  215).  An  exchange  of  letters  between  Alcock  and  Harris 
at  this  time  showed  that  good  relations  had  not  been  restored 
(For.  Rel.,  1861,  p.  440;  1862,  p.  801). 
35  For.  Rel.,  1861,  p.  439. 


178  HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE 

without  instigators  or  abettors  among  men  of  high  rank 
or  station ;  and  they  hoped  that  as  Harris  "  had  been 
so  long  in  the  country,  and  knew  its  condition  better 
than  any  other  foreigner,"  he  would  give  his  testi 
mony  in  support  of  their  representations.  Of  the 
fourteen  engaged  in  the  attack  seven36  were  accounted 
for,  and  every  effort  would  be  made  to  arrest  those 
who  had  escaped;  but  this  would  be  difficult,  as  was 
shown  by  the  failure  to  secure  all  the  men  who  had 
murdered  Lord  li  more  than  a  year  ago.  They 
furthermore  protested  that  Alcock  had  refused  to  allow 
the  Japanese  guard  to  be  posted  as  they  had  desired, 
and  said  that  they  were  ready  to  afford  the  same  pro 
tection  to  the  foreign  representatives  as  they  themselves 
enjoyed.37 

Alcock  naturally  had  been  carrying  on  an  extended 
correspondence  with  the  ministers.  On  the  7th  he  de 
scribed  the  attack,  complained  against  the  supineness 
and  tardiness  of  the  Japanese  guard,  pointed  out  the 
grievous  nature  of  the  outrage,  insinuated  that  some 
daimyo  must  be  the  instigator  of  the  deed,  and  asserted 
that  "unless  signal  satisfaction  be  given,  and  ample 
security  for  the  future,  the  common  voice  of  Europe 
will  hold  the  Government  responsible  for  the  acts  of 

36  Three  were  killed  on  the  spot,  one  was  wounded  and  cap 
tured,  and  three  committed  hara-kiri  at  Shinagawa,  of  whom 
one  was  taken  alive. 

37  For.  Rel,  1862,  pp.  709-800. 


HARRIS    STANDS    ALONE  179 

its  subjects."38  He  followed  this  up  on  the  nth  with 
a  letter  in  which  he  required  the  ministers  "  without 
delay,  to  answer  categorically  and  truly  the  following 
queries"  concerning  the  steps  taken  by  the  govern 
ment  in  the  matter.39  This  despatch,  with  its  insinua 
tions  and  demands,  might  well  have  been  ignored  by 
the  ministers.  On  the  I3th  they  replied  to  his  letter 
of  the  7th,  requesting  that  he  withdraw  the  British 
guard,  lest  in  their  ignorance  of  the  language  they 
wound  friends  as  well  as  foes,  and  stating  that  the 
crime  had  been  the  work  of  persons  of  low  standing 
without  any  secret  instigator  of  rank.40 

Alcock's  conference  with  the  Japanese  ministers  took 
place  on  the  2Oth.  They  made  practically  the  same 
explanation  that  they  had  given  Harris,  but  they 
frankly  stated  that  although  they  would  do  all  they 
could  to  protect  the  foreigners,  yet  in  the  present  state 
of  the  country  such  attacks  were  inevitable ;  they  them 
selves  were  menaced  from  the  same  hostile  motives, 
"nor  could  any  Government  be  held  responsible  for 
the  isolated  acts  of  individuals,  or  outrages  perpetrated 
by  bands  of  their  lawless  subjects."  At  this  interview 
the  ministers  presented  to  Alcock  letters  from  the 
Tycoon  and  themselves  asking  for  the  postponement  of 

38  P.P.  1862,  Com.  64,  pp.  7-8. 

39  Ibid.,   19.     The  ministers  frequently  asked  for  delay  in 
order  to  translate  properly  Alcock's  long  despatches. 

«°  Ibid.,  p.  20. 


ISO  HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE 

the  opening  of  the  ports.41  In  the  three  weeks  which 
had  elapsed  since  the  attack  Alcock  found  the  question 
at  issue  narrowed  down  to  this :  Does  the  government 
lack  the  will  or  the  power  to  protect  the  flags  and  the 
representatives  of  the  treaty  powers?  His  final 
opinion  was  that  the  government  had  no  "  deliberate 
intention"  to  allow  them  to  be  sacrificed  by  assassins 
or  by  the  followers  of  any  daimyo.42 

After  his  interview  with  the  ministers  for  foreign 
affairs  Alcock  notified  his  colleagues  that  "  what  line 
of  conduct  and  course  of  general  policy  may  eventually 
be  best  adapted  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  such  a  posi 
tion,  is  a  grave  question,  and  full  of  difficulty,  but  one 
for  the  decision  of  Governments  rather  than  Diplo 
matic  Agents."43  Therefore  no  exchange  of  views  oc 
curred  among  the  representatives  in  Japan.  It  should 
be  noted  that  on  this  occasion  the  Dutch  consul-general 
announced  that  he  would  not  return  to  Yedo  until 
further  instructed  by  his  government,  for  the  same 
reasons  which  caused  him  to  withdraw  earlier  in  the 
year,44  but  Alcock  and  De  Bellecourt  remained  in  their 
legations.  It  might  be  argued  that  far  greater  reason 

41  P.P.  1862,  Com.  64,  pp.  13-16. 

42  Ibid.,  23,  28 ;  For.  Rel.,  1862,  p.  802.    At  this  time  Alcock 
had  the  idea,  later  proved  to  be  quite  erroneous,  that  the  at 
tack  was  instigated  by  the  Prince  of  Tsushima  in  revenge  for 
an  insult  offered  by  the  Russians  the  preceding  year   (P.P. 
1862,  Com.  64,  p.  23;  Alcock,  II,  161-164). 

43  P.P.  1862,  Com.  64,  p.  18. 

44  For.  Rel.,  1862,  p.  801. 


HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE  l8l 

was  given  by  the  last  attack  for  withdrawing  from 
Yedo  than  in  the  case  of  the  murder  of  Mr.  Heusken ; 
but  this  time  Alcock  reported  that  an  advantage  had 
been  gained  through  remaining,  for  it  held  in  check 
those  who  thought  the  foreign  representatives  could  be 
driven  from  the  capital  by  violence  and  intimidation.45 
Mr.  Harris  must  have  taken  some  comfort  from  his 
colleague's  change  in  policy. 

On  the  receipt  of  Harris's  despatch  describing  the? 
attack  on  the  British  legation,  Mr.  Seward  assured  the 
British  government  directly  "  of  the  willingness  of  the 
United  States  to  co-operate  with  it  in  any  judicious 
measure  it  may  suggest  to  insure  safety  hereafter  to 
diplomatic  and  consular  representatives  of  the  western 
powers  in  Japan,  with  due  respect  to  the  sovereignties 
in  whose  behalf  their  exposure  to  such  grave  perils  is 
incurred."48 

45  P.P.  1862,  Com.  64,  p.  27.    Oliphant's  views,  as  expressed 
to  Sir  Harry  Parkes  at  Hongkong,  in  September,  1861,  while 
on  his  way  to  England,  were  that  "  we  must  cease,  for  a  time 
at  least,  to  be  the  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  Japanese  that  for 
eigners  and  foreign  treaties  have  been  during  the  last  three 
years ;  that  they,  the  Japanese,  must  be  allowed  time  to  digest 
those  treaties,  which  were  rammed  down  their  throats  too 
hastily  in  the  first  instance  and  which  are  evidently  disagree 
ing  with  them;  that,  in  a  word,  we  must  slack  the  strain,  or 
the  string  of  our  connection  with  them  will  snap"   (Dickins 
and  Lane-Poole,  I,  450).    If,  as  was  expected  at  the  time, 
Oliphant  had  succeeded  Alcock,  this  slackening  of  the  strain 
might  have  taken  place. 

46  For.  Rel.,  1861,  p.  441. 


1 82  HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE 

When  Harris  finally  received  discretionary  power  to 
agree  to  a  postponement  of  the  opening  of  the  ports  it 
was  coupled  with  an  instruction  to  first  secure  satis 
faction  "  of  some  marked  kind "  for  the  murder  of 
Mr.  Heusken.  This  demand  caused  him  to  review  the 
whole  incident  and  to  determine  what  form  the  satis 
faction  should  take.  iHis  despatch  to  Mr.  Seward  of 
November  23  shows  how  thoughtfully  he  considered 
the  whole  question  and  gives  further  confirmation  of 
his  keen  sense  of  fair  play.47  The  satisfaction,  he 
believed,  might  take  three  forms:  "  ist,  by  the  arrest 
and  punishment  of  the  assassins ;  2d,  by  a  salute  to  our 
flag;  or  3d,  by  a  money  payment  as  an  indemnity/' 
On  an  examination  of  the  facts  he  could  acquit  the 
Japanese  government  of  any  complicity  in  the  murder, 
and  he  was  convinced  that  "  they  have  loyally  and  seri 
ously  endeavored  to  arrest  and  punish  his  assassins." 
A  salute  to  the  flag,  under  the  circumstances,  with  no 
American  ship  to  receive  it,  would  mean  nothing.  A 
money  indemnity  presented  two  difficulties :  It  might 
be  taken  as  a  satisfaction  for  the  murder,  or  as  a 
"  condition  precedent "  for  postponing  the  treaty 
stipulation,  but  he  had  not  "the  least  doubt  that  the 
ministers  will  readily  agree  to  any  demand  I  may 
make,  provided  it  be  in  their  power  to  comply  with 
it."  He  knew  whereof  he  spoke,  for  when  he  met 
with  them  in  conference  on  the  27th  they  agreed  to 

47  For.  Rel.,  1862,  pp.  804-806. 


HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE  183 

give  any  satisfaction  in  their  power;  assured  Harris 
that  they  were  making  every  effort  to  arrest  and  punish 
the  murderers ;  and  willingly  agreed  to  pay  for  the 
support  of  Heusken's  widowed  mother  the  sum  of 
$10,000,  which  was  not  to  be  considered  payment  for 
his  blood,  or  an  atonement  for  the  murder,  or  a  release 
from  the  obligation  to  arrest  the  murderers.48 

Harris  promptly  notified  his  colleagues  that  he  had 
received  satisfaction  for  the  murder  of  Heusken,  and 
that  he  possessed  discretionary  power  as  to  postponing 
the  opening  of  the  ports.  He  stated  that  he  was  con 
vinced  that  it  was  not  desirable  to  open  Yedo  at 
present,  and  he  requested  their  opinions  as  to  the  other 
ports.49  Alcock  and  De  Bellecourt,  however,  were  not 
ready  to  take  up  the  question  at  that  time.  The  former 
had  recommended  to  Lord  Russell,  on  August  16, 
that  the  postponement  be  granted,  and  had  proposed 
to  make  a  rule,  under  the  Order  in  Council,  suspend 
ing  the  opening  of  Yedo.50  Oliphant,  who  had  been 
wounded  in  the  attack  on  July  5,  had  been  sent  home 
with  despatches  and  first-hand  information  for  the 
foreign  secretary.  He  arrived  in  London  on  October 
28,  and  on  November  23  Lord  Russell  sent  out  in 
structions  covering  the  attack  on  the  legation  and  the 

48  For.  Rel.,  1862,  p.  806.    Compare  this  sum  with  the  £125,- 
ooo  demanded  for  the  murder  of  Richardson.    The  latter  sum 
was  exemplary  rather  than  compensatory. 

49  November  27.     Ibid.,  807-809. 
80  P.P.  1862,  Com.  64,  p.  33. 


184  HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE 

postponement.51  These,  in  brief,  insisted  upon  the 
payment  of  a  pecuniary  indemnity  for  Oliphant  and 
Morrison  and  the  granting  of  a  full  equivalent  for  the 
postponement.  Almost  four  months  passed  before 
Alcock  attempted  to  follow  out  these  instructions. 

•  Early  in  the  new  year  two  events  occurred  which 
testified  to  the  unstable  equilibrium  of  Japanese  poli 
tics.  On  January  23,  1862,  the  second  Japanese 
mission  to  the  treaty  powers  steamed,  in  a  British 
frigate,  down  the  Bay  of  Yedo.52  It  consisted  of 
three  ministers  plenipotentiary  and  a  retinue  of  thirty- 
two  officers  and  servants,  under  instructions  to  visit 
the  governments  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Prussia, 
Russia,  the  Netherlands,  and  Portugal.  This  opening 
of  direct  relations  with  the  European  powers  was  con 
sidered  a  hopeful  sign,  although  the  principal  object 
of  their  mission  was  to  urge  the  postponement  of 
opening  the  additional  ports. 

The  other  event  was  the  attempt,  on  February  14, 
to  assassinate  Ando  Tsushima-no-Kami,  one  of  the 
ministers  for  foreign  affairs,  by  a  band  of  eight 
ronins.53  This  time  the  escort  was  on  the  alert,  and 
although  the  minister  was  twice  wounded  his  life  was 
saved,  and  seven  of  the  eight  assailants  were  cut  down 

61  Ibid.,  72^73. 

"  Alcock,  II,  377-383. 

53  Retainers  of  Hori  Oribe-no-Kami,  who  had  committed 
hara-kiri  because  of  a  reprimand  from  Ando  (Cambridge 
Modern  History,  XI,  844). 


HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE  185 

on  the  spot.  Of  all  the  ministers,  Ando  was  con 
sidered  the  one  best  disposed  toward  foreigners,  and 
on  this  account  he  had  been  signalled  out  for  destruc 
tion.54  This  event,  coupled  with  the  murder  of  Lord 
li,  should  have  convinced  any  doubters  of  the  diffi 
culty  which  the  government  experienced  in  dealing 
with  desperadoes  of  this  type,  who  considered  them 
selves  patriots.* 

On  March  17  Alcock  reported  to  Russell  his  en 
deavors  to  settle  the  two  questions  at  issue, — repara 
tion  for  the  legation  attack  and  postponement  of 
opening  the  ports.55  As  to  the  first,  the  Japanese 
promptly  met  his  demands.  An  indemnity  of  $10,000 
was  granted  for  Oliphant  and  Morrison,  a  new  site  for 
the  British  legation  was  conceded,  and  the  execution 
of  two  of  the  assailants  recently  captured  was 
promised.  When  he  demanded  some  equivalent  for 
the  postponement  of  the  treaty  concessions,  however, 
the  Japanese  frankly  confessed  that  they  could  not 
agree.  It  was  their  hope,  if  there  were  no  further 
development  in  foreign  intercourse,  to  allay  the  present 
national  antipathy  within  the  next  six  years;  but  if 
any  of  the  new  ports  were  opened,  or  any  equivalent 
was  demanded,  they  despaired  of  being  able  to  carry 
out  their  plans.  Alcock  appreciated  the  force  of  these 

5*  Alcock,  II,  395-397;  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  p.  1067;  Japan, 
1853-64,  PP-  41-42. 
65  P.P.  1863,  Com.  74,  pp.  15-22. 


1 86  HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE 

arguments,  and  promised  on  his  return  to  London  to 
ask  government  to  send  out  fresh  instructions  and 
authority  to  make  large  concessions  "  upon  the  under 
standing  always  that  some  equivalent  or  correspond 
ing  advantage  should  be  gained  to  compensate  the  loss, 
either  in  the  public  repeal  of  all  hostile  law  and  the 
sanction  of  Treaties,  the  improvement  of  our  position 
at  the  open  ports,  or  other  ports  in  lieu."  As  Alcock 
was  about  to  depart  for  England  on  sick  leave,  he 
offered  to  take  with  him  Moriyama,  the  interpreter, 
as  a  bearer  of  despatches  to  the  Japanese  envoys  there. 
This  offer  was  accepted.  In  spite  of  the  better  rela 
tions  which  had  been  established,  Alcock  left  on  March 
23  without  an  audience  of  leave  of  the  Shogun,  be 
cause  he  considered  certain  features  of  the  proposed 
ceremonial  derogatory  to  himself. 

On  his  arrival  in  England  the  matter  was  taken  up 
with  the  Japanese  envoys,  and  on  June  6  a  memo 
randum  was  signed  by  Lord  Russell  and  the  Japanese.56 
This  postponed  until  January  I,  1868,  the  opening  of 
Niigata  and  Hiogo  and  the  residence  of  British  sub 
jects  in  Yedo  and  Osaka.  These  concessions  were 
made  in  order  to  enable  the  Japanese  ministers  to  over 
come  the  existing  opposition,  but  "they  expect  the 
Tycoon  and  his  Ministers  will  in  all  other  respects 
strictly  execute  at  the  ports  of  Nagasaki,  Hakodadi, 
and  Kanagawa,  all  the  other  stipulations  of  the  Treaty ; 

56  P.P.  1863,  Com.  74,  PP-  6-8. 


HARRIS    STANDS    ALONE  187 

that  they  will  publicly  revoke  the  old  law  outlawing 
foreigners;  and  that  they  will  specifically  abolish  and 
do  away  with "  certain  specified  restrictions  on  com 
merce  and  social  intercourse.57  In  default  of  the  strict 
fulfillment  of  these  conditions  the  concessions  would 
be  withdrawn  and  the  Tycoon  would  be  called  upon  to 
open  the  ports.  In  addition  the  envoys  agreed  to  sub 
mit  to  the  Tycoon  the  policy  and  expediency  of  open- 

57  These  were :  "  i.  All  restrictions,  whether  as  regards  quan 
tity  or  price,  on  the  sale  by  Japanese  to  foreigners  of  all  kinds 
of  merchandize  according  to  Article  XIV  of  the  Treaty  of 
26th  of  August,  1858.  2.  All  restrictions  on  labour,  and  more 
particularly  on  the  hire  of  carpenters,  boatmen,  boats,  and 
coolies,  teachers,  and  servants  of  whatever  denomination.  3. 
All  restrictions  whereby  Daimios  are  prevented  from  sending 
their  produce  to  market,  and  from  selling  the  same  directly 
by  their  own  agents.  4.  All  restrictions  resulting  from  at 
tempts  on  the  part  of  the  Custom-house  authorities  and  other 
officials  to  obtain  fees.  5.  All  restrictions  limiting  the  classes 
of  persons  who  shall  be  allowed  to  trade  with  foreigners  at 
the  ports  of  Nagasaki,  Hakodadi,  and  Kanagawa.  6.  All  re 
strictions  imposed  on  free  intercourse  of  a  social  kind  between 
foreigners  and  the  people  of  Japan."  In  addition  to  the  ques 
tion  of  postponement,  the  Japanese  raised  twelve  other  ques 
tions,  most  of  them  concerned  with  details,  and  these  were 
properly  left  to  be  discussed  and  settled  in  Japan.  But  Lord 
Russell  flatly  refused  to  give  up  the  escort  of  British  cavalry 
which  had  been  established  at  the  legation  in  Yedo  (P.P.  1863, 
Com.  74,  pp.  7,  13,  15,  28).  It  should  be  noted  that  Russell  did 
not  act  upon  Alcock's  suggestion  that  the  treaties  be  ratified 
by  the  Mikado.  The  mission  visited  all  the  European  treaty 
powers  and  secured  their  consent  to  the  postponement  of 
opening  the  ports  on  terms  similar  to  those  in  the  British 
memorandum  (Alcock,  II,  407). 


1 88  HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE 

ing  Tsushima;58  of  placing  glassware  among  the 
articles  dutiable  at  five  per  cent;  and  of  establishing 
bonded  warehouses. 

It  has  been  necessary  to  follow  this  question  of 
postponing  the  opening  of  the  ports  in  order  to  note 
the  conditions  with  which  it  was  surrounded.  During 
the  next  six  years  it  was  possible  at  almost  any  time 
to  cite  some  violation,  real  or  imagined,  of  this  London 
Convention  as  a  reason  for  demanding  the  immediate 
opening  of  the  ports  and  cities. 

/^lTownsend  Harris's  term  of  service  was  now  draw 
ing  to  its  close.  [On  July  10,  1861,  he  had  desired 
Mr.  Seward  to  lay  "before  the  President  his  request 
to  be  recalled,  on  the  ground  of  impaired  health  and 
advancing  years.59  His  resignation  was  accepted  on 
October  7  by  the  President,  with  "  profound  regret/'60 

58  In  1861,  from  March  to  September,  a  Russian  force  was 
established  on  Tsushima  Island,  and  its  withdrawal  was  largely 
due  to  the  representations  of  the  British  admiral  directly,  and 
of  the  British  government  through  its  ambassador  at  Petro- 
grad  (Michie,  II,  111-115).    In  his  instructions  to  Alcock  of 
November  23,  1861,  Russell  had  included  the  opening  of  Tsu 
shima  and  the  neighboring  coast  of  Korea  among  the  equiva 
lents  to  be  demanded. 

59  For.  Rel,  1862,  p.  799.    Mr.  E.  H.  House,  a  friend  of 
Harris's  later  years,  states  that  he  resigned  "  under  a  mistaken 
sense  of  his  obligations  "  on  the  inauguration  of  the  Repub 
lican  administration  (Atlantic  Monthly,  vol.  47,  p.  610).     But 
the  dates  do  not  confirm  this,  and  the  statement  made  in  his 
letter  of  resignation  probably  describes  the  case  correctly. 

•o  For.  Rel.,  1862,  p.  816. 


HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE  189 

and  Robert  H.  Pruyn,  of  New  York,  was  appointed  as 
his  successpr.7  He  was  expected  to  arrive  early  in 
January,  as  Harris  had  requested.^. 

When  the  Shogunate  government  learned  that 
Harris  was  to  be  recalled  it  addressed  a  letter  to 
Seward  testifying  to  his  ability,  knowledge  of  the 
country,  and  friendly  attitude,  and  begging  that  he  be 
allowed  to  remain.61  This  letter,  of  course,  could 
have  no  effect  in  view  of  Harris's  expressed  wishes 
and  the  appointment  of  his  successor.  This  expression 
of  esteem  was  repeated  when  Harris  took  his  leave. 
_On_April  25,  1862,  Mr.  Pruyn  arrived  at  Kanagawa, 
and  the  next  day  Harris  had  his  farewell  audience  of 
the  Shogun,  and  thus  ended  his  five  strenuous  years 
as  pioneer  consul  and  minister  in  Japan. 

No  onecan  study  this  troubled  period  of  Japanese 
affairs  without  gaining  a  high  admiration  for  the 
services  of  Townsend  Harris]  but  unhappily  too  few 
have  scanned  one  of  the  most  creditable  pages  of 
America's  diplomatic  history.  Mr.  John  W.  Foster, 
himself  a  diplomat  and  secretary  of  state,  has  paid 
this  tribute:  [He  reflected  great  honor  upon  his 
country,  and  justly^Heserved  to  rank  among  the  first 
diplomats  of  the  world,  if  such  rank  is  measured  by 
accomplishments.^2  Japanese  encomiums  are  not 

61  December  5,  1861.     Ibid.,  812,  822.    A  similar  letter  was 
sent  to  Lord  Russell  concerning  Alcock,  on  March  20,  1862, 
just  before  he  left  Japan  on  leave  (P.P.  1863,  Com.  74,  p.  10). 

62  Foster,  186. 


HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE 

wanting,  for  beyond  question  he  is  better  known  and 
appreciated  in  Japan  than  in  his  own  land.63  The 
estimate  of  Longford,  British  consul  and  historian,  is 
a  noble  one :  "  The  story  of  how,  unbacked  by  any  dis 
play  of  force  under  his  country's  flag,  he  succeeded  by 
his  own  personal  efforts  in  overcoming  the  traditional 
hatred  of  centuries  to  even  the  smallest  association 
with  foreigners,  is  one  of  marvelous  tact  and  patience, 
of  steady  determination  and  courage,  of  straight 
forward  uprightness  in  every  respect,  that  is  not  ex 
ceeded  by  any  in  the  entire  history  of  the  international 
relations  of  the  world."64  Mr.  Seward  fittingly  said: 
"  It  is  a  deserved  crown  of  his  long  period  of  public 
service  that  the  same  high  appreciation  of  his  merits 
and  usefulness  is  entertained  by  the  government  which 
sent  him  abroad  and  by  the  government  near  which  he 
has  been  accredited."65 

The  opening  of  Japan  to  foreign  intercourse  after 


63  Nitobe,   Intercourse   between   United   States   and   Japan, 
115;  Shibusawa,  in  Japan  to  America,  19;  S.  G.  Hishida,  In 
ternational  Position  of  Japan  as  a  Great  Power,  in,  114,  117; 
Griffis,  Harris,  331-333.     After  his  return  to  the  United  States 
Mr.  Harris  lived  quietly  in  New  York  City  until  his  death  on 
February  25,  1878.    In  1909,  when  the  Japanese  Commercial 
Mission  visited  this  country,  its  members  found  the  grave  of 
Harris  in  Greenwood  Cemetery,  Brooklyn,  and  placed  a  floral 
tribute  upon  it. 

64  Longford,  302. 

«5  For.  Rel.,  1862,  p.  822. 


/  HARRIS    STANDS   ALONE  IQI 

two  hundred  years  of  seclusion  was  not  the  work  of 
any  man  or  of  any  single  agency.  A  combination  of 
circumstances  and  a  group  of  forward-looking  Japa 
nese  and  foreigners  made  it  possible^  But  if  one  man 
is  entitled  to  a  full  measure  of  praise  it  is  Townsend 
Harris.  His  honesty  and  his  fairmindedness  while 
isolated  at  Shimoda  won  the  respect  and  the  confidence 
of  the  Japanese.  I  That  victory  gained, |}he  negotiation 
of  his  great  treaty  was  no  difficult  matter,  and  Japan 
peacefully  conceded  almost  all  that  China  had  been 
forced  to  grant  after  two  unhappy  warsj  If  the  story 
of  Japan's  relations  with  the  western  powers  reads  so 
differently  from  that  of  China's  bitter  experience, 
much  of  the  credit  is  due  to  Townsend  Harris  as  well 
as  to  Lord  Hotta  and  Lord  li.  /After  he  had  nego 
tiated  his  revolutionary  treaty  Harris  remained  for 
two  years  to  help  the  Japanese  enter  upon  their  new 
relations.  He  was  the  first  to  recognize  the  immediate 
difficulties  created  by  foreign  intercourse  and  the  first 
to  recommend  that  some  of  the  concessions  granted  in 
his  treaty  be  postponed.  While  the  blades  of  the 
ronins  were  flashing  he  kept  his  head,  and  his  refusal 
to  join  his  colleagues  in  their  withdrawal  from  Yedo 
brought  into  relief  the  futility  of  their  action.  Above 
all,  he  tried  to  understand  the  Japanese  point  of  view 
and  to  reconcile  his  country's  interests  and  those  of 
Japan,  and  in  doing  so  he  was  a  real  statesman,  for 


IQ2  HARRIS   STANDS   ALONE 

he  was  building  for  all  time.J  The  student  of  inter 
national  relations  may  well  consider  how  these  prob 
lems  might  have  been  solved  in  Japan  if  all  the  foreign 
representatives  and  their  home  governments  could 
have  recognized  in  time  the  fundamental  wisdom  of 
the  policy  of  Townsend  Harris. 


CHAPTER  VII 

ROBERT  H.  PRUYN,  SECOND  MINISTER  RESIDENT 

In  the  selection  of  a  successor  to  Townsend  Har 
ris  the  United  States  was  again  most  fortunate  in  its 
choice  of  a  representative  in  Japan.  In  spite  of  the 
serious  situation  which  had  developed  with  the  prog 
ress  of  the  Civil  War  and  the  strained  relations  with 
England  and  France  in  the  first  year,  Mr.  Seward 
considered  the  mission  to  Japan  one  of  extreme  im 
portance,  and  desired  to  have  some  one  there  whom 
he  knew  thoroughly  and  on  whose  sound  judgment 
he  could  rely.  Such  a  representative  he  found  in 
Robert  Hewson  Pruyn,  of  Albany,  New  York.  Mr. 
Pruyn  was  born  in  that  city  on  February  14,  1815,  of 
Flemish  ancestry.  Educated  at  the  Albany  Academy 
and  Rutgers  College,  he  had  been  admitted  to  the 
bar  in  1836,  and  had  promptly  entered  upon  a  career 
of  public  service.  First  serving  as  attorney  and  cor 
poration  counsel  for  his  native  city,  he  later  entered 
the  State  Assembly,  and  in  1854  was  elected  speaker 
of  the  House  by  the  Whig  majority.  During  these 
years  he  was  the  intimate  friend  of  Mr.  Seward  and 
his  strong  political  supporter.  With  the  success  of 
the  Republican  party  in  1860,  Mr.  Pruyn  was  assured 

193 


194  ROBERT   H.    PRUYN 

of  an  important  appointment ;  but  with  the  resignation 
of  Mr.  Harris,  Mr.  Seward,  after  consultation  with 
President  Lincoln,  made  a  strong  personal  request 
that  Mr.  Pruyn  accept  the  Japanese  mission.  He  was 
loath  to  do  this.  At  such  a  time,  when  the  fate  of 
the  nation  was  at  stake,  it  required  a  high  sense  of 
civic  duty  for  a  man  to  accept  so  dangerous,  difficult, 
and  remote  a  post.  Mr.  Pruyn  did  accept,  however, 
and  the  event  justified  the  confidence  which  Mr.  Sew- 
ard  had  placed  in  him.  In  his  letter  of  instructions 
of  November  15,  1861,  Seward  pointed  out  the  diffi 
culties  which  Pruyn  would  have  to  face,  due  to  the 
loss  of  national  prestige  during  the  war  and  to  the 
hostility  of  the  Japanese  to  foreign  intercourse:1 

You  will  find  no  open  questions  for  discussion  in  your  mis 
sion.  It  is  important  to  preserve  friendly  and  intimate  rela 
tions  with  the  representatives  of  other  western  powers  in 
Japan.  You  will  seek  no  exclusive  advantages,  and  will  con 
sult  freely  with  them  upon  all  subjects,  insomuch  as  it  is  espe 
cially  necessary,  at  this  time,  that  the  prestige  of  western  civi 
lization  be  maintained  in  Yedo  as  completely  as  possible.  In 
short,  you  will  need  to  leave  behind  you  all  memories  of  do 
mestic  or  of  European  jealousies  or  antipathies,  and  will,  by 
an  equal,  just,  and  honorable  conduct  of  your  mission,  make 
the  simple  people  of  Japan  respect,  not  only  the  institutions 
of  your  own  country,  but  the  institutions  of  Christianity  and 
of  western  civilization. 

On  April  25,  1862,  Mr.  Pruyn  arrived  at  Kana- 
gawa,  and  was  conveyed  to  Yedo  in  the  Shogun's 

1  For.  Rel.,  1862,  p.  817. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  195 

steam-yacht  Emperor,  the  gift  of  the  British  govern 
ment  to  the  Tycoon.2  His  reception  in  Yedo  and 
by  the  ministers  for  foreign  affairs  and  the  Council 
of  State  was  marked  by  the  utmost  cordiality.  On 
May  17  he  was  received  in  audience  by  the  Shogun 
and  presented  his  credentials.  Here  also  the  evidence 
of  good-will  was  marked.  The  ceremony  was  the 
same  as  that  used  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Harris,  the 
Japanese  refusing  to  make  any  unfavorable  distinc 
tion  between  the  minister  resident  and  his  colleagues, 
— Alcock,  then  absent  on  leave,  being  an  envoy  extra 
ordinary  and  minister  plenipotentiary,  and  De  Belle- 
court,  a  minister  plenipotentiary.3 

The  American  minister  took  up  his  residence  in  the 
temple-legation  where  Harris  had  held  his  ground 
during  almost  three  eventful  years.  He  also  was 
for  a  time  the  only  foreign  representative  in  Yedo. 
The  temple  grounds  were  defended  by  a  double  pali- 

2  Mr.  Pruyn  was  delayed  on  his  way  to  Japan  through  the 
illness  and  death  of  his  son  in  San  Francisco.    Because  of  the 
war  no  national  vessel  was  available  to  convey  him  to  Japan, 
as  had  been  planned;  and  although  the  Russian  government 
placed  the  corvette  Caravala  at  his   disposal,  he  thought  it 
unwise  to  sail  under  a  foreign  flag.    He,  therefore,  chartered 
the  American  sailing-ship  Ringleader.    No  trans-Pacific  steam 
ships  were  then  in  operation. 

3  For.  Rel.,  1862,  p.  812.     Pruyn  understood  that  this  was 
why  Alcock  refused  to  take  an  audience  of  leave.     Portman 
told    Pruyn   that  his  audience  contained   unusually   friendly 
features,  such  as  the  escort  back  to  the  legation.    The  au 
dience  is  described  in  Pruyn  MSS.,  May,  1862. 


196  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

sade  of  bamboo,  with  frequent  guard-houses.  At 
least  one  hundred  and  sixty  soldiers,  later  increased 
to  two  hundred  and  eighty-four,  part  being  two- 
sworded  yaconins  of  the  Shogun's  forces  and  part 
troops  of  the  daimyo  in  charge  of  protecting  the  lega 
tion,  were  constantly  at  their  posts.  No  one  was 
allowed  to  enter  the  enclosure  except  those  whose 
business  was  known,  and  when  any  of  the  residents 
went  abroad  on  horseback,  thirty-two  mounted  yaco 
nins  and  twenty-two  fleet-footed  bettoes  (grooms)  ac 
companied  them.  None  of  the  Americans  ever  went 
armed,  in  distinction  to  the  other  foreigners,  who  gen 
erally  wore  sabres  and  revolvers. 

In  one  respect  Mr.  Pruyn  entered  upon  his  mission 
under  favorable  circumstances.  There  can  be  little 
doubt  that  the  friendliness,  sympathy,  and  good-will 
of  Townsend  Harris  had  caused  the  Japanese  to  feel 
more  kindly  disposed  toward  Americans  than  toward 
any  other  nationals.  Mr.  Pruyn  felt  this  at  once,  and 
the  Japanese  in  turn  continued  to  look  to  him  as  their 
adviser  and  mediator  as  they  had  in  the  case  of  Har 
ris.  In  fact  the  next  year  the  French  minister  con 
fessed  that  the  American  minister  alone  could  secure 
results,  and  that  soon  "'everything  will  have  to  be 
done  through  the  Americans."4 

In  every  other  respect,  however,  Mr.  Pruyn's  posi 
tion  was  a  most  difficult  one.  The  Civil  War  at 

*  Pruyn  MSS.,  March  12,  1863. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  197 

home  caused  doubts  as  to  the  very  survival  of  the 
government  which  he  represented.  It  prevented  the 
presence  of  an  American  fleet  in  eastern  waters  to 
support  his  position,  and  this  fact  led  the  British  and 
French  ministers,  with  ships  at  their  call,  to  act  to 
gether.  Just  as  Harris  won  his  great  treaty  without 
the  support  of  a  squadron,  so  Pruyn  maintained  the 
honor  and  dignity  of  the  United  States  practically 
without  material  backing.5  And  the  three  years  cov 
ered  by  his  mission  were  the  years  which  saw  the 
culmination  of  the  anti-foreign  movement.  He  had 
to  face  crises  far  more  serious  than  those  which  Har 
ris  knew.  If  Perry  opened  the  gates  of  Japan,  and 
Harris  threw  them  open  wide,  then  Robert  H.  Pruyn 
is  entitled  to  no  little  credit  for  preventing  their  be 
ing  closed  again. 

In  preceding  chapters  the  rise  of  the  anti-foreign 
movement  and  its  intricate  relation  with  the  anti- 
Shogunate  and  pro-Mikado  propaganda  have  been 
pointed  out.  While  Lord  li  lived,  the  imperial  court 
and  the  rebellious  daimyos  were  cowed,  the  trouble- 
making  ronins  were  suppressed  in  Yedo  with  a  heavy 
hand,  and,  although  it  occasioned  civil  war  within  the 

5  It  must  be  remembered  that  Colonel  Neale  and  Sir  Ruth 
erford  Alcock  had  the  support  of  a  powerful  fleet  and  of 
troops  landed  in  Japan.  Mr.  Pruyn,  practically  without  sup 
port,  save  for  the  occasional  presence  of  one  or  two  ships  of 
war,  exerted  a  strong  influence  upon  the  leaders  of  the  Sho- 
gunate  administration. 

14 


1C)  8  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

clan,  the  imperial  order  to  the  Lord  of  Mito  was 
finally  turned  over  to  the  Shogunate.  With  the  as 
sassination  of  Lord  li  in  1860,  however,  there  was  no 
one  strong  enough  to  take  his  place,  and  the  anti- 
foreign  feeling,  so  long  suppressed,  surged  forth 
again.  "  From  this  time  the  advocates  of  the  expul 
sion  of  the  'barbarians'  increased  every  day,"  says 
the  Japanese  historian.6  Then  followed  the  outrages 
already  described, — the  murder  of  Heusken,  the  first 
attack  on  the  British  legation,  and  the  frequent  alarms 
in  Yedo  and  Yokohama,  all  well  founded,  for  the  sur 
rounding  country  was  infested  with  anti-foreign 
ronins.7  On  September  17,  1861,  the  old  Prince  of 
Mito,  Nariaki,  leader  of  the  anti-foreign  forces  and 
stout  antagonist  of  Lord  li,  died.  With  his  death 
the  leadership  of  this  cause  passed  to  daimyos  of 
western  Japan. 

One  of  Lord  li's  measures  for  reconciling  the  court 
and  the  castle  was  the  arrangement  of  a  marriage  be 
tween  the  sister  of  the  Mikado  and  the  boy  Shogun. 
After  the  death  of  Lord  li  his  successors  were  able  to 
carry  this  through.  In  December  the  princess  arrived 
in  Yedo,  and  on  March  u,  1862,  the  marriage  was 
consummated,  but,  unhappily,  its  influence  was  slight. 
In  the  meantime  the  ronins  had  struck  again,  this 

6Yamaguchi  Uji,  History  of  Japan,  translated  by  Satow, 
p.  20,  cited  hereafter  as  Japan,  1853-69. 
7  Japan,  1853-69,  p.  21. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  1 99 

time  at  Lord  Ando,  one  of  the  ministers  for  foreign 
affairs,  because  of  his  support  of  the  pro-foreign  pol 
icy.  "  During  this  period  the  samurai  deserted  from 
their  clans  in  daily  increasing  numbers.  They  allied 
themselves  with  the  ronins  in  all  parts  of  the  country 
to  raise  the  cry  of  '  honour  the  Mikado  and  expel  the 
barbarians.'  "8  Not  for  two  hundred  years  had  Japan 
known  such  internal  commotion,  and  the  Shogunate 
seemed  unable  to  rise  to  the  demands  of  the  hour. 

At  this  time  the  clans  of  Satsuma  and  Choshiu 
(Nagato)  assumed  the  leadership  which  they  held 
throughout  this  troubled  period,  and  which  they  hold 
even  to  the  present  time.  The  Daimyo  of  Choshiu, 
Mori  Daizen-no-Daibu,  had  frequently  urged  the 
Shogunate  to  act  in  harmony  with  and  under  the  or 
ders  of  the  Mikado,  pointing  out  that  the  treaties  had 
been  signed  before  the  Mikado's  approval  had  been 
obtained,  and  that  this  sort  of  arbitrary  government 
might  lead  to  the  overthrow  of  the  Shogunate.9 
About  the  same  time  Shimadzu  Idzumi,  brother  of 
the  late  and  father  of  the  then  Daimyo  of  Satsuma, 
while  on  his  way  to  Yedo,  was  addressed  by  a  band 
of  ronins  at  Himeji,  on  May  4,  and  called  upon  to 
lead  them  against  the  Shogun's  castles  at  Osaka  and 
Nijo,  in  Kyoto,  and  against  the  castle  at  Hikone  of 

8  Ibid.,  24. 

9  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  49.     See  his  letter  to  the  Shogun,  in  P.P. 
1864,  Com.  66  (3242),  p.  27. 


200  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

the  li  family,  and  then  drive  the  Shogunate  officials 
out  of  Kyoto,  free  the  princes  and  nobles  there,  and 
escort  the  Mikado  over  the  mountains,  to  punish  the 
crimes  of  the  Shogunate.10  Instead  of  proceeding  to 
Yedo,  Shimadzu  turned  off  to  Kyoto,  and  presented 
the  memorial  of  the  ronins  to  the  Mikado.  The  Em 
peror  was  delighted,  and  ordered  Shimadzu  to  re 
main  in  Kyoto  "to  quiet  the  excitement  among  the 
ronins  of  all  parts,  and  give  tranquility  to  the  Em 
pire."11  A  few  days  later  the  Daimyo  of  Choshiu 
arrived  in  Kyoto  and  was  associated  with  Shimadzu 
in  control  of  the  loyal  ronins.  These  two  nobles  now 
stood  forth  as  advocates  of  the  imperial  demands. 
Although  four  years  had  passed  since  the  treaties 
of  1858  had  been  negotiated,  the  foreign  ministers 
were  still  uncertain  as  to  the  serious  flaw  in  their 
validity, — the  lack  of  the  Mikado's  sanction.  As  we 
have  seen,  Townsend  Harris  had  realized  the  formal 
authority  of  the  Mikado,  and  had  twice  threatened 
to  carry  his  negotiations  to  Kyoto.  But  he  believed 
that  the  treaties  had  been  ratified  by  the  Mikado,  ex 
cept  so  far  as  they  related  to  Osaka,  and  he  so  in 
formed  his  successor.12  Rutherford  Alcock  had  first 
been  impressed  with  the  lack  of  validity  while  mak 
ing  his  overland  journey  from  Osaka  to  Yedo,  in 

10  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  45- 

"  Ibid.,  48. 

"  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1035. 


ROBERT   H.   PRUYN  2OI 

June,  i86i.13  When,  however,  on  August  14  he  asked 
the  ministers  for  foreign  affairs  if  the  Mikado  had 
sanctioned  the  British  treaty,  they  replied  in  the  af 
firmative.14  However,  in  the  following  March  he 
suggested  that  "the  sanction  of  Treaties"  be  one  of 
the  equivalents  secured  for  postponing  the  opening 
of  the  ports,  but  Lord  Russell  did  not  accept  the  pro 
posal.  The  French  minister,  De  Bellecourt,  in  June 
did  not  believe  that  they  had  been  ratified,  but  the 
difference  of  opinion  and  information  on  this  score 
caused  the  ministers  to  determine  on  June  27,  1862, 
"  to  raise  no  questions  which  would  imply  a  doubt  as 
to  the  validity  of  the  treaties."  It  was  left  for  Mr. 
Pruyn  to  point  out  clearly  and  forcefully  the  absolute 
necessity  of  obtaining  the  Mikado's  approval. 

It  was  in  such  a  milieu  of  doubt  and  uncertainty, 
alarms  and  sudden  death  that  Mr.  Pruyn  began  his 
mission.  Happily  he  possessed  a  disposition  which 
made  for  usefulness  at  such  a  time.  First  of  all,  he 
had  the  utmost  consideration  for  the  Japanese  people 
as  a  whole,  and  especially  for  the  harassed  officers  of 
the  Shogunate.  He  realized  with  unusual  clearness, 
in  view  of  the  lack  of  accurate  information,  the  diffi- 

13  "  I  think  this  gave  me  the  first  clear  insight  as  to  the 
actual  relations  established  by  the  treaties  entered  into  on  the 
part  of  the  Tycoon.    He  had  made  treaties,  but  the  Mikado 
had  never  ratified  or  sanctioned  them,  and  the  Daimios  could 
not  therefore  be  compelled  to  observe  them"  (Alcock,  II,  137). 

14  P.P.  1862,  Com.  64,  p.  31. 


202  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

cult  position  in  which  they  were  placed,  between  the 
foreigners  who  demanded  the  fulfillment  of  the 
treaties  to  the  letter,  and  the  rising  tide  of  imperial 
opposition.  He  never  doubted  their  anxiety  to  pro 
tect  him  and  all  foreigners,  even  when  relations  were 
most  strained,  and  he  was  ever  ready  to  distinguish 
between  the  acts  of  the  Shogunate  and  those  of  the 
hostile  Japanese  who  dealt  their  blows  both  at  the 
foreigners  and  at  the  Yedo  administration.  Further 
more  he  preferred  to  think  for  himself  and  arrive  at 
his  own  conclusions  unswayed  by  the  clamor  of  the 
treaty  ports.  In  one  of  his  early  despatches  he  wrote: 
"  I  regret  to  say  that  many  idle  rumors  are  con 
stantly  agitating  the  foreign  residents  at  Yokohama, 
many  of  whom  are  too  ready  to  believe  everything  to 
the  prejudice  of  the  Japanese.  For  my  part  I  am 
amazed,  when  I  consider  that  two  centuries  of  isola 
tion  have  moulded  the  customs  and  opinions  of  this 
people,  that  there  is  so  much  freedom  of  intercourse 
and  so  little  appearance  of  hostility."15  And  again : 
"  I  had  learned  to  receive  with  distrust  all  the  rumors 
and  news  of  which  Yokohama  is  the  prolific  parent, 
and  which  keep  it  in  a  state  of  constant  alarm."16 
Perhaps  the  fact  that  his  colleagues  lived  almost  all 
the  time  in  Yokohama,  in  such  an  atmosphere,  colored 
their  thoughts  and  actions.  As  we  have  seen,  Mr. 

15  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1040. 

16 For.  Rel,  1863,  II,  1056,  1088.   "',', 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  2O3 

Pruyn  relied  entirely  upon  the  Japanese  guards  at 
the  legation  and  never  asked  for  American  forces. 
Although  adopting  such  precautionary  measures  as 
the  officials  recommended,  he  considered  them  de 
signed  in  good  faith  for  his  protection  and  not  in  or 
der  to  isolate  him,  and  while  frequently  making  ex 
cursions  through  Yedo,  and  up  and  down  the  Tokaido 
to  Yokohama,  he  never  reported  a  hostile  act  or  ges 
ture.17  In  fact  the  cheeriness  and  the  good-will  of 
the  people  were  most  evident. 

With  his  colleagues  Mr.  Pruyn  was  on  the  best  of 
terms  except  for  a  brief  period  at  the  time  of  the 
British  ultimatum  of  April,  1863.  Mr.  Seward  had 
advised  the  most  friendly  cooperation  and  Pruyn's 
genial  personality  made  it  easy.  He  was  fortunate 
in  having  as  the  British  charge  d'affaires  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Neale,  who  arrived  in  May,  1862,  to  take  the 
place  of  Alcock,  then  on  leave.  Colonel  Neale  was 
more  sympathetic  than  Alcock  and  his  views  were, 
at  first,  quite  in  accord  with  Pruyn's.  From  the  first, 
official  meetings  were  occasionally  held  for  a  consid 
eration  of  the  general  situation  and  in  order  to  in 
sure  harmonious  action.  Soon  another  alarming 
event  occurred.  On  the  night  of  June  26  a  single 
Japanese  made  his  way  through  the  heavy  guards  at 
the  British  legation,  struck  down  two  of  the  British 
sentries,  and  then  committed  suicide.  Such  were  the 

17  Ibid.,  1028;  Pruyn  MSS.,  July  7,  November  20,  1862. 


204  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

facts  ;  what  was  the  explanation  ?  Colonel  Neale  had 
taken  up  his  residence  in  Yedo  only  as  long  before  as 
the  I2th.18  His  guard  consisted  of  five  hundred  and 
thirty-five  Japanese  soldiers,  partly  of  the  Tycoon's 
body-guard  and  partly  troops  of  the  Daimyo  Matsu- 
daira  Tamba-no-Kami,  and  thirty  British  sailors  and 
fourteen  officers  and  men  of  the  British  body-guard. 
If  the  assailant  were  animated  by  unreasoning  hatred 
of  all  foreigners,  surely  the  British  legation  was  the 
last  place  which  could  have  been  attacked  with  im 
punity.  The  Japanese  officials  told  Pruyn  that  one  of 
the  Japanese  guard  "  had  been  suddenly  seized  with  a 
kind  of  madness."  In  his  opinion  one  or  all  of  three 
reasons  might  have  led  to  the  crime.  These  were,  re 
sentment  at  the  presence  of  foreign  soldiers  and 
sailors  as  guards,  some  quarrel  between  the  two  kinds 
of  guards,  or  an  act  of  revenge  on  the  part  of  rela 
tives  of  those  who  had  lost  their  lives  in  the  last  at 
tack  on  the  legation.19  The  most  reasonable  explana 
tion  was  the  second,  for  Mr.  Pruyn  learned  through 
his  servants  that  one  of  the  Japanese  guards  had  been 
kicked  by  a  British  guard  and  had  been  goaded  on  to 
avenge  the  insult.  A  somewhat  similar  story  was 
told  years  later  to  Mr.  Adams  and  recorded  in  his 

18  P.P.  1863,  Com.  74,  pp.  30-32;  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1033. 

19  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1034.    "  You  know  England  nor  France 
nor  the  United  States,  would  allow  any  such  thing  as  foreign 
guards  to  be  landed  in  their  cities"    (Pruyn  MSS.,  July  7, 
1862). 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  2O5 

History  of  Japan,20  and  the  author  of  Kinse  Shiriaku 
gives  about  the  same  explanation.21 

Mr.  Pruyn  at  once  addressed  a  strong  letter  to  the 
ministers  for  foreign  affairs  testifying  to  his  astonish 
ment  and  grief  at  such  an  outrage,  regretting  the  want 
of  fidelity  and  courage  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese 
guard,  and  urging  the  utmost  promptitude  and  vigor 
in  the  arrest  of  the  guilty  participators,  lest  the  repe 
tition  of  such  attacks  degrade  Japan  in  the  opinion  of 
the  whole  civilized  world.22  The  French  and  Dutch 
representatives  addressed  similar  letters,  and  a 
lengthy  exchange  of  notes  occurred  between  Colonel 
Neale  and  the  Japanese  ministers,  in  which  the  former 
sought  some  explanation  of  the  attack,  demanded  ad 
ditional  measures  and  guarantees  of  protection,  and 
complained  loudly  of  the  cowardice  and  inefficiency  of 
the  Japanese  guards.  The  ministers  made  such  ex 
planations  as  they  could,  and  carried  out  every  sug 
gestion  for  the  defense  of  the  legation.  They  also 
addressed  a  letter  to  Lord  Russell  in  which  they  ex 
pressed  the  regret  of  the  Shogun,  and  pointed  out  the 
measures  they  had  taken  to  protect  the  British  rep 
resentative.  The  question  now  resolved  itself  into 
one  of  the  amount  of  indemnity,  the  Japanese,  on 
their  part,  offering  $3000  for  the  relatives  of  the  two 

20 1,  170-172. 

21  Japan,  1853-69,  p.  28. 

22  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1036. 


2C>6  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

murdered  men;23  but  Lord  Russell  in  his  despatch  of 
September  22  demanded  that  an  indemnity  of  £10,000 
sterling,  in  gold,  be  levied  upon  the  estate  of  the 
daimyo  in  charge  of  the  legation.24 

As  for  Mr.  Pruyn,  he  was  convinced  of  the  sin 
cerity  of  the  distress  manifested  by  the  Shogunate 
officials,  and  he  had  little  fear  for  his  own  safety. 
Soon  he  was  the  only  foreign  minister  left  in  Yedo, 
for  Colonel  Neale  retired  to  Yokohama  on  July  15, 
to  await  the  completion  of  the  new  British  legation 
at  Goten-yama  about  the  end  of  October.25 

For  the  next  few  weeks  there  was  a  lull  in  the 
stormy  relations  of  the  time.  Mr.  Pruyn  endeavored 
to  straighten  out  a  dispute  as  to  the  proper  customs 
duty  to  be  levied  on  articles  imported  for  use  in  pack 
ing  tea,  and  hence  promptly  exported  again,26  and 
Colonel  Neale  instituted  an  inquiry  among  British 
merchants  as  to  Japanese  obstructions  and  restric- 

23  P.P.  1863,  Com.  74,  p.  57. 

24  Ibid.,  49.    In  this  despatch,  after  stating  that  the  admiral 
would  take  proper  steps  for  the  protection  of  the  legation, 
Russell  said  that  it  might  be  necessary  to  mount  three  or  four 
small  cannon  on  the  grounds. 

25  Pruyn  stated  that  Neale  withdrew  because  the  naval  cap 
tain  would  not  leave  more  than  twenty  sailors  in  Yedo.    There 
had  been  fifty  immediately  after  the  murders  (For.  ReL,  1863, 
II,  1042). 

26  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1039.     An  interesting  episode  at  this 
time  was  the  return  by  Mr.  Pruyn  of  a  sword  stolen  in  Balti 
more,  in  June,  1860,  from  one  of  the  Japanese  mission.    It  was 
recovered  and  transmitted  to  Mr.  Pruyn  by  Mr,  Seward. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  2O7 

tions  on  trade,  but  little  specific  information  was  ob 
tained.27  On  August  21  he  issued  a  notification  that 
his  government  had  consented  to  defer  the  opening 
of  the  other  treaty  ports  and  cities  for  five  years  from 
January  I,  1863,  and  a  little  later  Mr.  Pruyn  wrote 
that  when  he  took  up  the  question  he  would  try  to 
secure  as  a  compensation  the  establishment  of  a 
bonded  warehouse  system  and  the  opening  of  the 
island  of  Tsushima.28 

Then,  out  of  a  clear  sky,  came  one  of  the  most 
fateful  of  all  the  anti-foreign  outrages.  On  the  I4th 
of  September  four  British  subjects,  C.  L.  Richard 
son,  W.  Marshall,  W.  €.  Clarke,  and  Mrs.  Borrodaile, 
a  sister-in-law  of  Mr.  Marshall,  were  riding  on  the 
Tokaido  within  the  treaty  limits.  They  had  gone 
about  three  miles  from  Kanagawa  when  they  met  the 
train  of  Shimadzu  Saburo  Idzumi,  father  of  the 
Daimyo  of  Satsuma,29  and,  as  we  have  seen,  a  leader 
of  the  imperial  faction.  As  to  what  then  happened 
there  is  some  dispute,  but  it  appears  that  when  they 
reached  the  main  body  of  the  procession  an  order 
was  given,  a  retainer  drew  his  long  sword  and  swung 
right  and  left,  and  Richardson  was  fatally  wounded, 
but  able  to  ride  on  for  more  than  a  mile,  when  he  fell 
from  his  horse  and  was  there  put  out  of  his  misery. 

27  P.P.  1863,  Com.  74,  pp.  64-73. 

28  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1043. 

29  Own  father,  but  uncle  by  adoption. 


208  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

Marshall  and  Clarke  were  severely  wounded,  but  Mrs. 
Borrodaile,  though  attacked,  escaped  unharmed.30 

Great  was  the  excitement  when  the  news  reached 
Yokohama.  The  foreign  community  cried  out  for 
summary  punishment  and  demanded  that  an  armed 
force  be  sent  at  once  to  seize  the  nobleman  and  his 
escort.31  Happily  the  British  admiral  refused  to  be 
a  party  to  such  a  wild  expedition,  and  thus  immediate 
hostilities  were  prevented.  Colonel  Neale  incurred 
the  censure  of  the  British  community  for  his  mod 
erate  measures,  but  his  government  later  approved 
his  judgment  and  forbearance. 

*  Mr.  Pruyn  received  the  news  in  Yedo  late  that 
night;  he  notified  Mr.  de  Wit,  the  Dutch  charge,  the 
next  morning,  and  they  requested  a  joint  interview 
with  the  ministers  for  foreign  affairs.  After  some 
argument  the  request  was  granted,  and  the  two  for 
eign  representatives  joined  in  a  strong  demand  that 
the  leader  of  the  party  (whom  they  understood  to  be 
the  secretary  of  the  daimyo)  be  arrested  before  he 
escaped  to  Satsuma.  When  the  ministers  said  that 
they  could  not  arrest  so  important  an  officer,  but 
would  have  to  ask  his  daimyo  to  seize  him,  Pruyn 
warned  them  that  if  he  were  not  arrested  the  Tokaido 
might  be  seized.  The  ministers  finally  authorized 

30  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1048-1051;  P.P.  1863,  Com.  74,  pp. 
73-94;  Black,  124-144. 

81  Estimated  at  from  200  to  1,000  followers.  Japan,  1853-64, 
says  600  well  armed  retainers  (p.  54). 


ROBERT   H.    PRUYN  2O9 

Pruyn  and  De  Wit  to  assure  their  colleagues  that  the 
guilty  parties  would  be  punished  whatever  their  posi 
tion,  and  said  that  they  would  act  promptly  and  vig 
orously.  They  furthermore  hoped  that  the  foreign 
ministers  would  use  their  influence  to  prevent  the 
seizure  of  the  Tokaido  or  any  other  hostile  act. 

This  unhappy  affair  presented  several  complicating 
features.  It  was  not  deliberate  murder,  without  ex 
cuse,  by  some  irresponsible  ronin.  Instead,  the  blow 
was  delivered  in  hot  blood,  to  avenge  an  insult  offered, 
in  ignorance  it  may  be  presumed,  to  one  of  the  most 
powerful  nobles  in  the  land.  According  to  Japanese 
law,  when  the  procession  of  a  man  of  high  rank  was 
passing  it  was  customary  for  bystanders  to  show  some 
mark  of  respect.  Those  who  were  privileged  to  ride 
would  dismount,  and  those  who  stood  would  fall  on 
their  knees.32  Every  foreigner  in  Japan  doubtless 
knew  the  danger  involved  in  meeting  and  passing 
such  a  procession.  Repeatedly  the  government 
warned  the  legations  to  advise  their  nationals  not  to 
use  the  Tokaido  on  certain  days,  and  in  fact  a  request 
of  this  nature  was  made  for  the  I5th  and  i6th,  when 
the  imperial  envoy  was  to  pass  from  Yedo  toward 
Kyoto.33  Shimadzu  Saburo  was  in  charge  of  his 

32  Adams,  I,  214;  Hodgson,  283-285;  De  Fonblanque,  95-99; 
Black,  I,  72,  143. 

33  Even  after  this   event   some   British   subjects   protested 
against  being  debarred  from  the  Tokaido  on  days  when  dai- 
myos  were  passing  (P.P.  1863,  Com.  74,  p.  104). 


210  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

escort  and  he  had  started  two  days  in  advance.  That 
Clarke  and  Marshall  recognized  the  danger  is  plain 
from  their  evidence  at  the  inquest,  and  Mr.  Pruyn 
reported  that  "  some  time  before  the  attack  was  made, 
Mr.  Marshall  exclaimed  '  For  God's  sake,  Richard 
son,  do  not  let  us  have  any  trouble ! '  To  which  Mr. 
Richardson  replied,  '  Let  me  alone ;  I  have  lived  in 
China  fourteen  years,  and  know  how  to  manage  this 
people.'  "34  Although  both  Marshall  and  Clarke  denied 
that  any  provocation  was  given,  yet  the  very  fact  that 
they  were  on  horseback  was  an  insult,  and  gave  color 
to  the  charge  that  they  attempted  to  force  their  way 
through  the  procession.  Death  alone  could  have 
wiped  out  such  an  insult  from  a  Japanese  of  low 
class,  and  the  retainers  of  this  bitterly  anti-foreign 
lord  were  not  inclined  to  make  an  exception  in  the 
case  of  "barbarians."  That  a  woman  was  attacked 
was  due  to  sheer  ignorance,  for  a  woman  was  not  ex 
pected  to  be  on  horseback.35 

34  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1064. 

35  "  Shimadzu  Idzumi  had  left  Yedo  on  the  I3th  in  advance 
of  Ohara  dono,  and  on  arriving  at  Namamugi  in  Musashi,  fell 
in  with  English  barbarians  riding  on  horseback.    They  passed 
through  in  front  of  Shimadzu's  retinue,  and  behaved  in  a  rude 
manner.     The  light  infantry  in   front  of  the  procession  re 
buked  them  for  their  rudeness,  and  killed  three  of  them  on 
the  spot.     After  this,  the  military  glory  of  the  house  of  Shi 
madzu  shone  more  and  more  brightly"  (Japan,  1853-64,  p.  59). 

Kawakami  Tajima,  minister  of  the  Prince  of  Satsuma,  to 
Colonel  Neale,  August  13,  1863  (when  the  British  expedition 
was  at  Kagoshima)  :  "  We  have  heard  something  about  a 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  211 

* 

At  this  critical  period  of  domestic  politics,  to  have 
the  leading  imperial  supporter  become  involved  with 
the  most  determined  of  the  foreigners  and  to  be  com 
pelled  to  punish  him,  was  a  situation  which  seemed 
to  spell  disaster  for  the  Shogunate.  That  they  could 
not  arrest  an  officer  of  so  powerful  a  daimyo  as  Sat- 

Treaty  having  been  negotiated  in  which  a  certain  limit  was 
assigned  to  foreigners  to  move  about  in ;  but  we  have  not 
heard  of  any  stipulation  by  which  they  are  authorized  to  im 
pede  the  passage  of  a  road. 

"  Supposing  this  happened  in  your  country,  travelling  with 
a  large  number  of  retainers  as  we  do  here,  would  you  not 
chastise  (push  out  of  the  way  and  beat)  any  one  thus  disre 
garding  and  breaking  the  existing  laws  of  the  country?  If 
this  were  neglected  Princes  could  no  longer  travel.  We  repeat 
that  we  agree  with  you  that  the  taking  of  human  life  is  a  very 
grave  matter.  On  the  other  hand  the  insufficiency  of  the  Yedo 
Government,  who  govern  and  direct  everything,  is  shown  by 
their  neglecting  to  insert  in  the  Treaty  (with  foreigners)  the 
laws  of  the  country  (in  respect  to  these  matters)  which  have 
existed  from  ancient  times.  You  will,  therefore,  be  able  to 
judge  yourself  whether  the  Yeddo  Government  (for  not  in 
serting  these  laws)  or  my  master  (for  carrying  them  out)  is 
to  be  blamed."  Kawakami  also  stated,  in  this  reply,  that  the 
murderers  when  detected  should  be  punished  by  death,  but 
said  that  they  had  escaped  and  were  possibly  being  concealed 
by  hostile  daimyos  (P.P.  1864,  Com.  66  (3242),  p.  95). 

"  Passing  over  several  years  to  1863,  when,  owing  to  a  wilful 
lady,  and  an  after-lunch  expedition  on  horseback — we  being 
entirely  in  the  wrong  and  the  Japanese  in  the  right — we  found 
ourselves  involved  in  a  war  with  one  of  the  chief  princes" 
(H.  C.  St.  John,  Notes  and  Sketches  from  the  Wild  Coasts 
of  Nipon,  204).  Captain  St.  John  later  took  part  in  the  bom 
bardment  of  Kagoshima, 


212  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

suma  they  frankly  confessed.  At  best,  they  could 
only  trust  that  he  would  heed  the  requests  of  the 
Shogun  and  his  council.  In  the  meantime  they  were 
prepared  to  build  a  new  road  for  the  use  of  daimyo 
processions,  to  erect  more  guard-houses  on  the  old 
one,  and  to  furnish  guards  for  foreigners  who  desired 
to  use  it  when  daimyos  were  passing.36  So,  with 
sincere  expressions  of  regret  for  the  outrage,  with 
eagerness  to  take  every  precaution  to  avoid  another, 
but  with  no  power  to  arrest  and  punish  the  actual 
participants  in  the  crime  then  under  discussion,  the 
Shogunate  officials  waited  for  the  presentation  of 
such  demands  as  Her  Majesty's  government  might 
deem  it  desirable  to  make.  In  the  meantime,  in  order 
to  prepare  for  the  civil  or  foreign  war  which  might 
grow  out  of  the  present  complications,  they  turned 
to  their  trusted  adviser,  the  American  minister,  and 
asked  him  to  arrange  for  the  building  in  America  of 
three  steam  ships  of  war,  which  would  be  a  match 
for  those  purchased  by  some  of  the  daimyos  in  Hol 
land  and  England.37 

36  P.P.  1863,  Com.  74,  pp.  98,  102. 

37  October  21,  1862,  request  by  ministers  for  foreign  affairs. 
The  cost  was  to  be  $860,000;  of  this  $200,000  was  paid  down, 
and  balance  on  specified  dates  until  delivery.     The  needs  of 
the  American  government  for  cannon  delayed  the  completion 
of  the  first  of  these  ships,  and  then  it  was  detained  in  New 
York  pending  the  outcome  of  the  Shimonoseki  affair  in  1864. 
The  Fusiyama  finally  was  delivered  to  the  Japanese  at  Yoko 
hama  on  February  5,  1865  (For.  Rel.,  1866,  II,  671-679;  37th 
Cong.,  3d  sess.,  S,  Ex.  Doc.  No.  33,  pp.  1-8). 


ROBERT   H.    PRUYN  213 

It  is  again  necessary  to  turn  to  the  developments 
at  Kyoto  during  the  past  few  months.  From  week 
to  week  the  waves  of  opposition  against  the  Shogunate 
and  its  foreign  policy  were  rising  higher  and  higher. 
Some  of  the  great  daimyos  of  western  Japan  were 
coming  out  in  open  criticism  of  their  ancient  over 
lord,  and  threats  were  being  made  that  they  would 
dissolve  their  allegiance  to  the  Shogun  and  transact 
affairs  of  state  only  with  the  Mikado.  The  most 
outspoken  of  these  leaders,  such  as  Shimadzu  (Sat- 
suma)  and  Mori  (Choshiu),  as  we  have  seen,  had 
taken  up  their  residence  at  Kyoto,  and  other  feudal 
lords  on  one  pretext  or  another  had  failed  to  make 
their  regular  journey  to  Yedo.  At  the  court  the  de 
mand  was  often  presented  that  the  Shogunate  bring 
to  a  close  the  temporary  foreign  intercourse,  as  it 
had  seemingly  agreed  to  do,  but  among  the  leading 
daimyos  it  was  understood  that  to  break  off  all  for 
eign  relations  would  be  difficult.38  '  Instead,  they  de 
manded  that  no  additional  liberties  be  granted  and 
the  present  concessions  be  restricted.  The  leaders  in 
this  open  criticism  were  lords  of  the  west,  long  re 
sentful  of  the  Tokugawa  regime,  and  now  glad  to 
make  use  of  the  foreign  complication  to  bring  it  to 
account. * 

The  result  of  all  this  agitation  at  the  imperial  capi- 

88  For  a  resume  of  one  of  the  documents  put  forward  by  the 
anti-foreign  daimyos  at  this  time  see  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66, 
pp.  7-10. 

15 


214  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

tal,  where  the  presence  of  daimyos  and  their  retainers 
and  the  loyal  ronins  nerved  the  long  hostile  court 
nobles,  was  the  sending  of  an  imperial  envoy  to  Yedo 
to  make  known  the  Mikado's  will  and  to  secure  the 
promise  of  the  Shogun  to  respect  it.39  The  Kuge 
(court  noble)  Ohara  Jiu-sammi  was  selected  for  this 
purpose.  He  was  raised  in  rank  and  appointed  Saye- 
mon-no-Kami,  and  on  June  16  he  set  out,  escorted  by 
Shimadzu  Saburo  and  six  hundred  well  armed  re 
tainers,  arriving  at  the  castle  in  Yedo  on  July  6.  He 
carried  with  him  a  letter  of  instruction  from  the 
Kwambaku  which  summed  up  the  evils  of  foreign  in 
tercourse  and  the  discord  which  it  had  occasioned 
among  the  people,  and  insisted  that  Osaka  and  Yedo 
must  not  be  opened,  and  that  Kanagawa  must  be 
closed ;  but  if  the  foreigners  would  not  listen  to 
reason  then  Shimoda  might  be  offered  in  exchange.40 
The  Shogun  was  told  to  permit  them  to  hold  a  slight 
hope  that  Kanagawa  might  be  reopened  in  the  future, 
"  for  the  Daimios  say  that  Japan  will  be  able  to  re 
ceive  foreigners  without  blushing  in  six  or  seven 
years."  Finally,  "  Our  Envoy  has  received  strict  or 
ders  not  to  leave  Yeddo  until  you  have  solemnly  prom 
ised  to  do  your  utmost  to  replace  our  country  in  the 
position  it  occupied  when  the  Ooranda  (Dutch)  were 
at  Nagasaki."  In  addition  three  alternative  demands 

39  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  54. 

40  Summarized  in  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  8. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  215 

were  presented :  First,  "  The  Shogun  must  proceed  to 
Kioto  to  take  counsel  with  the  nobles  of  the  Court, 
and  exert  himself  thoroughly ;  must  send  forth  orders 
to  the  clans  of  the  home  provinces  and  seven  circuits, 
and  performing  within  a  few  days  the  exploit  of  ex 
pelling  the  barbarians,  restore  tranquillity  to  the  em 
pire  ; "  or  second,  five  of  the  great  maritime  daimyos 
should  be  appointed  Tairo  to  assist  in  the  govern 
ment;  or,  third,  Hitotsubashi  Giobukio  should  be  ap 
pointed  guardian  of  the  Shogun,  and  the  ex-daimio 
of  Echizen  (Matsudaira  Shungaku)  be  appointed 
Tairo  to  assist  the  Shogunate  in  the  conduct  of  do 
mestic  and  foreign  affairs.41 

The  Shogun  received  the  imperial  commands  with 
due  respect,  and  on  July  27  gave  a  formal  answer  that 
he  accepted  the  first  and  third  proposals,  a  proceed 
ing  which  indicated  the  helplessness  of  his  position 
quite  as  much  as  his  respect  for  the  Mikado's  author 
ity.  Both  of  these  resolutions  had  a  serious  import. 
Not  since  the  year  1634,  when  the  third  Tokugawa 
Shogun,  lemitsu,  entered  Kyoto,  had  a  Shogun  gone 
up  to  pay  his  respects  to  the  Mikado,  and  no  Shogun 
of  his  house  had  ever  done  so  in  obedience  to  a  com 
mand.  '  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  this  step  marked 
the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the  Tokugawa  Shogunate. 
Conditions  had  greatly  changed  since  the  Tairo  li 

41  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  58;  also  Japan,  1853-69,  p.  29;  in  this 
latter  version  no  choice  is  mentioned. 


2l6  ROBERT   H.    PRUYN 

had  sent  his  minister  to  overawe  the  court  and  punish 
the  recalcitrant  kuge.  By  the  placing  of  Hitotsubashi 
and  Echizen  in  positions  of  chief  authority  the  Yedo 
administration  was  entrusted  to  followers  of  the  Mito 
school.42  The  former  was,  of  course,  the  son  of  the 
late  Lord  of  Mito,  and  the  latter  was  Mito's  strong 
supporter  in  his  struggles  with  Lord  li.  Echizen,  on 
the  other  hand,  had  from  the  first  recognized  the  wis 
dom  and  the  necessity  of  foreign  intercourse. 

The  tide  of  imperial  authority  was  now  running 
high.  Already,  in  May,  a  general  amnesty  had  par 
doned  the  court  nobles  and  feudal  lords  who  had  been 
punished  by  Lord  li  in  1859,  and  they  were  released 
from  their  confinement.43  Then,  in  July,  the  Em 
peror  conferred  posthumous  honors  on  the  late  Lord 
of  Mito  and  on  the  late  kuge,  Sanjo  Naidaijin,  both 
of  whom  had  opposed  Lord  li  and  had  died  while  in 
domiciliary  confinement.44  Shortly  after,  several  of 
the  court  nobles  who  had  supported  the  Shogunate 
policies  were  punished,  including  the  retired  Kuam- 
baku,  Kujo.  This  act  was  followed  by  a  reorgani 
zation  of  the  Yedo  ministry  and  the  retirement  of 

42  It  was  soon  after  his  appointment  as  guardian  or  regent 
that  Hitotsubashi  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  power  of  the 
Shogunate  should  be  restored  to  the  Emperor,  and  after  he 
became  Shogun  in  1867  he  made  the  surrender  (Okuma,  1, 70). 

43  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  52. 
**  Ibid.,  55- 


ROBERT   H.    PRUYN  217 

three  of  the  pro-foreign  members.45  In  Kyoto  the 
ronins  began  their  bloody  work  of  murdering  the 
retainers  of  pro-Shogunate  nobles  and  those  who 
supported  the  Yedo  regime. 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  these  alarming  conditions 
that  the  Richardson  affair  took  place.  The  noble 
concerned  was  the  leader  of  the  western  anti-Toku- 
gawa  lords,  and  his  retinue  was  the  guard  that  had 
accompanied  Ohara,  the  imperial  envoy,  to  Yedo. 
Such  a  complication  at  such  a  time  was  confusion 
worse  confounded.  Then  another  western  lord,  Tosa, 
came  up  to  Kyoto  and  joined  the  clans  of  Satsuma 
and  Choshiu,  "in  the  repression  of  disorder,"  but 
really  in  threatening  the  power  of  the  Tokugawa 
Shogunate.  This  was  the  beginning  of  the  "  Satcho- 
to"  triumvirate.46 

On  October  17  a  decision  of  great  importance  was 
taken  by  the  Yedo  authorities.  It  was  no  less  than 
to  relieve  the  daimyos  and  the  hatamotos  from  the 
more  burdensome  features  of  the  San-Kin  Ko-tai 
system,  "  taking  turns  in  official  attendance  at  Yedo," 
which  had  been  introduced  in  1634  by  the  great 
Shogun  lemitsu.47  Under  this  system  most  of  the 

45  Kuze    Yamato-no-Kami    and    Naito    Kii-no-Kami    were 
members  of  the  Roju.    Ando  Tsushima-no-Kami  had  been 
removed  from  that  office  in  May. 

46  Japan,  1853-69,  p.  31. 

47  Japan,  1853-64,  pp.  60-62;  Gubbins,  Progress  of  Japan, 
139-143. 


2l8  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

daimyos  spent  alternate  years  in  Yedo,  and  the  others 
spent  alternate  half-years,  but  all  were  required  to 
leave  their  families  there,  as  hostages,  in  the  power 
of  the  Shogun.  The  new  system  cut  down  the  resi 
dence  in  the  case  of  the  greatest  lords  to  one  hundred 
days  every  third  year,  and  in  the  case  of  the  lesser 
daimyos  and  hatamotos  to  two  hundred  days  a  year, 
and  the  frequent  exchange  of  presents  between  the 
Shogun  and  the  feudal  lords  was  done  away.48  The 
old  system  was  troublesome  and  costly,  but  it  served 
to  keep  the  lords  under  the  control  of  the  Yedo  gov 
ernment,  and  the  presence  of  these  feudatories  and 
their  numerous  retainers  made  the  capital  populous, 
rich,  and  splendid.  The  reason  given  for  the  change 
was  in  order  that  the  daimyos  might  use  for  coast  de 
fences  the  money  saved  and  devote  the  time  to  ad 
ministering  their  fiefs.49  Coming  at  this  moment, 
however,  it  is  probable  that  the  measure  was  dictated 
by  the  Kyoto  party,  who  saw  in  it,  and  justly,  a  means 
of  weakening  the  Shogunate.  And  this  was  the  im 
mediate  effect.  The  daimyos,  relieved  from  attend 
ance  at  Yedo,  now  flocked  to  Kyoto;  all  the  large 
temples  were  occupied  as  their  headquarters,  and 
even  those  of  neighboring  villages  were  in  demand. 
"  Kioto  had  never  been  so  crowded  since  the  visit  of 

48  The  daimyos,  however,  wished  all  visits  to  cease.     See 
memorial  of  daimyos  in  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1109. 

49  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  pp.  5-6. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  219 

lyemitsu,  third  Shogun,  in  i634."50  When  one  of  the 
western  daimyos,  on  his  way  to  take  up  his  duties  at 
Yedo,  passed  by  Kyoto,  as  had  always  been  the  cus 
tom,  the  action  was  now  taken  as  "a  slight  offered 
to  the  Court  and  therefore  a  crime."  Orders  were 
given,  and  some  of  the  patriotic  samurai  overtook  him 
and  demanded  an  explanation.  He  obeyed  the  orders 
of  the  court,  returned  to  Kyoto,  and  took  up  his 
residence  there.  This  incident,  as  well  as  any,  indi 
cates  the  temper  of  the  times.  *  So  while  Kyoto  was 
acquiring  a  new  splendor,  the  Shogun's  capital  fell 
upon  evil  days. 

As  the  Shogun  had  not  kept  his  promise  to  ap 
pear  at  Kyoto,  a  second  imperial  mission  was  sent 
to  Yedo,  this  time  consisting  of  two  court  nobles, 
escorted  by  the  Lord  of  Tosa.  Leaving  Kyoto  on  De 
cember  3,  they  reached  Yedo  safely,  and  on  January 
22  delivered  the  imperial  message,  to  the  effect  that 
in  the  following  spring  the  Shogun  must  go  up  to 
Kyoto,  "and  assuming  the  command  and  leadership 
of  all  the  clans,  wield  in  his  hands  the  military  prestige 
of  the  Empire,  and  accomplish  the  feat  of  driving 
out  the  barbarians  without  loss  of  time."51  Shortly 
after  this  two  of  the  western  daimyos,  those  of  Inshiu 
and  Chikuzen,  were  sent  by  the  court  on  a  similar 

50  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  67. 
si  Japan,  1853-64,  P-  68. 


220  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

mission.52  That  the  Shogunate  was  facing  a  crisis 
was  evident,  even  if  no  serious  complication  with  Great 
Britain  arose  out  of  the  two  latest  attacks  on  her 
nationals. 

In  order  to  allay,  in  some  measure,  the  rising 
hostility  of  the  court,  the  Shogunate  turned  against 
its  own  faithful  servants  and  punished,  with  heavy 
hand,  all  who  had  taken  any  prominent  part  in  the 
foreign  relations  of  the  past  five  years.  The  estate  of 
Lord  li  was  reduced  from  350,000  to  240,000  koku. 
Among  the  others  who  were  punished  either  by  loss 
of  revenue,  forced  retirement  from  the  headship  of 
their  clan,  or  domiciliary  imprisonment  were  the  former 
ministers  and  high  officials,  Naito  Kii-no-Kami, 
Manabe  Shimosa-no-Kami,  Sakai  Wakasa-no-Kami, 
Hotta  Bitchiu-no-Kami,  Kuze  Yamato-no-Kami,  Ando 
Tsushima-no-Kami,  Matsudaira  Hoki-no-Kami,  and 
Matsudaira  Idzumi-no-Kami,  while  a  number  of  lesser 
officials  were  dismissed  from  office.53  Hotta  Bitchiu- 

62  These  anti-foreign  edicts  got  into  the  hands  of  the  minis 
ters  at  Yedo  in  various  ways.  On  February  16,  1863,  Mr. 
Pruyn  forwarded  to  Mr.  Seward  a  translation  of  an  edict 
from  the  Mikado  to  the  Tycoon  calling  for  the  speedy  expul 
sion  of  the  barbarians.  This  may  have  been  the  message  pre 
sented  on  January  22  (For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1070).  On  June 
20  he  enclosed  a  similar  imperial  message,  dated  the  twelfth 
month,  January  2O-February  18,  1863,  calling  either  for  the 
expulsion  of  the  foreigners  or  their  removal  to  Nagasaki  or 
Hakodate.  This  may  have  been  delivered  by  the  daimyos  of 
Inshiu  and  Chikuzen  (ibid.,  1112). 

53  Japan,  1853-64,  pp.  69-71. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  221 

no-Kami,  who  had  actually  negotiated  the  Harris 
treaty,  was  pursued  into  his  retirement,  for  after  Lord 
li  became  Tairo  he  had  resigned  the  headship  of  his 
clan.  The  Shogun  also  offered  to  descend  one  step  in 
rank  for  his  shortcomings,  but  the  Mikado  graciously 
would  not  permit  this,  and  the  Shogun  promised  to  do 
better  and  "to  obey  faithfully  his  Majesty's  will  in 
all  things." 

These  punishments  met  with  the  approval  of  the 
court  party,  and  shortly  afterwards  eleven  of  the  lead 
ing  daimyos  sent  up  a  memorial  which,  after  joining 
in  approval  of  these  acts,  and  stating  that  in  relieving 
the  daimyos  from  most  of  their  visits  to  Yedo  the 
Shogunate  had  not  gone  far  enough,  insisted  that 
foreign  affairs  should  be  placed  on  the  old  basis,  that 
the  foreigners  should  be  allowed  to  trade  as  a  favor 
and  not  to  enjoy  the  privilege  as  a  right,  and  that  the 
Shogun  should  go  up  to  Kyoto  as  he  had  promised, 
there  to  consult  with  the  Mikado.54 

In  February  the  regent,  Hitotsubashi,  went  up  to 
Kyoto,  arriving  there  on  March  I,  accompanied  by 
Ogasawara  Dzusho-no-Kami,  one  of  the  Roju,  and 
followed  by  Echizen-no-Kami,  the  Tairo.55  The 
ronins  there  were  eagerly  demanding  that  a  date  for 
the  expulsion  of  foreigners  be  fixed,  and  in  their  un- 

5*  Text  in  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1109-1112;  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66, 
pp.  49-50. 
"  Japan,  1853-64,  P-  72. 


222  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

rest  frequent  murders  of  pro-foreign  samurai  oc 
curred.  In  fact  a  few  days  after  Hitotsubashi  arrived 
the  head  of  a  murdered  man  was  left  at  his  temple 
residence,  with  a  note  to  the  effect  that  the  regent's 
views  on  the  expulsion  of  the  barbarians  were  known 
to  be  of  a  temporizing  nature.56  In  this  respect  the 
ronins  were  right,  for  Hitotsubashi,  representative  of 
the  Mito  clan,  and  apparently  advocate  of  the  anti- 
foreign  views  of  old  Lord  Nariaki,  had  learned  enough 
during  his  regency  in  Yedo  to  know  that  any  attempt 
to  carry  out  the  demands  of  the  court  would  mean  a 
foreign  war,  and  to  know  also  what  would  be  the 
effects  upon  Japan  of  such  a  war  at  that  time.  At  first 
a  critic  of  the  Shogunate  policy,  it  was  now  his  duty 
to  follow  it  himself,  endeavoring  to  prevent  any  clash 
between  the  ignorant  courtiers  and  the  masterful 
foreigners,  until  more  knowledge  and  better  under 
standing  might  remove  the  grounds  for  friction,  or 
until  Japan  should  have  acquired  strength  enough  to 
hold  her  own  against  any  foreign  foe.  To  temporize 
— that  was  the  policy  of  the  Yedo  government  from 
the  start. 

(  In  considering  this  period  of  unrest  and  agitation 
it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  foreign  representa 
tives  possessed  only  a  very  hazy  idea  of  what  was  in 
progress.  The  Tycoon's  government  naturally  failed 
to  inform  the  ministers  of  the  strength  of  the  anti 
cs  Ibid.,  p.  73. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  223 

foreign  movement.  It  is  doubtful  if  any  de  facto 
government  would  have  done  so.  It  did,  repeatedly, 
describe  the  general  situation,  the  popular  opposition 
to  foreign  intercourse,  the  hostility  of  the  court  and 
of  some  of  the  great  lords,  but  it  always  expressed 
its  confidence  that  in  the  course  of  time  the  opposition 
would  pass  away.  Occasionally  news  reached  the 
ministers  or  some  of  their  nationals  who  were  on 
friendly  terms  with  the  Japanese,  and  copies  of  the 
more  important  state  papers  generally  came  to  light 
after  some  time.57  On  receiving  one  of  these  un 
official  communications  Mr.  Pruyn  and  the  other 
ministers  would  endeavor  to  have  some  Japanese  offi 
cial,  either  a  minister  or  one  of  the  governors  for 
foreign  affairs,  vouch  for  its  correctness.  This  they 
would  frequently  do,  although  unwilling  to  furnish  an 
official  copy  directly.  At  an  interview  with  the  min 
isters  on  August  19,  1862,  Colonel  Neale  complained 
of  this  unwillingness  to  furnish  information.  "  Im 
portant  political  changes,"  he  said,  "such  as  the  ap 
pointment  of  the  Gotiro,  the  proposed  visit  of  the 
Tycoon  to  the  Mikado,  the  assembly  of  large  bodies 
of  armed  men  at  Miako,  or  any  other  matters  of  gen 
eral  political  interest,  are  not  communicated."58  To 
which  the  ministers  replied  that  they  did  not  consider 
these  subjects  were  of  interest  to  the  foreign  repre- 

57  For  examples  of  these  rumors  see  Alcock,  II,  167-170. 

58  P.P.  1863,  Com.  74,  P-  55-    . 


224  ROBERT   H.    PRUYN 

sentatives,  but  they  promised  to  inform  him  in  the 
future,  and  added :  "  We  thought  that  the  Governors 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  whom  we  send  to  the  foreign 
Ministers  on  matters  of  business,  would  have  answered 
any  questions  which  you  put  to  them."  But  Colonel 
Neale  pointed  out  that  no  information  would  be  given 
by  them,  and  "  the  Gorogio  here  smiled  in  acquies 
cence."  In  keeping  their  promise  they  notified  the 
foreign  representatives  on  November  2  that  the  Tycoon 
was  about  to  proceed  to  Kyoto  in  March  of  the  fol 
lowing  year.59  No  reason  for  the  unusual  expedition 
was  given,  and  the  ministers  had  to  conjecture  what  it 
could  all  be  about. 

One  incident  in  these  troubled  times  should  be  cited 
as  a  foretaste  of  better  days.  On  the  night  of  No 
vember  22  the  American  bark  Cherdie,  en  route  from 
Hakodate  to  Shanghai,  struck  a  sand  bank  and  became 
a  total  loss  off  the  coast  of  Hitachi  Province,  about  a 
hundred  miles  north  of  Yokohama.  "The  officers 
and  crew  were  not  only  saved,"  wrote  Mr.  Pruyn, 
"  but  treated  with  humanity  and  kindness  by  the  officers 
and  people  of  the  province.  Nothing  which  could  be 
done  was  left  undone  to  display  good  will;  even  a 
flagstaff  was  erected  by  the  Japanese  at  the  temple 
appropriated  for  the  use  of  the  crew,  from  which  to 
display  our  national  flag."60  Now  this  was  the  prov 
es  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  3. 
eo  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1055. 


ROBERT   H.    PRUYN  225 

ince  of  the  Mito  clan,  supposedly  bitterly  hostile  to 
foreigners.  In  Yokohama  the  usual  rumors  were  cur 
rent  as  to  the  hostility  of  the  Japanese,  and  the  French 
minister  very  kindly  offered  to  send  the  French  war 
ship  Dupleix,  in  the  absence  of  any  American  vessel, 
to  the  place  to  inquire  into  the  state  of  affairs  and 
offer  such  protection  as  the  Americans  might  need. 
But  the  Japanese  government  also  offered  the  services 
of  their  warship,  the  Choyo-Maru,  and  Mr.  Pruyn  very 
wisely  decided  to  accept  its  offer.  Colonel  Fisher, 
American  consul  at  Kanagawa,  went  to  the  scene  of 
the  wreck  in  the  Japanese  vessel,  and  found  that  the 
Americans  had  been  treated  with  "  true  kindness  "  by 
the  Japanese  people  and  officials.  This  incident  made 
a  deep  impression  upon  him,  and  he  reported :  "  I 
cannot  but  regard  this  act,  as  it  most  assuredly  is,  an 
unparalleled  demonstration  of  the  rapid  advance  this 
remarkable  people  and  government  are  making  towards 
a  full  emancipation  from  exclusiveness  which  is  to 
place  them  speedily  in  the  front  rank  of  nations,  if  not 
to  make  it  and  them  a  Christian  country  and  people — 
a  nation  soon  to  be  counted  as  among  the  first  and 
most  enlightened  of  the  earth."61  Surely  times  had 
changed  since  shipwrecked  mariners  were  placed  in 
confinement  and  shipped  in  cages  to  Nagasaki  for 
deportation  in  Dutch  or  Chinese  ships. 

The  Japanese  government  appreciated  Mr.  Pruyn's 

61  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1059. 


226  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

confidence  in  them  in  accepting  their  ship  and  not 
that  of  France.  Our  government,  on  receipt  of  the 
news  of  this  gratifying  exhibition  of  humanity,  for 
warded  appropriate  presents  for  the  principal  officers 
of  the  Choyo-Maru  and  of  the  province.62 

It  was  just  at  this  time  that  the  first  of  the  British 
demands  for  reparation  was  presented.  This  dealt 
with  the  murder  of  the  two  guardsmen  at  the  British 
legation  on  the  night  of  June  26.  The  Japanese  au 
thorities  had  conducted  their  examination  into  the 
crime,  and  in  August  had  inflicted  severe  punishments 
on  the  Japanese  guards  who  might  in  any  way  be  con 
sidered  guilty  of  dereliction  or  cowardice.  The 
daimyo  whose  troops  were  on  guard,  Matsudaira 
Tamba-no-Kami,  was  reprimanded  and  placed  under 
arrest.  Two  of  the  Tycoon's  body-guard  were  sen 
tenced  to  fifty  days'  and  five  to  thirty  days'  confine 
ment;  one  was  reprimanded  and  two  left  to  be 
punished  by  the  daimyo,  while  two  had  died  before 
punishment  could  be  inflicted.63  In  other  words,  the 
Japanese  considered  that  they  had  made  ample  repara 
tion  for  the  deed  of  a  single  assassin,  although  Colonel 
Neale,  in  order  not  to  forestall  the  demands  of  his 
government,  refused  to  express  any  opinion  on  this 
point. 

Before  he   had   learned   of    these   measures,   Lord 

«2Ibid.,  1128. 

63  P.P.  1863,  Com.  74,  pp.  58-60. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  227 

Russell  had  forwarded  to  Colonel  Neale  his  demand 
for  reparation.64  It  was  based  on  the  assumption  that 
the  government  was  aware  of  the  projected  attack, 
that  the  daimyo  had  favored  it,  and  that  its  purpose 
was  to  induce  the  British  to  abandon  Yedo  and  "  allow 
the  ancient  custom  of  non-intercourse  and  prohibition 
of  trade  to  be  reestablished."  Neale  was  instructed  to 
"  show  in  every  possible  way  that  Her  Majesty's  Gov 
ernment  will  not  be  deterred  from  their  course  by 
these  shameful  murders.  It  would  be  better  that  the 
Tycoon's  palace  should  be  destroyed  than  that  our 
rightful  position  by  Treaty  should  be  weakened  or  im 
paired."  If  the  daimyo  had  betrayed  his  trust  or 
had  connived  in  the  attack  on  the  legation,  he  should 
be  openly  degraded  and  most  severely  punished.  A 
compensation,  in  the  sum  of  £10,000  gold,  was  to  be 
demanded  for  the  families  of  the  marines,  and  this 
sum  should  be  levied  on  the  estate  of  the  daimyo  in 
charge  of  the  guard. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  these  demands  were 
based  on  erroneous  premises.  No  well  informed  man 
on  the  ground  believed  that  either  the  government  or 
the  daimyo  was  in  any  way  responsible  for  this  crime, 
even  though  the  guard  might  have  been  wanting  in 
vigilance  or  courage.  If  cable  communication  had 
existed  and  Colonel  Neale  could  have  kept  Lord  Russell 
promptly  informed  of  developments,  it  is  doubtful 

« Ibid.,  49-51. 


228  ROBERT   H.   PRUYN 

whether  such  demands  would  have  been  formulated. 
As  it  was,  Colonel  Neale  could  do  nothing  but  pre 
sent  them,  which  he  did  at  an  interview  with  the 
Japanese  ministers  on  December  4.65  At  this  time 
the  ministers,  without  discussing  the  amount  of  the 
indemnity,  protested  against  the  implication  that  their 
government  was  concerned  in  the  attack  on  the  lega 
tion,  and  when  they  asked  Neale  if  he  himself  thought 
so  he  replied:  "You  have  afforded  me  no  substantial 
grounds  for  forming  an  opinion  upon  that  subject." 
For  the  first  time  Colonel  Neale  described  the  punish 
ments  inflicted  in  August  as  "insufficient  and  un 
satisfactory." 

In  an  unusually  long  despatch  the  ministers,  on 
December  20,  replied  to  the  British  demands,  taking 
up  the  incident  with  great  detail,  endeavoring  to  re 
move  any  suspicion  from  the  government  and  from 
the  daimyo,  explaining  that  the  punishments  inflicted 
were  burdensome,  especially  in  the  case  of  Tamba-no- 
Kami,  and  finally  stating  that  "the  law  of  our  land 
does  not  allow  us  to  grant  the  indemnity,  and  we 
therefore  decline  (to  pay)  it."  They  were  willing  to 
pay  $3000  in  silver  to  the  relatives  of  the  murdered 
men  "  for  their  maintenance."66  Here  the  matter 
rested,  in  spite  of  no  little  correspondence,  for  several 
months. 


65  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  pp. 

08  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  pp.  14-16. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  22Q 

The  New  Year  dawned  with  another  alarm  of  a 
ronin  attack.  Government  warned  the  foreign  settle 
ment  and  did  all  it  could  to  prevent  a  surprise,  with 
complete  success.  Mr.  Pruyn,  who  was  in  Yokohama 
at  the  time,  returned  to  Yedo,  as  the  Japanese  advised, 
and  thus  again  showed  his  willingness  to  cooperate 
with  them  for  his  own  protection.  The  French  and 
British  ministers  protested  to  the  government  against 
these  alarms  (can  it  be  that  they  preferred  to  be  sur 
prised  by  the  desperadoes?),  but  Mr.  Pruyn  considered 
them  unworthy  of  any  formal  notice.67 

The  foreign  community  was  now  much  alarmed  by 
rumors,  either  that  the  Japanese  were  about  to  assume 
hostilities,  or  that  the  British  were  preparing  to  de 
mand  redress.  It  was  said  that  British  troops  were 
on  their  way  to  Japan,  and  a  large  fleet  was  expected.68 
On  January  16  one  of  the  Japanese  guards  at  the  un 
finished  and  unoccupied  British  legation  in  Yedo  was 
killed  by  four  ronins  who  sought  to  force  an  entrance.69 

When  news  of  the  attack  on  the  British  legation  on 
June  26  reached  Washington,  the  conduct  of  Mr. 
Pruyn  was  scrutinized  carefully  to  note  whether  he 
had  failed  in  any  way  to  cooperate  with  and  sustain 
the  British  representative.  His  conduct  was  approved, 
and  he  was  instructed  to  persevere  in  the  same  course 

«  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1062. 
es  Ibid.,  1063. 

«»  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  20. 
16 


230  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

of  proceedings  in  the  future.  Moreover  he  was  to 
"especially  inform  the  ministers  for  foreign  affairs 
that,  while  the  United  States  will  hereafter,  as  hereto 
fore,  prove  themselves  a  generous  friend,  yet  that  the 
safety  of  all  representatives,  citizens  and  subjects,  of 
all  the  treaty  powers,  must  and  will  be  insisted  upon, 
as  an  indispensable  condition  of  the  continuance  of 
the  relations  between  this  country  and  Japan,  which 
have  been  so  happily  established."70  On  receipt  of  a 
later  despatch  from  Mr.  Pruyn,  Seward  replied  that 
the  President  earnestly  hoped  that  the  government  of 
the  Tycoon  might  "  practice  such  diligence,  in  bring 
ing  all  persons  connected  with  the  transaction  to  con 
dign  punishment,  as  will  give  assurance  to  the  British 
government,  and  to  the  other  treaty  powers,  that  the 
rights  and  safety  of  foreigners  in  Japan  will  hereafter 
be  inviolably  protected."71 

On  receiving  these  despatches  Mr.  Pruyn,  on  Jan 
uary  27,  1863,  addressed  the  ministers  for  foreign 
affairs  and  conveyed  to  them  their  more  important 
passages.  In  addition  he  wrote :  "  It  has  afforded  me 
sincere  pleasure  to  be  able  to  inform  the  President  that 
the  Japanese  government  is  sincerely  desirous  of  ex 
tending  this  protection,  and  of  securing  to  the  citizens 
and  subjects  of  the  treaty  powers  all  the  rights  con 
ferred  upon  them  by  treaty."  Coming  at  a  time  when 

70  September  25,  1862.    For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1053-1054. 

71  September  29,  1862,    Ibid.,  1054. 


ROBERT   H.    PRUYN  23! 

another  of  the  treaty  powers  had  charged  them  with 
complicity  in  the  murderous  attack  on  the  British  lega 
tion,  this  kindly  letter  must  have  been  well  received. 
The  closing  advice  of  the  American  minister  might 
well  be  quoted: 

The  cultivation  of  this  feeling  of  good  will,  and  the  faithful 
observance  of  their  reciprocal  obligations  by  Japan  and  all  the 
powers  with  which  treaties  have  been  made,  not  in  a  narrow 
spirit,  constantly  asking  how  much  can  be  withheld,  but  in  an 
enlarged  spirit  of  liberality,  which  shall  ever  ask  how  much 
can  with  propriety  be  done,  will  result  in  great  advantage  to 
Japan  and  the  world.  And  I  indulge  the  hope  that  the  friend 
ship  which  now  animates  all  these  governments  will  be  greatly 
increased  and  be  perpetual.72 

When  Mr.  Pruyn  reported  the  punishment  inflicted 
by  the  government  upon  the  daimyo  and  the  guards 
at  the  British  legation,  Mr.  Seward  replied  on  January 
31  that  the  President  hoped  "that  the  proceedings  of 
the  Japanese  government,  in  this  painful  transaction, 
may  be  satisfactory  to  the  British  government."73  In 
reply  to  a  later  despatch  of  Mr.  Pruyn  he  sent  this 
word  of  deserved  approval: 

The  President  does  not  fail  to  observe  that  some  of  the 
agents  of  some  others  of  the  treaty  powers  pursue,  in  their 
intercourse  with  the  Japanese,  a  course  more  energetic,  if  not 
more  vigorous,  than  that  which  you  have  followed  under  the 
instructions  of  this  department.  He,  nevertheless,  approves 
your  decision  to  persevere  in  your  past  course,  which,  so  far 

"  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1065.  , 
"  Ibid.,  1066. 


232  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

at  least,  has  attained  all  desired  objects,  while  it  seems  to  have 
inspired  the  Japanese  authorities  with  sentiments  of  respect 
and  friendship  towards  the  United  States.74 

Before  this  despatch  reached  Yedo,  however,  Mr. 
Pruyn  had,  on  his  own  motion,  refused  to  follow  his 
colleagues  in  their  high-handed  course,  and  this  note 
must  have  comforted  him  in  his  isolation.75 

On  the  very  day  that  these  moderate  (Jespatches 
were  being  framed  in  Washington,  the  American 
minister  in  Yedo  again  demonstrated  his  reasonable 
attitude.  Two  governors  for  foreign  affairs  waited 
upon  him,  as  they  had  already  done  in  the  case  of  his 
colleagues,  in  Yokohama,  and  frankly  said  that  the 
difficulties  between  the  Shogun  and  the  Mikado  might 
lead  to  civil  war,  not  between  the  two  principals,  but 
between  the  Shogunate  and  the  great  daimyos  of 
Satsuma  and  of  Choshiu,  who  had  hitherto  influenced 
the  Mikado.  The  Tycoon  had  appointed  his  guardian, 
Hitotsubashi,  as  an  ambassador  to  the  Mikado,  and 
the  Tycoon  himself  would  go  up  in  March.  Between 
them  they  would  remove  these  prejudices  from  the 
mind  of  the  Mikado  and  defeat  the  machinations  of 
the  hostile  daimyos  Much  as  they  desired  peace,  yet 
civil  war  might  take  place,  and  in  this  event  they  asked 
"  what  would  be  the  feeling  and  action  of  the  United 
States."76 

74  January  31,  1863.    For.  Rel.,  1863,  H,  1065. 

«  See  Chapter  VIII. 

™  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1066-1069. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  233 

To  this  Pruyn  replied 

that  the  government  of  the  United  States  would,  of  course, 
be  deeply  interested  in  such  a  struggle,  and  that  all  the  moral 
support  it  could  render,  and  all  material  support  which  would 
be  justified  by  international  law,  would  doubtless  be  given; 
and  that  it  was  my  opinion  that,  if  called  on  by  the  govern 
ment  of  the  Tycoon  for  aid,  all  the  treaty-powers  would  be 
justified  in  giving  it,  in  self-defence,  and  would  give  it  if,  as 
was  said,  the  object  of  the  hostile  daimios  was  to  drive  out 
foreigners. 

The  governors  replied  that  "  they  supposed  the  United 
States  and  Russia  would  have  this  disposition,  but 
feared  England  and  France  might  act  contrary." 

The  next  matter  to  be  discussed  was  the  new  site  of 
the  legations.  After  the  first  attack  on  the  British 
legation,  on  July  5,  1861,  Alcock  had  asked  for  and 
received  a  new  site  "on  a  commanding  table-land, 
having  a  tolerably  direct  communication  with  the 
water."77  This  was  at  Goten-yama,  an  attractive  piece 
of  land  to  the  west  of  the  scattered  temporary  temple- 
legations,  part  of  which  had  been  used  by  the  people 
as  a  pleasure  resort.  On  this  site  the  legations  of  all 
five  of  the  treaty  powers  were  to  be  erected.  The 
grant  of  this  site  to  the  foreigners  aroused  no  little 
opposition  among  the  people,  who  would  lose  their 
park,  and  among  the  hostile  daimyos,  who  pointed  out 
that  the  elevated  site  commanded  the  five  forts  in  the 
bay  and  the  main  road  into  the  city.78  One  of  the 

"Alcock,  II,  179. 

"  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1067. 


234 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 


reasons  given  for  the  assault  on  Lord  Ando  in  1862, 
and  of  his  punishment  the  next  year,  was  because  he 
had  granted  this  concession,  and  it  was  realized  by  the 
beginning  of  1863  that  the  establishment  of  the  lega 
tions  there  would  result  in  difficulties.  It  was  said 
to  be  a  common  remark  among  the  people :  "  The 
British  have  our  plum-garden,  but  the  blossoms  will 
be  red."79 

Under  these  circumstances  the  Japanese  asked 
Pruyn  if  he  and  the  other  ministers  would  accept 
another  site.  The  French  minister  was  said  to  be 
willing,  but  the  British  charge  could  not  act  until  the 
return  of  the  minister,  Sir  Rutherford  Alcock.  Pruyn 
at  once  consented  to  accept  "  any  location  equally  con 
venient  and  pleasant/'  and  addressed  a  letter  to  that 
effect  to  the  ministers  for  foreign  affairs,  in  which, 
after  commenting  on  the  popular  opposition,  he  added : 
"  I  do  not  wish  that  the  American  flag  shall  ever  be 
regarded  as  an  emblem  of  hostility,  either  by  the 
people  or  government  of  Japan,  but  only  as  an  emblem 
of  friendship  and  good  will."  The  correctness  of  the 
government's  views  on  this  matter  was  demonstrated 
that  very  night,  for  at  2  a.  m.  (February  i)  the  un 
finished  British  legation  was  destroyed  by  an  in 
cendiary  fire. 

In  reporting  this  latest  incident  to  Lord  Russell, 
Colonel  Neale  said : 

79  Note  the  murder  of  a  Japanese  guard  there  on  January  16. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  235 

The  inference  would  seem  to  be  that  the  Japanese  Govern 
ment  has  connived  at  the  accomplishment  of  this  act  as  the 
only  effectual  solution  of  the  pressure  brought  to  bear  by  the 
Mikado  and  his  party  upon  the  Tycoon.  It  is  equally  possible 
that  the  retainers  and  partizans  of  the  hostile  Daimios,  intent 
on  carrying  out  the  desires  of  their  Chiefs,  may  have  accom 
plished  a  portion  of  the  work  allotted  to  them  by  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  residence  at  Goteng-yama,  despite  all  the  effort's  of 
the  Government  to  restrain  them.80 

The  government,  however,  affirmed  that  the  disaster 
was  due  to  no  dereliction  of  its  guards  ;81  and  years 
afterwards  it  was  learned  that  among  the  incendiaries 
were  two  men  who  became  among  the  greatest  of 
Japanese  statesmen,  Ito  and  Inouye,  then  young 
samurai  of  the  bitterly  hostile  Choshiu  clan.82 

At  the  interview  with  the  Japanese  governors  it  was 
suggested  that  Mr.  Pruyn  would  find  it  more  pleasant 
to  live  in  Yokohama  and  only  occasionally  visit  Yedo 
on  business,  in  which  case  the  Japanese  government 
would  assume  all  the  additional  expenses.  This  pro 
posal  he  declined,  however,  saying :  "  I  had  not  come 
to  Japan  for  my  pleasure ;  that  I  had  refused  to  leave 
Yedo  when  the  other  ministers  did,  because  I  had  sup 
posed  I  would  serve  my  own  country,  and  Japan  also, 
by  remaining;  that  when  I  could  render  such  service 
better  'by  departing  than  by  remaining,  I  was  willing  to 
converse  on  the  subject;  but  that  such  time  had  not 

8°  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  21. 

81  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1070. 

82  Michie,  II,  62n ;  Japan,  1858-69,  p.  33n ;  Rein,  34gn. 


236  ROBERT    H.    PRUYN 

arrived,  and,  in  my  judgment,  was  not  likely  to  arrive." 
His  assumption  was  doubtless  correct,  that  the  Japa 
nese  desired  to  be  able  to  report  to  the  Mikado,  at  the 
great  meeting  in  Kyoto,  that  no  foreigners  resided  in 
Yedo. 

It  was  now  evident  to  the  foreign  ministers  that  a 
crisis  was  impending.  It  was  felt  that  the  rule  of  the 
Shogun  was  being  threatened  by  the  Mikado,  sup 
ported  by  some  of  the  most  powerful  and  wealthy 
daimyos  of  the  Empire.  The  French  minister  and 
many  other  foreigners  and  Japanese  believed  that 
when  the  Tycoon  went  up  to  Kyoto  he  would  be  de 
posed.  Mr.  Pruyn  believed  that  the  Tycoon  had 
"  sufficient  power  to  maintain  his  position,  even  against 
the  Mikado."83  Colonel  Neale  felt  that  although  the 
Tycoon's  government  did  not  seek  to  break  off  rela 
tions  with  the  treaty  powers,  it  was  showing  signs  of 
yielding  to  the  pressure  exerted  by  the  opposition 
forces.84  If  it  should  be  overthrown,  a  desperate 
effort  might  be  made  "by  their  less  well-informed  or 
reckless  successors  to  accomplish  the  Mikado's  im 
puted  desire  to  expel  or  extirpate  foreigners,  especially 
from  this  settlement,  so  unpalatably  contiguous  to  the 
capital."  He  therefore  addressed  Rear-Admiral 
Kuper,  at  Hongkong,  and  pointed  out  the  advisability 

83  February  16,  1863.    For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1068. 

84  To  Russell,  February  10,  1863.     P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  pp. 
24-25. 


ROBERT    H.    PRUYN  237 

of  a  considerable  naval  demonstration  in  Japanese 
waters,  not  merely  to  insure  the  maintenance  of  treaty 
rights,  but  at  the  same  time  to  "afford  a  powerful 
moral  support  to  the  Tycoon's  Government  in  its  well- 
disposed  but  wavering  and  timid  policy  in  regard  to 
foreign  intercourse."85 

On  the  receipt  of  this  strong  representation  the  ad 
miral  prepared  to  proceed  to  Japan  with  all  the  avail 
able  strength  of  the  British  navy.  But  before  his 
squadron  sailed  into  the  Bay  of  Yedo  a  new  situation, 
bristling  with  difficulties,  had  developed. 

85  February  2,  1863.     Ibid.,  22. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

EXCLUSION  AGAIN  DECREED 

The  event  which  so  profoundly  affected  not  only 
the  foreign  relations  but  the  domestic  affairs  of  Japan 
was  the  presentation  of  the  British  ultimatum  de 
manding  reparation  for  the  attack  on  Mr.  Richard 
son  and  his  companions  on  September  14,  1862.  Earl 
Russell's  despatch  was  dated  December  24,  and  was 
received  by  Colonel  Neale  about  March  14,  1863. 
Earl  Russell  stated: 

In  fixing  the  reparation  to  be  required,  Her  Majesty's  Gov 
ernment  have  had  to  consider  the  anomalous  state  of  political 
rule  in  Japan.  They  find  two  parties  who  are  responsible  to 
the  British  Government:  first,  the  Government  of  Yeddo,  who, 
when  British  subjects  are  attacked  and  murdered  on  the  high 
road  in  full  daylight,  by  persons  who  are  known,  nevertheless 
allow  those  persons  to  remain  unpunished;  secondly,  the 
Daimio  Prince  of  Satsuma,  whose  relation,  Simadzoo  Saboolo, 
permitted,  if  he  did  not  actually  order,  his  retainers  to  com 
mit  this  horrible  crime,  and  who  do  not  punish  it. 

This  was  an  extraordinary  decision,  as  far  as  the 
canons  of  international  law  were  concerned.  The 
British  government  had  treaty  relations  only  with  the 
government  of  Yedo,  and  from  it  alone  should  re 
dress  be  demanded.  But  Colonel  Neale  was  in- 

238 


EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED  239 

structed   to    demand    reparation    from   both   parties. 
From  the  Japanese  government  he  was  to  ask  for : 

1.  An  ample  and  formal  apology  for  the  offence  of  permit 
ting  a  murderous  attack  on  British  subjects  on  a  road  open 
by  Treaty  to  them. 

2.  The  payment  of  £100,000  as  a  penalty  on  Japan  for  this 
offence. 

From  the  Daimyo  of  Satsuma  he  was  to  demand: 

1.  The  immediate  trial  and  capital  execution,  in  the  presence 
of  one  or  more  of  Her  Majesty's  naval  officers,  of  the  chief 
perpetrators  of  the  murder  of  Mr.  Richardson,  and  of  the 
murderous  assault  upon  the  lady  and  gentlemen  who  accom 
panied  him. 

2.  The  payment  of  £25,000  to  be  distributed  to  the  relations 
of  the  murdered  man,  and  to  those  who  escaped  with  their 
lives  the  swords  of  the  assassins  on  that  occasion. 

The  measures  to  be  taken  by  Neale  were  also  pre 
scribed  : 

If  the  Japanese  Government  should  refuse  the  redress  you 
are  thus  instructed  to  demand,  you  will  inform  thereof  the 
Admiral  or  Senior  Naval  Officer  on  the  station,  and  you  will 
call  upon  him  to  adopt  such  measures  of  reprisal  or  blockade, 
or  of  both,  as  he  may  judge  best  calculated  to  attain  the  end 
proposed. 

You  will  at  the  same  time  communicate  the  substance  of  your 
instructions  to  the  Envoys  and  Naval  Commanders  in  Japan 
of  other  European  Powers;  and  you  will  concert  with  the 
British  Admiral,  and  the  naval  officers  of  those  Powers,  ar 
rangements  for  the  safety  of  foreigners  during  coercive 
operations. 

If  the  Daimio  Satsuma  should  not  immediately  agree  to 
and  carry  into  effect  the  terms  demanded  of  him, 


240  EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED 

the  admiral  should  either  go  himself  or  send  a  suf 
ficient  force  to  the  territory  of  the  prince,  there  to 
blockade  the  port  or  to  shell  the  residence  of  the 
prince.  Certain  steamships  which  the  prince  had 
bought  in  Europe  might  be  seized  or  held  till  redress 
was  obtained. 

During  these  operations,  whether  against  the  Government 
of  Japan  or  the  Prince  of  Satsuma,  care  must  be  taken  by  the 
Admiral  to  protect  the  ports  where  British  persons  and  prop 
erty  may  be  in  jeopardy. 

The  distinction  between  the  Government  and  the  Daimios  is 
one  that  must  be  kept  in  view. 

The  Prince  of  Satsuma  is  said  by  one  of  the  Japanese  Min 
isters  to  be  a  powerful  Daimio,  who  could  not  easily  be  coerced 
by  the  Japanese  Government.  He  must  not,  nor  must  the 
other  Daimios,  escape  on  that  account,  the  penalty  of  their 
misdeeds.1 

Such  was  the  reparation  demanded  by  a  great  na 
tion,  than  which,  as  Colonel  Neale  admonished  Mr. 
Pruyn,  none  "more  frankly,  loyally,  and  assiduously 
watches  over,  and  administers  to,  the  interests  of 

1  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  pp.  1-2.  These  demands  were  criticized 
in  debates  in  House  of  Lords,  July  10,  and  House  of  Com 
mons,  July  21,  1863  (Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  3d 
series,  vol.  172,  pp.  502-536,  1186-1198).  Lord  Stanley  said 
in  the  House  of  Commons,  February  9,  1864:  "If  the  murder 
of  a  British  subject  took  place  under  anything  like  similar  cir 
cumstances  in  a  European  country,  you  would  insist'  on  the 
punishment  of  the  offender  and  demand  compensation;  but 
you  would  not  demand  a  sum  amounting  altogether  to  about 
L.  150,000  and  proceed  in  satisfaction  to  seize  property  of 
much  greater  value"  (ibid.,  vol.  173,  p.  361). 


EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED  24! 

its  subjects  abroad  and  at  home."2  But  once  more 
the  demands  of  Downing  Street  were  drafted  without 
consideration  of  what  might  happen  to  be  the  situa 
tion  in  the  Far  East.3  We  have  seen  that  all  the 
representatives  were  convinced  that  a  crisis  was 
threatening  in  the  early  part  of  1863 ;  that  the  Shogun 
was  about  to  go  up  to  Kyoto  to  fight  for  his  place  and 
power;  and  that  Colonel  Neale  had  requested  naval 
support,  not  merely  to  defend  treaty  rights,  but  also 
to  afford  a  strong  moral  support  to  the  Shogun's  gov 
ernment.  Nothing  could  arouse  more  bitter  anti- 
foreign  feeling  than  the  presentation  of  such  humiliat 
ing  demands ;  nothing  could  weaken  the  prestige  of 
the  Shogunate  more  than  to  humbly  accept  them; 
and  nothing  could  rally  more  effectually  the  hostile 
daimyos  of  the  west  to  the  standard  of  hostility  to  the 
foreigners  than  the  punitive  measures  directed  against 
their  fellow  daimyo  of  Satsuma. 

It  is  of  interest  to  note  Colonel  Neale's  views  as  to 
what  would  be  adequate  reparation,  expressed  in  his 
despatch  of  March  2,  forwarded  before  he  had  re- 

2  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1082. 

8  As  Sir  Rutherford  Alcock  was  in  England  at  this  time  it 
is  very  probable  that  his  advice  was  sought  by  Lord  Russell 
in  framing  these  demands.  As  early  as  March  6,  1860,  he  had 
suggested  an  indemnity  of  from  $20,000  to  $50,000  for  every 
foreigner  slain  (P.P.  1860,  Com.  69  (2694),  p.  8).  Compare 
this  demand  with  MouraviefFs  action  in  1859,  and  Harris's 
in  1861. 


242  EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED 

ceived  the  above  instructions.4  The  result  of  various 
communications  with  the  Japanese  ministers  concern 
ing  the  outrage,  he  wrote, 

has  led  to  the  conviction  that  the  Tycoon's  Government  is 
powerless  to  afford  reparation,  inasmuch  as  that  reparation 
necessitates  the  arrest  of  the  malefactors  within  the  domain 
of  the  Prince  of  Satsuma,  an  attempt  to  effect  which  would, 
in  all  probability,  hasten  to  a  climax  the  gathering  elements  of 
civil  war  in  this  country.  The  urgent  necessity  for  active 
measures  on  the  part  of  the  Tycoon's  Government  to  constrain 
the  Prince  to  deliver  up  the  criminals  is  not  as  yet  sufficiently 
apparent  to  the  Mikado  and  nobles  hostile  to  foreign  inter 
course.  Extraneous  pressure,  coming  from  a  powerful  na 
tion,  would  not  only  afford  a  ready  reason  to  this  Government 
for  the  adoption  of  such  stringent  measures  as  are  possibly 
within  its  reach;  but  there  are  strong  reasons  to  entertain 
the  belief  that  the  Tycoon  and  his  Government  would  view 
with  passive  satisfaction  Satsuma,  Nagato,  and  Tosa  (the 
three  powerful  Daimios  who  are  hostile  alike  to  the  Tycoon's 
Dynasty  and  to  foreign  intercourse),  made  aware  of  the  con 
tingency  of  Her  Majesty's  Government  exacting  redress,  if 
needs  be,  at  the  ports  of  their  own  seaboard  possessions. 

With  these  views,  Colonel  Neale  must  have  been  sur 
prised,  to  say  the  least,  when  he  received  Earl  Rus 
sell's  despatch  with  its  heavy  demands  upon  the 
Shogun's  government. 

The  ominous  instructions  were  in  Neale's  hands  by 
March  14,  but  he  refrained  from  presenting  them  until 
Rear-Admiral  Kuper  and  his  squadron  arrived.5  On 
the  22d  the  admiral  entered  the  bay  in  the  Euryalus, 

*  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  pp.  34-35- 
5  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  35. 


EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED  243 

flag-ship,  accompanied  by  the  Rattler  and  the  Race 
horse.  The  Centaur  and  the  Kestrel  were  already 
in  port,  and  the  Argus  soon  arrived,  while  the  Pearl, 
Encounter,  Coquette,  Ringdove,  Cormorant,  and  all 
other  available  vessels  on  the  China  station  were  to 
follow.  An  imposing  squadron  was  to  give  weight  to 
the  British  demands. 

While  waiting  for  this  force  to  gather,  Neale  ad 
vised  Earl  Russell  of  the  steps  he  proposed  to  take  in 
carrying  out  his  instructions.  These  were  to  direct 
the  hardest  blows  against  Satsuma,  rather  than  the 
Tycoon,  so  that  "the  scene  of  hostilities  would  be 
removed  to  a  distance  from  the  Tycoon's  Court  and 
capital,  while  the  news  which  would  percolate  through 
out  the  Empire  that  Satsuma  had  been  humbled  in  his 
independent  career,  would  afford,  I  have  reason  to 
believe,  actual  satisfaction  to  the  Yeddo  Government." 
He  proposed,  moreover,  to  do  all  that  he  could  to 
secure  redress  in  both  cases  without  recourse  to  co 
ercion,  and  he  would  point  out  to  the  Japanese  "the 
essential  difference  between  measures  of  reprisal 
should  they  be  forced  upon  us  for  the  purpose  of 
awakening  in  them  a  knowledge  of  the  serious  neces 
sity  of  affording  redress,  and  a  declaration  of  war, 
as  declared  between  nations,  founded  upon  great  po 
litical  differences."  He  would  also  point  out  that  the 
penalty  now  imposed  in  thousands  would  expand  into 
millions  should  Japan  drift  into  open  hostilities  with 


244  EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED 

Great  Britain.  Finally — and  this  might  lead  one  to 
believe  that  the  charge  d'affaires  was  not  whole 
heartedly  in  sympathy  with  what  he  was  about  to  do — 
he  wrote: 

Impressed  with  the  fact  that  the  difference  which  we  have 
at  issue  with  the  Japanese  Government  is  restricted  to  a 
demand  for  reparation  arising  out  of  the  occurrence  of  two 
isolated  outrages  which  we  have  no  proof  were  perpetrated 
with  the  knowledge  or  acquiescence  of  the  Tycoon's  Govern 
ment;  impressed,  moreover,  with  the  humble  conviction  that, 
apart  from  these  lamentable  occurrences  and  the  first  attack 
on  the  Legation,  no  hostile  or  defiant  conduct  has  been  ex 
hibited  towards  us  by  the  Japanese  Government  during  the 
course  of  our  relations  with  this  country, — although,  indeed, 
want  of  confidence  and  distrust  has  ever  been  perceptible, — I 
shall  devote  my  best  endeavours  to  avert  a  serious  interruption 
of  our  commercial  relations,  which  may  fairly  be  said  to  be 
prosperous;  keeping  at  the  same  time  steadily  in  view  the 
paramount  duty  with  which  I  am  charged,  of  carrying  into 
effect,  in  letter  and  in  spirit,  the  instructions  with  which  I  am 
furnished  by  your  Lordship. 

While  Neale  was  waiting  for  the  gathering  of  the 
squadron  he  was  advised  by  the  ministers  for  foreign 
affairs,  on  March  30,  that  the  Tycoon  had  resolved  to 
start  for  Kyoto  on  the  next  day.6  To  this  Neale  re 
plied  that  he  was  about  to  present,  in  two  or  three 
days,  certain  demands  for  reparation,  the  peremptory 
and  explicit  nature  of  which  would  require  "  the  most 
serious  deliberation  and  prompt  attention  of  the 
Tycoon's  Government  within  a  restricted  period  of 

e  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  38. 


EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED  245 

time."  The  ministers,  however,  naturally  refused  to 
delay  the  departure  of  the  Shogun.  From  their  point 
of  view,  no  doubt,  it  would  have  been  to  the  last 
degree  unwise  for  the  Tycoon  to  put  off  his  long 
promised  visit  to  Kyoto,  made  in  obedience  to  the  im 
perial  commands,  in  order  to  receive  some  new  de 
mand  of  one  of  the  foreign  powers.  They  did  not 
say  as  much,  but  they  did  naively  remark  that  they 
could  not  promise  a  speedy  answer  to  Neale's  de 
mands  as  they  did  not  know  how  important  the  mat 
ters  might  be.T 

It  was  indeed  unfortunate  that  the  Shogun  and 
two  of  the  Roju8  were  about  to  leave  the  capital,  but 
it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  great  event  of  the 
moment  was  the  approaching  conference  between  the 
Shogun  and  the  Mikado  at  Kyoto.  It  was  even  more 
unfortunate  that  the  most  threatening  of  all  foreign 
complications  should  come  just  at  this  critical  time. 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  Colonel  Neale  delayed 
presenting  the  ultimatum  for  at  least  twenty-three 
days,  in  order  to  have  the  support  of  a  powerful  fleet. 

It  was  on  the  6th  of  April  that  Mr.  Eusden,  of  the 
British  legation,  delivered  the  ultimatum  to  one  of 
the  Japanese  governors  for  foreign  affairs  in  Yedo. 
It  was  a  long  document,  but  phrased  in  the  clearest 

7  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  39. 

8  One  was  already  in  Kyoto  with  Hitot'subashi ;  two  would 
remain  in  Yedo. 

17 


246  EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED 

English.9  In  addition  to  the  reparation  demanded 
for  the  Richardson  murder,  which  would  not  be 
"  deviated  from,  modified  or  discussed,"  the  indem 
nity  of  £10,000  for  the  two  marines  was  now  "per 
emptorily  demanded."  Twenty  days  were  allowed 
for  a  categorical  reply  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese 
government,  and  at  the  end  of  that  time,  if  the  answer 
were  anything  but  a  positive  acceptance,  the  admiral 
would,  within  twenty-four  hours,  "  proceed  to  enter 
upon  such  measures  as  may  be  necessary  to  secure  the 
reparation  demanded."  It  was  suggested,  and  the 
point  was  repeated  in  a  second  letter,  that  a  high 
officer  accompany  the  British  to  Satsuma  to  advise 
that  daimyo  to  comply  with  the  demands. 

The  first  reaction  of  this  astounding  ultimatum 
upon  the  two  Japanese  ministers  for  foreign  affairs 
who  were  left  in  Yedo  was  anxiety  to  prevent  the 
British  from  resorting  to  direct  action  against  the 
Lord  of  Satsuma.  "  It  is  to  be  feared,"  they  wrote, 
"  whether  the  said  undertaking  may  not  originate  an 
unexpected  calamity,  increase  confusion  tenfold  and 
create  discord  amongst  us ;  and  it  causes  us  great 
sorrow  (to  think)  that  this  undertaking  might  injure 
(put  aside)  the  law  of  our  Empire  and  cause  many 
irregularities.  Therefore  it  is  desirable  that  the  said 
mission  of  men-of-war  to  (the  domains  of  the  Prince 
of)  Satzuma  should  be  given  up."  They  requested 

9  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  pp.  40-44. 


EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED  247 

that  the  settlement  of  this  point  be  left  in  their  hands, 
and  said,  therefore,  that  they  could  not  send  an  offi 
cer  of  high  rank  with  the  British  man-of-war  to 
Kagoshima.10 

Colonel  Neale  had  some  appreciation  of  "the  dis 
turbed  political  condition "  of  the  country,  and  was 
not  ill  disposed  to  defer  the  proposed  expedition;  in 
fact  he  wrote  to  Earl  Russell  that  "  circumstances  may 
render  its  forced  delivery  inexpedient;  as,  for  ex 
ample,  the  prompt  offer  of  the  Tycoon's  Government 
to  satisfy  the  redress  and  reparation  made  upon  its 
quasi  independent  vassal."11  In  other  words  the 
British  charge  was  ready  to  modify  the  strict  letter 
of  his  instructions,  which  called  for  reparation  from 
Satsuma  as  well  as  from  the  Tycoon.  In  this  way  the 
matter  rested,  the  ministers  assuring  Neale  that  the 
Tycoon  could  not  receive  their  message  until  the  I2th 
or  1 3th,  and  he,  in  turn,  leaving  them  in  doubt  as  to 
his  intentions  concerning  Satsuma.la 

The  attitude  of  the  representatives  of  the  other 
leading  treaty  powers  toward  these  demands  should 
now  be  noted.  The  French  minister,  M.  de  Belle- 
court,  and  Captain  Massot,  of  the  corvette  Dupleix, 
had  received  their  instructions  to  act  in  perfect  ac 
cord  with  the  policy  pursued  by  the  British  govern- 

10  April  8.    Ibid,  45. 

11  April  14.     Ibid,  40. 

12  Ibid,  45- 


248  EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED 

ment,  and  De  Bellecourt  so  informed  the  Roju  on 
April  21. 13  Colonel  Neale  counted  upon  this  "moral, 
if  not  material,  cooperation;"  and  when  Admiral 
Jaures  arrived  on  the  26th,  he  unreservedly  ex 
pressed  the  "  entire  sympathy  "  entertained  by  France 
with  the  justice  of  the  British  demands.14 

The  American  minister,  on  the  contrary,  had  re 
ceived  no  instructions,  and  therefore  had  to  act  on  his 
own  responsibility  and  in  the  light  of  existing  condi 
tions.  He  had  to  bear  in  mind  the  friendly  relations 
between  his  government  and  Japan,  as  well  as  his  in 
structions  to  maintain  harmonious  relations  with  the 
treaty  powers,  and  Seward's  proposal,  early  in  1861, 
for  a  joint  naval  demonstration.  His  position  was 
bound  to  be  a  difficult  one.  Officially  neutral,  his 
views  concerning  the  justice  of  the  British  demands 
were  very  different  from  those  of  his  colleague  of 
France.  In  reporting  the  ultimatum  to  Mr.  Seward 
he  wrote: 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  this  demand  should  have  reached 
here  at  this  particular  juncture.  It  is  well  known  that  the 
Tycoon  has  been  summoned  to  Kioto  by  the  Mikado ;  that  all 
the  great  daimios  will  shortly  assemble  there,  and  that  the 
Mikado  has  been  influenced  to  regard  the  treaties  with  dis 
pleasure.  At  this  meeting,  and  within  a  few  days,  the  foreign 
policy  of  this  government  will  probably  be  determined,  and  I 
fear  that  this  demand  of  the  British  at  this  time  will  weaken 
the  influence  of  the  Tycoon  and  his  supporters,  and  inflame 

13  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1090. 
**  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  52. 


EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED  249 

the  passions,  and  increase  the  influence,  and  add  to  the  number 
of  daimios  opposed  to  foreign  trade.15 

Three  weeks  later  he  added : 

I  have  felt  from  the  outset  that  the  course  of  the  British 
government  has  been  a  most  extraordinary  one.  No  one  can 
deny  that  the  occurrence  of  September,  however  unfortunate, 
was  purely  accidental.  It  is  conceded  that  under  the  same 
circumstances  a  Japanese  would  have  been  killed.  It  is  like 
wise  conceded  that  the  nationality  of  none  of  the  parties 
attacked  was  known.  Indeed,  the  governor  of  Kanagawa  de 
spatched  a  messenger  that  evening  to  our  consul,  under  the 
impression  that  one  of  the  wounded  men  was  an  American. 
And  yet  I  have  strongly  urged  a  compliance  with  the  demand, 
though  I  view  it  with  feelings  I  shall  not  permit  myself  to 
express.16 

In  urging  compliance,  therefore,  Mr.  Pruyn  was  not 
moved  by  the  justice  of  the  cause,  but,  frankly,  by  a 
desire  to  save  the  Japanese  from  having  to  pay  a  far 
larger  demand  later,  based  upon  the  expenses  of  the 
British  fleet  and  the  business  losses  of  British  mer 
chants.  If,  however,  the  Japanese  would  not  agree, 
he  advised  Mr.  Seward  that  he  would  recommend  to 
them  to  propose  submitting  the  whole  case  for  settle 
ment  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  or  the 
Emperor  of  Russia,  or  both,  or  even  to  the  British 
government.  He  also  informed  him  of  the  deplor 
able  results  which  might  follow  should  the  British 
charge  insist  that  the  demands  be  complied  with 

"  April  10.    For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1071. 
16  May  3.     Ibid.,  1079. 


25O  EXCLUSION    AGAIN    DECREED 

"  without  modification  or  even  discussion."  "  No 
country  is  so  susceptible  of  defence  as  this.  There 
are  no  roads  for  artillery.  The  whole  country  is 
intersected  by  ditches  and  canals  and  covered  by  rice 
fields.  The  people,  or  rather  the  two-sworded  men, 
are  as  reckless  of  life  as  any  people  that  ever  existed, 
and  no  hostile  force  can  hold  any  considerable  por 
tion  of  this  empire  without  the  sacrifice  of  thousands 
of  lives  and  millions  of  money." 

Mr.  Pruyn  promptly  notified  Colonel  Fisher,  the 
American  consul  at  Kanagawa,  of  the  serious  aspect 
of  affairs,  and  of  the  possibility  that  the  Japanese 
might  not  be  able  to  comply  with  the  demands  within 
twenty  days  because  of  the  absence  of  the  Tycoon  and 
most  of  the  ministers  for  foreign  affairs,  and  recom 
mended  that  citizens  of  the  United  States  "pursue 
their  business  as  usual,  avoiding  excitement,  sacrifice 
of  property,  and  all  exposure  to  danger.  Their  posi 
tion,  until  other  wise  determined  by  the  action  of  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  or  by  hostile  acts 
of  the  Japanese  government  or  people,  which  are  not 
apprehended,  must  be  that  of  entire  neutrality."  He 
also  recommended  that  they  form  an  organization  so 
that  they  might  act  in  concert.  This  step  was  not  to 
indicate  any  separation  of  interests  from  those  of  the 
other  treaty  powers,  but,  as  he  pointed  out,  "  thus  far 
nothing  has  disturbed  the  peaceful  relations  between 
the  government  of  the  United  States  and  that  of 


EXCLUSION    AGAIN    DECREED  251 

Japan,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  nothing  will  change 
those  relations."17 

From  the  Japanese  point  of  view  it  was  of  the  ut 
most  importance  that  the  British  demands  be  not  dis 
cussed  until  after  the  close  of  the  Tycoon's  confer 
ence  with  the  Mikado  at  Kyoto.  But  the  Tycoon 
reached  the  capital  only  on  the  21  st,  and  the  ultimatum 
would  expire  on  the  26th.  In  this  crisis  the  two  min 
isters  for  foreign  affairs  in  Yedo  turned  to  the  Amer 
ican  minister  for  help.18  They  requested  him  to 
mediate  for  the  grant  of  an  extension  of  the  time 
limit,  and  they  said,  "  From  the  treaty  such  great 
friendship  may  be  expected ;  and  also,  because  we  ex 
perienced  your  friendly  feeling  on  more  than  one  oc 
casion."  This,  of  course,  referred  to  the  second  ar 
ticle  of  the  treaty  of  1858. 

Mr.  Pruyn  advised  the  ministers  to  place  the  matter 
frankly  before  the  British  charge,  pointing  out  to  him 
the  necessity  for  having  such  an  important  matter 
settled  by  the  Tycoon  and  his  full  Council,  and  also 
to  ask  the  friendly  interposition  of  the  French  min 
ister.  He  then  proceeded  to  Yokohama  to  consult 
with  the  British  and  French  representatives.  Colonel 
Neale  was  unwilling  to  grant  the  extension  asked; 
but  on  receipt  of  the  letter  from  the  ministers  in 
which  it  was  stated  that  the  Tycoon  would  be  back  in 

17  April  9.    For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1073. 

18  April  19.    For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1077, 


252  EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED 

Yedo  within  thirty  days  (by  May  20),  he  agreed,  on 
the  25th,  to  an  extension  of  fifteen  days  from  April 
27;  that  is,  until  May  n.19  This  extension  did  not 
allow  for  the  return  of  the  Tycoon  from  Kyoto,  nor 
was  it  Neale's  intention  to  do  so.  It  merely  granted 
time  for  a  new  exchange  of  despatches  between  the 
ministers  in  Yedo  and  the  Tycoon  and  his  counsellors 
in  Kyoto.  It  is  interesting  to  note,  in  passing,  that 
the  ministers  thanked  Mr.  Pruyn  for  his  friendly  in 
terposition,  and  informed  him  that  they  attributed  the 
successful  result  of  their  application  entirely  to  his 
mediation;20  but  Colonel  Neale  took  pains  to  inform 
them  that  the  days  of  grace  were  granted  in  conse 
quence  of  their  appeal  in  writing  to  him,  and  indi 
rectly  to  his  colleague,  the  minister  of  France.21 
This  statement  would  indicate  that  all  was  not  well 
between  the  representatives  of  the  English  speaking 
peoples.  Such  was  the  case. 

i  On  the  1 6th  of  April  a  conference  took  place  at 
the  British  legation  in  Yokohama  which  was  at 
tended  by  the  British  admiral,  charge,  and  military 
officer,  the  French  naval  captain,  and  the  commander 
of  the  Netherlands  naval  force,  for  the  purpose  of 

19  Ibid.,  1078.  Note  Neale's  explanation  to  Russell,  and  his 
reply  to  the  Japanese  ministers,  in  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  pp. 
52-53,  53-54-  See  the  Sanke  Owari's  statement  on  the  26th 
(ibid,  79). 

2°  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1077. 

21  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  54. 


EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED  253 

considering  the  protection  of  that  port.22  It  was 
their  decision  that  "  there  was  not  a  sufficient  force  at 
present  in  Japan  to  guarantee  perfect  security  to  the 
foreign  community  at  Yokohama  in  the  event  of  an 
attack  in  force  by  the  Japanese,"  and  the  residents 
there  were  advised  to  adopt  such  measures  as  might 
be  in  their  power  for  their  security  before  the  ulti 
matum  expired  on  the  26th.  Mr.  Pruyn,  who  was, 
of  course,  in  Yedo,  was  informed  of  this  decision  by 
Colonel  Neale;  and  in  reply,  after  expressing  his 
regret  that  he  was  not  notified  of  the  meeting  so  that 
he  could  have  explained  his  views  more  fully,  he  ven 
tured  to  advocate  a  policy  of  moderation.23  At  the 
time  of  the  delivery  of  the  ultimatum  he  had  received 
from  Colonel  Neale  the  impression  that  the  British 
fleet  was  sufficient  to  protect  the  treaty  ports ;  now  it 
seemed  that  the  combined  forces  of  Britain,  France, 
and  Holland  would  not  suffice.  If  the  problem  were 
one  of  unprovoked  attack  by  the  Japanese,  he  would 
have  no  observation  to  offer,  for  he  did  not  consider 
that  such  an  attack  was  at  all  likely  to  be  made ;  but 
if  it  were  concerned  with  the  hostilities  which  might 
ensue  from  the  measures  resorted  to  by  the  British  to 
enforce  their  present  demands,  he  felt  it  his  duty  to 
point  out  the  disastrous  effects  of  allowing  the  Jap 
anese  to  gain  a  temporary  advantage  which  would 

22  For.  Rel.,  1863,  H,  1080. 

23  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1081. 


254  EXCLUSION    AGAIN    DECREED 

arouse  the  whole  country  and  possibly  destroy  all 
the  advantages  which  the  treaty  powers  had  gained. 
"  It  appears  to  me,"  he  said,  "  the  dictate  of  wisdom, 
that  no  coercive  measures  be  resorted  to  by  any 
power,  unless  ample  means  be  at  hand  for  the  de 
fence  and  protection  of  life  and  property  at  the  settle 
ment."  It  would  be  unwise,  he  considered,  to  estab 
lish  such  a  precedent,  for  some  one  of  the  treaty 
powers,  with  a  force  wholly  inadequate  to  protect  the 
foreign  residents,  might  hereafter  attempt  to  do  what 
Great  Britain,  with  its  powerful  fleet,  now  proposed. 
The  Japanese,  he  maintained,  would  not  be  able  to 
discriminate  between  the  various  nations  in  case  of 
hostilities,  and  therefore  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  having  the  largest  commerce  and  the  largest 
interests  at  stake,  were  most  concerned  in  the  preser 
vation  of  peaceful  relations.24 

This  candid  statement  brought  forth  from  Colonel 
Neale  a  spirited  defence  of  the  British  policy,  in 
which  he  stated  that  the  views  of  Mr.  Pruyn,  "  though 
doubtless  applicable  and  just  when  regarded  in  the 
sole  light  in  which  you  have  presented  them,  namely, 
that  of  commercial  interests  .  .  .  are  wholly  inap 
plicable  when  weighed  in  the  balance  against  the  of 
fended  dignity  of  a  great  nation."  He  then  pro- 

24  Mr.  Pruyn  believed  that  the  Japanese  would  have  fought 
the  British  if  they  would  not  have  been  involved  with  other 
powers  (Pruyn  MSS.,  April  26,  May  4,  1863). 


EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED  255 

ceeded  to  accuse  American  citizens  of  supplying  arms 
and  munitions  to  the  Japanese  at  this  critical  junc 
ture,  and  asserted,  on  the  basis  of  current  reports, 
that  they  were  aiding  the  Japanese  in  making  prep 
arations  for  resistance,  a  report  which,  if  it  could  be 
proved,  he  said,  would  ill  accord  with  Mr.  Seward's 
policy  of  joint  action  and  a  joint  demonstration  as 
proposed  in  i86i.25 

To  this  Mr.  Pruyn  replied  in  a  despatch  of  unusual 
length,  conciliatory  in  tone,  but  also  perfectly  frank.28 
He  had  not  attributed  to  Neale  a  desire  to  act  with 
undue  haste,  because  he  understood  perfectly  that  he 
was  acting  under  explicit  instructions,  nor  did  he  pre 
sume  to  express  an  unfavorable  opinion  as  to  the  ac 
tion  of  the  British  Cabinet.  He  was  interested,  how 
ever,  not  in  commerce,  but  in  the  safety  of  American 
citizens,  and  on  this  account  he  was  ready  to  renew 
the  suggestion  made  in  his  former  letter,  that  no 
measures  of  retaliation  be  taken  before  the  powers 
were  better  prepared  for  defence.  As  to  his  own  at 
titude,  he  had  from  the  very  day  after  the  murder 
made  every  effort  to  arouse  the  Japanese  government 
to  the  necessity  of  prompt  and  vigorous  action  and 
ample  reparation.  He  had  repeatedly  advised  that 
the  present  demands  be  met.  His  interpretation  of 
Mr.  Seward's  proposal  in  1861  was,  however,  dif 
ferent  from  that  of  his  colleague. 

25  April  20.    For.  Rel,  1863,  II,  1082. 

26  April  30.    Ibid.,  1085-1088. 


256  EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED 

If  I  rightly  understand  Mr.  Seward's  proposition,  he  desired 
to  establish  the  principle  that  the  treaty  powers,  recognizing 
their  identity  of  interest  and  their  exposure  to  a  common  dan 
ger,  should  abstain  from  separate  action  and  make  common 
cause  in  maintaining  common  rights,  and  securing  the  common 
safety  of  their  citizens  and  subjects.  It  was  a  wise  sugges 
tion,  because  it  insured  unity  of  action  and  moderation  and 
equity  of  demand ;  it  was  humane  likewise,  because  necessarily 
attended  with  peaceful  results. 

He  brought  out  the  difference  between  Seward's  pol 
icy  and  the  British  program  by  citing  the  case  of  Mr. 
Heusken's  murder,  when  "  for  the  sake  of  a  salutary 
precedent,  a  specific  demand  for  redress  was  waived," 
and  the  sum  of  $10,000  was  accepted  for  the  support 
of  the  widowed  mother.  Finally  the  charge  that 
American  citizens  were  supplying  the  Japanese  with 
arms  was  refuted,  for  such  few  sales  as  had  been 
made  were  made  openly  and  in  time  of  peace. 

It  was  at  this  juncture  that  Mr.  Seward's  de 
spatch  of  December  13,  1862,  dealing  with  the  Rich 
ardson  affair,  arrived,  and  Pruyn  read  it  to  the  gov 
ernors  for  foreign  affairs  on  May  i.2T  It  expressed 
the  hope  that  the  Japanese  authorities  would  bring 
the  offenders  to  punishment  and  make  reparation 
without  delay,  and  added :  "  You  cannot  too  strongly 
advise  the  government  of  Japan  that  it  can  only  have 
friendship,  or  even  peace  with  the  United  States, 
by  protecting  citizens  and  subjects  of  foreign  powers 
from  domestic  violence." 

27  For.  Rel.,  1863,  1054,  1076. 


EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED  257 

The  next  development  in  this  interesting  situation 
could  hardly  have  been  anticipated.  The  time  limit 
of  the  British  ultimatum  would  expire  on  May  II, 
and  if  the  demands  were  not  complied  with  the  British 
fleet  would  commence  operations.  The  members  of 
the  Roju  in  Yedo  had,  on  April  30,  begged  that  the 
full  extension  of  thirty  days  be  granted.  This  re 
quest  was  the  occasion  of  a  conference  between  the 
British  and  French  diplomatic  and  naval  officers.  On 
May  3  two  of  the  governors  for  foreign  affairs  came 
down  to  Yokohama  seeking  an  interview  with  the 
allies,  which  was  granted  on  the  4th  and  5th.  On 
the  night  of  the  3d  the  Japanese  residents  of  Yoko 
hama,  alarmed  at  the  approaching  hostilities,  began 
to  leave  the  city  and  supplies  ceased  to  come  in.28 
This  alarm  and  panic  continued  for  several  days,  and 
on  the  6th  several  foreigners,  including  three  Amer 
icans,  were  badly  handled  by  certain  Japanese,  who 
demanded  sums  of  money  due,  or  believed  to  be  due, 
on  contracts.  Under  these  circumstances  the  repre 
sentatives  of  England  and  France  announced  that 
they  had  offered  their  naval  forces  to  the  Tycoon  for 
service  against  the  hostile  daimyos ! 

The  reasons  for  this  offer  were  summed  up  by 
Colonel  Neale  as  follows : 

28  A  circular  of  warning  had  been  issued  by  the  governor  of 
Kanagawa. 


258  •     EXCLUSION   AGAIN    DECREED 

ist,  the  avowal  of  the  Tycoon's  government  itself  of  the 
opposition  it  encounters  in  its  relations  with  foreigners,  on  the 
part  of  certain  powerful  daimios  specifically  named ;  2d,  upon 
the  knowledge  which  has  been  conveyed  to  us  of  peremptory 
and  arrogant  written  appeals  addressed  to  the  Tycoon  and  his 
counsel,  by  eleven  of  the  most  influential  of  those  daimios, 
against1  all  intercourse  with  foreigners,  and  the  authenticity  of 
which  is  not  denied  by  the  government  envoy;  and,  finally, 
upon  a  correspondence  between  the  Mikado  and  the  Tycoon ; 
wherein  the  former  enjoins  the  immediate  expulsion  of  for 
eigners.29 

In  order  that  this  proffer  of  assistance  might  be 
placed  before  the  Tycoon,  an  additional  term  was 
granted  to  the  ultimatum,  which  would  now  expire  on 
the  23d,  but  this  extension  was  granted  on  the  dis 
tinct  condition  that  the  authorities  would  stop  the 
evacuation  of  Yokohama  by  the  Japanese  and  would 
assure,  further,  the  provisioning  of  the  town.30  If 
these  conditions  were  not  carried  out,  it  would  be 
considered  an  initiation  of  hostilities  on  the  part  of 
the  Shogunate.  It  was  implied  that  if  the  Tycoon 
refused  this  offer  the  allied  fleet  would  resort  to 
measures  of  coercion. 

This  decision  was  taken  by  the  British  and  French 
'  representatives  on  May  5.  De  Bellecourt  promptly 

29  For.  Rel.,  1863,   II,  1092-1093.    In  1864  the  four  treaty 
powers  came  to  the  support  of  the  Shogunate  in  the  Shimo- 
noseki  operations. 

30  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  55.    Mr.  Pruyn  was  informed  that 
the  ultimatum  would  expire  on  the  21  st  (For.  Rel.,  1863,  H, 
1093)- 


EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED  259 

advised  Mr.  Pruyn,  and  Colonel  Neale  wrote  *a  letter 
on  the  ;th.31  In  reply  to  the  former  Mr.  Pruyn 
stated  that  the  propriety  of  giving  support  to  the 
Tycoon  by  all  the  treaty  powers  had  been  recognized 
for  almost  a  year,  and  would  be  quite  in  accord  with 
Seward's  proposal  of  i86i.32  Moreover  he  had  told 
the  Japanese  in  February  last  that  in  the  case  of  civil 
war  the  United  States  and  all  the  powers  would 
doubtless  support  the  Tycoon  if  asked  to  do  so.  But 
should  the  Tycoon  accept  in  the  meanwhile  the  assist 
ance  of  the  fleets  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  he  had 
no  observation  to  offer,  for  he  had  not  been  invited  to 
the  allies'  conferences  nor  his  opinion  asked  in  respect 
to  the  results  of  their  deliberations.  This  offer  to  sup-! 
port  the  Tycoon,  coming  while  the  demand  for  an 
enormous  indemnity  was  still  pressing,  might  well 
have  astounded  the  harassed  Japanese  officials. 

Left  in  ignorance  by  his  colleagues  of  what  had 
taken  place,  Mr.  Pruyn  learned  from  the  Japanese 
officials  of  the  proceedings  at  the  Yokohama  confer 
ences.  He  reported  to  Mr.  Seward  that  "they  had 
several  times  declined  the  offer  of  assistance  to  the 
Tycoon,  fearing  that  the  knowledge  even  that  such  a 
proposition  had  been  made  might  disturb  the  peace  of 
the  empire;  but  that  finally,  as  the  ministers  and  ad 
mirals  were  not  satisfied  with  their  answer,  the  gov- 

81  Ibid.,  1088-1090,  1092-1094. 
32  Ibid.,  1091-1092. 


26O  EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED 

ernmerit  has  reluctantly  agreed  to  despatch  an  officer 
in  whom  they  had  entire  confidence  to  the  Tycoon" 
to  make  known  this  offer  and  return  with  his  reply.33 
This  governor  left  Yedo  on  the  8th  and  was  ex 
pected  back  from  Kyoto  on  the  23d.  It  was  Mr. 
Pruyn's  opinion  that  "  unless  a  collision  shall  have 
taken  place  at  Kioto,  or  the  civil  war,  which  I  wrote 
you  on  the  i6th  of  February  last  was  feared,  shall 
break  out  or  appear  imminent,  I  do  not  anticipate  the 
offer  will  be  accepted.  I  believe  that  if  the  alterna 
tive  be  distinctly  presented,  a  foreign  war  will  be  ac 
cepted,  if  thereby  a  civil  war  may  be  averted,  calami 
tous  as  it  may  prove."34 

In  this  respect  he  was  right,  for  when  the  term  ex 
pired  on  the  23d  the  ministers  declined  the  offer  of 
assistance,  and  offered  to  pay  the  demand  of  £110,000 
at  some  future  day,  "  after  the  Tycoon  has  succeeded 
in  quieting  the  troubles  which  prevail."  To  make  the 
payment  at  this  time  would  precipitate  civil  war.36 

At  this  juncture,  when  war  between  Japan  and 
England  and  France  seemed  imminent,  Mr.  Pruyn  and 
the  American  colony  were  relieved  to  have  the  U.  S. 
S.  Wyoming  enter  the  bay  on  May  n.  On  the  morn 
ing  of  the  26th,  however,  the  American  minister  suf 
fered  through  a  disaster  which  is  all  too  common  in 

83  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1094-1095. 
3*  See  Pruyn  MSS.,  May  11,  1863. 
"  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1098. 


EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED  26 1 

Japan.  This  was  the  destruction  of  the  legation  in 
Yedo  by  fire, — not  an  unusual  incident  in  a  land 
where  houses  are  built  of  light  wood  and  paper,  but 
smacking  of  incendiarism  at  this  time  of  internal  com 
motion.  Mr.  Pruyn  was  ready  to  "suspend  judg 
ment,"  reporting  to  Mr.  Seward :  "  I  desire  to  believe, 
for  the  sake  of  this  government,  as  well  as  our  own, 
that  this  fire  was  purely  accidental.  Still,  for  weeks, 
and  even  for  months  past,  repeated  attempts  have 
been  made  to  induce  me  to  leave  Yedo."36  In  spite 
of  certain  suspicious  circumstances,  the  authorities 
who  investigated  the  event  always  maintained  that 
the  fire  was  accidental,  and  the  yaconins  on  guard, 
more  than  five  hundred  that  night,  did  all  that  they 
could  to  save  property  and  protect  the  residents.37 

The  next  day  Mr.  Pruyn  took  up  his  abode  in  tem 
porary  quarters  and  remained  there  until  the  3ist. 
He  had  planned  to  go  to  Yokohama  the  next  day,  but 
that  afternoon  he  was  informed  by  one  of  the  gover 
nors  for  foreign  affairs  that  the  government  had 
learned  of  a  conspiracy  to  attack  the  legation  that 
very  night,  and  although  it  would  do  all  it  could  to 
arrest  the  conspirators,  yet  some  might  escape  and 
trouble  be  made.  It  would  relieve  the  government 
greatly  if  Mr.  Pruyn  would  retire  temporarily  to 
Yokohama,  and  this  he  agreed  to  do.38  Although  he 

36  Ibid.,  1097-1098. 
"For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1116. 
38  Ibid.,  1 100,  1117. 
18 


262  EXCLUSION    AGAIN    DECREED 

hoped  to  return  early  in  July,  it  was  actually  two 
years  before  the  American  legation  was  again  per 
manently  established  in  Yedo. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  turn  to  Kyoto  and  follow 
the  developments  there  during  the  great  conference 
between  the  Mikado  and  the  Tycoon.  In  the  last 
chapter  it  was  stated  that  the  regent,  Hitotsubashi, 
had  preceded  the  Shogun,  arriving  in  Kyoto  on  March 
i,  and  finding  there  a  state  of  great  agitation  and  in 
sistent  demands  in  many  quarters  that  the  Mikado's 
decrees  for  the  expulsion  of  the  foreigners  be  carried 
out  at  a  definite  date.  On  April  8  a  council  was 
held  at  the  palace  attended  by  the  regent  and  the 
Tairo,  princes  of  the  blood,  kuge  of  high  rank,  and 
the  leading  daimyos  in  Kyoto,  at  which  a  new  man 
date  for  the  expulsion  of  the  foreigners  was  read. 
In  this  the  Mikado  expressed  his  belief  that  the  date 
should  be  fixed,  and  that  all  who  had  ideas  on  the 
subject,  "even  low-class  two-s worded  men  and  people 
of  the  baser  class,"  might  present  their  opinions  to  the 
Gakushiu-in.39  On  this  day  and  the  next  some  of 
the  leading  kuge  and  greater  daimyos  appealed  to  the 
regent  to  fix  the  date,  while  Mori,  of  Choshiu,  took 
the  matter  up  with  the  Kwambaku.  Hitotsubashi  re 
plied  to  all  these  demands  that  nothing  should  be 
done  until  the  Tycoon  arrived,  when  the  date  would 
certainly  be  fixed. 

39  Japan,  1853-64,  pp.  80-81.  The  Gakushiu-in  was  the 
school  for  nobles  in  Kyoto. 


EXCLUSION    AGAIN    DECREED  263 

But  the  agitation  could  not  be  quelled.  On  the  Qth 
all  Kyoto  was  talking  of  an  astounding  act  of  sacrilege. 
Some  of  the  hostile  samurai  entered  the  temple  of  To- 
jiu-in,  where  wooden  images  of  the  Ashikaga  Shoguns 
were  preserved,  cut  off  the  heads  of  three  of  them,  and 
pilloried  them  in  the  bed  of  the  river  in  the  heart  of 
the  city.  This  act  was  designed  to  call  attention  to  the 
usurpation  of  the  Mikado's  power  by  the  Shoguns. 
The  Shogun's  military  governor  in  Kyoto,  the  Lord  of 
Aidzu,  caused  his  retainers  to  ferret  out  the  perpe 
trators  of  this  sacrilege,  and  some  were  killed  and 
others  thrown  into  prison.  This  caused  Mori,  of 
Choshiu,  to  come  forward  in  defence  of  the  ronins — 
and  at  the  same  time  of  the  Mikado — but  Aidzu  would 
not  relent.  One  result  was  that  Mori  became  the  idol 
of  the  ronins,  and  his  influence  among  them  and  at 
the  court  was  unbounded. 

Word  had  now  reached  Kyoto  of  the  British  de 
mands,  and  on  April  15  the  Shogun's  representative  at 
Kyoto  (the  Shoshidai)  issued  a  notice  to  the  thirty- 
six  principal  daimyos  concerning  the  situation,  and 
stating  that  "three  demands  have  been  preferred  in 
satisfaction ;  but  as  none  of  them  can  be  accorded,  we 
intend  to  reject  them  entirely.  As  this  refusal  will 
probably  cause  immediate  war,  we  request  you  to  as 
semble  around  your  sovereign  (the  Mikado)  like  a 
wall,  and  to-  make  the  necessary  preparations  for 


264  '    EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED 

war."40  This  notice  must  have  rejoiced  the  hearts  of 
the  anti-foreign  party,  into  whose  hands  the  British 
were,  in  ignorance,  apparently  playing. 

On  the  2 ist  of  April  the  Shogun,  accompanied  by 
a  noble  retinue  of  counsellors,  daimyos,  hatamotos, 
eight  or  nine  hundred  soldiers,  and  two  thousand  serv 
ants,  entered  Kyoto.  More  than  two  hundred  years 
had  passed  since  the  imperial  capital  had  seen  such  a 
spectacle.  On  the  24th  he  paid  a  visit  of  ceremony  to 
the  palace  to  inquire  after  His  Majesty's  health  and 
to  present  his  gifts  to  the  Mikado  and  the  court,  and, 
according  to  the  precedent  created  by  lemitsu,  he  dis 
tributed  a  large  sum  of  money  among  the  townspeople. 
His  advisers  had  hoped  that  he  could  hurriedly  trans 
act  the  business  in  hand  and  return  to  Yedo  by  the 
first  of  May,  but  this  did  not  fit  in  with  the  plans  of 
the  court  party,  who  desired  to  keep  him  in  Kyoto 
until  the  plans  for  the  expulsion  of  the  foreigners  had 
been  formulated  to  their  satisfaction.  So  on  the  28th 
the  Mikado  and  the  Tycoon  proceeded,  in  magnificent 
state,  to  visit  the  shrines  at  Upper  and  Lower  Kamo, 
"as  a  preliminary."41 

The  result  of  the  first  conference  between  the 
Mikado  and  the  Shogun  was  the  acceptance  by  the 
latter  of  the  imperial  commands  to  expel  the  barba 
rians.  This  was  to  be  done  by  peaceful  negotiation  if 

*°For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1107. 
«  Japan,  1853-64,  P-  84. 


EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED  265 

possible,  'but  if  not,  then  they  were  to  be  swept  away, 
and  it  was  suggested  that,  depending  upon  circum 
stances,  the  Mikado  himself  might  conquer  the 
foreigners.42 

The  news  of  this  decision  was  promptly  transmitted 
throughout  the  Empire,  for  on  May  14  the  governor 
of  Hakodate,  in  distant  Hokkaido,  issued  a  proclama 
tion  to  the  inhabitants  that  "  the  treaty  between  Euro 
pean  countries  and  Japan  is  finished.  Henceforth 
Hakodadi  and  Nagasaki  will  be  the  only  ports  opened 
to  foreigners.  If  the  foreigners,  however,  persist  in 
their  claims,  a  war  will  break  out."  He  also  assured 
his  people  that  there  was  not  the  least  chance  of  war 
breaking  out  in  Hakodate.43 

The  first  decision,  however,  failed  to  fix  a  specific 
date  for  the  expulsion,  and  thus,  of  course,  could  not 
satisfy  the  extremists.  The  Tycoon  and  his  advisers, 
on  their  part,  realized  what  was  meant  by  the  presence 
of  the  British  and  French  fleets  at  Yokohama  at  this 
time  and  what  would  follow  if  relations  with  all  the 
six  treaty  powers  were  abruptly  terminated.  Again 
they  struggled  to  find  some  loophole.  The  oppor 
tunity  to  negotiate  with  the  powers  would  enable  them 
to  temporize,  and  in  time  all  might  be  well.  With  the 

42  May  6,  notification  to  the  o-metsukes,  to  be  transmitted  to 
the  feudal  lords  and  retainers ;  May  8,  notification  made  to 
the  daimios  in  the  presence  of  the  Gorogio  (Roju)  in  Nijo 
Castle,  Kyoto  (For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1113-1114). 

«  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  64. 


266  EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED 

situation  in  Kyoto  in  mind  it  is  easy  to  understand 
why  the  Tycoon  refused  to  accept  the  offer  of  British 
and  French  aid.  It  would  have  meant  a  wide-waged 
civil  war. 

In  order  to  nerve  the  Shogun  to  carry  out  the  ex 
pulsion  plan,  it  was  arranged  that  on  May  28  the 
Mikado  and  the  Shogun,  with  their  suites,  would  visit 
the  shrine  of  Hachiman,  god  of  war,  at  Otokoyama, 
where  "  the  Mikado  was  to  present  to  the  Shogun  in 
the  presence  of  the  God  a  sword  of  justice  for  the 
expulsion  of  the  barbarians."44  But  the  Shogun  sud 
denly  fell  ill,  and  was  unable  to  attend.  Then  the 
Mikado  ordered  that  the  Regent  Hitotsubashi  should 
receive  the  sword,  but  at  the  last  minute  he  "  suddenly 
fell  sick  "  and  went  down  from  the  shrine  before  the 
presentation. 

In  consequence  of  this  the  honest  patriots  were  greatly  in 
censed,  and  declared  that  the  Bakufu  officials  did  not  sincerely 
intend  to  drive  out  the  barbarians;  that  all  of  them,  including 
Hitotsubashi,  were  deceiving  the  Imperial  Court,  and  that  the 
villany  they  thus  displayed,  and  in  constantly  urging  the  Sho 
gun  to  return  to  Yedo,  was  beyond  the  power  of  words  to 
stigmatize.  And  they  clamoured  loudly  that  since  this  was 
so,  the  Mikado  himself  should  proceed  to  conquer  the  bar 
barians  in  person,  without  waiting  for  the  Bakufu.45 

The  patriots  were  right.  The  Shogunate  officials 
did  not  sincerely  intend  to  drive  out  the  barbarians, 

44  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  88. 

45  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  90. 


EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED  267 

and  yet  in  the  threatening  environment  of  Kyoto  they 
felt  the  presence  of  a  force  majeure.  A  few  days 
later,  on  June  5,  another  audience  was  held,  and  on 
that  fateful  day  the  date  for  the  expulsion  of  the  bar 
barians  was  fixed.  The  25th  of  June  was  the  day 
appointed  by  the  Mikado,  and  the  daimyos  were 
notified  to  that  effect  and  instructed  to  defend  their 
coasts  and,  when  invaders  came,  sweep  them  away.48 
Satsuma  and  many  of  the  maritime  daimyos  had  re 
turned  to  their  fiefs  after  the  decision  to  expel  the 
barbarians  had  been  reached  but  before  the  date  was 
fixed,  and  the  news  was  swiftly  forwarded  to  them. 

Although  forced  to  accept  this  alarming  decision,  the 
Shogunate  officials  realized  the  hopelessness  of  their 
position.  The  Tairo,  Echizen-no-Kami,  who  had 
stoutly  advocated  foreign  intercourse,  begged  leave  to 
resign  his  office,  and  when  the  Mikado  refused  his 
request,  he  departed  for  his  fief  without  imperial  per 
mission.47  The  Shogun  again  begged  leave  to  return 
to  Yedo,  but  this  was  refused,  for  the  Lord  of  Mito 
had  been  appointed  by  the  Mikado  to  proceed  there  in 
his  stead  and  "  expel  totally  the  foreigners,  and  sweep 
them  away  as  it  were  with  a  broom."  His  commis- 

46  Ibid.,  87.     Tycoon  to  Roju,  June  6   (For.  Rel.,  1863,  H, 
1124).     Notice  to  daimyos    (ibid.).     Notice  by  Governor  of 
Yedo,  June  9  (P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  68). 

47  June  6.    Japan,  1853-64,  p.  87.    He  notified  his  agent  in 
Yokohama  that  the  Mikado  was  under  the  influence  of  Sat 
suma  and  the  anti-foreign  daimyos  (For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1108). 


268  EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED 

sion  from  the  Tycoon  was  far  more  moderate.  He 
was  told  "  to  do  what  is  right  and  proper,  in  order  that 
the  good  name  of  Japan  may  not  be  lost."48  The 
Shogun  was  permitted  to  visit  his  castle  at  Osaka  and 
he  was  there  when  the  day  of  expulsion  arrived. 
Hitotsubashi  had,  in  the  meantime,  returned  to  Yedo. 
And  there  the  scene  shifts.  How  was  the  expulsion 
edict  to  be  carried  out? 

The  situation  at  Yedo  and  at  Yokohama  was  much 
as  follows :  The  ultimatum  covering  the  British  de 
mands  and  the  Anglo-French  offer  of  assistance  ex 
pired  on  May  23.  The  officials  in  Yedo,  knowing  of 
the  decision  taken  at  Kyoto  on  the  6th  to  expel  the 
foreigners,  and  doubtless  under  explicit  instructions, 
refused  the  offer  of  assistance,  and  proposed  to  pay 
the  indemnity  at  some  later  date.  This  refusal  was 
the  subject  of  several  interviews  between  the  British 
charge  and  the  Japanese  governors.  In  the  meantime 
the  news  of  the  decreed  expulsion  aroused  the  ronins 
to  greater  activity,  and  the  Shogunate  to  increased 
efforts  to  protect  the  foreigners.  It  was  a  curious 
situation :  an  allied  fleet  menacing  Yedo,  and  the  Yedo 
authorities  straining  every  nerve  to  prevent  hostile 
operations  on  the  part  of  impetuous  Japanese.  On 
May  31  the  governor  of  Kanagawa  summoned  the  con 
sular  corps  to  a  conference,  in  which  he  stated  the 

48  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  iio6.  He  reached  Yedo  about  the 
end  of  May. 


EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED  269 

danger  of  attacks  from  ronin  bands,  and  urged  that 
the  foreigners  at  Kanagawa  move  over  to  Yokohama 
for  safety.  This  request  applied  only  to  the  Ameri 
can  consul  and  to  missionaries.  He  then  stated  that 
the  Yedo  authorities  would  reinforce  the  daimyos' 
troops  on  guard  at  Yokohama  by  some  of  their  own 
troops,  commanded  by  officers  of  the  rank  of  hatamoto, 
"gentlemen  of  birth  and  breeding,  much  superior  to 
the  daimios'  officers,"  and  that  "any  unnecessary 
threatening  display  of  firearms  would  be  felt  by  them 
as  a  special  indignity."49  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
this  scrupulous  endeavor  to  protect  the  foreigners,  at 
this  exciting  period,  was  received  with  suspicion,  the 
British  consul  writing:  "Undoubtedly  the  Japanese 
Government  is  quite  capable  of  creating  a  fictitious 
alarm,  and  under  its  cover  compassing  their  darling 
object  of  controlling  the  movements  or  (it  may  be) 
getting  rid  of  this  community." 

The  protracted  discussion  concerning  the  payment  of 
the  indemnity  was  brought  to  a  close  with  the  pro 
nouncement  of  a  new  ultimatum  fixing  ten  days  as  the 
limit  for  compliance.  The  Japanese  wished  to  extend 
the  payment  over  a  long  term,  from  ten  months  to 
ten  years,  but  Colonel  Neale  insisted  that  six  weeks 
was  the  maximum  time  allowance.  This  declaration 
was  accepted  by  the  governors  for  foreign  affairs  on 
June  8  and  approved  by  the  three  members  of  the 

«»  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  pp.  64-66. 


270  EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED 

Roju  on  the  nth,  and  the  formal  agreement  was  signed 
on  the  I4th,  calling  for  a  first  payment  of  $140,000 
(Mex.)  on  June  18,  and  $50,000  weekly  thereafter, 
the  last  payment  being  due  on  July  3O.50  It  should  be 
noted  that  this  agreement  was  signed  after  word  of 
the  decision  to  expel  foreigners  on  the  24th  must  have 
reached  Yedo,  and  with  the  approval  of  the  Lord  of 
Mito,  who  had  been  sent  up  to  "  expel  totally  the 
foreigners,  and  sweep  them  away  as  it  were  with  a 
broom."51 

The  news  which  had  come  up  from  Kyoto,  of  the 
decision  to  expel  foreigners  and  the  appointment  of 
Mito  for  that  purpose,  caused  Mr.  Pruyn,  for  the  first 
time,  to  feel  the  necessity  for  an  American  naval  force 
in  Japanese  waters.  His  opinions  on  this  question 
had  undergone  a  great  change.  Just  as  the  presence 
of  Perry's  formidable  fleet  had  opened  Japan,  so,  he 
felt,  "  it  is  both  natural  and  undeniable  that  the  same 
means  must  be  relied  on,  for  some  time  at  least,  to 
preserve  to  the  world  what  has  thus  been  gained."52 
It  was  in  his  opinion  the  presence  of  ships  of  the 
United  States,  France,  and  Holland,  as  well  as  of 
Great  Britain,  which  doubtless  caused  the  Japanese  to 

60  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  pp.  67-69. 

51  On  June  9  the  governor  of  Yedo  had  warned  the  inhabi 
tants    that  negotiations    regarding   the   closing   of   the   ports 
would  soon  be  opened  and  war  might  result.    He  urged  the 
preservation  of  order  (ibid.,  68). 

52  June  16.    For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1104-1106. 


EXCLUSION  AGAIN  DECREED          271 

abandon  or  at  least  to  suspend  the  expulsion  decrees, 
and  he  recommended  to  Mr.  Seward  that  the  treaty 
powers  combine  to  maintain  a  permanent  fleet  in  Japan 
for  some  time.  At  that  date  he  felt  relieved  because 
the  promise  to  pay  the  indemnity  seemed  to  mark  a 
change  in  the  policy  of  Mito,  hitherto  so  hostile  to 
foreigners.  If  his  change  in  policy  was  approved  by 
the  Mikado  and  the  hostile  party,  all  would  be  well ; 
out  if  the  latter  reestablished  their  influence  over  the 
Mikado  or  insisted  that  a  more  vigorous  agent  be  ap 
pointed  to  carry  out  the  "  exterminating  war,"  or  if  the 
fleet  should  be  withdrawn,  the  foreigners  might  be 
overwhelmed. 

When  they  agreed  to  pay  the  indemnities  the  Yedo 
officials  took  up  the  question  of  Satsuma,  and,  after 
explaining  anew  the  difficulties  of  the  situation,  offered 
to  pay  the  £25,000  demanded  of  that  daimyo  at  once 
and  to  postpone  the  arrest  and  punishment  of  the 
murderers.53  This  offer  Colonel  Neale  refused  to 
consider,  and  while  the  negotiations  proceeded,  he  was 
amazed  to  receive  on  the  I7th,  the  day  before  the  first 
payment  of  the  indemnity  was  due,  a  statement  to  the 
effect  that  the  money  would  not  be  paid  the  next  day. 
An  explanation  was  offered,  on  the  2Oth,  to  the  effect 
that  an  order  had  been  received  from  the  Mikado  not 
to  pay  the  indemnity,  and  that  this  must  be  obeyed 
"in  the  first  place,  because  it  emanated  from  the 

53  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  70. 


272  EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED 

Mikado,  and  secondly,  because  they  feared  an  out 
burst  of  public  indignation  if  not  complied  with;  also, 
if  not  carried  out,  the  Tycoon  might  have  to  pay  for 
it  with  his  life."54 

Colonel  Neale  had  now  no  alternative  but  to  place 
the  matter  in  the  admiral's  hands  on  the  2Oth,  and  to 
request  him  to  adopt  "prompt  coercive  measures  of 
reprisal."55  But  on  that  day  the  French  minister 
learned  the  real  situation, — that  the  Yedo  authorities 
had  received  orders  from  the  Tycoon  for  the  expul 
sion  of  the  foreigners.  Mr.  Pruyn  at  once  sent  for 
the  governors  for  foreign  affairs,  and  when  one  ap 
peared  the  next  day,  he  asked  why  he  had  not  been 
informed  of  this  important  decision.  The  answer  was 
that  although  the  orders  had  been  received,  the  Yedo 
authorities  proposed  to  disregard  them. 

R*  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  71.  At  an  interview  between  the 
governor  of  Kanagawa  and  the  consular  corps  the  former 
stated  that  the  Tycoon  had  been  willing  to  pay  the  indemnity 
and  that  he  had  so  ordered  before  he  left  Yedo,  but  that  he 
would  lose  his  life  if  he  paid  now.  The  governor  also  twice 
affirmed  that  the  Tycoon  did  not  leave  Yedo  until  after  April 
6,  when  the  demand  was  presented.  This  was  hardly  possible. 
The  foreign  ministers  were  told  that  the  Tycoon  would  leave 
on  March  31.  He  arrived  in  Kyoto  on  April  21,  which  would 
hardly  have  been  time  enough  for  a  state  progress  if  he  left 
after  the  6th.  The  apparent  contradiction  was  due  either  to 
faulty  interpretation,  which  might  always  cause  difficulty,  or 
to  the  governor's  speaking  from  memory.  There  was  no  ap 
parent  reason  for  deceiving  the  consuls  on  this  point. 

65  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  73;  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1117. 


EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED  273 

They  were  not  disposed  to  reflect  the  wishes  and  views  of 
the  Tycoon;  that  the  Mikado  had  been  prejudiced  against  the 
foreigners  by  bad  men  at  Kioto,  that  he  had  given  such  orders ; 
that  the  Tycoon  was  obliged  to  obey  them,  or  he  would  lose 
his  office  and  life;  but  that  the  ministers  at  Yedo  knew  that 
the  orders  could  not  be  executed;  they  had  neither  ships-of- 
war  nor  arms  to  accomplish  this;  besides,  the  Tycoon  had 
made  the  treaties  and  wished  to  observe  them. 

Near  midnight  on  the  22d  Mr.  Pruyn  was  informed 
by  the  governor  of  Kanagawa  that  the  British  in 
demnity  would  be  paid  on  the  24th,  that  Ogasawara 
Dzushu-no-Kami,  the  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  who 
had  been  at  Kyoto  during  the  first  days  of  the  great 
conference,  would  go  up  there  again  for  the  purpose 
of  changing  the  hostile  views  of  the  Mikado,  and  that 
before  leaving  he  desired  to  see  all  the  foreign  repre 
sentatives  at  Yokohama.56  The  next  day  the  governor 
informed  the  French  minister,  who  in  turn  advised 
his  colleagues,  that  the  purpose  of  the  interview  was  to 
notify  them  that  orders  had  been  received  for  their 
expulsion  and  to  request  them  to  leave.  He  replied 
that  a  communication  of  such  importance  should  be 
reduced  to  writing,  and  in  fact  suggested  a  form,  which 
was  modified,  however,  by  the  Japanese.  The  French 
minister  was  given  to  understand  that  nothing  would 
be  done  pending  negotiations,  which  would  have  to 
cover  a  considerable  period  in  order  that  the  ministers 
might  receive  instructions  from  their  governments.  In 

56  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II, 


274  EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED 

other  words  the  Shogunate  was  going  to  consider  the 
fixed  date,  June  25,  to  refer  to  the  beginning  of  nego 
tiations  for  the  closing  of  the  ports,  rather  than  to  the 
actual  expulsion. 

By  five  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  24th  the  total 
indemnity  of  £110,000,  or  $440,000  (Mex.),  was  paid 
to  the  British  charge  and  hurriedly  transferred  to  the 
warships  in  the  harbor.57  Later  in  the  day  the  min 
ister,  Ogasawara,  arrived  on  the  Shogun's  steam-yacht 
Emperor,  and  shortly  afterwards  the  foreign  ministers 
received  a  communication  much  as  follows : 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  your  excellency  that  I  have  re 
ceived  full  powers  to  act  on  the  subject  herein  stated. 

I  have  received  orders  from  his  Majesty  the  Tycoon,  now 
residing  at  Kioto,  and  who  received  orders  from  the  Mikado 
to  cause  the  opened  ports  to  be  closed  and  the  foreigners  (sub 
jects)  of  the  treaty  powers  to  be  removed,  as  our  people  will 
have  no  intercourse  with  them ;  hence  negotiations  on  this 
subject  will  afterwards  take  place  with  your  excellency.58 

The  three  ministers  sent  immediate  replies,  for  no 
time  was  available  for  a  conference.  Although  they 
had  been  told  that  there  was  no  intention  of  enforcing 

57  A  satisfactory  written  apology  as  demanded  by  the  ulti 
matum  was  sent  by  the  Roju  on  July  3  (P.P.  1864,  Com.  66, 
p.  80). 

68  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1120.  Three  other  translations  in  P.P. 
1864,  Com.  66,  p.  74.  Mit'o  reported  to  the  Mikado  that  the 
Richardson  affair  and  the  closing  of  the  ports  should  not  be 
confused.  That  the  indemnity  should  be  paid  and  then  nego 
tiations  on  the  other  point  commenced,  see  Japan,  1853-64, 
p.  92. 


EXCLUSION    AGAIN   DECREED  275 

the  orders,  yet  they  felt  that  their  replies  should  deal 
with  the  written  notice  and  not  with  the  verbal  ex 
planations.  In  each  case,  therefore,  a  strong  reply, 
refusing  to  abandon  the  treaties,  was  returned.  Mr. 
Pruyn  stated :  "  A  solemn  treaty  has  been  made  by  , 
the  government  of  Japan  with  the  United  States  grant 
ing  to  its  citizens  the  liberty  to  reside  and  trade  at 
these  ports.  The  right  thus  acquired  will  not  be  sur 
rendered,  and  cannot  be  withdrawn.  Even  to  pro 
pose  such  a  measure  is  an  insult  to  my  country,  and 
equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war."  He  warned  the 
government  of  the  folly  of  attempting  to  carry  out 
such  a  course,  announced  that  life  and  property  of 
American  citizens  would  be  defended  to  the  last  ex 
tremity,  and  declared  that  the  government  would  be 
held  responsible  for  any  consequences  and  liable  for 
any  losses  which  might  result.59 

The  French  minister  asserted  that  the  proposal  was 
without  precedent  in  the  history  of  civilized  nations 
and  might  bring  some  chastisement  upon  those  who 
conceived  it;  in  the  meantime  he  entrusted  the  safety 
of  his  nationals  to  the  French  admiral,  who  would  take 
all  necessary  measures  by  land  or  by  sea  against  any 
one  violating  the  spirit  of  the  treaty.60  Colonel  Neale 
also  considered  the  indiscreet  communication  "un 
paralleled  in  the  history  of  all  nations,  civilized  or  un- 

59  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1121. 

60  Ibid.,  1123. 


276  EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED 

civilized,"  and,  in  fact,  "  a  declaration  of  war  by  Japan 
against  the  whole  of  the  treaty  powers,  and  the  con 
sequences  of  which,  if  not  at  once  arrested,  it  will 
have  speedily  to  expiate  by  the  severest  and  most 
merited  chastisement."61 

The  foreign  ministers,  therefore,  would  not  even 
discuss  the  right  of  the  Japanese  to  denounce  the 
treaties.  As  a  practical  proposition  their  attitude  was 
eminently  sound.  It  would  have  been  unfortunate  for 
Japan,  and  for  the  world,  if  the  treaty  powers  had 
consented  to  withdraw  from  Japan  and  permit  that 
country  to  retire  into  her  old  seclusion,  even  though 
for  only  a  few  years.  In  spite  of  temporary  disad 
vantages,  some  of  which  persisted  for  more  than  thirty 
years,  it  was  well  for  Japan  to  solve  the  problem  of 
how  to  take  her  place  in  the  great  family  of  nations. 
It  would  have  been  far  more  unfortunate  if  expulsion 
by  force  had  been  attempted,  with  its  resulting  war 
and  its  legacy  of  debt  and  sorrow  and  hate.  But  as 
a  matter  of  equity,  the  right  was  not  all  on  the  side 
of  the  treaty  powers.  If  the  choice  lay  between  de 
nunciation  of  the  treaties  and  civil  war,  who  would 
deny  the  right  of  the  Japanese  to  rid  themselves  of 
such  calamitous  engagements?  Also,  if  the  treaties 
had  been  ratified  by  the  de  facto  but  not  the  de  jure 
power,  could  their  sanctity  be  unqualifiedly  asserted? 
These  are  moot  points,  and  there  is  much  to  be  said 

"Ibid.,  1124. 


EXCLUSION   AGAIN    DECREED  277 

on  both  sides.  Finally,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
when  Perry  opened  the  doors  of  Japan,  the  message 
which  he  bore  contained  this  suggestion,  which  made 
a  deep  impression  at  the  time : 

If  your  imperial  majesty  is  not  satisfied  that  it  would  be 
safe  to  abrogate  the  ancient  laws  which  forbid  foreign  trade, 
they  might  be  suspended  for  five  or  ten  years,  so  as  to  try  the 
experiment.  If  it  does  not  prove  as  beneficial  as  was  hoped, 
the  ancient  laws  can  be  restored.  The  United  States  often 
limit  their  treaties  with  foreign  States  to  a  few  years,  and 
then  renew  them  or  not,  as  they  please.62 

If  ever  a  nation  is  justified  in  denouncing  its  treaty 
obligations,  surely  the  Japanese  were  justified  in  doing 
so  in  June  of  1863. 

Happily  the  question  was  not  going  to  be  pressed  at 
the  time.  Ogasawara  was  on  his  way  to  Kyoto  to 
convince  the  Mikado  of  the  futility  of  his  commands. 
Hitotsubashi,  the  regent,  reported  from  Yedo  that  the 
imperial  mandate  could  not  be  enforced,  and,  realiz 
ing  his  guilt  in  not  carrying  out  the  duty  of  expelling 
the  barbarians,  he  humbly  awaited  his  punishment 
and  begged  to  be  allowed  to  resign  his  present  office.63 
The  imperial  court  seethed  with  indignation  at  the 
"cowardly  and  temporizing  action"  of  the  Yedo  offi- 

62  Hawks,  I,  257.    This  provision  was  not  incorporated  in 
any  treaty.     The  Japanese  referred  to  it  in  an  interview  with 
Colonel  Neale  as  late  as  January  4,   1864  (P.P.  1865,  Com. 
57,  P.  5). 

63  Japan,    1853-64,   p.   93.    He   reached   Yedo   on   June   24 
(Heco,  I,  326). 

19 


278  EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED 

cials,  but  it  refused  to  allow  the  Shogun  to  return  to 
Yedo  in  spite  of  the  pleas  of  his  advisers  that  only 
through  his  presence  could  the  result  be  achieved. 

In  the  midst  of  this  period  of  uncertainty  and  con 
fusion  the  American  minister  made  the  one  positive 
contribution  toward  a  happy  solution  of  the  problems 
at  hand.  On  the  27th  of  June  Mr.  Pruyn  forwarded 
to  Mr.  Seward  a  despatch  of  weightiest  import.6*  His 
proposal  was  none  other  than  to  advocate  a  joint  naval 
demonstration,  as  suggested  by  Mr.  Seward  in  1861, 
designed  not  for  the  protection  of  the  treaty  ports,  but 
for  securing  the  ratification  of  the  treaties  by  the 
Mikado.  Until  that  was  obtained,  he  said,  the  public 
mind  of  the  country  will  not  be  quieted,  "  the  position 
of  foreigners  must  continue  precarious,  and  their  pres 
ence  occasion  intrigues,  and  perhaps  civil  war,  be 
cause  not  sanctioned  by  the  rightful  sovereign,  which 
the  Mikado  doubtless  is,  theoretically  and  practically, 
should  the  daimios  gather  around  him."  He  pointed 
out  how  this  was  to  be  accomplished,  by  making  a 
naval  demonstration  at  Osaka,  twenty  miles  fron. 
Kyoto,  backed,  if  necessary,  by  a  land  force  to  move 
on  Kyoto.  This  was  a  statesmanlike  proposition,  if 
the  powers  intended  to  insist  upon  the  maintenance  of 
the  existing  treaties,  and,  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge, 
Mr.  Pruyn  was  the  first  diplomat  to  adequately  realize 
the  importance  of  such  a  step.  He  not  only  pointed 

6*For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1125. 


EXCLUSION   AGAIN   DECREED  279 

out  what  should  be  done,  but  he  showed  exactly  how 
it  might  be,  and  later  was,  accomplished. 

To  arrange  such  a  demonstration  would  require 
reference  to  the  home  governments,  and,  even  if  they 
approved,  the  plan  could  not  be  carried  out  for  many 
months.  Before  the  proposal  was  framed,  however, 
an  event  occurred  in  far  western  Japan  which  was  to 
have  wide-reaching  effects. 


CHAPTER  IX 

CHOSHIU  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE 

The  alarming  news  which  reached  Yokohama  on 
the  nth  of  July  was  none  other  than  that  one  of  the 
great  daimyos,  Choshiu,  the  leader  of  the  anti-foreign 
faction,  had  taken  literally  the  Mikado's  order  for 
the  expulsion  of  the  foreigners,  which  set  the  date 
for  June  25,  and  had  fired  on  the  first  foreign  vessel 
which  tried  to  pass  through  the  Straits  of  Shimono- 
seki.1  This  vessel  was  the  little  American  steamer 
Pembroke,  which  was  en  route  from  Yokohama  to 
Shanghai,  and  the  attack  was  delivered  by  two  armed 
vessels  at  I  a.  m.  on  the  morning  of  June  26,  while 
she  lay  at  anchor  near  the  entrance  to  the  straits. 
Happily  no  lives  were  lost  and  little  damage  was  done, 
but  the  American  flag  had  been  fired  upon  by  a  foe 
which  carried  the  national  flag  of  Japan.2 

Mr.  Pruyn  learned  of  this  attack  on  the  evening  of 
the  nth,  first  from  a  governor  for  foreign  affairs, 
despatched  from  Yedo,  and  a  little  later  from  a  letter 
written  by  the  owners  at  Shanghai,  covering  an  affi- 

1For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1129-1137. 

2  One  of  the  vessels  carried  the  government  flag,  the  red 
sun  on  a  white  field,  whereas  when  the  Medusa  was  attacked 
later  the  Choshiu  flag  of  blue  and  white  was  used. 

280 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE  OFFENSIVE  28 1 

davit  and  a  request  for  $10,000  damages.3  Early  the 
next  day  he  sent  for  the  governor  and  learned  that 
the  vessels  belonged,  not  to  the  Shogun,  but  to  the 
Lord  of  Choshiu,  and  that  they  carried  the  govern 
ment  flag  in  disobedience  to  orders.  Mr.  Pruyn 
pointed  out  the  serious  nature  of  the  insult  to  the 
American  flag,  assured  the  governor  that  ample  satis 
faction  would  be  demanded,  and  said  that  he  would 
expect  to  receive  some  statement  from  the  Japanese 
government  concerning  this  serious  offence.  The 
governor  was  unwilling  to  approve  an  American  puni 
tive  expedition,  and  begged  that  Mr.  Pruyn  do  noth 
ing  until  the  Yedo  authorities  should  act.* 

At  this  time  there  happened  to  be  in  the  harbor  of 
Yokohama  the  American  steam  war  vessel,  Wyoming. 
Commander  McDougal  had  been  present  at  the  inter 
view  between  Mr.  Pruyn  and  the  governor,  and  he 
had  decided  that  the  proper  course  was  to  proceed  to 
Shimonoseki  and  seize  or  destroy  the  two  offending 
vessels.  In  this  decision  he  had  the  cordial  support 
of  the  American  minister,  for  the  following  reasons : 
If  the  outrage  were  not  promptly  punished  the  inac 
tion  would  be  attributed  either  to  fear  or  to  weak 
ness,  and  great  encouragement  would  be  given  to  the 
hostile  daimyos;  on  the  other  hand,  the  Shogun's 

8  The  damages  were  for  loss  of  time,  loss  of  freight  and 
passengers  through  not  being  able  to  visit  Nagasaki,  and  rec 
ompense  for  the  deadly  peril  to  which  the  crew  were  subjected. 

4Heco,  I,  335. 


282  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

government  would  no  doubt  welcome  any  punishment 
meted  out  to  the  leader  of  the  anti-Tycoon  and  anti- 
foreign  forces  which  would,  in  effect,  aid  it  in  its  at 
tempt  to  curb  the  opposing  faction ;  and  finally  it  was 
especially  important,  in  view  of  the  Civil  War  at 
home,  that  the  United  States  should  be  ready  to  pro 
tect  its  nationals,  lest  it  be  deemed  too  weak  to  do 
so.  It  was  felt  that  Choshiu  was  carrying  out,  in 
good  faith,  the  expulsion  edicts,  and  was  using  the 
national  flag  to  cover  his  proceedings.  "  His  acts,  if 
justified  by  the  government,  constituted  war;  if  dis 
avowed,  were  acts  of  piracy."5 

With  minister  and  commander  in  such  accord  and 
ready  to  assume  the  responsibility,  there  was  im 
mediate  action.  The  Wyoming  sailed  the  next  day, 
the  1 3th,  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  the  two  ves 
sels  and  delivering  them  to  the  Shogunate,8  but  with 
out  the  slightest  idea  that  Choshiu  would  fire  upon  an 
American  ship  of  war.7  But  that  aggressive  daimyo 
evidently  meant  business,  as  the  news  which  reached 
Yokohama  indicated.  On  July  8  the  little  French  steam 
gunboat  Kienchang  was  fired  upon  by  the  ships  and 
by  the  batteries  on  shore,  and  on  the  nth  the  Nether 
lands  steam  sloop  Medusa  was  attacked  and  replied 
vigorously.  News  of  these  attacks  reached  Yoko- 

5  Pruyn  to  Seward,  July  24,  1863  (For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1131). 

6  Ibid.,  1139. 

7  Heco,  I,  338.    Heco  accompanied  Commander  McDougal 
as  interpreter. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  283 

hama  on  the  I5th  and  i6th.  In  the  meantime  the 
Wyoming  had  reached  the  straits  on  the  i6th,  and  had 
been  fired  on  by  six  of  the  shore  batteries.  By  good 
seamanship  the  vessel  was  kept  close  in  to  the  bat 
teries,  and  most  of  their  shells  passed  over  her  deck. 
Commander  McDougal  steered  between  the  bark  and 
the  brig  on  the  one  side  and  the  steamer  on  the  other, 
receiving  from  and  delivering  broadsides  into  each 
ship,  and  succeeded  in  sinking  the  steamer  and  the 
brig.8  This  punishment  effected,  he  returned  to  Yoko 
hama,  having  lost  four  seamen  killed  and  seven 
wounded  (one  of  whom  died  later).  The  first  blow 
in  defence  of  treaty  rights  had  been  struck  by  the 
United  States. 

When  the  news  of  the  attack  on  the  Kienchang 
reached  Yokohama,  Admiral  Jaures  sailed  on  the  i6th, 
with  two  vessels,  for  Shimonoseki.  Arriving  there 
on  the  2oth,  he  landed  a  small  force  and  destroyed 

8  The  steamer  Lancefield,  renamed  Koshin  Maru,  had  been 
purchased  from  the  British  firm  of  Jardine,  Matheson  and 
Company  for  $115,000;  the  brig  Lanrick,  formerly  in  the 
opium  trade,  from  the  same  firm  for  $20,000;  and  the  bark 
had  been  built  in  Japan  (For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1133).  These 
values  are  stated  differently;  see  P.  P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  87, 
and  41  st  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Rept  No.  250.  The  Lancefield 
was  later  repaired  and  was  sold  to  an  American  firm  in  1865 
(40th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Mis.  Doc.  No.  52).  The  officers  and 
men  of  the  Wyoming  were  allowed  prize  money  for  the  de 
struction  of  "  hostile  vessels  in  the  Straits  of  Shimonoseki." 
See  Appendix. 


284  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE  OFFENSIVE 

one  of  the  batteries,  burned  a  small  village  and  caused 
other  destruction.9  Six  of  the  seven  batteries  were 
left  intact.  Happily  the  Kokura  clan,  on  the  south 
side  of  the  straits,  took  no  part  in  these  engagements, 
or  the  foreign  ships  would  have  suffered  greater  loss  ; 
but  for  this  neutrality  the  clan  was  sharply  censured 
by  the  Mikado.  In  spite  of  these  acts  of  reprisal  by 
the  American  and  French  ships  of  war,  the  Straits 
of  Shimonoseki  remained  closed,  nor  were  they  forced 
open  for  more  than  a  year. 

The  position  of  Choshiu  was  therefore  clear.  Act 
ing  upon  his  own  interpretation  of  the  imperial  order 
he  had  struck  the  first  blows  against  the  foreigners, 
blows  which,  in  his  opinion,  were  bound  to  involve  the 
hated  Shogunate  in  difficulties.  But  what  would  be 
the  attitude  of  the  Yedo  authorities,  and  what  fur- 


9  Mr.  Pruyn  wrote  to  Commander  McDougal  on  the 
begging  him  to  cooperate  with  Admiral  Jaures  in  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  batteries  (4ist  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Kept.  No.  250). 
This  letter,  apparently  sent  down  with  the  French  expedition, 
did  not  reach  McDougal.  Its  purpose  was  to  inform  him  that 
batteries  as  well  as  the  two  ships  had  fired  on  the  Kicnchang, 
and  that  even  if  the  ships  had  escaped  he  should  not  return 
"  without  vindicating  our  flag  and  taking  full  satisfaction  for 
the  outrages  upon  it."  On  the  20th  Admiral  Kuper  sent  a  vessel 
to  communicate  with  Admiral  Jaures  and  cooperate  with  him 
if  needed  (P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  84).  It  was  expected  that 
she  would  be  fired  upon  and  thus  all  four  of  the  leading 
treaty  powers  would  be  involved.  But  she  was  informed  that 
she  would  not  be  fired  upon  unless  she  fired  first,  —  a  hopeful 
sign  (Pruyn  MSS.,  August  3,  1863). 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  285 

ther  steps  would  the  aggrieved  powers  take?    These 
were  questions  of  immediate  interest. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Shogunate  this  blow, 
aimed  more  at  it  than  at  the  foreigners,  came  at  a 
most  unfortunate  period.  The  anti-foreign  party 
was  in  the  saddle  at  Kyoto,  and  the  Shogun  was  still 
detained  there,  almost  as  a  hostage  for  the  carrying 
out  of  the  expulsion  edicts.  The  British  indemnity 
crisis  had  just  been  passed  and  the  indemnity  paid, 
while  the  Satsuma  phase  of  that  complication  still 
loomed  threateningly.  And  the  treaty  powers  had 
flatly  refused  even  to  negotiate  regarding  the  closing 
of  the  open  ports.  At  such  a  time  the  opening  of 
hostilities  by  Choshiu  upon  the  flags  of  the  United 
States,  France,  and  Holland  might  easily  incite  the 
other  hostile  daimyos  and  precipitate  the  general  war 
which  the  Shogunate  had  so  long  tried  to  avoid. 
The  governors  for  foreign  affairs  had  promptly  dis 
avowed  the  actions  of  Choshiu,  and  had  promised 
that  the  government  would  investigate  the  circum 
stances  ;  but  on  July  23  Sakai  Hida-no-Kami,  a  vice- 
minister,  while  repeating  these  statements,  also  said 
that  if  it  were  found  that  Choshiu  acted  under  or 
ders  of  the  Mikado,  "the  Tycoon  would  be  com 
pelled  '  exteriorly '  to  approve  his  conduct,  but  that 
'  interiorly,'  of  course,  he  would  disapprove,  and  con 
tinue  the  friend  of  the  foreigners."10  In  other  words, 

"For.  Rel,  1863,  II,  H34- 


286  CHOSHIU    TAKES    THE   OFFENSIVE 

although  no  known  edict  could  justify  the  conduct 
of  Choshiu,  yet  the  Yedo  authorities  did  not  know 
what  secret  orders  might  have  issued  from  the  hos 
tile  court  of  Kyoto,  and,  just  as  in  the  matter  of 
closing  the  ports,  the  Shogun  might  have  to  endorse 
openly  a  course  which  he  really  disapproved. 

On  July  25  the  representatives  of  France,  the 
United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  the  Netherlands 
signed  a  memorandum  to  the  effect  that  it  was  neces 
sary,  for  the  maintenance  of  treaty  rights,  to  proceed 
immediately  to  the  reopening  of  the  inland  sea,  and 
therefore  expedient  to  request  the  naval  officers  to 
take  all  necessary  measures.11  It  was  agreed  also  to 
establish  a  combined  action  of  the  naval  and  mili 
tary  forces  available,  and  to  notify  the  Tycoon's  gov 
ernment  of  this  decision,  in  order  that  it  might  take 
the  requisite  measures  with  its  own  means,  and  thus 
render  it  unnecessary  for  the  agents  of  the  treaty 
powers  to  proceed  with  the  operations.  This  mem 
orandum,  marking  the  commencement  of  joint  action 
instead  of  Anglo-French  cooperation,  was  forwarded 
by  each  of  the  representatives  to  the  Japanese  min 
isters  for  foreign  affairs,  with  a  covering  letter  call 
ing  for  the  immediate  chastisement  of  Choshiu.12 
Mr.  Pruyn  even  intimated  that  the  treaty  powers 
might  have  to  pass  by  the  government  of  the  Tycoon 

"Ibid.,  1144. 

"  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  89. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  287 

and  address  themselves  directly  to  the  Mikado,  and 
"by  such  arguments  and  means  as  they  have  in  their 
power,  cause  him  to  give  indemnity  for  the  past  and 
security  for  the  future."13  Immediate  action,  either 
by  the  Shogunate  or  by  the  powers,  was  not,  how 
ever,  forthcoming. 

The  events  at  Shimonoseki  had  served  to  delay,  but 
not  to  prevent,  the  presentation  of  the  British  demands 
upon  Satsuma  for  the  murder  of  Richardson.  On 
July  15  Colonel  Neale  had  requested  Admiral  Kuper 
to  order  a  portion  of  the  squadron  to  proceed  to 
Kagoshima.14  So  quiet  were  affairs  at  Yokohama,  in 
spite  of  the  open  warfare  at  Shimonoseki,  that  the 
admiral  proposed  to  take  almost  all  his  squadron  to 
Satsuma,  leaving  only  three  vessels  behind.  On 
August  3  Neale  notified  the  Roju  that  within  three 
days  he  would  leave  for  Kagoshima,  and  suggested 
that  a  high  official  be  sent  with  the  squadron.  The 
Roju  at  once  replied  begging  that  the  expedition  be 
delayed ;  but  the  next  day  a  vice-minister  informed 
Neale  that  an  official  would  be  sent  in  one  of  the 
Tycoon's  steamers.  The  vessel  failed,  however,  to 
arrive  in  time.15 

The  British  squadron,  consisting  of  seven  vessels, 

"For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1146. 

14  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  82. 

15  An  officer  was  sent  in  the  Tycoon's  steamer  Emperor, 
but  was  delayed  and  arrived  after  the  attack  (P.P.  1865,  Com. 
57,  P.  68). 


288  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

left  Yokohama  on  August  6,  and  entered  the  Bay  of 
Kagoshima  on  the  evening  of  the  nth.16  The  next 
day  Colonel  Neale  delivered  his  letter  for  the  daimyo, 
which  had  been  written  on  April  Q.17  This  called  for 
the  immediate  acceptance  of  the  demands : 

First.  The  immediate  trial  and  execution,  in  the  presence 
of  one  or  more  of  Her  Majesty's  naval  officers,  of  the  chief 
perpetrators  of  the  murder  of  Mr.  Richardson,  and  of  the 
murderous  assault  upon  the  lady  and  gentleman  who  accom 
panied  him.  Second.  The  payment  of  £25,000  sterling,  to  be 
distributed  to  the  relations  of  the  murdered  man,  and  to  those 
who  escaped  with  their  lives  the  swords  of  the  assassins  on 
that  occasion. 

At  no  time  would  Colonel  Neale  or  the  admiral  land  in 
order  to  discuss  the  demands,  and  the  invitation  of  the 
Japanese  that  they  do  so  was  looked  upon  as  treachery. 
Finally,  on  the  I4th  a  written  reply  was  delivered  on 
board  the  flag-ship.18  This  letter,  signed  by  the 
minister  of  the  lord,  while  deprecating  the  murder  and 
asserting  that  the  assassins  had  escaped,  promised  that 
if  the  accused  were  taken  and  found  guilty  they  would 
be  executed  and  British  officers  would  be  invited  to  be 
present.  But  the  fault  lay  with  the  Shogunate,  it 
insisted,  in  failing  to  insert  in  the  treaties  the  ancient 
laws  of  the  land.19  This  question  should  be  decided 

16  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  pp.  90-92. 

17  Satsuma  had  been  notified  of  the  demands  long  since  by 
the  Yedo  authorities. 

18  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  95. 

19  See  Chapter  VII,  note  35. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE  OFFENSIVE  289 

between  the  Shogunate  and  Satsuma,--5ind  then  the 
money  indemnity  could  be  arranged.  The  letter  closed 
with  the  affirmation  that  "our  government  acts  in 
everything  according  to  the  orders  of  the  Yeddo 
Government." 

This  reply  was  considered  to  be  utterly  unsatis 
factory,  and  the  admiral  was  called  upon  to  resort  to 
such  preliminary  measures  of  coercion  as  might  bring 
the  daimyo  to  terms.  He  at  once  followed  out  the 
suggestion  in  Earl  Russell's  despatch  of  December  24, 
1862,  and  seized  three  small  steamers  belonging  to  the 
daimyo,  which  had  been  purchased  for  $300,000 
(Mex.),  with  the  intention  of  holding  them  until 
Satsuma  complied  with  the  demands.  The  immediate 
effect  was  what  might  have  been  expected.  Scarcely 
had  the  three  steamers  been  lashed  alongside  three  of 
the  British  ships  when  the  batteries  opened  fire  upon 
the  squadron,  "an  act  which,"  Admiral  Kuper  re 
ported,  "  it  became  necessary  immediately  to  resent, 
in  vindication  of  the  honour  of  the  flag,  and  as  a 
punishment  for  the  outrage."20  The  squadron  then 
engaged  the  batteries,  having  first  set  fire  to  the  cap 
tured  ships.  A  storm  was  brewing,  which  rose  to  a 
typhoon  during  the  night,  so  that  the  fires  started  by 
the  shells  swept  over  the  town  and  destroyed  half  of 
it,  as  well  as  an  arsenal,  a  gun  foundry,  and  five  large 
Loo-Choo  junks.  The  next  day  the  action  was  re- 

20  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  97- 


2QO  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

newed;  a  temple,  mistaken  for  the  palace  of  the 
daimyo,21  was  shelled,  and  the  entire  town  was  be 
lieved  to  be  in  ruins.  As  "every  act  of  retribution 
and  punishment  within  the  scope  of  operations  of  a 
small  naval  force"  had  been  accomplished,  the  squad 
ron  returned  to  Yokohama,  having  lost  fifty-six  officers 
and  men  killed  or  wounded.22 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Colonel  Neale  con 
sidered  that  he  had  now  carried  out  "  in  letter  and  in 
spirit "  the  onerous  instructions  of  last  September  con 
cerning  the  Richardson  affair.23  The  damage  wrought 
at  Kagoshima,  in  his  opinion,  covered  the  demands 
made  upon  Satsuma.  On  his  return  to  Yokohama, 
however,  he  advised  the  ministers  for  foreign  affairs 
that  Satsuma  had  stated  that  it  could  do  nothing 
toward  complying  with  the  demands  until  it  had  re 
ceived  orders  from  the  Tycoon's  government,  and  he 
requested  them  to  take  the  necessary  steps  lest  he  be 

21  Adams,  I,  327. 

22  The  Japanese  historian  (Japan,  1853-64,  p.  105),  after  de 
scribing  this  action,  states :  "  The  land  and  sea  strove  together 
like  a  couple  of  bulls,  until  the  robber  vessels,  unable  to  en 
dure  it  any  longer,  were  entirely  defeated,  and  fled  in  disorder 
to  the  ocean.     When  these  affairs  were  reported  to  the  Im 
perial  Court,  letters  of  approval  were  sent  to  the  clans  of  Sat 
suma  and  Choshiu."     Captain  St.  John,  who  was  present  at 
the  action,  wrote :  "  The  result  of  our  attack  on  Kagoshima 
was  to  induce  the  Prince  of  Satsuma  to  grant  our  demands. 
He  evidently  was  not  aware  how  he  had  really  driven  us  off  " 
(206). 

23  August  26.    P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  92. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  29! 

compelled  "to  engage  the  Admiral  again  to  proceed 
with  his  fleet  to  the  territory  of  Satsuma,  and  con 
tinue,  much  against  our  desire,  the  hostilities  which 
have  momentarily  been  suspended  in  order  that  the 
Tycoon's  Government  should  again  have  the  oppor 
tunity  of  satisfactorily  terminated  [sic]  this  matter."24 
Here  the  dispute  rested  for  more  than  two  months, 
with  occasional  queries  from  Colonel  Neale.  Early 
in  November  two  envoys  arrived  in  Yokohama  from 
Satsuma.  After  three  days  of  discussion  they  agreed 
on  the  1 6th  to  pay  the  indemnity  of  £25,000  and  to 
give  a  written  engagement  to  continue  the  search  for 
the  assassins  and  to  punish  them  when  discovered.25 
After  some  delay  the  money,  in  the  shape  of  $100,- 
ooo  (Mex.),  was  duly  paid  on  December  n,  the 
written  promise  was  delivered,  and  Colonel  Neale 
agreed  to  use  his  good  offices  toward  the  purchase  by 
Satsuma  of  a  ship  of  war  in  England.26 

The  "Kagoshima  affair"  is  considered  by  all  his 
torians  to  be  the  cause  of  the  sudden  change  of  front 
of  Satsuma,  from  leadership  in  the  anti-foreign  faction 
to  an  appreciation  of  the  strength  of  the  foreigners  and 
the  futility  of  trying  to  expel  them.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  men  at  Kagoshima  learned  a  remarkable 
lesson,  and  it  is  to  their  credit  that  they  did  not  need 

24  September  24.    Ibid.,  no. 

25  Ibid.,  116. 

26  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66  (3303),  PP.  i-7. 


292  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

to  have  it  repeated.  But  Satsuma  had  not  been 
rabidly  anti-foreign.  The  presence  of  steamships, 
shipyards,  foundries,  modern  fortifications,  are  proof 
of  that.  Although  at  this  time,  for  other  reasons, 
there  was  a  brief  conciliation  between  Satsuma  and 
the  Shogunate,  it  soon  came  to  an  end,  and  this 
haughty  western  clan  realized  that  it  could  oppose  the 
Shogunate  with  other  and  better  weapons  than  un 
reasoned  hostility  to  foreigners.27 

In  order  to  follow  through  the  Kagoshima  affair, 
events  as  late  as  December,  1863,  have  been  discussed. 
It  will  now  be  of  service  to  turn  back  and  endeavor  to 
follow  the  developments  at  Kyoto,  which  was,  when 
last  under  consideration,  the  center  of  a  determined 
anti-foreign  agitation.  The  date  for  the  expulsion  had 
been  fixed  for  June  25,  and  the  Shogun  was  detained 

27  The  action  at  Kagoshima  was  the  subject  of  an  extended 
debate  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  February  9,  1864,  result 
ing  in  the  defeat  of  a  resolution  expressing  regret  for  the 
burning  of  the  town  contrary  to  the  usages  of  war  among 
civilized  nations  (Hansard,  3d  ser.,  vol.  173,  pp.  335-422). 
Regret  was  expressed  in  the  Royal  Speech  at  the  opening  of 
Parliament,  on  February  4,  1864  (ibid.,  4).  It  is  interesting 
to  note  that  after  these  criticisms  Colonel  Neale,  who  had 
reported  the  damage  as  amounting  to  £1,000,000  and  1500 
casualties  (November  17,  1863),  later  reported  (January  16, 
1864)  that  the  inhabitants  had  retired  from  the  town  before 
the  attack,  and  that  the  damage,  caused  by  the  typhoon  rather 
than  by  the  squadron,  was  slight.  The  assassin  of  Richardson 
was  never  punished,  although  in  later  years  he  was  well  known 
(Michie,  II,  56). 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  293 

in  Kyoto  practically  as  a  hostage.  At  about  the  same 
time  came  the  news,  from  Yedo,  that  the  British  in 
demnity  had  been  paid,  and  from  Choshiu  that  the  first 
shots  had  been  fired  at  the  foreigners.  The  former 
was  received  with  indignation,  and  the  latter  with  loud 
acclaim. 

Just  about  this  time,  July  4,  a  high  court  noble  was 
murdered  in  Kyoto  by  three  Satsuma  samurai.  This 
deed  moderated  the  admiration  of  the  court  for  that 
clan,  and  it  was  removed  from  its  honorable  post  of 
guardian  of  the  Inui  gate  of  the  palace.28 

At  Yedo  there  was  much  alarm  because  of  the  en 
forced  residence  of  the  Shogun  at  Kyoto.  It  was 
commonly  reported  that  he  would  be  deposed,  and 
perhaps  put  to  death.  He  had  gone  up  to  the  court  in 
April,  intending  to  stay  for  ten  days  at  the  most ;  now, 
almost  three  months  had  passed.  It  was  determined 
to  rescue  him  by  force,  if  necessary,  and  an  attempt 
was  made  to  secure  the  loan  of  some  of  the  foreign 
war-ships  at  Yokohama  as  transports.29  When  the 
representatives  of  the  United  States,  France,  and 
England  refused  to  allow  their  national  vessels  to  sail 
under  the  Japanese  flag  (although  Mr.  Pruyn  offered 
the  services  of  the  Wyoming  to  bring  the  Shogun  back 
by  sea),  several  British  merchant  vessels  were  char 
tered.  Loaded  with  troops,  and  commanded  by  Oga- 

28  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  96. 
2»  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1131. 

20 


294  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

sawara  Dzusho-no-Kami,  the  most  active  member  of 
the  Roju,  they  proceeded  to  Osaka.30  This  resolute 
proceeding  was  successful,  without  the  use  of  arms, 
and  the  Shogun  was  able  to  leave  Osaka  by  sea  on 
July  24.  But  Ogasawara  suffered  for  his  loyalty,  and 
for  having  paid  the  British  indemnity,  and  at  the 
demand  of  the  court  he  was  punished  by  the  Shogun, 
being  deprived  of  his  title  and  honors  and  confined  in 
the  castle  of  Osaka.31 

So  far,  to  the  disgust  of  the  court,  the  Yedo  authori 
ties  had  done  nothing  toward  expelling  the  foreigners 
save  to  give  notice  of  future  negotiations.  At  Kyoto 
another  imperial  edict  urging  action  and  citing  the 
example  of  Choshiu  was  issued.32  A  court  noble, 
escorted  by  troops  from  western  clans,  proceeded  to 
Choshiu  as  an  imperial  visitor.  Another  noble  was 
sent  to  Yedo  to  warn  the  Shogun  that  his  delay  in 
expelling  the  barbarians  was  most  improper,  while  in 

30  Left  Yokohama  on  July  n  and  13.    Other  troops  left  on 
the  23d. 

31  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  100.     For  an  entirely  erroneous  survey 
of  these  events,  but  the  best  information  then  available  to 
the  foreign  representatives,  see  Pruyn  to  Seward,  September 
28,  1863,  in  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  447-479,  in  which  it  is  stated 
that  a  conspiracy  existed  to  depose  and  assassinate  the  Shogun 
and  place  Hitotsubashi  in  his  stead.     Ogasawara  was  said  to 
have  been  at  the  head  of  this  conspiracy  and  to  have  been  pun 
ished  on  its  discovery.     It  was  even  said  that  the  old  Prince 
of  Mito,  who  died  in  1861,  was  believed  to  be  at  the  bottom 
of  it. 

32  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  100. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  295 

September  others  were  sent  to  visit  some  of  the  coast 
daimyos.33  The  court  was  in  earnest  in  its  anti- 
foreign  campaign,  even  if  the  Shogunate  was  not. 

In  order  to  strengthen  its  weakened  prestige,  the 
Bakufu  determined  to  send  envoys  of  its  own  to  some 
of  the  western  clans,  and  also  to  investigate  the  attacks 
on  foreign  vessels  at  Shimonoseki.  On  September  8 
the  Shogun's  ship,  Choyo  Maru,  was  fired  on  by  the 
Choshiu  forts,  and  two  of  the  envoys,  who  were  com 
pelled  to  land,  were  assassinated  by  ronins.  And  yet, 
in  spite  of  this  direct  insult,  the  Shogunate  felt  itself 
too  weak  to  strike  at  its  open  foe.3* 

Meanwhile  the  prestige  of  the  court  steadily  in 
creased.  The  daimyos  continued  to  flock  into  Kyoto, 
and  many  of  them,  great  and  small — more  than  a  hun 
dred,  it  is  said — built  residences  there  or  enlarged 
their  old  sites,  so  that  the  town  was  full  of  troops. 
Never  had  it  been  so  prosperous.35  The  victories  re 
ported  by  Choshiu  and  Satsuma  over  the  foreigners 
were  welcomed  by  the  court,  and  letters  of  approval 
were  sent  to  the  clans.  But  the  Yedo  authorities  at 
the  same  time  sent  out  a  warning  to  the  daimyos  not 
to  proceed  to  hostilities  until  all  efforts  at  negotiation 
had  failed.36 

With  the  announcement  of  this  temperate  advice, 

33  August  14.    Ibid.,  101. 

34  Japan,  1853-64,  pp.  102-103. 
85  Ibid.,  104. 

36  Ibid.,  106. 


296  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE  OFFENSIVE 

the  hotheads  were  more  than  ever  convinced  that  noth 
ing  could  be  expected  of  the  weakling  Yedo  adminis 
tration,  and  the  cry  arose  that  the  Mikado  should  take 
the  field  in  person  in  the  Phoenix  Car.  In  Kyoto  the 
ronins  struck  down  "  traitorous "  officials  and  trades 
men  with  impunity.  The  court,  now  completely  under 
the  influence  of  the  Choshiu  party,  approved  of  the 
proposal  that  the  Mikado  take  the  field ;  a  military 
review  was  held  in  his  presence  on  August  18 ;  a  week 
later  it  was  announced  that  he  would  visit  the  shrines 
in  Yamato  and  at  Ise  before  undertaking  the  expul 
sion  campaign  in  person ;  and  on  the  27th  the  prince  of 
the  blood,  Arisugawa,  was  appointed  generalissimo.37 
At  this  time  a  band  of  ronins,  led  by  a  former  court 
noble,  took  the  offensive  in  Yamato,  attacking  a 
Shogunate  revenue  office  there,  and  proclaiming  them 
selves  the  vanguard  of  the  Emperor's  army.  Evi 
dently  the  anti-foreign  forces  had  gathered  over 
whelming  strength. 

It  was,  indeed,  the  high  water-mark  of  the  exclu- 
sionist  agitation.  Never  again  was  it  so  near  achieve 
ment.  When  its  prospects  seemed  most  fair,  suddenly 
they  were  blighted.  On  September  30  a  coup  d'etat 
was  executed  in  Kyoto  which  destroyed  for  several 
years  the  influence  of  Choshiu  and  weakened  the  anti- 
foreign  party.  The  enemies  of  the  clan — and  there 
were  many  among  the  Tokugawa  officials  and  court 

37  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  107. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  2Q7 

nobles — charged  it  with  planning  to  seize  the  person 
of  the  Mikado  when  he  visited  the  shrines  of  Yamato, 
and  thus  to  become  dictator  of  the  Empire.38  The 
palace  revolution  was  successfully  carried  through. 
The  Choshiu  forces  were  expelled  from  the  city,  and 
seven  court  nobles  of  high  rank,  who  were  accused  of 
furthering  the  designs  of  the  clan,  retired  with  them. 
Satsuma  troops  were  restored  to  their  guardianship  of 
one  of  the  palace  gates,  the  act  marking  a  breach 
between  the  two  powerful  anti-foreign  clans.  This 
coup  d'etat,  however,  was  based  upon  internal  rather 
than  foreign  affairs.  The  Mikado  announced  during 
the  confusion  that  his  personal  campaign  was  only 
postponed,  and  on  October  I  the  clans  were  instructed 
to  expel  the  barbarians  at  once,  without  further  orders 
from  the  Shogunate.39 

But  without  the  aggressive  leadership  of  Choshiu 
the  anti-foreign  campaign  lacked  vigor.  The  Shogu 
nate  officials  in  Kyoto,  regaining  their  courage,  now 
began  to  punish  the  hitherto  swaggering  ronins,  and 
many  of  the  latter  fled  to  Choshiu  or  joined  maraud 
ing  bands  in  the  provinces.  As  the  Japanese  historian 
says :  "  From  this  time  the  scheme  of  expelling  the 
barbarians  fell  to  pieces  like  ice  during  a  thaw,  and  the 
prestige  which  had  accrued  to  the  Imperial  Court 
seemed  to  be  lessened  again  by  its  own  acts."40  In 

38  Japan,  1853-64,  110-118;  Japan,  1853-69,  pp.  45-46. 

39  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  118. 
*°  Ibid.,  121. 


298  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

the  meantime  Choshiu  made  repeated  efforts  to  win 
pardon  for  itself  and  for  the  seven  kuge,  but  the 
Mikado  was  obdurate.  The  rising  influence  of  the 
Shogunate  was  evident  in  a  new  imperial  edict,  very 
different  from  those  which  had  gone  before,  to  the 
effect  that  as  the  Shogunate  was  engaged  in  negotia 
tions  for  the  closing  of  the  ports,  its  directions  were 
to  be  followed  in  all  things,  and  no  rash  or  violent 
actions  should  be  committed.41  This  development  at 
Kyoto  explains  what  otherwise  seemed  inexplicable  at 
Yokohama. 

In  spite  of  all  the  expulsion  edicts  which  were 
known  to  the  foreigners — and  the  many  others  of 
which  they  had  no  inkling — the  community  at  Yoko 
hama  did  not  consider  the  situation  by  any  means 
desperate.  To  be  sure,  Mr.  Pruyn,  in  a  despatch  of 
July  24  describing  the  Shimonoseki  operations,  very 
correctly  stated :  "  The  current  is  now  setting  strongly 
against  us,"42  because  he  feared  the  ministers  at  Yedo 
might  be  overawed  by  the  hostile  daimyos.  In  spite 
of  all  that  had  happened,  he  never  failed  to  express 
his  great  sympathy  with  the  government  in  its  troubles ; 
and  although  entire  harmony  existed  among  the  four 
foreign  representatives  he  would  act  with  them  only 
if  they  would  not  go  too  far.43  Within  a  few  days 

41  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  128. 

42  For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1134. 

43  Ibid.,  1135;  Pruyn  MSS.,  July  22. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  299 

this  alarm  subsided,  as  was  evident  from  the  departure 
of  almost  the  entire  British  fleet  to  press  the  demands 
against  Satsuma.  A  private  letter  of  Mr.  Pruyn  at 
this  time  gives  a  good  idea  of  the  situation  at  Yoko 
hama  : 

I  received  yesterday  a  letter  which  Mr.  Browne  is  translat 
ing  said  to  be  a  summons  from  the  Tycoon  to  some  of  the 
most  powerful  Daimios  to  meet  him  at  Yedo  to  arrange  for 
the  expulsion  of  foreigners.  He  is  now  free  from  actual 
restraint,  whether  this  movement  is  serious  or  not  we  cannot 
even  anticipate.  The  rulers  of  Japan  are  performing  a  play 
on  a  grand  stage,  which  is  farce,  comedy  and  tragedy  inter 
mingled.  We  cannot  tell  until  the  curtain  falls  and  the  actors 
walk  the  streets  of  everyday  life,  which  will  predominate. 
All  we  can  now  do  is  to  watch  the  motions  and  guess  which 
is  the  prevailing  tone.  The  faces  are  masked  and  no  feature 
or  emotion  betrays  the  real  feeling.  We  have  all  kinds  of 
rumours  to  which  I  have  learned  to  pay  no  attention  and  all 
kinds  of  speculation  to  which  I  never  attribute  any  value. 
Meanwhile  everything  goes  on  merry  as  a  marriage  bell  and 
the  disinterested  observer,  neither  blinded  by  interest  or  led 
away  by  feeling  would  be  inclined  to  laugh  at  the  idea  of 
danger.  We  have  business  and  pleasure  flowing  freely  in 
their  accustomed  and  almost  well-worn  channels — everything 
seen  almost  in  palpable  open  conflict  with  what  is  heard.  We 
have  no  marrying  and  giving  in  marriage  because  there  is  no 
raw  material,  but  with  that  exception  we  are  as  unconcerned 
as  the  antediluvians  and  yet  a  storm  may  come  here  as  sud 
denly  and  out  of  as  clear  a  sky.44 

So,  although  the  closing  of  the  ports  was  manda 
tory,  yet  commerce  prospered,  and  a  boom  in  land 
values  at  Yokohama  occurred  just  about  the  time  of 

44  Pruyn  MSS.,  August  3. 


300  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

the  Kagoshima  affair  !45  Mr.  Pruyn  then  believed  the 
Shimonoseki  difficulty  would  'be  settled  by  the  Shogu- 
nate,  though  perhaps  not  speedily  enough,  and  early 
in  September  he  believed  it  would  be  quite  safe  for 
him  to  take  up  his  residence  again  at  Yedo  and  pur 
posed  to  do  so  as  soon  as  his  quarters  were  ready. 
In  the  meantime  the  representatives  awaited  instruc 
tions  from  their  governments  as  to  the  course  to 
pursue  toward  Choshiu. 

This  calm  merely  preceded  another  storm,  one  not 
so  violent,  however,  as  those  which  had  gone  before. 
On  October  14  occurred  another  unprovoked  murder 
of  a  European  near  Kanagawa.  This  time  it  was  a 
French  officer,  Lieutenant  Camus,  of  the  3d  battalion 
of  the  Chasseurs  d'Afrique,  who,  while  riding  alone, 
was  cut  down  by  three  two-sword  men.46  Great  was 
the  indignation;  but  it  was  now  realized  that  little 
could  be  done  except  to  demand  of  the  Tycoon's  gov 
ernment  that  it  run  down  and  punish  the  offenders. 
The  drastic  demands  based  on  the  Richardson  affair 
were  not  repeated,  nor  was  it  now  considered  wise  or 
proper  to  hold  the  Shogun's  government  responsible 
for  the  murderous  acts  of  private  fanatics.  Another 
phase  of  the  renewed  ronin  activity  was  the  pressure 
which  these  outlaws  exerted  to  stop  the  commerce  of 
Yokohama,  this  time  striking  at  the  source  by  in- 

45  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66  (3242),  p.  101 ;  Heco,  II,  11. 
"For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  450;  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  no. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  3OI 

timidating  the  merchants  of  the  interior  who  were 
shipping  goods  to  the  seaport.  Under  these  circum 
stances  the  Roju  begged  Mr.  Pruyn  not  to  return  to 
Yedo. 

A  few  days  later  Mr.  Pruyn  and  Mr.  van  Polsbroek, 
the  Netherlands  consul-general,  proceeded  to  Yedo  in 
response  to  an  urgent  invitation  of  the  ministers  for 
foreign  affairs.  The  interview  was  held  on  October 
26,  and  its  purpose  was  to  request  the  foreign  repre 
sentatives  to  ask  their  governments  to  consent  to  the 
closing  of  Yokohama  and  to  have  the  trade  transferred 
to  Nagasaki  and  Hakodate,  while  the  notification  of 
Ogasawara  that  the  foreigners  would  be  entirely  ex 
pelled  would  be  withdrawn.47  The  reasons  for  this 
request  were  stated  as  follows: 

The  unsettled  state  of  things  in  our  realm  is  increasing. 
We  are  apparently  approaching  a  revolution ;  there  may  be  a 
general  uprising  among  the  people  who  hate  foreigners,  and 
to  our  shame  we  must  confess  that  we  have  no  power  to  sup 
press  this  insurrectionary  movement. 

It  is  principally  owing  to  the  opening  to  trade  of  Yokohama 
that  this  deplorable  state  of  things  exists. 

If  a  continuance  of  trade  at  Yokohama  be  persisted  in,  the 
state  of  affairs  will  grow  worse.  Trade  will  suffer,  and  no 
doubt  disappear  in  consequence,  and  then  the  friendship  will 
be  destroyed.  It  was  to  establish  friendly  relations  that  the 
treaties  were  made,  as  may  be  seen  in  the  heading  of  each 
of  them.  Friendship  is  the  corner-stone ;  trade  is  subordinate 
to  friendship.  We  have  always  considered  that  the  framers 
of  the  treaty  intended  it  as  an  experiment,  to  last  as  long  as 

«'•  For.  Rel,  1864,  III,  450-456. 


3O2  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

it  would  not  prove  injurious  to  Japan.  In  order  to  perpetuate 
this  friendship,  it  is  of  the  highest'  mutual  interest  that  the 
port  of  Yokohama  be  closed  to  trade,  and,  in  our  opinion,  this 
is  the  only  way  to  allay  the  prevailing  excitement. 

There  was,  of  course,  a  great  measure  of  truth  in 
this  exposition ;  and  yet,  as  events  proved,  there  were 
other  ways  of  quieting  the  agitation  than  by  closing 
Yokohama.  The  request  itself,  so  much  less  drastic 
than  that  presented  four  months  ago,  marked  a  lessen 
ing  of  the  anti-foreign  pressure  at  Kyoto ;  and  it  must 
be  remembered  also  that  the  anti-Choshiu  coup  d'etat 
had  occurred  on  September  30.  This  new  proposal 
was  presented  to  the  American  and  Netherlands  repre 
sentatives  first  because  the  first  treaties  had  been  made 
with  them,  but  also,  no  doubt,  because  it  was  felt  that 
they  would  be  more  apt  to  accept  it  than  their  col 
leagues  of  Great  Britain  and  France.  But  on  this 
point  there  was  no  illusion.  Mr.  Pruyn  and  Mr.  van 
Polsbroek  both  assured  the  ministers  that  they  were 
convinced  that  the  treaty  powers  would  never  consent 
to  the  closing  of  Yokohama  to  trade,  nor  could  they 
themselves  enter  into  any  negotiations.  They  further 
said  "that  the  treaties  were  never  meant  to  be  ex 
periments,  but  that  it  is  explicitly  stated  that  they  were 
made  to  perpetuate  friendship  and  commerce  between 
our  respective  governments  and  their  citizens  and  sub 
jects,"  and  they  refused  to  withhold  the  proposal  from 
their  colleagues. 

When,  the  next  day,  a  similar  invitation  was  ex- 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  303 

tended  to  all  the  ministers  to  visit  Yedo,  they  refused 
either  to  go  there  or  to  receive  at  Yokohama  any 
envoys  charged  with  such  a  communication.  The 
most  they  would  agree  to  do  was  to  forward  the  pro 
posal  to  their  respective  governments.  Colonel  Neale, 
in  addition,  warned  the  Roju  that  any  hostile  acts  by 
the  government  or  by  any  daimyo  would  be  resented 
by  corresponding  acts  of  retribution,48  while  Mr.  Pruyn 
took  the  opportunity  to  repeat  his  friendly  advice : 

Let  it  be  at  once  proclaimed  that  his  Majesty  the  Tycoon 
will  faithfully  observe  the  existing  treaties  and  require  his 
subjects  to  do  the  same.  Peace  in  Japan  will  be  secured  by 
such  an  exhibition  of  good  faith  and  vigor.  A  contrary 
course  invites  to  a  resistance  of  the  authority  of  the  Tycoon. 
It  holds  out  expectations  which  will  never  be  realized,  while 
it  encourages  a  defiance  of  his  authority  which  may  subject 
him  to  the  twofold  danger  of  a  civil  war  and  of  serious  diffi 
culties  with  all  the  treaty  powers. 

This  advice  called  for  too  strong  a  policy  for  the 
weak  and  temporizing  Yedo  officials  to  adopt  at  this 
juncture.  One  valued  suggestion  of  the  American 
minister  was  accepted.  He  had  twice  urged  the  Roju 
to  withdraw  the  expulsion  letter  presented  by  Oga- 
sawara  on  June  24,  on  the  ground  that  it  might  be 
considered  by  the  treaty  powers  as  the  equivalent  of  a 
declaration  of  war  and  hence  render  Japan  liable  for 
all  the  expenses  incurred  by  them  in  protecting  their 
interests,  and  also  on  the  ground  that  it  announced  the 

48  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  114. 


304  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE  OFFENSIVE 

settled  policy  of  government  to  close  the  ports,  and 
thus  left  no  opportunity  for  negotiation  with  the 
powers.49  He  went  over  this  ground  again  with  three 
governors  for  foreign  affairs  on  November  9,  with 
such  conviction  that  the  Roju,  on  the  nth,  notified  all 
the  foreign  representatives  that  the  former  opinion  of 
the  government  had  been  changed  and  that  it  was 
desirable  that  the  letter  of  Ogasawara  be  returned.50 
This  change  in  policy  was  received  with  much  satis 
faction  by  all  the  foreign  representatives,  the  British 
charge  very  naturally  believing  that  the  pressure  ex 
erted  by  the  British  fleet  had  contributed  very  largely 
to  the  happy  result.51 

The  Shogunate,  however,  had  not  abandoned  their 
proposal  to  close  Yokohama,  and  they  doubtless 
reasoned  that  as  the  mission  in  1862  to  the  treaty 
powers  had  been  so  successful,  another  mission  might 
succeed  in  this  difficult  emergency.  On  November  30, 
therefore,  they  turned  first  to  the  American  minister 
and  asked  his  advice  as  to  how  such  a  mission  would 
be  received  in  Europe  and  the  United  States.  Mr. 
Pruyn  could  not  speak  for  the  European  states,  but  he 

«  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  45& 

°o  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  457. 

81  P.P.  1864,  Com.  66,  p.  115.  On  November  6  Admiral 
Kuper  notified  the  governor  of  Kanagawa  that  he  would  not 
permit  the  Japanese  to  erect  certain  projected  batteries  for 
the  defence  of  Yokohama,  and  they  were  in  consequence  given 
up  (ibid.,  114). 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  305 

could  say  that  in  the  United  States  their  proposals 
would  be  listened  to  patiently  and  would  be  carefully 
considered,  though  he  could  hold  out  no  hope  of 
success.52  Also,  at  their  request,  he  agreed  to  trans 
mit  any  communication  they  desired  to  the  govern 
ment  of  Russia,  which  at  that  time  had  no  minister 
in  Japan.  The  most  likely  explanation  of  this  move, 
to  Mr.  Pruyn,  was  that  government  sought  to  gain 
time,  as  it  had  failed  in  its  endeavors  to  commence 
negotiations  with  the  foreign  representatives  at 
Yokohama. 

Although  they  had  received  little  encouragement 
from  the  most  kindly  of  all  the  representatives,  the 
Japanese  still  pondered  over  the  new  mission.  Finally 
an  opportunity  was  presented  during  the  discussion 
growing  out  of  the  murder  of  Lieutenant  Camus.  The 
French  minister,  M.  de  Bellecourt,  favored  a  mission 
of  apology  and  regret,  and  Admiral  Jaures  believed 
that  an  autograph  letter  from  the  Tycoon  to  the 
Emperor  Louis  Napoleon  would  go  far  toward  settling 
the  affair.53  So  it  was  determined  that  a  mission 
should  leave  in  February,  nominally  designed  "to 
deprecate  the  anger  of  France,"  but  actually  commis 
sioned  to  visit  the  European  treaty  powers  and  secure, 
if  possible,  their  assent  to  the  closing  of  Yokohama. 
This  meant  that  for  at  least  six  months  no  active 

82  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  463-464. 
"  For.  Rel,  1864,  III,  472. 


306  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

measures  were  likely  to  be  taken  at  Yokohama,  and 
as  we  have  seen,  the  Shogunate  had  warned  the 
daimyos  against  any  overt  acts,  and  the  Mikado  had 
issued  orders  to  the  clans  to  follow  the  Shogun's  in 
structions. 

At  this  point  something  should  be  said  as  to  the 
attitude  of  the  American  government  toward  the 
amazing  developments  in  Japan  during  this  critical 
year.  Several  things  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  this 
connection.  The  United  States  was  involved  in  the 
great  Civil  War,  and  the  summer  of  1863  marked  the 
high  water  of  the  Confederacy.  Although  the  rela 
tions  with  the  European  powers  had  improved,  yet 
there  was  still  every  reason  to  preserve  a  good  under 
standing  with  them.  For  this  reason,  if  for  no  other, 
Mr.  Seward  constantly  counselled  the  American  min 
ister  to  sustain  and  to  cooperate  in  good  faith  with  the 
legations  of  the  treaty  powers.  He  was  also  told  to 
deserve  and  win  the  confidence  of  the  Japanese  govern 
ment,  if  possible.  "  It  may  be  not  altogether  easy  to 
apply  these  two  principles  in  the  conduct  of  details. 
You  will  however  make  the  best  effort  to  do  so,  and 
will  be  permitted  to  judge  which  of  them  must  give  way 
in  any  case  of  irreconcilable  conflict."54  So  when  Mr. 
Seward  learned  of  the  British  demands,  which  had 
impressed  Mr.  Pruyn  so  unfavorably,  he  warned  him 
to  lend  them  his  moral  support  as  long  as  the  British 

"July  10,  1863.    For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  1129. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  307 

sought  no  conquest  or  exclusive  advantage;  but  the 
naval  forces  were  only  to  protect  American  lives,  and 
were  not  to  unite  in  hostilities  against  the  Japanese.55 
Mr.  Pruyn,  furthermore,  was  to  use  his  moral  influ 
ence  to  procure  or  to  preserve  peace  between  the 
other  powers  and  Japan.56  As  it  took  at  least  four 
months  for  despatches  to  be  exchanged  between  Yoko 
hama  and  Washington,  although  occasionally  brief 
messages  were  telegraphed  from  San  Francisco  after 
the  overland  wire  was  opened  on  October  24,  1861, 
Mr.  Seward  wisely  left  to  Mr.  Pruyn  a  large  discre 
tion,  and  when  the  assaults  on  Americans  early  in  May 
were  reported,  Mr.  Pruyn  was  allowed  to  judge 
whether  a  pecuniary  indemnity,  in  addition  to  the 
punishment  of  the  offenders,  should  be  insisted  upon, 
or  whether  the  claim  should  be  put  over  until  after 
the  British  demands  had  been  adjusted.57 

When,  however,  Mr.  Pruyn  reported,  on  June  9, 
that  the  legation  in  Yedo  had  been  burned  and  that  he 
had  been  compelled  to  take  refuge  in  Yokohama,  then, 
on  September  I,  Mr.  Seward  penned  a  despatch  which 
called  for  specific  reparation.58  It  was  based  upon 
certain  conclusions,  derived  from  Mr.  Pruyn's  reports. 

55  June  29.    Ibid.,  1126. 

56  July  7.    For.  Rel.,  1863,  II,  112$. 
"Ibid.,  1129. 

88  In  reply  to  fourteen  despatches  from  Mr.  Pruyn,  May 
26-June  24  (ibid.,  1148-1150). 


308  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

First,  the  facts  submitted  by  you  raise  a  strong  presumption 
that  the  act  of  firing  the  residence  of  the  legation  was  com 
mitted  by  incendiaries,  with  a  purpose  at  once  political  and 
hostile  to  the  United  States,  and  that  the  government  of 
Japan  could  probably  have  foreseen  and  prevented  it,  and  that 
they  have,  at  least,  given  to  it  tacit  assent  and  acquiescence. 

Secondly,  The  President  is  satisfied  that  your  removal  of 
the  legation  from  Yedo  to  Yokohama  was  prudent  and  wise, 
in  view  of  the  circumstances  then  existing  in  Japan,  and  the 
proceeding  is  approved.  But  it  is  equally  clear  that  the  gov 
ernment  of  Japan  ought  to  have  so  controlled  those  circum 
stances  as  to  have  rendered  the  removal  unnecessary;  and 
that  it  is  bound  to  provide  for  your  safe  return  to  Yedo,  and 
for  the  secure  and  permanent  re-establishment  of  the  lega 
tion  in  that  capital.  .  .  . 

Fourthly.  It  is  with  much  regret  that  the  President  has 
arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  the  government  of  Japan  has 
failed  to  keep  its  faith,  solemnly  pledged  by  treaty,  with  the 
United  States.  .  .  .  The  friendship  of  this  country  cannot  be 
secured  by  the  government  and  people  of  Japan,  nor  would  it 
be  of  any  avail,  if  the  United  States  should  fail  to  maintain 
their  own  dignity  and  self-respect  in  their  intercourse  with 
Japan  with  the  same  firmness  which  they  practice  in  regard  to 
all  other  nations. 

Then  followed  the  five  demands:  (i)  indemnifica 
tion  for  all  the  losses  suffered  through  the  burning  of 
the  legation;  (2)  diligent  search  to  discover  and 
punish  the  incendiaries;  (3)  proper  and  adequate 
guarantees  for  Mr.  Pruyn's  safe  return  to  Yedo,  and 
the  permanent  reestablishment  of  the  legation  there 
without  delay;  (4)  the  full  observance  of  the  treaties 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan;  (5)  a  reason 
able  indemnity,  to  be  fixed  by  Mr.  Pruyn,  for  the 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  309 

injuries  sustained  by  American  citizens  at  the  hands 
of  Japanese,  and  the  bringing  of  the  transgressors  to 
justice.  The  Tycoon's  government  was  to  be  in 
formed  that  the  United  States  would,  "as  they  shall 
find  occasion,"  send  additional  forces  to  insist  upon 
these  demands. 

It  should  be  noted  that  although  certain  categorical 
demands  were  to  be  preferred,  yet  they  were  in  the 
nature  of  indemnities  or  guarantees,  and  carried  no 
punitive  measures.  In  this  way  they  differed  widely 
from  the  heavy  British  indemnities. 

This  despatch,  for  some  reason,  was  long  delayed 
in  transmission.  On  December  14  Mr.  Pruyn  wrote 
that  he  had  received  no  letters  since  those  dated  July 
10,  but  he  had  received  copies  of  the  despatch  of 
September  I  through  the  courtesy  of  the  French  and 
the  British  minister,  for  Mr.  Seward  had  forwarded 
copies  to  their  respective  governments.59  His  despatch 
to  the  Roju  of  December  21  was  based  on  the  copies, 
before  the  original  despatch  had  reached  him.  In  pre 
senting  the  American  demands  Mr.  Pruyn  reviewed 
all  the  circumstances  connected  with  the  burning  of  the 
legation  and  the  assaults  upon  Americans  at  Yoko 
hama,  and  he  assessed  the  damages  at  $10,000  in  the 
first  instance  and  $20,000  in  the  second,  and  in  addi 
tion  $2000  for  an  American  citizen,  George  Horton, 
who  had  been  deported  by  the  Japanese  from  the 

"  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  465. 

21 


310  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

Bonin  Islands.  If  the  sum  of  $32,000  was  not  paid 
within  thirty  days,  he  reserved  the  right  to  make  such 
additional  demands  as  might  be  required  by  further 
instructions  or  the  course  of  events.60 

Before  the  presentation  of  these  demands,  Mr. 
Pruyn  had  already  secured  the  consent  of  the  Roju  to 
the  payment  of  $10,000  damages  for  the  Pembroke, 
although  the  amount  had  not  been  received.  He  had 
expressed  his  willingness  to  settle  the  attack  upon  the 
Wyoming  and  the  insult  to  the  flag  without  any  money 
indemnity,  provided  a  sum  was  paid  to  provide  annui 
ties  for  the  families  of  the  dead  and  for  the  wounded.61 
Furthermore  a  correspondence  regarding  the  return 
of  the  American  legation  to  Yedo  had  been  in  progress 
for  several  months.62  Now,  without  any  ship  of  war 
to  support  him  (for  the  Jamestown  left  on  December 
28  in  search  of  the  Confederate  cruiser  Alabama),  Mr. 
Pruyn  was  called  upon  to  secure  redress  by  argument 
alone. 

In  their  reply  of  January  18,  1864,  the  Roju  refused 
to  pay  any  damages  for  the  burning  of  the  legation, 
lest  it  be  taken  as  a  confession  that  the  fire  was  caused 
"by  secret  instigation  of  criminals,"  which  would  be 
"an  extraordinary  indignity  for  our  government." 
This  question  they  proposed  to  have  their  new  em- 

eo  ibid.,  466-472. 

61  November  28.     For.  Rel.,  1864,  HI,  458. 

«  Ibid.,  460-463. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  3!  I 

bassy  take  up  with  the  Washington  authorities.  As  to 
the  other  indemnities,  they  would  investigate  and  con 
fer  with  Mr.  Pruyn  later.63 

To  this  the  American  minister  replied  that  the  pay 
ment  of  the  claim  would  not  "necessarily  involve  the 
idea  ...  of  the  complicity  of  the  government  in  these 
lamentable  occurrences,"  and  he  warned  them  that  the 
President's  decision  would  not  be  modified  or  aban 
doned,  and  that  it  would  be  useless  to  send  envoys  to 
Washington  while  affairs  at  Yokohama  were  in  so  un 
satisfactory  a  position.  Their  refusal,  he  asserted,  was 
additional  proof  that  no  justice  could  be  expected 
unless  a  minister  was  supported  by  a  permanent  and 
strong  naval  force,  and  it  would  be  his  duty  to  sum 
mon  the  force  now  in  Chinese  waters  and  make  use 
of  it  if  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  the  national 
dignity  and  the  rights  of  American  citizens.  In  closing 
he  reminded  them  that  the  United  States  had  not  yet 
agreed  to  the  postponement  of  the  opening  of  Osaka, 
Hiogo,  and  Niigata,  and  it  would  be  justified  in  with 
holding  such  consent  altogether  and  notifying  the 
treaty  powers  that  it  regarded  such  ports  as  now  open 
under  its  treaty  with  Japan.64 

This  statement  introduced  a  new  subject  for  dis 
cussion,  which  had  been  overlooked  by  the  Japanese, 
and  it  came  just  when  they  were  anxious  to  have  their 

63  Ibid.,  476-477. 

64  January  20.    For.  ReL,  1864,  HI,  477-478. 


312  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

affairs  in  order  before  the  new  mission  to  negotiate 
for  the  closing  of  Yokohama  should  sail.  Mr.  Pruyn 
was  approached  on  the  matter  of  granting  the  assent 
of  the  United  States  to  the  postponing  of  the  opening 
of  the  ports,  and  the  result  of  the  conferences  was  a 
convention  lowering  to  five  per  cent  the  duty  on 
several  kinds  of  imports,  and  placing  articles  used  in 
the  preparation  and  packing  of  tea  on  the  free  list.65 
On  the  same  day,  January  28,  Mr.  Pruyn  consented  to 
the  extension  of  the  time  for  opening  Yedo,  Osaka, 
Hiogo,  and  Niigata,  to  five  years  from  January  I, 
1863.  A  few  days  later  the  ministers,  by  proclama 
tion,  reduced  the  duties  on  certain  other  imports  to 
six  per  cent.66  These  tariff  reductions,  as  well  as  the 
signature  of  the  Swiss  treaty  and  the  long  delayed  ex 
change  of  ratifications  of  the  Prussian  treaty,  were  all 
considered  due  to  the  desire  of  the  government  to 
propitiate  the  treaty  powers  before  the  arrival  of  their 

85  These  terms  were  practically  agreed  upon  in  January, 

1863,  but  the  signature  was  delayed  for  a  full  year  (For.  Rel, 

1864,  III,  482-484;  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  9). 

66  Articles  to  be  admitted  at  five  per  cent  duty:  machines 
and  machinery;  drugs  and  medicines;  iron,  in  pigs  or  bars; 
sheet  iron  and  iron  ware ;  tin  plates ;  white  sugar,  in  loaves 
or  crushed ;  glass  and  glassware ;  clocks,  watches,  and  watch 
chains;  wines,  malted  and  spirituous  liquors.  Mr.  Pruyn  in 
serted  the  provision  for  spirituous  liquors  in  order  not  to 
appear  unfriendly  to  France.  The  Japanese  themselves  re 
duced  the  duty  on  jewelry,  perfumery  and  soap,  books,  paper, 
mirrors,  arms,  cutlery,  and  drawings. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  313 

envoys.  This  was  the  second  break  in  the  reasonable 
tariff  drawn  up  by  Townsend  Harris  in  1858;  but  as 
the  whole  tariff  would  be  subject  to  revision  after 
July  I  following  (according  to  the  treaties  of  1858), 
the  Japanese  doubtless  thought  the  concession  a  small 
one.  It  was  the  treaty  of  June  25,  1866,  which  bound 
Japan  by  a  disadvantageous  conventional  tariff  until 
1894. 

In  spite  of  this  friendly  interlude,  the  American 
claims  remained  unsettled ;  yet  so  encouraged  was  Mr. 
Pruyn  at  the  turn  in  the  reactionary  tide  that  he  coun 
selled  moderation  in  pressing  them.  He  wrote  to  Mr. 
Seward :  "  The  dictates  of  an  enlightened  humanity 
have  justified  the  friendly  and  patient  forbearance 
which  has  heretofore  characterized  our  relations  with 
this  government ;  and  it  is  pleasant  to  believe  that  such 
forbearance  is  still  compatible  with  our  true  interests 
as  being  best  calculated  to  overcome  the  obstacles  aris 
ing  from  the  laws  and  institutions  of  the  government 
and  the  prejudices  of  the  ruling  class."67  Similar 
moderate  views  were  entertained  at  this  time  by 
Colonel  Neale,  the  British  charge.  On  March  I  he 
wrote  to  Earl  Russell  that  trade  was  flourishing,  and 
the  general  results  at  the  close  of  the  last  year  were 
"  satisfactory  beyond  all  expectation ; "  that  no  ag 
gressive  or  seriously  obstructive  acts  might  be  ex 
pected  from  either  the  Tycoon  or  any  of  the  daimyos, 

67  February  29,  1864.    For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  484. 


314  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

at  least  while  the  envoys  were  in  Europe  ;  that  although 
Choshiu  still  closed  the  Straits  of  Shimonoseki,  yet, 
"unless  for  the  purpose  of  vindicating  our  right  of 
passage,  I  am  not  aware  of  any  detriment  sustained  to 
our  commerce  or  navigation  in  this  country  by  this 
temporary  obstruction ; "  that  "  the  real  designs  of  the 
rulers  of  this  country  in  regard  to  foreigners  in  the 
future,  whether  they  tend  towards  peace  and  amity, 
or  to  stoppage  of  trade,  aggressive  acts  and  war,  are 
not  .  .  .  matured  or  determined  even  by  the  Tycoon's 
Government  itself,  or  by  the  principal  feudal  chiefs ; " 
and,  finally,  "an  expectant  and  defensive  policy,  with 
a  strong  naval  force  in  these  waters,  and  a  moderate 
military  contingent  available  in  China,  if  meanwhile 
our  commercial  relations  are  continuedly  prosperous, 
would  seem,  I  humbly  conceive,  to  be  the  best  adapted 
to  meet  the  actual  and  present  position."68  Fifty 
years  later  such  a  policy  would  be  summed  up  in  the 
two  words,  "watchful  waiting." 

Such  were  the  views  of  the  representatives  of  the 
two  leading  treaty  powers  in  Japan  about  the  first  of 
March,  views  which  counselled  "  friendly  and  patient 
forbearance  "  and  an  "  expectant  and  defensive  policy." 
But  in  a  short  time  all  this  was  changed  and  a  strong 
policy,  to  secure  peace  by  making  war,  was  substituted. 
For  that  change  two  things  were  responsible, — the  lack 
of  telegraphic  communication  with  Japan,  and  the  re- 

08  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  12. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  315 

turn  to  his  post  of  Rutherford  Alcock,  the  British 
minister. 

Sir  Rutherford — for  he  had  recently  been  created  a 
Knight  Commander  of  the  Bath — had  left  Yedo  in 
March,  1862.  He  had  been  present  in  London  when 
the  first  Japanese  envoys  had  agreed  to  the  conven 
tion  of  June  6  of  that  year,  and  his  views  had  doubtless 
influenced  Earl  Russell  when  he  drafted  his  crushing 
demands  for  indemnities  in  the  Richardson  affair,  in 
December.  A  year  later,  in  December,  1863,  he  left 
England  for  Japan,  and  arrived  at  Yokohama  on 
March  2,  1864.  When  about  to  leave,  Earl  Russell 
had  given  him  certain  very  general  instructions,  in 
view  of  the  uncertainty  concerning  affairs  in  Japan 
which  then  prevailed.69  These  instructions  called, 
however,  for  a  defensive  policy.  He  was  to  require 
from  the  Tycoon  and  the  daimyos  the  execution  of  the 
engagements  of  the  treaty;  he  was  to  consult  with  the 
admiral  and  any  military  officer  in  Japan  as  to  the 
means  of  strengthening  and  holding  Yokohama;  but 
the  abandonment  of  Nagasaki  in  case  of  attack  was 
suggested.  The  admiral,  if  Alcock  agreed,  was  au 
thorized  to  destroy  the  batteries  which  had  been  erected 
to  interrupt  the  passage  of  British  merchantmen,  "  and 
which  shall  have  evinced  their  hostile  purposes  by  some 
hostile  act,"  but  their  hostile  purpose  must  be  clearly 
proved.  The  admiral  was  to  take  care  "that  no  un- 

69  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  i. 


316  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

armed  and  peaceable  towns  should  be  bombarded,  but 
when  fired  upon  the  ships  of  war  must  return  the  fire 
with  vigor  and  rapidity."  In  other  words,  the  govern 
ment  was  unwilling  to  authorize  the  destruction  of 
another  town  like  Kagoshima, — and  it  must  be  re 
membered  that  to  the  date  of  these  instructions  no 
British  ship  had  been  fired  upon  at  Shimonoseki. 
Further  instructions  warned  Alcock  that  the  modifica 
tions  in  the  treaty  agreed  upon  at  London  in  1862  were 
to  be  considered  binding  unless  expressly  revoked,70 
and  also  that  although  he  might  call  upon  the  naval  and 
military  forces  for  assistance,  yet  when  operations  had 
been  decided  upon  their  execution  was  to  be  solely 
in  the  hands  of  the  naval  and  military  commanders.71 
He  was  to  have  "  no  authority  to  direct  either  of  them 
to  undertake  any  operation,  or  to  interfere  with  their 
directions  as  to  the  manner  in  which  any  operation 
should  be  conducted,"  nor  could  they  undertake  any 
military  or  naval  operations  without  his  concurrence, 
unless  some  sudden  emergency  should  call  for  im 
mediate  action.  Further  evidence  of  the  moderate 
opinions  which  prevailed  at  Downing  Street  is  found 
in  the  passing  of  an  additional  Order  in  Council  on 
January  7,  1864,  which  authorized  the  British  consul- 
general  in  Japan,  whenever  it  should  appear  that  the 
unrestricted  entrance  or  passage  of  British  ships  or 

70  December  19.     P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  I. 

71  December  24.     Ibid.,  2. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  317 

vessels  into  any  straits  or  other  waters  of  Japan  "  may 
lead  to  acts  of  disturbance  or  acts  of  violence,  or  may 
otherwise  endanger  the  maintenance  of  peaceful  rela 
tions  and  intercourse"  between  British  subjects  and 
those  of  Japan,  to  make  and  enforce  any  rule  or  regula 
tion  for  the  purpose  of  prohibiting  or  regulating  such 
entrance  or  passage.  British  ships  of  war  were 
authorized  to  use  force  to  carry  out  such  regulations, 
and  if  need  be  to  seize  the  offending  ship  and  take  her 
to  some  port  in  Japan  so  that  the  navigators  might  be 
brought  to  trial.72  This  Order  in  Council  certainly 
was  designed  to  avoid  trouble  in  the  Straits  of 
Shimonoseki. 

The  development  of  Sir  Rutherford's  views  after  his 
return  to  Japan  can  be  traced  with  some  accuracy 
through  the  voluminous  despatches  which  he  for 
warded  to  Earl  Russell  or  to  his  colleagues  in  Yoko 
hama.  As  dean  of  the  diplomatic  corps,  with  experi 
ence  going  back  to  1859  in  Japan,  and  earlier  still  in 
China,  his  views  were  worthy  of  careful  consideration, 
and,  when  supported  by  his  forceful  character,  soon 
prevailed  upon  all  his  colleagues.  Under  Alcock's 
leadership  they  revised  their  own  opinions  and  set  aside 
the  instructions  of  their  governments.  Nothing  but 
the  apparent  success  of  his  policies  saved  him  and  his 

72  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  3-4.  The  right  of  foreign  ships 
to  enter  the  Straits  of  Shimonoseki  was  not  questioned  at  the 
time,  although  this  narrow  strait  was  wholly  within  the  juris 
diction  of  Japan. 


31 8  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

colleagues  from  severest  censure,  and  today  it  is  pos 
sible  to  think  of  that  success  as  more  apparent  than 
real. 

It  will  be  remembered  that,  some  years  before,  Sir 
Rutherford  and  Townsend  Harris  were  not  on  the  best 
of  terms.  Their  different  attitudes  toward  Japan  pre 
cluded  any  common  understanding.  But  the  events  of 
the  past  two  years  had  seemingly  given  some  support 
to  Alcock's  earlier  views,  so  that  after  his  first  con 
ference  with  Mr.  Pruyn,  on  March  16,  the  latter  was 
able  to  write :  "  We  find  ourselves  in  very  fair  accord 
and  I  think  we  will  walk  well  together.  There  need  be 
no  conflict  as  the  interests  of  our  respective  govern 
ments  harmonize,  and  yet  he  and  Mr.  Harris  quar 
relled  like  old  women."73  Already  the  policy  of  co 
operation  had  'been  established  in  the  joint  memo 
randum  of  July  25,  1863,  and  it  was  incumbent  upon 
Alcock  to  maintain  this  joint  action,  but  if  possible 
under  his  own  direction. 

At  the  end  of  the  month  Alcock  sent  to  Earl  Russell 
a  long  despatch,  summing  up  the  developments  of  the 
past  two  years,  and  stating  his  conviction  that  the  end 
of  conciliation  and  forbearance  by  the  treaty  powers 
had  been  reached.74  This  conclusion,  however,  was 
based  upon  premises  both  false  and  erroneous.  After 
describing  the  concessions  made  when  the  first  envoys 
visited  Europe,  he  wrote: 

73  Pruyn  MSS.,  March  16,  1864. 

74  March  21.     P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  13-16. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  319 

The  avowed  object  of  the  second  Mission  is  to  declare  that 
all  the  hopes  held  out  by  the  Tycoon  of  the  probable  results 
of  the  first  concessions  have  been  illusory.  He  is  not  stronger 
but  weaker  than  he  was.  His  Government  is  not  more  but 
less  able  to  hold  its  own  and  protect  foreigners  from  the  hos 
tility  of  the  opposing  Daimios ;  and  now  what  he  has  to  pro 
pose  is  no  longer  concession  or  even  alliance  offensive  and 
defensive,  but  absolute  withdrawal  from  the  country  as  the 
sole  condition  of  peace. 

As  to  the  first  statement,  we  have  already  seen  the 
weakening  of  the  anti-foreign  agitation  at  Kyoto,  the 
expulsion  of  Choshiu,  the  pro-foreign  views  of  Sat- 
suma,  and  the  Mikado's  edict  to  follow  the  directions 
of  the  Shogun  in  regard  to  foreign  affairs.  As  to 
the  second,  the  very  mission  of  the  envoys  was  proof 
of  the  improvement  in  foreign  relations.  In  June, 
1863,  the  foreign  ministers  were  served  with  notice 
that  the  Mikado  had  given  orders  that  all  the  ports 
be  closed ;  but  this  letter  had  been  withdrawn,  and  in 
February,  1864,  the  envoys  were  despatched  to  nego 
tiate  regarding  the  closing  of  Yokohama  only.  The 
idea  of  "  absolute  withdrawal "  had  not  been  men 
tioned  for  several  months  until  Alcock  himself  re 
vived  it.  In  this  despatch  there  were  enclosures  de 
scribing  the  conferences  then  in  progress  at  Kyoto  in 
which  several  of  the  staunch  pro-foreign  daimyos  were 
taking  a  prominent  part,  as  well  as  telling  of  the  attack 
by  Choshiu  upon  a  steamer  of  Satsuma,75  thus  indicat- 

75  January  26.  The  steamer  belonged  to  the  Tycoon  and 
had  been  loaned  to  Satsuma.  It  was  burned,  and  twenty-six 


32O  CHOSHIU    TAKES    THE   OFFENSIVE 

ing  the  open  breach  'between  the  former  leaders  of  the 
anti-foreign  faction.     It  would  have  been  easy  to  find 
in  recent  developments  a  vindication  of  the  policy  of 
"  friendly  and  patient  forbearance." 
Two  weeks  later  Alcock  wrote76  that  although 

there  is  the  strongest  ground  for  believing  that  there  will  be 
no  material  improvement  until  measures  of  hostile  and  coer 
cive  character  are  resorted  to — measures  sufficiently  decisive 
and  uncompromising  to  carry  conviction  into  the  minds  of  all 
who  are  responsible,  and  the  ruling  classes  generally,  that 
there  are  some  Treaty  Powers  at  least  who  possess  both  the 
will  and  the  ability  to  maintain  in  their  integrity  all  the  rights 
conferred  by  Treaties,  and  secure  their  full  observance  with 
the  strong  hand, 

yet  the  time  was  not  ripe.  In  the  first  place,  the 
Americans  had  no  ships,  the  French  but  one,  and  the 
Dutch  but  two,  in  those  seas,  and,  secondly,  it  might 
be  well  to  wait  until  more  was  learned  of  the  decision 
taken  at  Kyoto  concerning  foreign  affairs.  For  co 
ercive  measures  Alcock  found  ample  justification  in 
the  acts  of  Choshiu  in  firing  upon  foreign  flags  and 
in  sinking  native  junks  laden  with  produce  for  the 
foreign  trade.  Other  grievances  requiring  redress 
were  the  virtual  exclusion  of  the  foreign  representa 
tives  from  Yedo,  and  "  the  suspension  of  all  the  func 
tions  of  Government  there,  so  far  as  foreigners  are 

Satsuma  men  were  lost.     Choshiu  explained  that  it  was  mis 
taken  for  a  foreign  vessel  (P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  17;  Japan, 
1853-64,  P-  130). 
76  April  14.     P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  18-20. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  32! 

concerned,  by  the  prolonged  absence  of  the  Tycoon 
and  his  Ministers ; "  the  isolated  attacks  upon  for 
eigners  at  the  treaty  ports;  and  even  the  murder  of 
Japanese  merchants  at  Osaka  and  elsewhere,  avowedly 
for  trading  with  foreigners.  One  may  search  in  vain 
through  these  despatches  of  the  British  minister  for 
any  appreciation  of  the  difficult  position  in  which  the 
Tycoon's  government  was  placed,  or  any  sympathy 
with  it  in  its  endeavors  to  keep  faith  with  the  for 
eigners  and  preserve  order  within  the  land.  But  to 
consider  the  absence  of  the  Tycoon  and  some  of  his 
ministers  from  Yedo,  in  order  to  take  part  in  a  con 
ference  of  the  most  vital  significance  at  Kyoto,  as  a 
grievance  "  requiring  redress,"  seems  to  reach  the 
summit  of  arrogance. 

In  the  meantime  Alcock  and  Mr.  Pruyn  had  en 
gaged  in  several  conferences  on  the  state  of  affairs, 
and  their  views  were  presented  in  an  exchange  of  let 
ters.77  Alcock's  letter  of  April  22  surveyed  at  great 
length  the  situation  as  he  understood  it,  and  arrived 
at  certain  conclusions :  first,  "  that  there  is  a  settled 
purpose  to  get  rid  of  foreigners,  and  either  to  expel 
them  from  the  Japanese  territories  altogether,  or, 
failing  this,  to  lock  them  up  within  the  fortified  bar 
riers  of  Nagasaki,  where  entrance  and  escape  are  alike 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  without  the  consent  of 
those  who  hold  the  keys;"  secondly,  that  the  treaty 

77  For.  Rel.,  1864,  HI,  495-SO2. 


322  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

powers  must  decide  between  the  active  and  the  passive 
policy ;  thirdly,  that  the  conduct  of  Choshiu  amply  jus 
tified  any  action  on  the  part  of  the  powers ;  and  finally, 
that  an  attack  upon  Choshiu  by  all  the  powers  with 
or  without  the  Tycoon's  consent  might  either  pre 
vent  an  attack  upon  the  foreign  communities,  or  else 
precipitate  a  war  now,  when  the  Japanese  would  have 
to  act  at  a  disadvantage  before  their  preparations 
were  completed.  These  views  were  based  on  the 
premise  that  hostilities  were  bound  to  occur  sooner 
or  later,  and  that  the  offensive  would  really  be  the 
best  defensive. 

Mr.  Pruyn's  reply,  dated  May  13,  while  accepting 
much  of  Alcock's  reasoning,  arrived  at  a  very  dif 
ferent  conclusion : 

In  view  of  these  facts,  what  is  the  duty  of  the  treaty  powers  ? 
Manifestly  to  insist  on  the  observance  of  the  treaties,  and 
neither  to  surrender  nor  postpone  any  rights  now  acquired. 
At  the  same  time,  they  should,  in  my  opinion,  exercise  great 
moderation  and  forbearance  in  their  treatment  of  the  govern 
ment,  and  give  it  credit  for  sincerity,  as  far  and  as  long  as 
possible;  sympathize  with  and  aid  it  in  its  difficulties,  and 
strengthen  it  as  far  as  may  be  safe,  to  enable  it  to  resist  any 
probable  combination  of  the  Daimios,  of  whom  the  Tycoon  is 
not  the  sovereign,  and  who  are  in  a  great  measure  independent 

But  the  wisdom  of  punishing  Choshiu  evidently  ap 
pealed  to  him,  and  he  was  ready  to  meet  with  his 
colleagues  and  concert  such  measures  as  seemed  es 
sential  to  the  preservation  of  treaty  rights. 

On  the  first  of  May,  Sir  Rutherford  forwarded  an- 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  323 

other  long  despatch  to  Downing  Street,  to  the  effect 
that  advices  from  Kyoto  were  convincing  proof  that 
the  government  was  determined  to  expel  the  for 
eigners  as  soon  as  it  had  made  the  necessary  prepara 
tions,  and  that  a  decision  would  soon  have  to  be  made 
whether  the  powers  would  calmly  await  "the  full- 
maturing  of  all  their  schemes  of  treachery  and  vio 
lence  to  effect  their  avowed  object,  the  destruction  of 
trade,  and  the  expulsion  of  foreigners,  in  violation 
of  all  existing  Treaties,  or  anticipate  such  hostile  ac 
tion  by  taking  at  once  some  effective  steps  to  place 
our  relations  on  a  more  secure  and  less  derogatory 
footing?"78  On  May  6,  for  the  first  time,  he  devel 
oped  his  plans  for  an  attack  upon  Choshiu,  "  the  most 
violent  and  rash  of  his  class,"  which  would  tend  to 
paralyse  the  whole  body  of  daimyos.79  He  also  sum 
moned  more  troops  from  Hongkong  to  guard  Yoko 
hama  while  the  projected  operations  were  in  prog 
ress.80 

These  despatches,  increasingly  strong  in  tone, 
caused  consternation  in  the  Foreign  Office  at  Lon 
don.  The  Kagoshima  operations  had  recently  been 
severely  criticized  in  Parliament.  Government  was 

78  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  27-29. 

79  Ibid.,  32-36.     In  this  despatch  Alcock  commented  at  length 
on  the  memorial  of  the  eleven  daimyos  early  in  1863.     The 
anti-foreign  views  of  several  of  them  had,  however,  altered 
considerably  in  the  year  that  had  passed. 

so  Ibid.,  43- 


324  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

not  well  disposed  toward  blundering  into  another 
war  in  the  Far  East,  and  Alcock  was  promptly  ad 
vised  to  that  effect.81  On  July  26  Earl  Russell  re 
plied  to  Alcock's  despatches  of  May  I,  6,  and  14,  and 
after  rejecting  his  proposal  "to  make  war  for  the 
sake  of  forestalling  war,"  continued: 

There  is  another  course  of  policy  which  appears  preferable, 
either  to  precipitating  hostilities,  or  to  the  abandonment  of 
the  rights  we  have  acquired  by  our  Treaties.  This  course  of 
policy  appears  in  conformity  with  the  views  so  moderately 
and  carefully  expressed  by  the  minister  of  the  United  States.82 

This  policy  consists  in — 

1.  Giving  every  encouragement  and  support  to  such  of  the 
Tycoon's  Ministers,  and  to  such  of  the  Daimios  as  are  favor 
able  to  foreign  trade,  and  thus  lead  to  the  ultimate  weakening 
of  the  feudal  system  and  of  the  protectionist  theory  of  Japan. 

2.  To  make  arrangements  with  the  Japanese  Government 
for  the  protection  of  the  foreign  settlement  at  Yokohama. 

3.  To  keep  for  the  present  a  strong  squadron  in  the  Japa 
nese  seas. 

4.  To   endeavour  to   establish   an   understanding   with   the 
Governments   of   France,   the   Netherlands,   and   the   United 
States,  with  a  view  to  our  common  interests  in  Japan. 

In  another  despatch  of  the  same  day  Earl  Russell 
wrote : 

si  Ibid.,  44. 

82  This  refers  to  Pruyn's  letter  of  May  13.  The  sentence 
"  This  .  .  .  States  "  is  omitted  from  the  despatch  as  printed 
in  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  44,  but  Alcock  gave  Pruyn  a  copy  of 
the  despatch  as  he  received  it,  which  is  published  in  For.  Rel, 
1864,  HI,  556,  and  Lord  Lyons  showed  a  copy  to  Mr.  Seward 
(ibid.,  594),  both  of  which  contained  the  sentence. 


CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE  325 

Her  Majesty's  Government  positively  enjoin  you  not  to  un 
dertake  any  military  operations  whatever  in  the  interior  of 
Japan;  and  they  would  indeed  regret  the  adoption  of  any 
measures  of  hostility  against  the  Japanese  Government  or 
Princes,  even  though  limited  to  naval  operations,  unless  abso 
lutely  required  by  self-defence.  The  action  of  the  naval  and 
military  forces  of  Her  Majesty  in  Japan  should  be  limited  to 
the  defence  and  protection  of  Her  Majesty's  subjects  resident 
in  Japan,  and  of  their  property,  and  to  the  maintenance  of  our 
Treaty  right's. 

It  may  be  hoped  that  the  power  vested  in  you  by  Her  Maj 
esty's  Order  in  Council  of  the  7th  of  January  last,  to  prohibit, 
or  regulate,  or  restrict,  the  entrance  or  passage  of  British 
ships  into  straits  or  waters  of  Japan,  when  such  entrance  or 
passage  may  lead  to  acts  of  disturbance  or  acts  of  violence,  or 
may  otherwise  endanger  the  maintenance  of  peaceful  relations 
or  intercourse  between  Her  Majesty's  subjects  and  the  sub 
jects  of  the  Tycoon  of  Japan,  will  enable  you  to  prevent  the 
occurrence  of  the  necessity  for  any  such  measures  of  hostility 
to  obtain  redress  for  injuries  done  to  British  vessels.83 

The  British  government  had,  therefore,  refused  to 
support  its  aggressive  representative  in  Japan,  and 
instead  it  had  adopted  as  its  own  the  policy  of  mod 
eration  and  forbearance  laid  down  by  the  American 
minister.  More  than  that,  it  sent  copies  of  Rus 
sell's  despatch  to  the  other  treaty  powers,  and  ex 
pressed  the  hope  that  a  concert  might  be  established. 
The  acquiescence  of  the  United  States  and  France 
was  promptly  given;  the  Netherlands  alone  favored 
action  against  Choshiu,  but  it  preferred  if  possible  to 
have  it  come  through  the  Tycoon's  government.84  In 

•»  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  45. 

"Ibid.,  54-55- 

22 


326  CHOSHIU   TAKES   THE   OFFENSIVE 

a  despatch  of  August  20  Mr.  Seward  informed  Mr. 
Pruyn  of  the  President's  approval  of  the  four  points 
laid  down  by  Earl  Russell,  and  emphasized  it  by  a 
statement  that  it  would  probably  be  inconvenient  to 
keep  a  naval  force  constantly  in  the  Japanese  seas, 
but  that  the  United  States  would  endeavor  to  have  a 
vessel  appear  there  sufficiently  often  to  make  a  suit 
able  impression  upon  the  Japanese  government.  But 
before  these  pacific  despatches  could  reach  Japan  the 
offensive  had  already  been  assumed.85  If  there  had 
been  telegraphic  communication  the  only  joint  naval 
operations  of  the  treaty  powers  would  never  have  oc 
curred. 

85  Alcock  received  the  despatches  before  September  30. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  JOINT  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  CHOSHIU 

The  proposal  "to  make  war  for  the  sake  of  fore 
stalling  war"  had  been  put  forward  by  Sir  Ruther 
ford  Alcock  on  the  strength  of  his  understanding  of 
the  probable  attitude  toward  foreigners  of  the  Mi 
kado,  the  Tycoon,  and  the  leading  daimy'os.1  It  is 
unfortunate  that  the  Shogunate  did  not  deem  it  ad 
visable  to  keep  the  foreign  ministers  well  informed 
of  the  political  situation  within  the  country;  and  yet 
its  course  was  intelligible.  To  have  told  the  for 
eigners  of  the  full  force  of  the  opposition  might  have 
encouraged  them  to  do  what  had  occasionally  been 
threatened, — pass  over  the  Shogun  and  deal  directly 
with  the  Mikado  at  Kyoto.  Nor  could  the  Yedo 
authorities  speak  freely  of  movements  concerning 
which  they  were  not  themselves  fully  informed,  or 
tell  the  ministers  that  the  anti-foreign  policy  which 
they  had  been  forced  to  accept  was  but  a  blind,  and 
that  they  hoped  to  temporize  long  enough  to  overcome 

1 "  It  is  possible  that  Sir  Rutherford  Alcock's  fears  were 
well  founded,  but  to  the  writer,  himself  a  resident  in  Japan  at 
the  time,  it  has  never  appeared  probable  that  the  policy  of 
expulsion  was  seriously  entertained  by  any  party  in,  or  likely 
to  be  in,  power"  (Dickins  and  Lane-Poole,  II,  33-34). 

327 


328  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

the  opposition  of  the  hostile  nobles  and  the  court.2 
There  was,  to  be  sure,  abundant  written  evidence  of 
the  hostile  disposition  of  both  the  Kyoto  and  the 
Yedo  administration,  but  there  was  also  reason  to  be 
lieve  that  the  crest  of  the  anti-foreign  wave  had  been 
reached  and  passed.  As  Mr.  Pruyn  had  said  of  this 
baffling  period,  "Everything  seen  [is]  in  palpable 
open  conflict  with  what  is  heard."  With  such  ig 
norance  of  the  real  situation  misunderstandings  were 
bound  to  occur.  The  amazing  thing  is,  not  that  there 
were  so  many,  but  that  there  were  so  few. 

After  the  expulsion  of  Choshiu  from  Kyoto  on 
September  30,  1863,  there  had  been  a  weakening  of 
the  anti-foreign  agitation  at  the  capital  accompanied 
by  an  increase  in  the  prestige  of  the  Shogunate,  until, 
as  we  have  seen,  the  Mikado  gave  orders  that  "  the 
directions  of  the  Bakufu  were  to  be  followed  in  all 
things,  and  that  no  rash  or  violent  actions  must  be 
committed."  This  declaration  had  encouraged  the 

2  A  slightly  similar  situation  prevailed  during  these  years 
of  civil  war  in  the  United  States.  Mr.  Seward,  secretary  of 
state,  was  very  frank  in  his  conversations  with  the  foreign 
ministers,  especially  Lord  Lyons,  but  he  gave  expression  to 
his  own  point  of  view,  which  at  times  did  not  agree  with  the 
facts.  Not  infrequently  his  despatches  to  the  American  repre 
sentatives  abroad  were  designed  rather  for  consumption  in 
America  than  for  effect  in  Europe.  So  the  Tycoon  framed 
letters  and  orders  which  might  quiet  the  restless  daimyos  but 
which  he  had  no  desire  to  act  upon  in  dealing  with  the  for 
eigners. 


JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU  329 

Yedo  officials  to  revise  their  demands  upon  the  for 
eigners,  and  instead  of  seeking  their  entire  expulsion 
to  ask  only  that  Yokohama  be  abandoned.  On  No 
vember  13  Shimadzu  Saburo,  of  Satsuma,  visited 
Kyoto  for  the  third  time  in  order  to  advocate  a  sec 
ond  great  conference  there  for  the  purpose  of  aiding 
the  Shogun  in  "  performing  his  duty  against  the  bar 
barians,  and  in  giving  peace  to  the  empire."3  This 
proposal  was  adopted  by  the  court,  and  the  Shogun 
was  requested  to  make  a  second  visit  to  Kyoto. 

Once  more  he  was  preceded  by  Hitotsubashi,  his 
guardian,  who  reached  Kyoto  on  January  5,  and  a 
month  later  the  Shogun  left  Yedo,  arriving  in  Kyoto 
on  February  22.  Instead  of  being  severely  repri 
manded  by  the  Mikado  for  so  constantly  putting  off 
the  date  of  expulsion  of  the  foreigners,  as  many  ex 
pected,  he  was  received  with  honor  and  promptly 
promoted  to  the  rank  of  third  minister  at  the  imperial 
court  (Udaijin).  On  February  28  the  Shogun  and 
his  suite  had  audience  of  the  Emperor,  at  which  an 
imperial  speech  was  read  by  one  of  the  nobles.4  In 
this  the  Emperor  ascribed  his  own  want  of  virtue  as 
the  cause  of  their  present  unhappiness :  "At  home  the 
laws  put  aside,  the  bonds  of  society  loosened  and  the 
people  groaning  under  a  weight  of  misery;  on  all 
sides  there  is  evidence  of  dissolution  and  ruin. 

8  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  129. 
4  Ibid.,  132-133. 


33O  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

Abroad,  we  are  exposed  to  the  insults  of  five  great 
continents  of  haughty  barbarians,  and  the  calamity 
of  being  swallowed  up  by  them  threatens  us  at  every 
moment."  He  then  stated:  "The  subjugation  of  the 
ugly  barbarians  is  a  fundamental  law  of  our  polity, 
and  we  must  set  an  army  on  foot  in  order  to  strike 
awe  into  them  and  chastise  them.  But  we  like  not  in 
truth  a  reckless  attack  upon  the  barbarians.  Do  you 
therefore  ponder  an  efficient  scheme  and  submit  it  to 
Us.  We  will  then  discuss  its  merits  with  care,  and 
come  to  a  firm  and  irrevocable  determination."  The 
Mikado  &lso  named  five  of  the  great  daimyos  who 
might  be  depended  upon  in  this  emergency,  and  the 
Shogun  was  instructed  to  work  with  them.  This 
speech,  while  still  calling  for  the  expulsion  of  the 
foreigners,  was  much  more  restrained  than  were  the 
edicts  of  the  preceding  year. 

On  March  5  an  imperial  letter5  was  presented  to 
the  Shogun,  which  lamented  the  weakness  of  the 
land:  "After  a  peace  of  more  than  two  hundred 
years,  Our  military  pow'er  is  insufficient  to  put  down 
our  foreign  enemies,  and  We  therefore  fear  lest  to 
revive  recklessly  the  law  of  punishment  and  warn 
ing  would  be  to  plunge  the  state  into  unfathomable 
disasters,"  but  found  comfort  in  the  reforms  intro 
duced  by  the  Bakufu.  In  regard  to  foreign  affairs 
there  was  this  surprising  statement: 

5  Japan,  1853-64,  pp.  134-136;  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  30; 
For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  502-503.  Three  different  versions. 


JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU  33! 

But  contrary  to  all  anticipation,  Fujiwara  Sanetomi  and 
others,  believing  the  violent  words  of  low  and  vulgar  fellows, 
and  disregarding  the  condition  of  the  Empire  and  the  safety 
of  the  state,  have  falsified  our  command,  and  issued  orders  to 
soldiers  of  low  rank  to  expel  the  barbarians,  and  madly  to 
raise  up  war  to  destroy  the  Shogun. 

The  violent  servants  of  the  Saisho  of  Nagato  have  made  a 
tool  and  a  plaything  of  their  master,  have  without  provoca 
tion  fired  upon  barbarian  ships,  have  murdered  the  messengers 
of  the  Bakufu,  and  have  for  their  own  purposes  seduced  away 
Sanetomi  and  others  to  their  province.  Such  mad  and  violent 
people  must  certainly  be  punished.  Nevertheless,  as  all  this 
arises  from  Our  want  of  virtue,  we  sincerely  feel  unspeakable 
repentance  and  shame.  Moreover,  We  are  of  opinion  that  if 
our  war  vessels  are  compared  with  those  of  foreigners,  it  will 
be  seen  that  they  are  as  yet  insufficient  either  to  destroy  the 
fierceness  of  the  proud  barbarians,  or  to  manifest  the  dignity 
of  our  country  abroad;  but  on  the  contrary  we  receive  con 
stant  insults  at  their  hands.  You  must  therefore,  as  you  have 
frequently  asked  permission  to  do,  fortify  the  important  har 
bours  of  the  Inland  Sea,  with  the  whole  resources  of  the  em 
pire,  subjugate  the  ugly  barbarians,  and  carry  out  the  Law 
of  Punishment  and  Warning  made  by  the  former  Emperors. 

This  letter,  therefore,  approved  the  cautious  policy 
of  the  Shogunate,  and  decreed  punishment  for  Choshiu 
and  the  fugitive  court  nobles.  It  was  received  by  the 
Tycoon  and  the  daimyos  present  in  Kyoto,  and  was 
forwarded  to  those  who  were  absent. 

The  Shogun's  reply  was  presented  on  the  2ist.6  In 
it  he  expressed  regret  for  all  his  shortcomings,  espe 
cially  in  failing  to  close  the  port  of  Yokohama,  and  he 

6  Japan,  1853-64,  pp.  137-139;  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  31;  For. 
Rel.,  1864,  III,  504-505.  Different  versions. 


332  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

promised  to  carry  out  all  the  instructions  then  re 
ceived  : 

The  protection  of  the  seaboard  is  a  matter  of  course,  and 
he  will  carry  to  the  highest  degree  of  perfection  the  military 
defences  of  every  province ;  he  will  put  an  end  to  the  con 
temptuous  treatment  we  receive  from  the  barbarians,  and  will 
prepare  vessels  of  war;  in  the  end  he  will  revive  the  great 
law  of  Punishment  and  Warning,  and  cause  the  dignity  of  our 
country  to  be  known  beyond  the  seas.  To  all  these  things 
will  he  give  his  most  diligent  attention. 

He  would,  however, 

strictly  observe  the  Imperial  wish  that  Punishment  and  Warn 
ing  should  not  be  recklessly  entered  upon,  and  he  hopes  to 
be  able  to  devise  such  a  plan  as  shall  ensure  certain  vic 
tory.  As  he  has  already  sent  envoys  to  foreign  countries  to 
speak  about  the  matter  of  closing  the  port  of  Yokohama,  he 
hopes,  at  all  events,  to  be  able  to  accomplish  that;  but  as  the 
dispositions  of  the  barbarians  are  hard  to  fathom,  he  will  con 
tinue  to  be  most  diligent  and  energetic  in  the  fortification  of 
the  seaboard. 

Copies  of  these  letters  came  into  the  possession  of 
Sir  Rutherford  Alcock  in  April,  and  became  the  evi 
dence  on  which  he  based  his  conclusions  that  the  Japa 
nese  were  about  to  either  expel  the  foreigners  or  lock 
them  up  at  Nagasaki.  At  the  time  both  documents 
were  considered  weak  and  temporizing  by  the  exclu- 
sionists.7  "  By  speaking  thus,  after  having  previously 
proclaimed  the  '  expulsion  of  the  barbarians,'  the  Court 
brought  upon  itself  the  reproach  of  inconsistency," 

7  Japan,  1853-69,  P-  53- 


JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST    CHOSHIU  333 

wrote  a  contemporary  historian.  The  Emperor  also 
wondered  if  the  Shogun  had  really  understood  his 
commands,  which  elicited  another  statement  from  the 
latter  that  "  the  barbarians  must  not  be  expelled  with 
out  deliberation."8 

During  the  rest  of  his  stay  in  Kyoto  the  Shogun 
steadily  gained  in  favor  and  influence.9  This  fact  is 
evident  in  the  stern  repression  of  the  anti-foreign  ronins 
in  Kyoto,  in  the  distribution  of  high  court  honors  by 
the  Mikado  among  the  leading  retainers  of  the 
Shogunate,  in  the  refusal  of  the  Mikado  to  pardon 
Choshiu  and  the  seven  fugitive  court  nobles,  and  finally 
in  the  conferring  on  June  3  of  full  powers  on  the 
Bakufu,  in  all  matters,  including  the  closing  of  Yoko 
hama  and  the  punishment  of  Choshiu  and  the  seven 
nobles.  The  Shogun,  in  turn,  issued  a  new  law  which 
greatly  increased  the  prestige  of  the  court,  providing 
among  other  things  that  the  Shogun  and  the  daimyos 
should  go  up  to  Kyoto  in  the  future  to  receive  in 
vestiture  on  succeeding  to  their  offices  or  fiefs.  From 
every  point  of  view  this  visit  to  Kyoto  was  more  en 
couraging  than  that  in  1862,  and  when  the  Shogun 
returned  to  Yedo  on  June  23  there  was  great  joy 
among  all  the  officials,  great  and  small,  "who  were 
glad  to  think  that,  by  the  aid  of  the  Shimadzu  family, 
the  Tokugawa  family  had  been  reinstated,  and  their 

8  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  P.  32. 

9  Japan,  1853-64,  pp.  141-144. 


334  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CHOSHIU 

happiness  was  shared  by  the  town,  down  to  the  very 
lowest  classes."10  But  this  satisfaction  was  not  shared 
by  Choshiu,  or  by  the  anti-foregin  ronins  who  had 
gathered  there.  The  restored  influence  of  the  Sho- 
gunate  at  Kyoto  was  to  be  maintained  by  the  presence 
there  of  Hitotsubashi,  who  had  been  appointed  pro 
tector  of  the  imperial  palace,  the  Daimyo  of  Aidzu, 
staunchly  loyal  to  the  Tokugawas,  who  was  military 
governor  of  the  city,  and  the  Ex-Daimyo  of  Echizen, 
the  most  outspoken  of  all  the  pro-foreign  lords. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  deliberations  at  Kyoto  were 
considered  menacing  by  the  foreign  representatives, 
and  it  was  generally  believed  that  a  determined  effort 
was  about  to  be  made  to  close  Yokohama.  Frequent 
conferences  were  held  by  the  four  representatives  of 
the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the 
Netherlands,  and  on  May  18  Mr.  Pruyn,  for  the  first 
time,  expressed  the  hope  "  that  the  position  of  affairs 
at  home  will  permit  the  President  to  despatch  a  strong 
re-enforcement  to  the  squadron  in  the  China  sea."  In 
his  opinion  the  withdrawal  of  the  ships  then  in  the 
harbor  would  be  the  signal  for  an  instantaneous  out 
break,  and  the  United  States  "  should  participate  in 
protecting  our  common  rights  and  interests."11 

About  this  time  the  Roju  sent  a  high  official  to  com 
municate  to  the  British  minister  certain  information 

10  Japan,  1853-64,  p.  144. 

11  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  493. 


JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU  335 

concerning  the  proceedings  at  Kyoto,  "and  the  satis 
factory  result  attained,  after  innumerable  difficulties," 
and  also  to  urge  the  powers  not  to  proceed  against 
Choshiu,  as  the  Tycoon  proposed  to  initiate  punitive 
measures  against  that  daimyo  himself.12  This  an 
nouncement  was  received  with  suspicion,  and  its  pur 
pose  was  believed  to  be  solely  to  gain  time  until  the 
Roju  were  ready  to  turn  against  the  foreigners.13  In 
reporting  this  to  Earl  Russell,  Alcock  asserted  that  the 
treaty  powers  were  reduced  to  three  alternatives :  to  be 
shut  up  in  Nagasaki  or  Hakodate,  to  withdraw  from 

12  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  45-49.    Typical  of  the  uncertainty 
of  the  times,  and  of  Alcock's  attitude  of  mind,  is  the  fact  that 
he  preferred  to  accept  as  correct,  instead  of  the  information 
presented  by  the  Shogunate  official,  which  really  was  accu 
rate,  certain  information  "  previously  received  from  other  and 
at  least  as  reliable  sources."    This  budget  of  news  contained 
such  false  information  as  that  Choshiu  had  appeared  before 
the  Council  at  Kyoto  (whereas  the  Mikado  resolutely  refused 
to   pardon   him)  ;   that  Aidzu   had  committed  hara-kiri,   and 
later  that  he  had  been  murdered  by  a  Satsuma  ronin;  that 
Echizen  had  been  denounced  as  a  traitor  and  had  left  the 
Council,  for  his  own  safety;  and  that  "the  final  triumph  of 
the  more  violent  members  of  the  Council  hostile  to  foreigners  " 
had  been  attained. 

13  It  was  at  this  time  that  Alcock  demanded  that  the  Japa 
nese  provide  accommodations  for  the  British  marines  and  the 
2Oth  Regiment,  on  the  ground  that  the  perpetual  menace  of 
danger  and  the  efforts  for  the  expulsion  of  the  foreigners 
directed  by   the   Tycoon's   government  made   their   presence 
necessary.     The  Japanese  granted  the  desired  quarters.     This 
would  seem  to  indicate  that  the  Shogun,  at  least,  had  no  im 
mediate  intention  of  attacking  Yokohama. 


336  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

Japan  altogether,  or  to  maintain  treaty  rights  in  their 
integrity  with  effective  force.  Pending  the  receipt  of 
specific  instructions,  he  felt  that  the  representatives 
on  the  spot  would  have  to  decide  between  one  of  two 
courses : 

They  must  either  consent  to  wait  passively  the  course  of 
events,  until  acts  of  violence  or  treachery  for  the  expulsion 
of  foreigners  from  Yokohama  are  in  full  operation,  or  antici 
pate  attack,  and,  if  possible,  avert  it,  by  striking  a  blow  at 
Choshiu's  batteries,  closing  the  Inland  Sea  to  commerce,  which 
may  cause  the  hostile  Daimios,  as  a  body,  to  pause  and  recoil 
before  the  immediate  consequences  to  themselves  of  a  conflict 
with  one  or  more  of  the  Treaty  Powers. 

Alcock  had  determined  upon  a  course  of  proceed 
ings — a  joint  attack  upon  Choshiu — as  early  as  the 
beginning  of  May,  but  he  was  not  prepared  to  carry 
it  immediately  into  effect  or  to  urge  it  too  forcefully 
upon  his  colleagues.  As  the  result  of  repeated  con 
ferences  of  the  four  representatives  a  protocol  was 
agreed  to  on  May  25  and  formally  signed  on  the  3Oth.14 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  forwarding  the  un 
signed  draft  to  Earl  Russell,  on  May  25,  Alcock  now 

14  In  sending  a  first  rough  draft  of  this  protocol  to  Mr. 
Pruyn  on  May  18,  Alcock  pointed  out  that  "  the  object  I 
believe  we  should  all  desire  to  have  in  view  is  to  affect  [affirm] 
our  right  of  action  in  any  direction  without  binding  ourselves 
down  to  the  time  or  the  mode — and  if  possible  to  deter  the 
government  from  proceeding  to  extremities  until  we  ourselves 
were  better  prepared  or  our  governments  had  time  to  give 
specific  instructions  and  means  to  carvy  them  out"  (Pruyn 
MSS.). 


JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CHOSHIU  337 

pointed  out  that  the  enemy  which  the  treaty  powers 
had  to  face  was  the  body  of  six  hundred  daimyos, 
which  controlled  both  Executive  and  people,  and  that 
as  the  former  could  not  be  conciliated  "  we  must  either 
accept  the  gage  he  throws  down  or  retire  from  the 
conflict."15 

The  preamble  of  the  protocol16  stated  that  the  repre 
sentatives  of  Great  Britain,  France,  the  United  States, 
and  the  Netherlands,  "being  fully  convinced  of  the 
increasing  gravity  of  the  existing  state  of  affairs  in 
Japan,  have  thought  it  right  to  unite  in  order  to  con 
sider,  in  concert  with  each  other,  the  nature  of  the 
situation,  and  to  organize  by  mutual  understanding  the 
means  for  preventing  its  aggravation."  Three  points 
were  then  considered:  the  silence  of  the  government 
regarding  the  joint  declaration  of  July  last  dealing  with 
the  hostile  acts  of  Choshiu ;  the  communications  made 
by  the  Roju  with  regard  to  closing  the  port  of  Yoko 
hama  ;  and  the  joint  measures  necessary  to  be  adopted 
"to  preserve  the  rights  guaranteed  by  Treaties,  to 
secure  the  safety  of  their  countrymen,  and  to  stay 
the  Governor  [sic]  of  the  Tycoon  in  the  course  of  open 
reaction  upon  which  they  have  entered."  As  to  the 
first  point,  it  was  resolved  to  recall  to  the  attention  of 
the  government  the  collective  declaration  of  last  July, 
and  to  make  a  fresh  effort  to  cause  it  to  remove  the 

15  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  49-50. 

16  French  and  English  texts,  ibid.,  50-53. 


338  JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST    CHOSHIU 

obstacles  which  obstructed  the  navigation  of  the  Inland 
Sea ;  as  to  the  second,  the  protocol  simply  recorded  the 
four  statements  of  the  Roju  that  Yokohama  should 
be  closed,  and  especially  similar  statements  recently 
made  to  the  British  and  French  ministers ;  and  as  to 
the  third,  it  was  held  to  be  the  duty  of  the  representa 
tives  to  summon  the  government  of  the  Tycoon  to 
formally  withdraw  the  declaration  of  its  determina 
tion  to  close  the  port  of  Yokohama,  and,  in  default 
of  a  satisfactory  reply  and  pending  the  final  decision 
of  their  respective  governments,  to  reserve  to  them 
selves 

in  the  first  place  the  right  of  declaring  collectively  to  the 
Tycoon's  Government  that  they  consider  them  responsible  for 
the  least  injury  which  may  be  caused  to  the  persons  or  prop 
erties  of  their  countrymen,  and  of  afterwards  taking  in  con 
cert  such  measures  as  they  may  judge  necessary  for  assuring, 
each  according  to  the  means  of  action  which  he  has  in  his 
power  to  dispose  of,  the  safety  of  the  foreign  communities  at 
Yokohama,  as  well  as  the  maintenance  of  the  rights  guaran 
teed  by  Treaties. 

A  copy  of  this  protocol  was  at  once  forwarded  to  the 
Roju  by  each  of  the  ministers,  under  an  identical 
covering  note.17 

On  receipt  of  Alcock's  despatches  of  May  21  and 
25  and  the  draft  protocol,  Earl  Russell  at  once  recalled 
the  forceful  British  minister,  and  again  criticized  his 
views  on  Japanese  affairs.18  On  August  18  he  re- 

"  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  53;  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  506. 
18  August  8.    P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  54- 


JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU  339 

peated  his  belief  that  the  navigation  of  the  Inland  Sea 
was  not  necessary  to  foreign  commerce  as  long  as 
Kyoto  and  Osaka  were  closed,  and  instructed  Alcock 
not  to  call  upon  Admiral  Kuper  to  attack  Choshiu, 
but  to  turn  all  their  attention  to  the  defence  of  Yoko 
hama.19  There  is  today  much  reason  to  believe  that 
in  this  paragraph  Earl  Russell  expressed  a  sound  judg 
ment  concerning  the  situation  in  Japan :  "If  the 
Tycoon  and  the  Mikado  see  that  the  British  position 
is  strong,  and  that  the  British  naval  and  military  forces 
are  effective,  they  will,  by  degrees,  if  not  at  once,  drop 
all  thoughts  of  violating  the  existing  Treaties,  and  of 
expelling  foreigners  from  Japan."  It  must  be  con 
sidered  a  great  pity  that  the  lack  of  prompt  com 
munication  prevented  a  trial  of  this  reasonable  course 
of  action. 

The  reply  of  the  Roju  to  the  protocol  was  not  pre 
sented  until  June  30,  and  was,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  foreign  representatives,  entirely  unsatisfactory.20 
In  regard  to  opening  the  Inland  Sea,  the  ministers 
stated  that  they  were  considering  this  action,  but  that 
time  would  be  required  to  carry  out  their  arrange 
ments,  and  they  requested  that  for  the  present  this 
matter  be  left  to  them  to  manage.  As  to  the  closing 
of  Yokohama,  they  had  explained  fully  the  reasons  for 
this  through  their  envoys  sent  abroad.  At  this  point 

« Ibid.,  56. 

20  p.p.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  67;  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  528. 


34-O  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CHOSHIU 

the  interpreters  of  the  American  and  British  legations 
failed  to  agree.  The  American  version  gave  the  im 
pression  that  the  Japanese  were  still  deliberating  on 
this  matter  and  hoped  to  tranquilize  the  public  feeling, 
while  the  British  translator  considered  the  closing  of 
the  port  to  be  the  only  plan  calculated  to  calm  the 
national  feeling  and  restore  good  relations. 

On  receipt  of  this  long  delayed  reply,  the  foreign 
representatives  again  considered  the  situation,  and  on 
July  5  came  to  the  decision  to  open  the  Inland  Sea  if 
the  government  failed  to  do  so  within  twenty  days.21 
For  this  purpose  there  were  available  one  American, 
fifteen  British,  four  Dutch,  and  three  French  ships 
of  war. 

This  decision  was  followed  by  the  drafting  and  sign 
ing,  on  July  22,  of  a  very  comprehensive  memorandum 
which  restated  the  views  already  expounded  by  the 
British  minister.22  After  agreeing  that  the  punish 
ment  of  Choshiu  was  the  action  best  qualified  to  meet 
the  exigencies  of  the  hour,  the  representatives  agreed 
to  five  principles  which  would  serve  as  a  basis  for 
future  cooperation:  (i)  the  neutralization  of  Japan; 
(2)  the  maintenance  of  treaty  rights;  (3)  the  protec 
tion  of  the  open  ports  against  any  attack,  considered 
by  them  improbable,  in  consequence  of  any  operations 
in  the  Inland  Sea;  (4)  the  determination  not  to  ask 

21  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  517. 

22  For.  Rel.  1864,  HI,  528-533 ;  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  62-66. 


JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU  34! 

for  or  to  accept  any  concession  of  territory  or  any 
exclusive  advantage,  in  the  open  ports  or  elsewhere 
in  Japan;  (5)  the  abstaining  from  all  interference  in 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Japanese  authorities  over  their 
people,  as  well  as  from  all  intervention  between  the 
contending  parties  in  the  country. 

They  furthermore  agreed  that  as  soon  as  the  naval 
commanders  should  report  that  they  were  ready  to  act, 
the  representatives  would  each  send  an  identical  note 
to  the  Roju,  covering  certain  specific  points,  among 
them  that  if  within  twenty  days  there  was  no  change 
in  the  Choshiu  situation  the  naval  and  military  authori 
ties  would  proceed  to  action  without  further  notice; 
that  they  would  not  even  discuss  the  closing  of  Yoko 
hama;  and  that  the  non-fulfillment  of  the  London 
Convention  of  1862  would  cause  the  powers  to  insist 
upon  the  immediate  opening  of  Yedo,  Osaka,  Hiogo, 
and  Niigata. 

The  framing  of  this  extended  statement  had  been 
the  work  of  many  days,  during  which  the  American 
minister  was  in  Yedo,  and  before  it  was  actually  signed 
there  seemed  to  be  a  chance  that  hostile  operations 
might  be  avoided.  It  had  been  reported,  by  way  of 
Nagasaki,  that  the  Daimyo  of  Choshiu  was  willing 
enough  to  come  to  terms  if  the  powers  would  approach 
him  peacefully  and  consider  his  justification  for  his 
deeds.23  Just  at  this  time  two  young  Choshiu  samurai 

23  Pruyn  MSS.,  July  19. 
23 


342  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

returned  from  England  (where  they  had  been  sent  by 
their  daimyo  to  be  educated)  alarmed  at  the  news 
which  had  reached  them  there  of  the  threatened  attack, 
and  eager  to  convince  their  lord  of  the  folly  of  oppos 
ing  Great  Britain  alone,  to  say  nothing  of  the  com 
bined  fleet  of  the  powers.  Sir  Rutherford  and  his 
colleagues  believed  that  it  would  be  wise  to  cooperate 
with  these  young  men  and  to  use  them  as  despatch 
bearers  to  the  obstinate  feudal  chief.  Admiral  Kuper 
agreed,  and  two  British  ships  of  war  left  Yokohama 
on  July  21,  to  carry  Ito  Shunske  and  Inouye  Bunda 
(later  Prince  Ito  and  Marquis  Inouye)  to  Choshiu. 
Each  of  the  four  representatives  sent  letters  of  advice 
and  warning  to  the  daimyo.2* 

The  youthful  envoys  landed  at  Totomi  on  July  26, 
and  the  two  vessels  cruised  about,  making  surveys,  and 
gathering  information  concerning  the  batteries,  until 
August  6,  when  the  Japanese  returned  with  an  oral 
answer  from  their  lord.25  It  was  to  the  effect 

that  the  hostile  attitude  of  their  lord  was  the  result  of  orders 
received  from  the  Mikado  and  the  Tycoon,  and  that  acting 
under  these  circumstances,  he  was  unable  to  change  his  policy. 
Being,  however,  perfectly  aware  of  the  strength  of  the  Euro 
pean  Powers,  and  that  it  would  be  useless  to  endeavour  to 
thwart  their  designs  or  refuse  compliance  with  their  demands, 
he  requested  a  delay  of  three  months,  during  which  time  he 

2*  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  534;  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  72-73- 
25  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  74- 


JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CHOSHIU  343 

would  communicate  with  the  Mikado,  and  endeavour  to  obtain 
the  recision  of  the  present  orders.26 

In  private  conversation  the  envoys  stated 

that  their  Daimio  had  been  originally  favourable  to  foreigners, 
but  had  gone  too  far  now  to  retract,  and  that  they  did  not 
believe  the  matter  could  be  settled  without  war.  They  also 
suggested  it  as  a  good  measure  that  the  foreign  Representa 
tives  should  throw  the  Tycoon  overboard,  and  going  to  Osaka, 
demand  an  interview  with  the  Mikado's  Ministers,  and  con 
clude  a  Treaty  with  him.  They  spoke  with  great  bitterness 
of  the  Tycoon's  Dynasty;  that  they  kept  all  trade,  not  only 
foreign,  but  native  also,  to  themselves  by  seizing  all  places 
where  trade  was  likely  to  develop  itself,  as  Nagasaki  and  Nee- 
gata ;  and  they  [said]  that  these  feelings  were  shared  by  most 
of  the  people  of  the  country.27 

On  the  arrival  of  the  ships  at  Yokohama,  on  August 
10,  after  this  unsuccessful  mission,  it  was  felt  that  the 
time  for  action  had  come. 

It  was  at  this  time,  while  the  joint  expedition  against 
Choshiu  was  pending,  that  the  American  minister  was 
able  to  settle  satisfactorily  the  claims  which  had  been 
subject  to  dispute  for  many  months.  It  will  be  re 
membered  that  the  Japanese  had  rejected  the  claim  for 
damages  due  for  the  burning  of  the  American  lega 
tion,  on  the  ground  that  such  a  payment  would  be 
considered  an  acknowledgment  that  the  government 
was  responsible  for  the  action  of  the  incendiaries.  Mr. 

26  The  ships  would  not  wait  until  a  written  statement  to  this 
effect  from  the  daimyo  could  be  procured. 

27  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  P-  75- 


344  JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

Pruyn  had  taken  pains  to  show  that  the  responsibility 
consisted  solely  in  the  failure  of  the  Japanese  guards 
to  take  proper  precautions,  rather  than  in  any  com 
plicity  of  the  government.28  The  Roju  at  first  refused 
to  accept  this  proposition,29  a  step  which  led  Mr. 
Pruyn  to  assume  that  the  claim  had  been  finally  re 
jected,  and  caused  him  to  reply  that  the  United  States 
would  demand  the  payment  of  all  the  expenses  caused 
in  enforcing  these  proper  demands.30  On  the  other 
hand  a  compromise  was  effected  concerning  another 
claim,  and  $1000  (Mex.)  was  paid  as  an  indemnity  in 
the  case  of  George  Horton.31 

With  the  various  claims  unsettled,  Mr.  Pruyn  de 
cided  that  the  only  thing  to  do  was  to  proceed  to  Yedo 
and  deal  directly  with  the  Roju.  In  addition  he  pro 
posed  to  strengthen  his  position  by  taking,  for  the 
first  time,  a  guard  of  American  sailors  and  marines 
with  him  into  Yedo.  This  was  done,  not  because  of 
any  fears  for  his  personal  safety,  as  he  felt  as  secure 
in  Yedo  as  ever,  but  because  he  felt  that  the  presence 
of  the  foreign  guards  would  serve  to  expedite  his 
negotiations.32  He  had  heretofore  consistently  been 
opposed  to  the  landing  of  troops  while  his  country 
was  at  peace  with  Japan,  but  the  Roju  had  refused  to 

28  May  24.     For.  Rel,  1864,  III,  518. 

29  June  10.    Ibid.,  519. 
80  June  ii.     Ibid.,  519. 
«  Ibid,  516. 

32  Pruyn  MSS,  July  12. 


JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU  345 

guarantee  his  safety  in  Yedo,  and  he  felt  that  their 
disclaimer  gave  him  the  opportunity  he  needed  to  bring 
this  pressure.33  So  on  July  14,  with  the  Jamestown 
lying  off  the  shore,  and  with  a  guard  of  sixty-five 
marines  and  sailors,  he  again  took  up  his  residence  in 
Yedo.  During  a  pleasant  stay  of  three  weeks,  marred 
by  no  threatening  incidents,  "  not  an  unpleasant  word 
or  even  an  unfriendly  look,"  and  in  which  he  enter 
tained  numerous  guests,  he  brought  all  the  outstand 
ing  questions  to  a  satisfactory  conclusion.34  He  re 
ceived  $10,000  in  payment  of  the  public  and  private 
losses  at  the  burning  of  the  legation ;  an  agreement 
to  pay  by  September  5,  $11,200  as  principal  and  in 
terest  on  the  Pembroke  claim ;  an  agreement  that  if  the 
claims  for  damages  to  American  citizens  at  Yoko 
hama  were  not  settled  within  thirty  days,  they 
would  be  submitted  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Emperor 
of  Russia;  and,  finally,  an  agreement  to  rebuild  the 
American  legation  and  have  it  ready  for  occupancy 
at  the  close  of  the  year.35  Mr.  Pruyn  took  especial 

33  Ibid.,  August  2. 

"For.  ReL,  1864,  III,  541. 

35  For.  Rel.,  1864,  HI,  535-537.  $11,200  is  wrongly  printed 
as  $1,200.  See  Pruyn  MSS.,  August  n,  September  10.  While 
Mr.  Pruyn  was  in  Yedo  word  was  received  that  some  batteries 
in  Choshiu  had  on  July  n  fired  upon  the  little  American 
steamer  Monitor,  which  had  put  into  a  harbor  there  presum 
ably  to  obtain  wood  or  coal,  water,  and  fresh  provisions.  He 
took  up  the  matter  with  the  Japanese  governors  for  foreign 
affairs,  but  was  willing  to  wait  for  further  consideration  until 


346  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

satisfaction  in  the  provision  for  the  arbitration  of  the 
sole  unadjudicated  claim,  and  well  he  might.  It 
marked  the  introduction  of  that  principle  in  Japan, 
and  by  accepting  it  he  felt  that  the  government  ac 
knowledged  the  sanctions  of  international  law.36  But 
what  an  apparent  contradiction  existed, — at  Yedo,  the 
Roju  accepting  this  advanced  principle  of  international 
comity,  and  at  Yokohama  the  foreign  representatives 
formulating  plans  for  maintaining,  by  the  use  of  force, 
the  treaty  rights  of  the  powers. 

As  we  have  seen,  no  action  would  be  taken  under  the 
memorandum  of  July  22  until  the  naval  officers  should 
have  agreed  to  the  feasibility  of  the  proposed  expedi 
tion.  So  on  the  return  of  the  two  British  ships  from 
Choshiu,  on  August  10,  this  preliminary  step  was 
taken.  In  requesting  Captain  Cicero  Price,  of  the  U. 

they  had  received  reports  from  the  governor  of  Nagasaki. 
Mr.  Pruyn  was  not  disposed  to  make  any  claim  in  favor  of 
the  owners,  as  no  damage  had  been  done,  because  this  ship 
had  entered  a  closed  port  in  Satsuma  in  1863,  "  and  it  would 
be  unwise  to  encourage  owners  of  vessels  brought  to  this 
country  for  sale,  to  enter  the  ports  of  hostile  Daimios,  or 
any  ports  not  open  to  trade"  (August  8,  1864.  For.  Rel., 
1865,  III,  517).  The  affidavit  of  the  master  of  the  Monitor 
is  printed  in  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  69-70.  When  news  of 
this  attack  reached  Washington,  the  President  suspended  the 
departure  of  the  steam  gunboat  Fusiyama,  built  at  New  York 
for  the  Japanese  government  (For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  596. 

36  The  claim  was  settled  without  the  necessity  of  arbitration. 
But  in  1875  the  Emperor  of  Russia  arbitrated  the  case  of  the 
Maria  Luz  between  Japan  and  Peru. 


JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU  347 

S.  S.  Jamestown,  to  attend  a  conference  of  the  com 
manding  officers,  Mr.  Pruyn  stressed  the  importance  of 
cooperation  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  (even 
though  its  force  was  insufficient)  "  either  in  the  dis 
play  of  our  flag  in  the  inland  sea,  or  in  the  defence  of 
Yokohama."37  The  conference  took  place  on  August 
12,  on  board  the  British  flag-ship,  and  was  attended 
by  Vice-Admiral  Kuper,  Rear-Admiral  Jaures,  Cap 
tain  Price,  and  Captain  de  Marr,  of  the  Dutch  navy. 
They  decided  that  they  were  prepared  to  act  in  con 
formity  with  the  policy  set  forth  in  the  memorandum, 
but  that,  as  they  would  have  to  take  the  greater  portion 
of  the  naval  force  and  some  of  the  troops,  they  would 
not  leave  Yokohama  "  until  they  shall  have  been  re 
lieved  entirely  by  their  respective  ministers  from  all 
responsibility  with  regard  to  the  defence  and  security 
of  the  settlement."38 

The  ministers  considered  this  proposal,  and  on  the 
1 5th  relieved  the  naval  officers  from  all  responsibility 
for  the  defence  and  security  of  Yokohama.39  They 
furthermore  requested  them  to  proceed  with  all  con 
venient  speed  to  open  the  straits  and  to  destroy  and 
disarm  the  batteries,  and  informed  them  "  that  the 
political  situation  renders  it  desirable  that  there  should 
be  no  considerable  delay  in  the  commencement  of 

37  July  24.     For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  546. 

38  Ibid.,  547. 
so  Ibid. 


348  JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

operations."  Even  if  Choshiu  were  intimidated  and 
failed  to  fire  on  the  fleet,  the  batteries  were  to  be 
destroyed  and  such  measures  taken  as  would  secure 
a  material  guarantee  against  any  further  hostilities  on 
his  part.  The  officers  were  also  requested  to  enter 
into  no  negotiations  with  the  prince,  reserving  all  ques 
tions  for  the  action  of  the  Tycoon's  government  and 
the  foreign  representatives,  and  they  were  asked  to 
avoid  any  demonstration  in  force  in  the  vicinity  of 
Osaka,  lest  it  give  rise  to  some  new  complication,  "  and 
in  order  not  to  change  the  character  of  this  expedition, 
which  ought  to  be  regarded  no  otherwise  than  as  a 
chastisement  to  be  inflicted  on  an  outlaw  or  a  pirate."40 
Two  features  of  this  new  memorandum  should  be 
noted.  In  the  first  place  the  proposal  in  the  memo 
randum  of  July  22  that  a  note  identique  be  sent  to  the 

40  On  this  day  Sir  Rutherford  Alcock  delivered  a  memoran 
dum  to  Takemoto  Kai-no-Kami,  a  confidential  official  of  the 
Shogunate,  pointing  out  the  futility  of  the  anti-foreign  policy 
of  the  government,  and  urging,  instead,  a  policy  of  freer  inter 
course  and  unrestricted  trade.  It  proposed,  in  order  to  meet 
certain  causes  of  complaint,  that  ports  be  opened  in  the  terri 
tories  of  daimyos  who  desired  it,  that  all  restrictions  on  the 
movement  of  goods  into  the  open  ports  be  withdrawn,  that 
monopolies  of  trade  and  burdensome  restrictions  be  removed, 
that  a  royalty  or  share  of  the  customs  receipts  be  paid  to  the 
Mikado,  and  that  the  ancient  law  against  foreigners  be  re 
moved.  In  return  for  these  more  cordial  relations  the  treaty 
powers,  or  at  least  those  now  acting  in  concert,  would  guar 
antee  the  neutrality  of  Japan  (August  12.  P.P.  1865,  Com. 
57,  PP.  75-79). 


JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU  349 

Roju  giving  it  twenty  days  to  settle  the  Choshiu  diffi 
culty,  was  now  dropped,  and  the  operations  were  to 
be  promptly  commenced.  More  important  than  this 
decision  is  the  statement  that  the  expedition  was  noth 
ing  more  than  a  punitive  one  directed  against  an  out 
law  or  pirate.  In  the  past  few  weeks  the  situation  had 
greatly  improved  at  Yokohama.  Probably  no  well 
informed  foreigner  believed  for  a  moment  that  the 
Shogunate  would  lead  any  hostile  campaign  against 
the  treaty  powers.  The  expedition  against  Choshiu 
was  now  considered  advisable  in  order  to  strengthen 
the  hands  of  the  Tycoon ;  it  was  carried  through  with 
the  secret  approval  of  his  government;  and  its  results 
were  welcomed.  As  such  it  was  primarily  an  inter 
ference  in  the  domestic  politics  of  Japan,  and  in  addi 
tion  it  was  expected  to  greatly  improve  the  relations 
between  the  Shogunate  and  the  treaty  powers.41 

41  Pruyn  to  Seward,  August  13,  1864.  At  an  interview  with 
Takemoto  Kai-no-Kami  and  two  other  Japanese  officials  that 
day,  Pruyn  informed  them  "  that  this  expedition  was  not  an 
act  of  hostility  to  his  [the  Tycoon's]  government,  but  for  its 
maintenance,  and  in  the  interests  of  peace,  which  I  and  my 
colleagues  were  satisfied  could  thus  be  more  effectually  se 
cured  "  (For.  Rel.  1864,  III,  542).  "  I  believe  he  [the  Tycoon] 
would  have  been  hurled  from  power  if  we  had  not  crushed 
the  hostile  party"  (Pruyn  MSS.,  September  30,  1864;  see  also 
August  12,  August  25).  About  this  time  Alcock  received  a 
letter  from  an  unknown  Japanese  which  gave  a  very  accurate 
summary  of  the  internal  situation  and  urged  that  Choshiu  be 


35O  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CHOSHIU 

It  was  arranged,  therefore,  that  the  allied  expedi 
tion  should  leave  Yokohama  on  August  20.  The  only 
American  ship  of  war  in  Japan  was  the  sailing  ship 
Jamestown,  which  would  have  had  to  be  towed  to 
Shimonoseki  and  which  would  have  been  useless  dur 
ing  the  operations  there.  In  order  that  the  American 
flag  might  be  represented  in  the  fleet,  Mr.  Pruyn  and 
Captain  Price  chartered  the  little  American  steamer 
Ta-Kiang  (600  tons),  placed  a  3O-pound  Parrott  gun 
and  eighteen  men  from  the  Jamestown  on  board,  and 
hurriedly  prepared  her  for  the  voyage.42  Although  the 

punished.  It  was  written  before  the  Kyoto  coup  of  August 
20  (P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  pp.  232-234). 

For  the  usual  interpretation  of  this  section  see  Moore,  V, 
750.  "  The  proceedings  of  the  treaty  powers  in  this  instance 
were  not  intended  nor  considered  as  an  act  of  interference  in 
the  political  affairs  of  Japan.  Their  object  was  the  enforce 
ment  of  treaty  rights,  with  the  approval  of  the  government 
that  granted  them;  and  the  effect  which  the  expedition  may 
have  had  on  the  fortunes  of  parties  in  Japan  was  purely  inci 
dental."  It  has  been  shown  that  the  passage  of  the  straits 
was  a  doubtful  treaty  right,  and  that  Great  Britain  had  no 
desire  to  enforce  it.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the 
straits  could  have  been  opened  in  the  fall  of  1864  without 
striking  a  blow.  For  the  wrong  done  by  Choshiu  in  firing 
on  the  foreign  ships  the  clan  had  been  punished  by  the 
Wyoming  and  the  French  force.  A  careful  study  of  all  the 
steps  leading  to  the  expedition  has  convinced  the  author  that 
the  real  object  was  that  cited  in  the  text, — to  strengthen  the 
Tycoon  through  the  punishment  of  the  most  active  of  the  hos 
tile  daimyos,  and  as  such  it  was  a  logical  development  of  the 
Anglo-French  offer  of  1863. 

42  She  was  referred  to  in  Congress  later  as  a  "  Chinese 
junk." 


JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU  351 

Japanese  government  had  given  its  assent  to  the  ex 
pedition  in  its  eagerness  to  have  Choshiu,  the  most 
recalcitrant  of  the  daimyos,  punished,  it  arranged  that 
a  deputation  from  the  Roju  should  wait  upon  the 
foreign  representatives  on  the  I9th  and  request  that 
the  operations  be  abandoned,  to  whom  the  ministers 
were  to  reply  that  no  further  delay  was  possible.43 
Early  that  morning  the  European  mail-steamer  en 
tered  the  port  with  the  Japanese  flag  at  the  fore,  and 
all  were  amazed  to  learn  that  the  envoys,  who  had 
left  for  Europe  in  February,  had  unexpectedly  re 
turned,  having  signed  a  convention  in  Paris,  but  with 
out  visiting  any  other  capitals. 

Before  the  envoys  had  reached  Europe  the  treaty 
powers  had  agreed,  at  the  instance  of  Great  Britain, 
that  they  would  not  even  consider  closing  the  port  of 
Yokohama.44  The  envoys  were  informed  of  this  in 
Paris  and  decided  that  it  would  be  useless  to  proceed 
further,  so  after  several  conferences  with  M.  Drouyn 
de  Lhuys,  the  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  they 
signed  a  convention  on  June  18,  and  promptly  departed 
for  Japan.  This  convention45  bound  the  Tycoon  (still 
spoken  of  as  "His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan") 
to  pay,  within  three  months  after  the  return  of  the 

43  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  542.     Minutes  of  this  conference  in 
P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  81-82. 

44  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  7,  11,  12,  17.    Russell's  note  to  the 
British  ministers  abroad  is  dated  April  20. 

45  Ibid.,  25-27. 


352  JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

envoys,  an  indemnity  of  140,000  Mexicans  piastres 
for  the  attack  upon  the  Kienchang,  of  which  100,000 
would  be  paid  by  the  Tycoon's  government  and  40,000 
by  the  authorities  of  Choshiu;  secondly,  to  open  the 
Straits  of  Shimonoseki  within  the  same  period  and 
to  maintain  them  free  at  all  times,  "  having  recourse, 
if  necessary,  to  force,  and,  in  case  of  need,  acting  in 
concert  with  the  Commander  of  the  French  naval 
division ; "  finally,  to  reduce  the  tariff  on  certain 
articles, — these  being,  however,  covered  by  the  reduc 
tions  made  in  January  and  already  mentioned.  At 
the  same  time  the  envoys  paid  an  indemnity  of  $35,000 
for  the  family  of  Lieutenant  Camus,  and  promised  that 
the  government  would  take  all  measures  necessary  to 
arrest  and  punish  his  murderers. 

The  news  of  this  convention  was  most  disappoint 
ing  to  both  Japanese  and  foreigners.  It  bound  the 
Japanese  to  do  something  which  they  could  not  do,  and 
it  withdrew  the  French  from  the  concert  of  the  treaty 
powers.  The  government  frankly  wished  that  their 
envoys  had  been  drowned,  and  in  fact  promptly 
punished  them,  and  the  foreign  ministers  had  to  coun 
termand  the  sailing  orders  of  the  fleet,  pending  the 
ratification  of  the  convention  by  the  Tycoon.46  They 
at  once  addressed  letters  to  the  Roju  asking  whether 
the  Tycoon  would  ratify  the  convention  and  was  pre 
pared  to  open  the  Inland  Sea.47  To  this  the  Roju 

««  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  548. 
47  August  19.    Ibid.,  548. 


JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU  353 

replied  with  unusual  promptness  by  a  messenger  on 
August  24  and  by  letter  on  the  evening  of  the  25th,48 
that  the  Tycoon  had  resolved  to  annul  the  convention. 
The  foreign  representatives  therefore  met  in  confer 
ence  on  the  afternoon  of  the  25th  and  drafted  a  new 
memorandum.49  This  called  upon  the  naval  com 
manders  to  proceed,  with  as  little  delay  as  possible,  to 
open  the  straits.  But  it  went  further  than  that,  and 
requested  them  to  seize  some  important  position  in  or 
commanding  the  Straits  of  Shimonoseki  and  to  hold 
it  as  a  guarantee  that  an  indemnity  should  be  paid  by 
Choshiu  to  cover  the  expenses  of  the  expedition,  "  and 
until  possession  can  be  given  to  the  Tycoon,  or  authori 
ties  deputed  by  him,  of  the  whole  line  of  territory 
coasting  the  straits  now  appertaining  to  the  Prince  of 
Nagato."  As  there  was  a  possibility  of  securing  an 
open  port  in  or  near  the  straits,  the  naval  officers  were 
requested  to  furnish  such  information  as  they  could 
gather  concerning  Shimonoseki  and  the  other  ports. 
The  indemnity  mentioned  above  was  to  cover  the  costs 
of  the  joint  action,  and  was  not  to  prejudice  the  right 
of  each  power  to  prosecute  claims  arising  out  of  sepa 
rate  grievances. 

With  these  instructions,  the  commanders  soon  had 
their  forces  in  order,  and  on  the  28th  and  2Qth  of 
August  the  expedition  of  seventeen  ships  put  out  from 

*8  Ibid.,  549. 
49  Ibid. 


354  JOINT    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CHOSHIU 

Yokohama.  On  the  latter  day  the  foreign  repre 
sentatives  sent  in  their  long  delayed  identical  notes  to 
the  Roju,  which  pointed  out  that  as  the  Tycoon  was 
unable  to  punish  Choshiu,  the  treaty  powers  would 
have  to  do  so ;  that  they  refused  to  entertain  any 
proposition  looking  toward  the  closing  of  Yokohama; 
and  that  the  Tycoon  would  be  held  responsible  for  any 
disturbances  there  during  the  absence  of  the  fleet,  and 
the  responsibility  would  be  enforced  by  reprisals,  not 
merely  at  Yedo,  but  at  Osaka  and  Kyoto.50  This  note 
must  be  considered  as  designed  for  general  consump 
tion,  for  a  perfect  understanding  existed  between  the 
foreign  and  the  Japanese  officials.  One  of  the  latter 
had  informed  the  representatives  that  in  order  to  keep 
the  daimyos  quiet  while  the  expedition  was  away  the 
government  would  send  another  embassy,  which 
would,  however,  go  only  as  far  as  Shanghai.51  On 
September  I,  after  the  fleet  had  left,  some  members  of 
the  Foreign  Office  called  upon  the  ministers  to  go 
through  the  farce  of  asking  that  the  vessels  should  not 
sail.52  Mr.  Pruyn  wrote  at  the  time :  "  Everything 
remains  quiet  here.  .  .  .  No  stranger  would  suppose 
that  war  was  actually  in  progress  in  any  part  of  the 
country." 

6»  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  550. 

51  Pruyn  MSS.,  August  25. 

52  Pruyn  MSS.,  September  2. 


JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CHOSHIU  355 

Before  the  fleet  had  sailed,  news  had  reached 
Yokohama  of  remarkable  developments  at  Kyoto  just 
at  this  time.53  Late  in  July  certain  ronins  and  anti- 
foreign  samurai  had  gathered  in  Choshiu  and  or 
ganized  themselves  into  bands  of  irregular  troops 
(Kiheitai).  They  determined  to  proceed  to  Kyoto, 
drive  away  the  hostile  officials,  and  force  the  court 
to  pardon  Choshiu  and  the  exiled  court  nobles.54  By 
the  end  of  July  these  bands  had  reached  the  environs 
of  Kyoto,  and  had  been  reinforced  by  clansmen  who 
had  fled  from  the  city.  The  irregulars  now  sent  up 
petitions  to  the  court,  praying  for  the  pardon  of 
Choshiu,  his  son,  and  the  nobles,  and  for  a  renewal  of 
the  campaign  against  the  foreigners.  In  Kyoto  opin 
ions  differed  as  to  what  should  be  done,  but  the  Toku- 
gawa  officials  were  resolute  in  advocating  the  severe 
punishment  of  these  threatening  bands.  The  Mikado, 
under  their  influence,  refused  to  answer  the  petitions. 
On  July  30  some  of  the  troops  moved  nearer  to 
Kyoto,  a  proceeding  which  caused  much  excitement 
in  the  city,  the  closing  of  the  Nine  Gates  of  the  palace, 
and  the  rushing  to  their  posts  of  the  Tokugawa  re 
tainers.  In  the  meantime  the  Daimyo  of  Choshiu 
had  sent  up  two  of  his  karo  (officials)  with  bodies  of 
troops,  presumably  to  keep  the  irregulars  in  order,  but 

53  News  reached  Yokohama  on  August  26  (Heco,  II,  59; 
P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  89-92. 

54  Japan,  1853-64,  PP-  147-239- 


356  JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

their  arrival  enraged  the  anti-Choshiu  faction  at  the 
capital.  Although  many  of  the  court  nobles  opposed 
the  decision,  yet  the  Shogunate  officials,  supported  by 
some  of  the  high  court  officers,  secured  an  edict  from 
the  Mikado,  on  August  19,  that  the  clansmen  who  had 
come  up  to  Kyoto,  and  the  Choshiu  provinces  from 
which  they  came,  should  be  severely  chastised  for 
their  attempt  to  intimidate  the  imperial  court.  This 
edict  made  civil  war  inevitable.  The  next  morning 
the  various  bodies  of  Choshiu  clansmen  hurled  them 
selves  upon  several  of  the  palace  gates,  presumably 
to  punish  and  destroy  the  Daimyo  of  Aidzu,  military 
governor  of  the  city  and  leader  of  the  Shogunate  par 
tisans  there,  and  hostile  to  Choshiu,  but  actually  to 
secure  control  of  the  Mikado.  The  fighting  lasted  all 
day,  clansmen  of  Aidzu,  Kuwana,  Echizen,  and  Sat- 
suma  being  in' opposition  to  those  of  Choshiu.  The 
latter  were  defeated  and  driven  out  of  the  city,  while 
a  fire,  started  during  the  fighting,  destroyed  the 
greater  part  of  the  imperial  capital.  This  ill-timed 
and  unsuccessful  coup  caused  Choshiu  to  be  outlawed, 
made  possible  a  strong  demonstration  of  Tokugawa 
retainers  as  a  punitive  expedition,  and  seemed  to 
mark  the  speedy  destruction  of  that  aggressive  anti- 
Shogunate  house.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  defeat 
came  just  before  the  visit  of  the  joint  expedition  to 
Shimonoseki.  It  is  not  unreasonable  to  believe  that 
its  far-reaching  effects  might  have  rendered  the 


JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU  357 

foreign  demonstration  quite  unnecessary.  In  fact  the 
imperial  court  promptly  deprived  the  Mori  family 
and  its  branches  of  all  its  titles,  and  issued  orders  that 
the  clan  be  punished.  Some  twenty  of  the  clans  were 
ordered  to  put  troops  in  the  field,  and  the  Lord  of 
Owari  was  appointed  commander-in-chief.55  As  the 
clansmen  were  unwilling  to  cooperate  with  the  foreign 
fleet  against  Choshiu,  the  Yedo  authorities  begged 
that  the  fleet  be  recalled.56  But  while  the  discussion 
was  gf>ing  on  at  Yokohama,  the  fleet  was  carrying  out 
its  orders  at  Shimonoseki. 

The  joint  expedition  which  sailed  from  Yokohama 
on  the  28th  and  2Qth  of  August  consisted  of  nine 
British,  four  Dutch,  three  French,  and  one  (char 
tered)  United  States  steamer.57  The  whole  squadron 
assembled  at  the  appointed  rendezvous  in  the  Inland 
Sea  and  proceeded  to  the  Straits  of  Shimonoseki. 
No  attempt  was  made  to  negotiate  with  Choshiu,  and 
the  attack  upon  the  batteries  was  commenced  by  the 
British  flag-ship  on  the  afternoon  of  September  5, 
when  five  batteries  were  silenced,  and  a  landing  party 
spiked  most  of  the  guns  in  one  of  them.  The  next 
morning  the  action  was  resumed,  and  a  party  of 
British,  French,  and  Dutch  sailors  and  marines  as 
saulted  and  took  possession  of  the  eight  principal  bat- 

55  Japan,  1853-69,  p.  61. 

56  Pruyn  MSS.,  September  10. 

57  Vice-Admiral  Kuper's  report,  September  15,  in  P.P.  1865, 
Com.  57,  pp.  99-103. 

24 


358  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CHOSHIU 

teries,  and  after  spiking  the  cannon  and  destroying 
the  magazines,  returned  to  the  ships.  On  the  7th, 
landing  parties  brought  off  the  guns  captured  the  day 
before,  and  on  the  8th,  the  two  remaining  batteries 
were  silenced  and  their  guns  taken  off,  sixty-two 
pieces  of  ordnance  being  eventually  taken  away. 
While  this  was  being  done,  an  envoy  of  the  daimyo 
appeared,  under  a  flag  of  truce,  and  sought  to  nego 
tiate  for  a  termination  of  hostilities.58  He  brought 
a  letter  from  his  lord  stating  that  henceforth  the 
straits  would  be  unobstructed,  and  he  offered  copies 
of  letters  to  show  that  in  firing  upon  the  foreign  ships 
the  daimyo  had  acted  under  the  direct  orders  of  the 
Mikado  and  the  Tycoon.50  The  admirals  determined 
that  before  any  discussion  could  take  place  they  must 
receive  a  written  request  from  the  daimyo,  and  two 
days  were  allowed  for  this  to  be  secured,  during 
which  an  armistice  was  declared.  On  the  loth  the 
chief  councillor  of  the  daimyo  came  on  board  and 
presented  identical  despatches  for  each  of  the  four 
commanders.60  In  this  letter  the  daimyo  stated  that, 
when  he  learned  of  the  foreigners'  demands,  through 

58  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  113;  For.  Rel.,  1864,  HI,  578. 

59  These  letters  were  printed  in  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  113, 
but  the  date  decreed  for  ceasing  communications  with  the  bar 
barians  (loth  day  of  the  5th  month)  was  wrongly  translated 
as  June  20,  instead  of  25,  1863,  thus  occasioning  much  confu 
sion  in  later  documents  and  secondary  accounts. 

60  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  114;  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  558. 


JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU  359 

the  letters  brought  by  Ito  and  Inouye  in  July,  he  had 
sent  his  son  to  Kyoto  to  learn  the  Emperor's  will,  but 
the  conflict  of  August  20  caused  the  latter  to  turn 
back  before  his  mission  was  accomplished.  He 
then  sent  two  of  his  retainers  (one  of  them  was 
the  late  Prince  Ito)  to  the  rendezvous  of  the  fleet  to 
notify  the  admirals  that  he  would  not  offer  any  op 
position  to  the  passage  of  the  straits,  but  unhappily 
the  fleet  had  already  departed.61  He  then  said:  "I 
felt  no  enmity  towards  you,  nor  did  I  wish  to  bring 
disaster  upon  my  own  people.  My  sole  desire  is  that 
you  will  grant  peace."  And  the  karo  who  brought 
this  message  stated :  "  My  Prince's  feelings  are  ex 
actly  the  same  as  your  own.  He  not  only  wishes  a 
cessation  of  hostilities,  but  is  also  desirous  to  have 
intimate  relations  with  you."62 

Although  the  admirals  desired  to  negotiate  directly 
with  the  daimyo  and  his  son,  the  former  wrote  that 
in  view  of  the  affair  that  had  recently  taken  place  in 
Kyoto  they  had  gone  into  retirement.63  Two  of  the 
chief  councillors  met  with  the  two  admirals  on  the 
I4th  and  drew  up  the  following  agreement:  (i)  All 
ships  of  all  countries  passing  through  the  straits 
would  be  treated  in  a  friendly  manner;  they  could 
purchase  supplies ;  and  in  stress  of  weather  their 

61  If  this  letter  had  been  delivered  there  might  have  been 
no  hostilities. 

«2P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  114-116. 
63  Ibid.,  117. 


360  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

people  could  land  at  Shimonoseki ;  (2)  no  new  forts 
would  be  built,  nor  the  old  ones  repaired;  (3)  a  ran 
som  would  be  paid  for  the  town  of  Shimonoseki  which 
"  might  justly  have  been  burnt,"  and  the  whole  ex 
penses  of  the  expedition  would  be  defrayed  by  the 
prince.64  This  agreement  was  ratified  by  the  daimyo 
and  his  son. 

Admiral  Kuper  was  convinced  of  the  inexpediency 
of  holding  a  position  in  or  near  the  straits,  as  desired 
by  the  ministers,  and  therefore  returned  to  Yoko 
hama,  leaving  three  vessels  at  Shimonoseki  for  a  few 
weeks,  as  a  guarantee  against  any  immediate  infrac 
tion  of  the  terms  of  the  agreement. 

The  joint  naval  demonstration  at  Shimonoseki  had 
been  a  great  success.  The  batteries  had  been  de 
stroyed,  their  cannon  carried  away  in  triumph,  the 
straits  opened,  and  the  daimyo  humbled,  and  all  this 
had  been  accomplished  with  the  loss  of  only  twelve 
killed,  fifty-six  wounded,  and  one  missing,  in  the 
allied  squadron.65  It  must  be  remembered,  however, 
that  the  position  in  1864  of  the  lord  who  was  pun 
ished  was  very  different  from  that  which  he  pos 
sessed  when  he  gave  the  offense  in  1863.  Then  he 
was  high  in  influence  at  the  imperial  court,  and  leader 
of  the  western  daimyos  in  their  opposition  to  the 
Shogunate  and,  nominally,  to  foreigners.  Now, 

«*Ibid.,  119. 

65  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  in. 


JOINT    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CHOSHIU  361 

after  the  events  of  September  30,  1863,  and  August 
20,  1864,  he  was  a  discredited  outlaw,  with  every 
man's  hand  against  him,  crushed  by  an  imperial  edict 
which  deprived  him  of  his  titles  and  called  upon  the 
Shogun  and  his  vasisals  to  punish  him.  Naturally 
the  Yedo  authorities  were  much  gratified  at  what  had 
been  done,  although  somewhat  mortified  "that  so 
little  valor  and  capability  of  resistance  had  been  dis 
played."66  With  the  batteries  demolished  and  stripped 
of  their  cannon,  the  punitive  expedition  of  the  twenty- 
one  daimyos  could  now  hardly  fail. 

This  was  the  second  and  the  last  time  an  Amer 
ican  ship  of  war  took  part  in  hostilities  in  Japanese 
waters,  the  next  participation  of  American  forces  in 
joint  operations  in  the  Far  East  coming  thirty-six 
years  later,  during  the  Boxer  Rising  in  China.  The 
little  chartered  steamer  Ta~Kiang}  proudly  floating  the 
American  flag,  was  by  no  means  an  idle  spectator  of 
the  stirring  events  at  the  straits.  The  big  Parrott 
gun  did  good  service;  the  light  draft  of  the  vessel 
enabled  it  to  be  used  to  tow  boats  with  landing  par 
ties  in  to  the  shore ;  and  all  the  wounded  were  taken 
on  board  the  ship  and  conveyed  to  Yokohama.67 

The  gratification  of  the  four  representatives  at 
Yokohama  was  tinged  with  misgivings  because  of 

e«  For.  ReL,  1864,  HI,  553- 

67  The  men  from  the  Jamestown  who  served  on  the  Ta- 
Kiang  received  prize  money  (Appendix). 


362  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

the  despatches  which  reached  Sir  Rutherford  Alcock 
while  the  fleet  was  still  at  Shimonoseki.  Among 
them  was  Earl  Russell's  of  July  26,  which  laid  down 
a  policy  of  moderation,  based  on  Mr.  Pruyn's  ideas, 
and  which  stated  that  he  advocated  a  concert  of  the 
powers  in  favor  of  this  plan.  So  on  September  28 
Alcock  framed  two  despatches,  one  which  told  of  the 
remarkable  success  achieved  at  Shimonoseki,  and  the 
other  which  would  serve  as  a  vindication  of  the  course 
he  had  pursued.68  Sir  Rutherford  took  up  every 
point  in  Russell's  despatch  and  maintained  that  he 
had  anticipated  each  one  "  in  a  great  degree,  if  not 
in  every  particular."  Thus,  whereas  Russell  had  held 
"  that  while  a  prosperous  trade  is  carried  on  it  would 
be  unwise  to  snap  asunder  the  chain  of  friendly  rela 
tions,  and  to  make  war  for  the  sake  of  forestalling 
war,"  Alcock  replied  that  the  trade  in  silk  at  Yoko 
hama  had  been  stopped  for  some  two  months  before 
it  was  finally  resolved  to  send  the  expedition  to  the 
Inland  Sea.  It  should  be  observed  that  there  is  no 
specific  reference  to  this  interference  with  the  silk 
trade  in  the  long  memorandum  of  July  22,  nor  did 
Alcock  mention  it  in  any  despatch  to  Earl  Russell 
until  that  of  September  7,  where  the  statement  is 
based  upon  the  complaint  of  a  dealer  in  Yokohama 
of  September  6.69  The  trade  in  cotton  and  tea  had 

es  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  PP.  in,  119-122. 
69  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  89,  92. 


JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU  363 

not  at  that  time  been  affected.  But  Earl  Russell's 
full  approbation  of  Alcock's  conduct,  expressed  on 
December  2,  was  primarily  on  the  ground  of  the  in 
terference  with  the  silk  trade.  On  this  point  the  de 
spatch  should  be  quoted: 

Your  despatch  of  the  28th  of  September  is  a  successful  vin 
dication  of  the  policy  you  have  pursued. 

My  despatches  of  the  26th  of  July  were  written  with  a  view 
to  discourage  the  interruption  of  a  progressive  trade  by  acts 
of  hostility,  and  to  forbid  recourse  to  force  while  the  Treaty 
was  generally  observed.  Those  despatches  you  will  under 
stand  remain  in  full  force. 

But  the  documents  you  have  sent  me,  which  arrived  by  the 
last  mail,  show  that  the  silk  trade  was  almost  wholly  inter 
rupted  by  the  Tycoon,  who  seemed  to  be  preparing  to  abet  or 
to  abandon  the  project  of  driving  out  foreigners  according  to 
the  boldness  or  the  timidity  of  our  demeanor. 

In  this  position  there  could  be  no  better  course  than  to 
punish  and  disarm  the  Daimio  Prince  of  Nagato.70 

With  the  arguments  used  by  Alcock  in  his  vindica 
tion  we  are  familiar :  that  the  operations  were  con 
ducted  with  the  Tycoon's  assent ;  that  it  was  necessary 
to  punish  Choshiu,  the  outlaw  and  common  enemy  of 
civilized  nations,  and  to  strike  a  blow  at  the  leader  of 
the  anti-foreign  daimyos;  that  this  was  the  best  way 
of  encouraging  and  supporting  the  Tycoon  and  the 
daimyos  favorable  to  foreign  trade — witness  the 
prompt  removal  of  the  restrictions  on  silk ;  and  that 
it  was  the  only  effective  way  to  protect  Yokohama 
from  hostile  operations. 

70  Ibid.,  127-128. 


364  JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

Mr.  Pruyn  also  prepared  a  despatch  justifying  his 
conduct,  in  which  he  stated :  "  It  is  my  belief  that  the 
result  of  the  expedition  to  the  straits  of  Shimonoseki 
has  greatly  contributed  to,  if  it  has  not  secured,  alto 
gether,  our  safety  in  Japan."71  Nothing  was  said  in 
this  despatch  about  the  silk  trade ;  instead  it  was 
pointed  out  that  the  operations  were  really  designed  to 
sustain  the  Tycoon's  government,  "which,  if  pros 
trated,  would  leave  us  without  a  friend,  and  liable  to 
be  involved  in  the  struggle  which  would  ensue.72  The 
best  place  to  defend  the  open  ports  was,  therefore, 
manifestly  at  the  straits  of  Shimonoseki,  where  the 
strength  of  the  hostile  party  might  be  broken  before 
it  was  ready  to  be  precipitated  on  these  ports."  In 
this  despatch  Mr.  Pruyn  brought  out  very  clearly  the 
real  situation :  "  Though  the  treaties  are  to  some  ex 
tent  the  cause  of  trouble  in  Japan,  they  are,  to  a 
much  greater  extent,  the  pretext  eagerly  embraced  by 
intriguing  and  ambitious  Daimios,  some  of  whom  are 
known  to  aspire  to  the  Tycoonship,  each  hoping  that, 
with  the  fall  of  the  Tycoon,  and  the  favor  of  the 
Mikado  secured,  that  high  position  would  not  be  be 
yond  his  reach."  On  the  receipt  of  this  despatch  Mr. 

71  October  12.     For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  553-558. 

72  An  evidence  of  the  temporary  restoration  of  the  Tycoon's 
power  was  the  order  of  September  30,  cancelling  the  one  of 
1862   which   relieved   the   daimyos   from   residence   in    Yedo 
(ibid.,  577). 


JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU  365 

* 

Seward,  on  December  14,  expressed  the  President's 
full  approval.73 

With  the  return  of  the  victorious  squadron  the 
representatives  proceeded  to  consolidate  the  good  re 
sults  of  the  demonstration.  On  September  18,  the 
day  after  the  first  news  had  reached  Yokohama,  the 
four  ministers  held  a  conference  with  three  of  the 
Yedo  officials,  led  by  Takemoto  Kai-no-Kami,  the 
principal  governor  of  foreign  affairs  and  confidential 
agent  of  the  Tycoon,  who  had  acted  as  the  chief  Jap 
anese  negotiator  in  all  these  meetings.74  This  con 
ference  brought  out  the  fact  that  the  defeat  of  Choshiu 
had  tremendously  strengthened  the  Tycoon,  and  that 
he  would  no  longer  have  to  temporize  and  equivocate 
in  his  dealings  with  the  treaty  powers.  The  French 
minister  advised  that  the  Tycoon  now  secure  the  sanc 
tion  of  the  Mikado  to  the  treaties,  and  even  asked  if 
the  Mikado  might  not  receive  the  foreign  represen 
tatives  at  Kyoto.  His  British  colleague  pointed  out 
that  the  time  had  come  for  the  Tycoon  to  give  up 
once  and  for  all  his  temporizing  policy,  and  that 
either  the  authority  of  the  Mikado  and  the  Tycoon 
must  be  reconciled,  or  the  powers  would  have  to  find 
some  other  means  of  securing  their  rights  than 
through  the  Tycoon.  Mr.  Pruyn  in  turn  suggested 
that  the  Straits  of  Shimonoseki  be  placed  under  the 

™  For.  Rel.,  1865,  HI,  229. 

7*  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  122-125. 


366  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

Tycoon,  and  that  possibly  some  port  there  be  opened. 

On  September  23  Takemoto  Kai-no-Kami  returned 
with  a  message  from  the  Roju  to  the  effect  that  they 
had  finally  resolved  to  abandon  their  double-faced  pol 
icy  and  henceforth  to  make  not  even  a  pretence  of 
closing  Yokohama,  and  that  they  would  send  one  of 
their  number  to  Kyoto  to  inform  the  Mikado  of  this 
decision  and  to  "  obtain  'his  sanction  to  the  public  re 
nunciation  of  such  a  policy,  and,  if  possible,  his  ac 
ceptance  and  ratification  of  the  treaties."75  In  the 
meantime  they  begged  that  the  foreign  ships  be  with 
drawn  from  the  straits,  as  they  interfered  with  the 
Tycoon's  operations  against  Choshiu.  It  was  sug 
gested  that  this  might  be  done  if  the  Tycoon  would 
enter  into  negotiations  either  to  pay  the  indemnities 
promised  by  Choshiu,  or  to  open  Shimonoseki  or  some 
more  convenient  port  in  the  vicinity,  at  the  option  of 
the  treaty  powers. 

It  was  peculiarly  gratifying  to  the  American  min 
ister  to  find  his  colleagues  at  last  adopting  a  policy 
which  he  had  urged,  even  to  the  details,  on  June  27, 
i863.76  Mr.  Seward  'had  promptly  taken  up  with  the 
treaty  powers  the  desirability  of  securing  the  Mi 
kado's  ratification  of  the  treaties,  but  the  plan  had 
been  rejected  by  Great  Britain  on  November  10,  on 
the  ground  that  the  power  and  the  right  to  make 

"  For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  565-567. 
78  Pruyn  MSS.,  October  10,  1864. 


JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CHOSHIU  367 

treaties  resided  in  the  Tycoon,  as  stated  by  Satsuma's 
envoy  to  Colonel  Neale  at  Kagoshima.77  Now  the 
wisdom  of  this  step  was  self-evident.  Before  the 
ministers  went  up  to  Yedo  for  their  conferences  with 
the  Roju,  letters  to  the  Tycoon  were  drafted  by 
Pruyn,  Alcock,  and  Roches,  urging  him  to  secure  the 
Mikado's  ratification  of  the  treaties.78 

At  the  first  conference  in  Yedo,  on  October  6,  the 
Roju  agreed  unconditionally  to  pay  the  indemnities 
promised  by  Choshiu,  but  they  could  give  no  promise 
as  to  the  opening  of  a  port  there,  pending  the  out 
come  of  the  mission  of  one  of  their  number  to  Kyoto, 
They  agreed  to  make  every  effort  to  secure  the  Mi 
kado's  ratification.  The  next  day  a  conference  of  a 
more  confidential  nature  took  place,  attended  by  only 
the  British  and  American  ministers,  as  representa 
tives  of  their  colleagues.79  At  this  meeting  the  Roju 
agreed  to  the  appointment  within  eight  days  of  pleni 
potentiaries  to  arrange  the  details  of  the  promised  in 
demnities.  Alcock  then  developed  his  plan  for  con 
ciliating  the  Mikado  and  the  daimyos  by  permitting 
them  to  share  the  profits  of  the  foreign  trade,  and 

77  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  19 ;  For.  Rel.,  1863,  I,  420,  Iviii-lix. 
Lord  Palmerston  stated  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  Feb 
ruary  9,  1864,  that  there  was  no  doubt  "as  to  the  binding 
nature  of  the  treaty  as  having  been  made  only  by  the  Tycoon  " 
(Hansard,  vol.  173,  p.  416). 

78  October  4,  5.    For.  Rel.,  1864,  HI,  559-561. 

79  Ibid.,  569-575. 


368  JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

pointed  out  that  if  the  treaties  were  not  ratified  the 
powers  would  insist  upon  their  full  execution,  includ 
ing  the  opening  of  the  cities  and  ports.  On  their 
ratification,  moreover,  he  would  send  away  the  British 
troops  at  Yokohama,  no  longer  necessary  to  meet  the 
hostility  created  by  the  Mikado  and  the  daimyos. 
He  suggested,  as  Mr.  Pruyn  had  done  a  year  before, 
that  while  these  negotiations  were  going  on  at  Kyoto, 
the  foreign  representatives  should  proceed  to  Osaka 
with  a  portion  of  the  squadron,  but  the  Roju  objected 
to  this  as  liable  to  be  construed  by  the  Mikado  and 
the  daimyos  as  an  attempt  to  coerce  the  Mikado  with 
foreign  aid.  Alcock  further  suggested  that  thirty 
days  be  set  in  which  to  obtain  an  answer  from  Kyoto, 
and  the  Roju  hoped  that  this  period  would  suffice. 
Other  subjects  of  discussion  were  met  in  the  same 
conciliatory  manner,  and  the  Roju  promised  to  re 
move  all  interference  with  the  silk  trade,  to  take  up 
certain  matters  concerning  the  improvement  of  Yoko 
hama,  to  permit  the  export  of  silkworm  eggs,  and  to 
consider  granting  the  legations  another  site  in  Yedo, 
in  lieu  of  Goten-yama. 

Shortly  after  the  representatives  returned  to  Yoko 
hama,  the  ships  left  at  Shimonoseki  returned,  and  on 
the  British  vessel  were  four  Choshiu  officials,  sent  to 
explain  the  hostile  deeds  of  their  lord  and  to  urge 
indulgence  in  the  matter  of  the  promised  indemni- 


JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU  369 

ties.80  On  August  10  the  chief  envoy  had  an  inter 
view  with  Alcock  and  Pruyn,  and  stated  his  case.81 
It  was  a  strong  defence  of  Choshiu,  for  it  stressed  the 
unsuccessful  attempt  of  the  daimyo  to  secure  the  with 
drawal  of  the  Mikado's  edict,  "and  thus  the  prince's 
good  intentions  in  respect  to  foreigners  had  been 
frustrated."  In  regard  to  the  indemnity,  the  envoy 
was  told  that  the  Tycoon's  government  had  agreed  to 
assume  the  responsibility  and  to  pay  it.  As  in  the 
case  of  Satsuma,  only  one  lesson  was  necessary  to 
teach  Choshiu  the  futility  of  opposing  the  treaty 
powers. 

The  plenipotentiary  promised  by  the  Roju  came  to 
Yokohama  before  the  appointed  time,  and  a  conven 
tion  was  agreed  upon  on  the  I2th,  which  was  signed 
by  the  four  foreign  representatives  and  Sakai  Hida- 
no-Kami  on  October  22. 82  The  preamble,  which  was 

80  Typical  of  Mr.  Pruyn's  generous  attitude  and  of  his  sound 
judgment  is  his  reference  to  this  humbled  daimyo :  "  I  must 
confess  this  prince  has  my  sympathy;  an  open  foe  is  much 
preferred  to  a  deceitful  and  doubtful  friend.  He  has  acted 
with  consistency,  vigor,  and  boldness.  He  now  desires  peace, 
and  his  past  history  will  probably  prove  a  guarantee  for  his 
future  sincerity.  If,  as  I  think  is  highly  probable,  he  shall 
escape  the  destruction  now  threatened  [by  the  Tycoon's  puni- 
dve  expedition],  perhaps,  on  payment  of  a  large  fine,  little 
damage  need  be  apprehended  from  his  open  hostility,  and  prob 
ably  as  little  from  his  secret  opposition"  (Pruyn  to  Seward, 
October  12,  1864,  in  For.  Rel,  1864,  III,  557). 

ei  Ibid.,  575-577- 

82  Ibid.,  583. 


37O  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CHOSHIU 

of  especial  significance,  was  framed  by  the  American 
minister.83  It  stated  that 

the  representatives  of  the  United  States  of  America,  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  the  Netherlands,  in  view  of  the  hostile 
acts  of  Mori  Daizen,  Prince  of  Nagato  and  Suwo,  which  were 
assuming  such  formidable  proportions  as  to  make  it  difficult 
for  the  Tycoon  faithfully  to  observe  the  treaties,  having  been 
obliged  to  send  their  combined  forces  to  the  Straits  of  Simo- 
noseki  in  order  to  destroy  the  batteries  erected  by  that  Daimio 
for  the  destruction  of  foreign  vessels  and  the  stoppage  of 
trade,  and  the  government  of  the  Tycoon,  on  whom  devolved 
the  duty  of  chastising  this  rebellious  prince,  being  held  re 
sponsible  for  any  damage  resulting  to  the  interests  of  treaty 
powers,  as  well  as  the  expenses  occasioned  by  the  expedition.  .  .  . 

It  fixed  the  amount  payable  at  $3,000,000,  to  include 
all  claims  for  indemnities,  ransom,  or  expenses,  pay 
able  in  six  quarterly  instalments  of  $500,000  each, 
beginning  from  the  date  when  the  representatives 
should  advise  the  Tycoon's  government  of  the  ratifi 
cation  of  the  convention  and  of  their  instructions. 
Finally,  "  inasmuch  as  the  receipt  of  money  has  never 
been  the  object  of  the  said  powers,  but  the  establish 
ment  of  better  relations  with  Japan,  and  the  desire  *.o 
place  these  on  a  more  satisfactory  and  mutually  ad 
vantageous  footing  is  still  the  leading  object  in  view," 
therefore  if  the  Tycoon  preferred  to  offer  in  place 
of  the  indemnity  the  opening  of  Shimonoseki  or  some 
other  eligible  port  in  the  Inland  Sea,  the  powers 
83  Pruyn  MSS.,  October  31. 


JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU  371 

would  have  the  option  to  accept  the  port  or  insist 
upon  the  money  payment.84 

It  will  be  observed  that  this  convention  said  noth 
ing  about  the  proposed  ratification  of  the  treaties  by 
the  Mikado.  That  matter  was  considered  to  be  well 
understood  after  the  friendly  conferences  at  Yedo. 
The  determination  of  the  amount  of  the  indemnity 
was  interesting.  Mr.  Pruyn  had  already  received 
$11,200  in  payment  of  the  claim  of  the  Pembroke. 
The  Japanese  envoys  had  promised,  in  Paris,  to  pay 
$140,000  for  the  attack  on  the  Kienchang,  but  that 
convention  had  been  annulled  by  the  Tycoon.  It  was 
felt  that  this  amount  should  serve  as  a  standard  for 
appraising  the  indemnities  for  firing  upon  the  national 
ships  of  the  United  States  and  the  Netherlands.  Be 
yond  that,  Alcock  and  Pruyn  thought  that  the  balance 
of  any  indemnity  should  be  divided  in  proportion  to 
the  force  sent  to  the  straits  by  each  of  the  powers.85 
So  they  advocated  a  lump  sum  of  $2,000,000,  to  be 
divided  as  follows:  Great  Britain  $1,000,000;  France 
$440,000;  Holland  $290,000;  and  the  United  States 
$27o,ooo.86  The  French  minister,  on  the  other  hand, 
won  approval  of  his  suggestion  that  the  sum  be  fixed 

84  The  ministers  believed  that  the  port  might  be  accepted  in 
either  full  or  part  payment  of  the  indemnity  (For.  Rel.,  1864, 
111,582). 

85  Ibid. 

88  Pruyn  MSS.,  October  31.  Pruyn's  first  estimate  for  the 
United  States  was  $150,000  for  indemnities  and  $20,000  for 
expenses  (Pruyn  MSS.,  October  10). 


372  JOINT   EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CHOSHIU 

at  $3,000,000,  and  that  its  division  be  left  to  the  home 
governments,  in  case  an  indemnity  was  paid  instead 
of  a  port  being  opened.87  A  memorandum  to  this 
effect  was  drawn  up  by  Mr.  Pruyn,  which  provided 
also  that  at  least  $140,000  be  paid  to  the  United 
States,  France,  and  the  Netherlands  before  the  other 
distribution  was  made,  and  this  agreement  was  signed 
by  the  four  representatives  on  the  22d.  The  French 
minister  also  thought  that  the  moral  support  given 
should  be  taken  into  account;  and  as  the  United 
States  had  given  more  moral  than  material  support, 
Mr.  Pruyn  agreed  with  him,  but  this  principle  was 
not  incorporated  in  the  memorandum.  It  was  be 
lieved  at  the  time  that  the  distribution  would  be  on 
the  basis  O'f  the  ships  and  men  on  duty  in  Japan. 

With  the  signing  of  this  convention  it  was  felt  that 
all  the  perplexing  questions  arising  out  of  the  Shi- 
monaseki  affair  had  been  settled,  but  in  the  sequel 
the  Shimonoseki  convention,  as  it  was  called,  was  to 
occasion  no  little  controversy.88 

87  Pruyn  approved  the  larger  sum  because  he  thought  the 
demand  for  it  would  be  more  likely  to  induce  the  Tycoon  to 
open  a  port  instead  of  paying  it. 

88  Alcock  received  his  letter  of  recall  on  October  10,  just 
before  the  convention  negotiations  began.     He  wrote  Mr.  Pruyn 
that  he  would  turn  his  steps  homeward  "very  joyfully,"  for 
"  I  have  done  the  work  I  came  out  determined  to  undertake, 
and  I  never  could  retire  at  a  happier  moment"  (Pruyn  MSS., 
October  10).     Mr.  Pruyn  believed  that  the  British  government 
was  "  afraid  of  the  Peace  party  as  a  general  election  is  ap 
proaching  and  so  he  will  be  home  ready  for  the  meeting  of 


JOINT   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CHOSHIU  373 

Parliament  and  to  be  offered  as  a  sacrifice  if  needful."  He 
also  felt  sure  that  "a  great  triumph  awaits  him.  There  is 
nothing  so  successful  as  success  and  the  Ministry  will  be 
obliged  by  public  sentiment  to  make  ample  atonement  to  one 
who  has  aided  so  much  in  gratifying  the  national  pride  and 
also  in  the  improvement  of  business"  (Pruyn  MSS.,  October 
12).  The  Japanese  minister  for  foreign  affairs  on  October  27 
addressed  Earl  Russell  asking  that  Alcock  be  sent  back  to 
Japan,  and  spoke  of  the  deep  regret  with  which  he  had  learned 
of  his  approaching  departure.  Alcock's  reply  to  his  letter  of 
recall  is  dated  November  19,  1864,  and  is  a  lengthy  considera 
tion  of  his  proceedings  and  defence  of  his  conduct  (P.P.  1865, 
Com.  57,  pp.  148-154).  To  this  Earl  Russell  replied  on  Jan 
uary  31,  1865,  stating  that  "  the  energetic  course  you  pursued 
in  concert  with  the  Representatives  of  the  other  Treaty  Powers 
in  these  altered  circumstances  has  been  entirely  approved  by 
Her  Majesty's  Government."  Russell  also  wrote  that  he  would 
wish  Alcock  to  return  to  Yokohama  after  he  had  reported  on 
the  present  state  of  affairs  in  Japan  (ibid.,  155).  Instead,  he 
was  promoted  to  the  post  at  Peking.  Sir  Harry  Parkes,  who 
met  Alcock  at  Hongkong,  on  his  way  home,  wrote  as  follows : 
"He  is  full  of  talk  and  feels  very  jolly,  because  satisfied  that 
he  is  in  the  right  and  the  Government  is  in  the  wrong,  in 
which  I  entirely  agree,  and  they  will  have  to  indemnify  him 
in  some  way  for  his  recall.  He  left  home  with  full  sanction 
of  the  Government  to  employ  force  to  bring  the  recalcitrant 
daimios  to  book  whenever  he  could  get  a  chance  and  force. 
A  battalion  of  marines  and  a  regiment  of  infantry,  in  addi 
tion  to  the  whole  navy  of  the  station,  were  furnished  him  for 
this  express  purpose.  But  when  the  Manchester  party  raised 
in  outcry  against  the  first  symptom  of  force  being  employed, 
.he  Government  would  not  declare  that  they  had  authorized 
the  course,  but  as  a  sop  to  Bright  and  Cobden  recalled  their 
Minister.  It  is  ...  unlike  Lord  Palmerston,  who  has  always 
backed  his  men ;  but  he  is  not  in  the  Foreign  Office  and  has 
to  give  way  to  his  colleagues  occasionally,  I  fancy"  (Dickins 
and  Lane-Poole,  I,  478). 

25 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  MIKADO  RATIFIES  THE  TREATIES 

As  a  military  operation  the  opening  of  the  Straits  of 
Shimonoseki  had  been  an  unqualified  success.  As  far 
as  could  be  seen  at  the  time,  it  had  been  a  great 
political  success  as  well.  The  Tycoon  had  certainly 
been  strengthened  in  his  position,  and  most  of  the  diffi 
culties  in  the  way  of  improved  foreign  relations  had 
been  apparently  removed.  But  was  the  success  as 
real  as  it  was  apparent?  In  little  more  than  three 
years  the  Shogunate  was  to  pass  away,  and  in  the  new 
government  Choshiu  was  to  play  a  prominent  role, 
which  the  clan  plays  even  to  this  day.  The  operations, 
therefore,  did  not  save  the  Shogunate,  nor  did  they 
destroy  Choshiu.  Their  effect  was,  for  a  time,  to  stem 
the  current  which  was  flowing  strongly  in  favor  of 
the  imperial  restoration ;  but  bombardments  and  memo 
randa,  protocols  and  conventions,  could  not  for  long 
save  the  doomed  Shogunate. 

The  first  fruit  of  the  improved  relations  was  the 
report  that  the  Mikado  was  now  in  full  accord  with 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  Tycoon.  A  vague  statement 
to  this  effect  was  sent  to  each  of  the  ministers  on 
November  22,  by  Abe  Bungo-no-Kami,  the  member  of 

374 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  375 

the  Roju  who  had  just  returned  from  Kyoto.1  On 
being  returned  by  them  as  not  explicit  enough,  it  was 
again  transmitted,  with  a  confidential  note  to  the  effect 
that  as  soon  as  Choshiu  and  the  hostile  parties  were 
punished,  the  Mikado  would  be  informed,  and  a 
definite  arrangement  would  be  made.2  Although  the 
ministers  had  hoped  for  the  formal  ratification  of  the 
treaties  by  the  Mikado  at  this  time,  yet  they  felt  that 
much  of  practical  value  had  already  been  gained.3 

This  good  understanding  between  the  Yedo  authori 
ties  and  the  foreign  representatives  was  suddenly 
jeopardized  by  another  atrocious  murder  on  the  part 
of  irreconcilable  ronins.  Two  British  officers,  Major 
George  Walter  Baldwin  and  Lieutenant  Robert 
Nicholas  Bird,  of  the  2Oth  Regiment,  stationed  at 
Yokohama,  were  cut  down  by  two  ronins  on  No 
vember  21,  1865,  near  the  Daibutsu  image  at  Kama- 
kura.4  One  was  evidently  instantly  killed,  and  the 

1  For.  Rel.,  1865,  III,  231. 

2  For.  Rel.,  1865,  III,  232. 

8  "  The  explanation  given  is  perfectly  Japanese.  The  Mi 
kado  was  never  seriously  opposed  to  foreigners  and  did  not 
contemplate  their  exclusion  and  thought  the  Tycoon  would 
understand  his  decree  was  only  issued  for  effect  at  home  and 
not  to  be  acted  on.  And  the  Tycoon  unfortunately  not  com 
prehending  this,  and  believing  the  Mikado  in  earnest  felt  him 
self  obliged  to  carry  out  those  orders  though  fully  sensible 
that  he  would  fail  in  his  efforts.  What  can  you  do  with  such 
a  government?"  (Pruyn  MSS.,  November  19,  1864). 

*  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  Japan,  No.  2,  No.  3. 


376  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

other  lingered  until  evening.  The  assassins  made  good 
their  escape.  Such  were  the  facts.  Great  was  the 
indignation  at  Yokohama,  and  genuine  was  the  horror 
and  regret  of  the  Roju.  But  a  better  appreciation  of 
the  difficulties  in  which  the  Shogunate  was  involved 
now  prevailed,  and  no  attempt  was  made  to  hold  the 
government  responsible  for  the  acts  of  these  fanatics. 
The  crime  was  a  more  brutal  and  less  explicable  one 
than  the  murder  of  Richardson,  but  the  day  of 
enormous  indemnities  and  sporadic  bombardments  had 
passed.  Sir  Rutherford  Alcock,  in  dealing  with  this 
tragedy,  followed  the  principles  laid  down  by  Town- 
send  Harris  in  1861,  and  it  must  have  given  the  Amer 
ican  ex-minister  some  pleasure  to  read  Alcock's  de 
spatch  to  Earl  Russell  of  December  23.  After  point 
ing  out  the  difficulty  of  arresting  such  criminals,  espe 
cially  in  a  feudal  state  like  Japan,  he  added : 

These  are  perplexing  and  difficult  conditions  to  deal  with; 
and  as  nothing  can  ever  be  gained  by  insisting  upon  impossi 
bilities,  even  if  such  a  course  could  be  defended  as  just  or 
right,  I  am  disposed,  while  pressing  our  demands  for  full 
justice  to  be  done  and  urging  the  utmost  diligence  and  energy 
in  the  pursuit  of  the  murderers,  to  accept  what  has  been 
already  done  as  a  satisfactory  instalment.  I  believe  it  may  be 
all  that,  with  the  best  good  will,  they  have  hitherto  been  able 
to  effect. 

On  its  part  the  Shogun's  government,  strengthened 
by  the  good  accord  with  the  Mikado  and  by  the  for 
eigners'  punishment  of  Choshiu,  made  strenuous  efforts 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  377 

to  arrest  and  punish  the  offenders.  The  governor  of 
Kanagawa  was,  on  the  advice  of  the  British  minister, 
dismissed  because  of  his  delay  in  reporting  the  crime. 
On  December  16  two  ronins  were  publicly  executed  in 
Yokohama  as  accomplices  of  the  assassins,  although 
the  charge  against  them  was  that  they  compelled  cer 
tain  farmers  to  contribute  funds  for  the  purpose  of 
exterminating  the  foreigners  and  expelling  them  from 
Yokohama.  At  the  same  time  the  government  posted 
proclamations  ordering  the  arrest  or  destruction  of 
assassins  of  Europeans  in  the  future,  and  holding  the 
communities  responsible  for  any  failure  to  report 
traces  of  fugitives.5 

A  few  days  later  one  of  the  actual  assassins  was 
arrested  and  was  beheaded  on  December  28,  in  the 
presence  of  a  large  body  of  Japanese  and  almost  the 
whole  foreign  community.  Two  battalions,  of  the  2Oth 
Regiment  and  the  Royal  Marines,  and  half  a  battery  of 
Royal  Artillery  were  drawn  up  in  a  square  around  the 
execution  ground.  The  foreign  representatives  were 
invited  to  be  present,  but  the  American,  British,  and 
French  officials  refused  to  attend,  as  it  would  be  re 
garded  by  the  Japanese  as  a  degradation  and  might 
give  the  impression  of  vindictiveness.  The  Dutch 
consul-general,  who  had  not  learned  of  this  decision, 

5  Both  Alcock  and  Pruyn  took  credit  for  this  proclamation 
(P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  Japan,  No.  3,  p.  3;  Pruyn  MSS.,  Decem 
ber  17,  1864). 


378  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

was  present.  This  was  the  first  time  that  a  two 
sworded  man  had  been  publicly  executed  for  an  at 
tack  upon  a  foreigner.  It  was  indeed  a  sign  of 
bettered  relations ;  but  more  blood  was  to  flow  before 
the  misguided  patriots  could  be  brought  to  sheath  their 
fatal  blades.6 

About  this  time  two  internal  disturbances  which  had 
threatened  the  authority  of  the  Shogunate  and  taxed 
its  resources  were  brought  to  what  seemed  to  be  a 
successful  termination.  One  was  the  Mito  civil  war, 
which  arose  out  of  clan  politics  of  some  years  before, 
and  which  culminated  in  the  fall  of  1864  in  a  little 
civil  war  in  the  fief,  in  which  one  side  rallied  to  its 
support  those  who  favored  the  anti-foreign  views  of 
the  late  Ex-Lord  of  Mito.7  The  Shogunate  sent 
troops  to  the  support  of  the  party  in  power,  then  ad 
vocating  liberal  foreign  policies.  It  was  this  cam 
paign  which  prevented  the  Tycoon  from  moving  against 
Choshiu  as  promptly  as  he  would  have  liked.  The 
strife  came  to  an  end  in  January,  1866,  with  the  sur- 

8  In  reporting  these  murders  to  Earl  Russell,  Alcock  spoke 
of  "  the  long  series  of  barbarous  murders  in  which  foreigners 
have  been  the  victims,"  and  references  to  "  the  long  and  dismal 
list "  were  frequent  at  the  time.  In  fairness  it  must  be  said 
that  in  more  than  five  years  since  Kanagawa  had  been  opened 
eleven  Europeans  had  been  murdered.  In  view  of  the  bitter 
hostility  to  the  Europeans  and  to  the  Shogun's  foreign  policy, 
this  number  must  be  considered  amazingly  small. 

7  Clement,  "  The  Mito  Civil  War,"  in  Trans.  As.  Soc.,  vol. 
19,  part  II. 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  379 

render  to  the  Daimyo  of  Kaga  of  the  "Righteous" 
(anti-foreign)  party,  and  with  the  execution  of  seven 
hundred  and  twenty-nine  of  the  prisoners  early  in 
March.8 

The  punitive  expedition  against  Choshiu  achieved 
an  easy  but  a  temporary  success.  Under  the  com 
mand  of  the  Ex-Lord  of  Owari  the  forces  of  twenty- 
one  daimyos  moved  to  the  frontier  of  Choshiu  and 
"  demanded  an  explanation."  Within  the  clan  a  coup 
d'etat  had  been  effected,  and  the  faction  opposed  to  the 
former  policies  was  now  in  control.9  It  therefore 
caused  the  three  karo  who  had  taken  part  in  the  Kyoto 
emeute  to  commit  hara-kiri  and  sent  their  heads  to  the 
commander-in-chief,  who  transmitted  them  to  the 
Mikado.  The  daimyo  and  his  son  were  confined  in  a 
temple,  and  certain  other  officials  were  placed  in 
domiciliary  confinement.  Five  of  the  seven  kuge,  who 
had  fled  to  Choshiu  in  1863,  were  surrendered  and 
were  placed  in  the  custody  of  Satsuma,  Chikuzen,  and 
Higo.  After  these  manifestations  of  repentance,  the 
punitive  expedition  retired  to  Osaka,  in  February,  and 
it  was  felt  that  final  sentence  would  be  pronounced 
after  a  consultation  between  the  Mikado  and  the 
Shogun.  That  the  western  daimyos  would  not  ap 
prove  of  the  destruction  of  the  house  of  Mori  was 
generally  believed. 

8  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  12. 
8  Japan,  1853-69,  pp.  69-70. 


380  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

It  was  this  difficulty  in  carrying  out  the  proposal  to 

confiscate  some  or  all  of  the  provinces  belonging  to 

the  Daimyo  of  Choshiu  which  caused  the  Shogunate 

to  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  be  better  to 

pay  the  heavy   indemnity  of   $3,000,000  rather  than 

/   open  a  port  in  the  Inland  Sea.     This  notice  was  given 

f*  by  the  Roju  on  April  5,  with  the  statement  that  the 

first   payment    would   be    made    in   the    sixth   month 

(August),  the  second  a  year  later,  and  the  others  as 

provided  by  the  convention.10 

This  decision  was  received  with  regret  by  both  the 
American  minister  and  the  British  charge,  Charles  A. 
Winchester.  Mr.  Pruyn  and  Sir  Rutherford  Akock 
had,  from  the  first,  preferred  a  new  port  to  a  heavy 
indemnity;  Mr.  Pruyn  had  very  soundly  pointed  out 
that  indemnities  of  this  kind  were  really  paid  by  the 
foreign  merchants  in  enhanced  burdens  on  commerce, 
and  he  had  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  great 
Richardson  indemnity  had  been  met  in  exactly  that 
way.11  In  this  view  he  was  supported  by  Mr.  Win 
chester.12  But  as  long  as  the  Japanese  preferred  to 
pay  the  indemnity  rather  than  open  the  port,  the  powers 
could  not  insist  otherwise.  There  was  one  chance  for 
further  discussion,  and  that  lay  in  the  request  of  the 
Japanese  that  the  second  payment,  instead  of  being 

10  For.  Rel.,  1865,  III,  247. 

11  October  29,  1864.    For.  Rel.,  1864,  III,  582. 

12  April  12,  1865.     P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  15. 


THE    MIKADO    RATIFIES    THE    TREATIES  381 

made  within  three  months,  be  postponed  to  one  year 
after  the  first.  Mr.  Winchester  first  saw  the  possibili 
ties  in  this  postponement,  and  in  reporting  the  Japanese 
request  he  suggested  that  the  treaty  powers  take  ad 
vantage  of  the  long  period  between  the  first  and  second 
instalments  "  to  effect  some  arrangement  which,  by 
securing  general  advantages,  such  as  the  opening  of 
Hiogo,  or  a  revision  of  the  tariff,  will  be  compatible 
with  a  reduction  of  the  total  amount  of  the  in 
demnity."13 

The  four  representatives  considered  in  conference 
the  proposal  of  the  Roju  and  decided  to  accept  the 
first  payment,  under  reservation,  but  to  refer  to  their 
home  governments  the  question  of  altering  the  date  of 
subsequent  payments.1*  Ten  days  after  this  confer 
ence,  on  April  25,  Winchester  made  a  suggestion  to 
Earl  Russell  which  shaped  the  course  of  the  later 
negotiations.  It  was 

whether  the  deviation  proposed  by  the  Japanese  might  not 
fairly  be  made  the  basis  of  a  joint  counter-proposition  on  the 
part  of  the  foreign  co-signatories  to  take,  as  equivalent  to  the 
moiety,  or  two-thirds  of  the  indemnity,  some  such  conces 
sions  as  the  opening  of  Hiogo  on  the  ist  of  January,  1866; 
the  written  adhesion  of  the  Mikado  to  the  Treaties;  and  the 
reduction  of  import  duties,  now  levied  at  5,  6,  and  20  per  cent. 

13  Ibid.,  15. 

14  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  18.    It  should  be  remembered  that 
no  payment  was  due  until  after  the  convention  had  been  rati 
fied  by  the  powers.    It  was  not  ratified  by  the  United  States 
until  April  9,  1866. 


382  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

on  different  classes  of  goods,  to  a  uniform  rate  of  5  per  cent., 
a  change  which  would  be  a  great  convenience  to  foreign  com 
merce,  and,  by  stimulating  consumption,  would  probably  be 
attended  with  no  material  diminution  of  profit  to  the  Japanese 
revenue.15 

This  proposal  of  the  British  charge  was  in  keeping 
with  the  Anglo-American  policy  of  commercial  de 
velopment.  The  only  new  feature  was  the  reduction 
in  the  tariff,  for  the  Mikado's  ratification  had  been 
promised,  and  Hiogo  would  be  open  anyway  after 
January  i,  1868.  If  the  opening  of  Shimonoseki  or 
a  similar  port  were  considered  equivalent  to  the  entire 
indemnity,  then  these  concessions  were  surely  worth 
half  or  two  thirds  of  it.  The  Dutch  and  French  gov 
ernments,  however,  favored  the  payment  of  the  full 
amount.  It  was  now  a  question  as  to  whose  views 
should  prevail. 

At  this  time  it  was  becoming  more  and  more  evident 
that  many  of  the  daimyos  were  eager  to  have  com 
mercial  relations  with  the  foreigners,  and  that  one 
cause  of  their  hostility  to  the  Shogun  was  the  restric 
tions  placed  upon  their  trade  at  the  open  ports,  all  of 
which  were  within  the  Tycoon's  domain.  It  was  for 
this  reason  that  Mr.  Pruyn  advocated  the  opening  of 
Osaka,  where  the  daimyos  had  long  enjoyed  privileges 

15  Ibid.,  19.  Winchester  felt  that  the  payment  of  so  large 
an  indemnity  would  seriously  tax  the  impoverished  resources 
of  the  Tycoon. 

"  For.  Rel.,  1865,  III,  249. 


THE    MIKADO    RATIFIES    THE    TREATIES  383 

of  trade.16  Mr.  Winchester  believed  that  if  the 
Tycoon  would  not  agree  to  open  some  ports  in  western 
Japan  the  daimyos  would  open  them  themselves,  and 
the  conduct  of  Choshiu  in  purchasing  supplies  from 
Shanghai  was  cited  as  a  case  in  point.17  On  several 
occasions  he  pointed  out  to  officials  from  Yedo  the 
folly  of  trying  to  bar  the  daimyos  from  foreign  trade, 
and  even  stated  that  Great  Britain  had  the  right  to  deal 
directly  with  the  feudatories,  but  had  no  intention  of 
adopting  prematurely  such  a  policy.18  Of  course  the 
object  of  these  suggestions  was  to  induce  the  Sho- 
gunate  to  open  the  desired  port  in  the  Inland  Sea. 

Early  in  May  the  American  minister,  Mr.  Pruyn, 
left  Japan  to  enjoy  a  well-earned  vacation  at  home. 
When  he  sailed  out  of  the  Bay  of  Yedo  it  was  with 
every  intention  of  returning  at  the  expiration  of  his 
leave  of  absence.  After  his  return  to  Albany  a  com 
bination  of  personal  reasons  caused  him  to  proffer  his 
resignation,  and  he  retired  from  the  diplomatic  service. 

The  career  of  Mr.  Pruyn  has  been  sketched  in  the 
preceding  pages,  but  in  this  place  a  few  words  of 
summary  might  well  be  added.  He  may  be  considered 
as  an  excellent  representative  of  the  American  diplomat 
of  his  day, — untrained  in  diplomacy,  but  well  supplied 
with  sound  judgment,  high  principles,  and  sympathetic 

17  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  24. 

18  Ibid.,  27-28. 


384  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

insight.19  His  colleague,  Sir  Rutherford  Alcock,  was 
an  excellent  British  representative,  ever  jealous  of 
British  rights  and  interests,  and  quick  to  support  or 
maintain  them.  But  Robert  H.  Pruyn,  like  Townsend 
Harris,  was  more  than  an  American  diplomat.  He 
.  could  see  more  than  American  rights  and  interests; 
his  vision  was  broad  enough  to  permit  him  to  see  the 
interests  of  Japan  as  well.  So  of  all  the  diplomats  in 
Japan  in  his  day  he  possessed  the  best  understanding 
of  the  embarrassing  problems  created  by  foreign 
affairs,  and  he  also  retained  to  the  end  the  greatest 
sympathy  for  the  Shogunate  in  its  difficulties.  His 
policy  was  a  simple  one.  He  would  maintain  the 
treaty  rights  intact,  but  he  would  not  commit  a  wrong 
to  preserve  a  right.  "Moderation  and  forbearance" 
were  the  principles  which  he  believed  would  serve  best 
in  such  unsettled  days.  Perhaps,  as  an  American,  he 
could  not  approve  of  the  threatening  attitude  of  Britain 
and  France  in  1863  because  he  realized  what  would 
have  been  the  effect  in  his  own  land  if  during  the  early 
days  of  the  Civil  War  a  similar  interference  had  been 
carried  through.20  When  he  finally  joined  Alcock  in 

19  Charles  Sumner,  chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  is  reported  to  have  said  that  Mr.  Pruyn's 
correspondence  was  unsurpassed  in  ability  by  any  other  Amer 
ican  envoy,  with  possibly  the  single  exception  of  Hon.  Charles 
Francis  Adams   (National  Cyclopedia  of  American   Biogra 
phy,  XIII,  439). 

20  Japan  was  happily  spared  a   foreign   war  at  this  time. 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  385 

the  expedition  against  Shimonoseki,  it  was  because  he 
was  convinced  that  it  would  serve  to  strengthen  the 
lawful  authority  of  the  Shogunate. 

These  principles  were  manifest  in  his  dealings  with 
the  Japanese.  In  settling  claims  he  kept  in  mind  the 
real  situation  in  Japan  and  never  sought  to  impose 
exemplary  damages,  but  was  content  merely  to  secure 
modest  sums  to  cover  reasonable  losses.  For  the 
murder  of  Mr.  Richardson,  Great  Britain  demanded 
and  received  £125,000,  and  destroyed  the  town  of 
Kagoshima;  but  for  firing  on  the  American  ship  of 
war  Wyoming  all  that  Mr.  Pruyn  asked  was  a  pro 
vision  of  annuities  for  the  families  of  the  slain  and 
for  the  wounded.  The  exaction  of  the  enormous  in 
demnity  did  not  save  the  fives  of  Major  Baldwin  and 
Lieutenant  Bird  a  year  later,  nor  did  the  modest  de 
mand  of  Mr.  Pruyn  encourage  the  Japanese  to  at 
tack  Americans  with  impunity.  In  assenting  to  the 
heavy  Shimonoseki  indemnity,  Mr.  Pruyn  did  so  in 
the  hope  that  it  would  result  in  the  opening  of  >a  port 
rather  than  in  the  payment  of  money. 

To  Mr.  Pruyn  was  due  the  recognition  by  the  Jap 
anese  of  the  principle  of  international  arbitration,  as 
well  as  the  first  proposal  that  the  treaty  powers  should 
unite  in  securing  the  Mikado's  ratification  of  the  trea- 

But  in  1857,  while  China  was1  in  the  throes  of  the  terrible 
Taiping  Rebellion,  demands  for  increased  treaty  rights  were 
made  which  resulted  in  the  war  with  Great  Britain  and  France. 


386  THE    MIKADO    RATIFIES    THE    TREATIES 

ties.  It  was  a  great  pity  that  he  could  not  have  re 
mained  in  Japan  a  few  months  longer  to  see  his  pro 
posal  carried  out.  The  credit  for  securing  the  ratifi 
cation  has  gone  to  the  man  who  executed  rather  than 
to  him  who  devised  the  plan. 

In  Mr.  Pruyn's  absence  the  legation  was  entrusted 
to  Mr.  A.  L.  C.  Portman  as  charge  d'affaires.  He 
had  first  visited  Japan  as  Dutch  interpreter  with  Com 
modore  Perry  and  returned  with  the  Japanese  em 
bassy  in  1860.  Early  in  June  he  was  able  to  move  the 
legation  once  more  to  Yedo. 

Soon  after  Mr.  Pruyn  left  Japan  the  Choshiu  prob 
lem,  which  had  been  dormant  for  several  months, 
again  became  acute.21  The  revival  was  due  to  an 
other  clan  revolution  which  this  time  put  the  old  con 
trolling  element  back  in  power.  But  although  they 
were  members  of  the  former  anti-Shogun  and  anti- 
foreign  party,  they  had  dropped  all  their  hostility  to 
ward  foreigners,  and  instead  had  doubled  their 
hatred  of  the  Shogunate.  At  this  time,  also,  a  rec 
onciliation  was  effected  between  Satsuma  and  Cho 
shiu,  at  the  instigation  of  Saigo  Kichinosuke,  the 
Satsuma  samurai  who  later  became  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  imperial  forces.  Henceforth  these  clans 
agreed  to  work  side  by  side  for  the  restoration  of  the 
Mikado  and  the  abolition  of  the  dual  government. 
When  news  of  this  coup  reached  Yedo — although  the 

21  Japan,  1853-1869,  pp.  70-76. 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  387 

agreement  'between  Satsuma  and  Choshiu  was  not 
known  at  the  time — the  Shogun  again  proclaimed  his 
intention  of  punishing  Cho'shiu,  and  called  upon  the 
vassal  daimyos  for  aid.  This  time  there  was  a  dif 
ference  of  opinion  among  the  retainers  as  to  the  wis 
dom  of  renewing  punitive  measures,  and  the  Ex-lord 
of  Owari,  who  had  commanded  the  first  expedition, 
now  urged  caution  before  proceeding  on  a  second. 
The  Shogunate  stood  firm,  however,  and  on  the  9th 
of  June  the  Shogun  left  Yedo  for  Osaka  to  direct  the 
operations  in  person. 

The  renewal  of  hostilities  caused  the  foreign  repre 
sentatives  to  consider  the  obligations  of  neutrality 
and  also  their  relations  with  Choshiu  under  the  Shi- 
monoseki  arrangements.  On  January  21  the  Roju 
complained  that  Choshiu  was  carrying  on  illicit  trade 
with  foreign  ships  in  the  straits,  and  the  ministers 
then  issued  warnings  against  their  nationals'  carry 
ing  on  trade  at  other  than  treaty  ports  or  selling 
munitions  of  war  to  others  than  the  Japanese  gov 
ernment.22  In  May  it  was  reported  that  foreign  ad 
venturers  were  flocking  to  the  support  of  Choshiu, 
and  the  notorious  General  Burgevine,  fresh  from  his 
exploits  during  the  Taiping  Rebellion,  was  said  to  be 
among  them.23  The  foreign  representatives  met  and 
signed  a  memorandum,  on  June  21,  which  was  ad- 

22  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  7. 

23  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  pp.  23,  24. 


388  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

dressed  to  the  commanders  of  their  national  naval 
forces.24  This  stated  that  although  the  commanders 
ought  to  oppose  the  rearmament  of  the  batteries  of 
Choshiu,  and  even  proceed  to  disarm  them  if  they 
should  have  been  rearmed,  yet  as  this  act  might  bring 
about  conflicts  and  complications,  they  were  requested 
to  make  such  remonstrances  as  they  deemed  appro 
priate  and  to  inform  their  respective  representatives. 
They  were  also  to  keep  the  straits  open  for  legitimate 
traffic,  and  to  lend  their  aid  in  the  repressing  of  con 
traband  trade ;  they  were  to  prevent  the  Tycoon's 
ships  from  going  too  far  in  the  prevention  of  unlaw 
ful  commercial  operations;  and  when  hostilities 
should  have  commenced  they  were  either  to  warn 
merchant  ships  or  even  to  prevent  them  from  enter 
ing  the  straits  if  there  were  actual  danger.  The  rep 
resentatives  expressed  their  desire  that  "  the  strictest 
neutrality  should  be  observed  in  all  that  concerns  the 
military  operations  between  the  Tycoon  and  the  Prince 
of  Nagato."  At  the  same  tame  Mr.  Winchester  is 
sued  an  official  notification,  based  upon  the  provisions 
of  the  treaty  and  on  the  Orders  in  Council  of  Janu 
ary  23,  1860,  warning  British  subjects  of  the  penalties 
attached  to  illicit  commerce,  especially  in  arms  and 
munitions  of  war.25 

On  the  1 8th  of  July  the  successor  of  Sir  Ruther- 

2*  For.  Rel.,  1865,  HI,  252. 

25  June  22.     P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  43. 


THE    MIKADO    RATIFIES    THE    TREATIES  389 

ford  Alcock  landed  at  Yokohama.  In  Sir  Harry 
Smith  Parkes  the  British  had  a  forceful  and  courage 
ous  representative  who  was  able  to  dominate  the  dip 
lomatic  body  during  his  eighteen  years  of  service  in 
Yedo  and  Tokyo.26  With  twenty-four  years  of  event 
ful  experience  in  China  to  draw  upon,  he  was  pre 
pared  to  take  the  leadership  among  his  colleagues,  and 
this  post  he  never  relinquished.  Thus  the  newcomer 
was  able  to  reap  the  harvest  which  his  predecessors 
had  so  laboriously  tended. 

It  now  becomes  necessary  to  follow  the  negotiations 
among  the  treaty  powers  concerning  the  wisdom  of 
accepting  the  Shimonoseki  indemnity.  In  reporting 
the  naval  success  at  Shimonoseki  and  the  terms  agreed 
to  there,  Alcock  had,  on  September  28,  1864,  asked 
for  instructions  as  to  whether  Russell  would  be  willing 
to  accept  the  opening  of  Shimonoseki  or  a  similar 
port  in  lieu  of  the  ransom  and  the  indemnity.27  Rus 
sell  had  promptly  replied,  on  December  3,  that  the 
government  would  renounce  any  money  payment  "if 
greater  or  equal  advantages  can  be  secured  by  stipu 
lations  to  be  obtaaned  from  the  Tycoon  or  the  Mi 
kado."  Russell  then  tried  to  secure  the  consent  of 
the  other  powers,  and  was  informed  by  France  and 

26  For  an  uncritical  biography  see  Dickins  and  Lane-Poole, 
Life  of  Sir  Harry  Parkes;  for  a  very  different  estimate  see 
E.  H.  House,  "  The  Martyrdom  of  an  Empire,"  in  Atlantic 
Monthly,  vol.  47,  pp.  610-623. 

27  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  126. 
26 


39O  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

the  United  States  that  their  representatives  were  en 
trusted  with  discretion  to  act  as  seemed  wise.28 

After  the  terms  of  the  convention  reached  Europe, 
France  took  the  lead,  and  announced  early  in  Janu 
ary  that  she  would  prefer  the  payment  of  the  indem 
nity  to  the  opening  of  a  port,  and  the  Netherlands 
agreed.29  But  now  Great  Britain  preferred  to  wait 
until  Alcock  had  returned  and  made  his  report.  On 
March  30  Russell  instructed  Sir  F.  Bruce  to  ask  Mr. 
Seward  what  was  the  opinion  of  the  United  States  in 
this  matter,  advising  him  at  the  same  time  of  the  dis 
agreement  between  England  and  the  two  continental 
treaty  powers. 

Before  any  agreement  could  be  reached  on  this 
question  the  Japanese  apparently  removed  it  from  the 
realm  of  discussion  by  announcing  that  they  would 
pay  the  indemnity  rather  than  open  a  port.  How 
ever,  in  requesting  a  modification  of  the  terms  of 
payment  they  at  once  opened  the  door  for  further  dis 
cussion.  Earl  Russell,  on  June  21,  instructed  the 

28  P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  pp.  136,  147. 

29  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  i.    These  reasons  were  advanced 
by  M.   Drouyn  de  Lhuys,   the  French  minister  for  foreign 
affairs :  "  In  the  first  place  that  Shimonasaki  was  no  port  at 
all,  but  an  open  roadstead,  not  always  safe;  secondly,  that 
the  port  of  Osaca,  not  a  great  way  off,  must,  according  to 
Treaty,  soon  be  opened;  and,  thirdly,  that  money  was  a  sub 
stantial  penalty  which  once  received  could  not  be  recalled, 
whereas   permission   to   trade   at   Shimonasaki   might   be   re 
scinded  at  any  moment."    See  also  For.  Rel.,  1865,  II,  353- 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  39! 

three  British  ministers  to  notify  the  treaty  powers  to 
which  they  were  accredited  that  the  British  govern 
ment  believed  the  whole  amount  of  the  indemnity 
ought  to  be  paid  in  i866.30  In  this  view  support  was 
received  from  France  and  the  Netherlands. 

On  July  6,  however,  Earl  Russell  received  Mr. 
Winchester's  despatch  of  April  25,  which  suggested 
the  waiving  of  half  or  two  thirds  of  the  indemnity  in 
return  for  the  opening  of  Hiogo,  the  written  adhesion 
of  the  Mikado  to  the  treaties,  and  the  reduction  of 
the  import  duties.  He  at  once  instructed  the  minis 
ters  abroad  to  take  up  this  proposal  with  the  respec 
tive  governments.31  If  the  Shogun  would  not  accept 
these  terms,  then  the  indemnity  was  to  be  promptly 
paid,  the  final  instalment  being  due  on  October  i, 
1866.  If  he  would  accept  neither  of  these  conditions, 
the  concessions  made  in  1862  should  be  withdrawn, 
and  the  opening  of  Osaka  and  Hiogo  from  January 
i,  1866,  should  be  insisted  upon.  If  the  powers 
agreed,  the  British  minister  in  Japan  would  be  in 
structed  to  act  in  concert  with  his  colleagues. 

The  Netherlands,  preferring  the  payment  of  the 
indemnity,  at  first  accepted  Lord  Russell's  scheme 
only  on  condition  that  the  other  powers  would  agree, 
but  later  sent  instructions  to  their  agent  in  Japan 
to  act  as  Russell  suggested.32  The  United  States, 

so  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  17. 

81  July  12.    P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  pp.  20,  21. 

a2  Ibid.,  29,  32. 


392  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

unable  to  act  until  the  treaty  was  ratified  by  the 
Senate,  was  still  disposed  to  concur  nominally  and 
cooperate  in  the  plans  proposed  by  Great  Britain.38 
The  French  government  continued  to  prefer  the  in 
demnity  ;  in  fact  it  held  that  the  powers  had  no  choice 
in  the  matter  as  long  as  Japan  offered  to  pay.34  As 
to  the  proposed  delay,  it  thought  the  ministers  on  the 
ground  could  determine  best  whether  the  delay  should 
be  accorded.35  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  also  took  up  the 
question  of  the  distribution  of  the  indemnity.  He 
believed  that  the  "moral  influence"  pointed  out  by 
the  Americans  should  be  considered,  and  his  proposed 
division  called  for  $2,000,000  to  be  distributed  on  the 
basis  of  the  forces  employed,  $420,000  to  France,  the 
United  States,  and  the  Netherlands,  for  attacks  on 
their  flags,  and  the  balance,  $580,000,  to  be  divided 
equally.  This  refusal  of  France  to  join  with  the 
other  powers  in  revising  the  demands  prevented  the 
new  joint  action  which  Earl  Russell  had  endeavored 
to  organize.  But  what  the  foreign  minister  was  un 
able  to  bring  about  by  despatches,  Sir  Harry  Parkes 

33  August  15.    Ibid.,  48. 

34  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  30. 

35  Note  the  erroneous  interpretation  of  the  French  position 
by  Sir  Harry  Parkes  later.     Russell  sent  a  summary  of  M. 
Drouyn  de  Lhuys'  despatch  to  Parkes  in  his  despatch  of  July 
26.     There   is   no   record   of    any  American   suggestion   that 
"moral  influence"  be  considered.     See   Chapter  X  for  dis 
cussion  at  the  time  the  convention  was  negotiated. 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  393 

was  quite  able  to  accomplish  through  his  forceful 
personality. 

The  instructions  which  Earl  Russell  forwarded  to 
Parkes  on  his  appointment  to  Japan  were  of  a  very 
general  nature.36  He  was,  in  brief,  to  maintain  all 
the  advantages  gained  by  the  Shimono'seki  operations 
and  to  cultivate  the  most  cordial  relations  with  his 
colleagues.  Among  the  advantages  thus  gained  were : 
"  Either  the  confirmation  of  the  Treaties  by  the  Mi 
kado,  or  the  formal  admission  that  the  Tycoon  hav 
ing,  as  the  Prince  of  Satsuma  said,  the  treaty-mak 
ing  power,  required  no  sanction  from  the  Mikado  for 
the  conclusion  and  execution  of  the  Treaties  with 
European  Powers  and  the  United  States  of  America." 
At  this  late  date  the  British  foreign  minister  was  un 
able  or  unwilling  to  appreciate  the  absolute  necessity 
of  securing  tKe  Mikado's  assent  to  the  treaties. 

After  the  French  reply  had  brought  to  a  close  the 
proposed  concert  for  the  revision  of  the  Shimonoseki 
convention,  Earl  Russell  penned  a  despatch  on  Au 
gust  23  which  actually  only  instructed  Parkes  "to 
ascertain  the  real  state  of  affairs,"  in  conjunction  with 
his  three  colleagues  and  in  communication  with  the 
Roju.37  The  despatch  pointed  out  the  contradictory 
assertions  of  the  Japanese  as  to  the  validity  of  the 
treaties,  but  maintained  that  the  British  government 

36  April  8,  1865.     P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  8. 
«7  P.p.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  36. 


394  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

had  properly  assumed  that  the  Tycoon  had  the  power 
to  conclude  them;  it  then  developed  the  view  that  the 
Tycoon's  government  had  deceived  the  treaty  powers 
in  stating  that  the  attacks  on  foreigners  were  due  to 
the  opposition  of  the  Japanese  people  and  the  ill-will 
of  some  of  the  most  powerful  daimyos,  whereas  both 
Satsuma  and  Choshiu  had  said  that  their  hostile  deeds 
were  committed  under  orders  from  the  Tycoon;  and 
it  recalled  that  the  powers  had  accepted  the  repre 
sentations  of  the  Tycoon's  government  and  had  agreed 
to  postpone  the  opening  of  some  of  the  treaty  ports, 
but  now  it  was  said  that  the  people  and  the  daimyos 
would  welcome  the  inauguration  of  trade  at  those 
places,  and  that  the  principal  daimyos  were  ready  to 
open  their  own  ports.  If  these  assertions  were  true, 
then  the  British  government  was  unwilling  to  exclude 
its  subjects  from  the  treaty  ports  upon  insufficient 
grounds.  Parkes  was  also  advised  that  his  govern 
ment  would  prefer  "a  large  and  healthy  extension  of 
commerce  "  to  the  payment  of  money  indemnities ;  but 
if  Japan  insisted  upon  the  payments,  then  they  must 
be  made  at  the  stipulated  times. 

This  despatch,  which  was  received  on  October  23, 
really  called  for  an  investigation  and  a  report,38  and 
a  man  of  less  initiative  and  assurance  would  doubt- 

38  Lord  Clarendon,  Russell's  succcessor,  was  waiting  for 
Parkes's  "report"  as  late  as  November  22  (P.P.  1866,  Com. 
76,  p.  59)- 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  395 

less  have  followed  the  letter  of  his  instructions.  Sir 
Harry  Parkes  knew,  however,  what  his  government 
desired,  and  he  proceeded  to  accomplish  it.  Basing 
his  action  upon  a  misinterpretation  of  Russell's  de 
spatch  of  July  26,  he  at  once  summoned  the  French 
and  Dutch  representatives  to  a  conference  and  easily 
convinced  them  of  the  wisdom  of  his  proposals.39 

The  Japanese  had,  true  to  their  promise  of  April, 
offered  to  pay  the  first  instalment  within  the  sixth 
month,  which  ended  on  August  20.  Although  this 
sum  was  not  due  until  after  the  representatives  had 
announced  to  the  Shogunate  the  ratification  of  the 
convention  and  the  receipt  of  their  respective  instruc 
tions,  yet  on  consultation  they  determined  to  accept 
the  first  payment.40  The  receipt,  which  was  given  on 
September  4,  expressly  stated  that  the  acceptance  of 

39  In  his  reply  to  Russell's  despatches  of  July  24  and  26  and 
August  23,  Parkes  wrote,  on  October  30,  that  he  understood 
Lord  Russell  had  arranged  with  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  that  the 
question  of  securing  other  compensations  in  return  for  the 
remission  of  two  thirds  of  the  indemnity  should  be  submitted 
to  the  four  representatives  in  Japan  "  in  order  that  they  might 
decide  on  the  course  to  be  adopted  or  to  report  to  their  Gov 
ernments  in  the  event  of  disagreement."  This  was  not  the 
case.  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  had  only  suggested  that  the  rep 
resentatives  in  Japan  should  decide  whether  to  permit  the 
Shogun  to  delay  the  payments  of  the  indemnity.  France  at 
this  time  stood  out  squarely  for  the  payment,  and  her  posi 
tion  was  reaffirmed  as  late  as  November  16  (P.P.  1866,  Com. 
76,  p.  59). 

4°  For.  Rel.,  1865,  III,  256. 


396  THE    MIKADO    RATIFIES    THE   TREATIES 

this  sum  should  not  affect  in  any  degree  the  right  of 
the  powers  to  demand,  if  they  saw  fit,  the  punctual 
payment  of  the  whole  indemnity  in  quarterly  pay 
ments  as  stipulated  in  the  convention.41  At  this  time 
Mr.  Portman  suggested  to  Mr.  Seward  that  if  he 
deemed  too  large  the  full  amount  of  $3,000,000 — "so 
much  larger  than  originally  intended" — a  portion  of 
it,  say  $500,000,  might  be  employed  in  the  improve 
ment  of  the  foreign  and  Japanese  settlements  at  the 
open  ports,  in  drainage,  street  cleaning,  and  so  on. 
"  In  no  manner  that  I  am  aware  of,"  he  added,  "  could 
any  portion  of  such  indemnity  be  employed  to  greater 
advantage  and  be  of  more  lasting^enefit  to  both  our 
political  and  commercial  relations  with  this  country."42 
In  other  words,  early  in  September  it  looked  as  if 
the  payment  of  the  indemnity  would  proceed,  with  or 
without  the  grace  desired  by  the  Shogunate.  How 
ever,  on  the  receipt  of  Russell's  despatches  Sir  Harry 
Parkes,  as  we  have  seen,  entered  into  a  conference 
with  the  two  representatives  in  Yokohama,  on  Oc 
tober  26.  He  stated  the  British  views  concerning 

41  Ibid.,  259.  Delivery  of  the  $500,000  commenced  on  Au 
gust  22,  but  as  it  was  not  possible  to  examine  more  than 
$50,000  a  day,  it  was  continued  until  September  I.  The 
money  was  at  first  deposited  in  two  of  the  foreign  banks  in 
Yokohama,  and  later  transferred  to  the  British  commissariat 
chest  there,  and  drafts  for  the  amount  were  made  available 
for  distribution  among  the  powers  in  London. 

« Ibid.,  257. 


THE    MIKADO    RATIFIES    THE    TREATIES  397 

the  remission  of  the  indemnity  and  the  three  conces 
sions  to  'be  secured  in  lieu  thereof,43  and  he  wrote, 
"  I  had  the  satisfaction  of  finding  that  these  views 
were  concurred  in  by  M.  Roches."  With  the  French 
minister  won  over  in  spite  of  his  instructions,  the  way 
was  clear.  M.  Roches  explained  that  he  had  changed 
his  views  because  he  had  not  felt  that  the  opening 
of  a  single  port,  as  mentioned  in  the  convention,  was 
a  fair  compensation  for  the  surrender  of  all  of  the  in 
demnity,  while  the  three  concessions  now  outlined 
would  be  quite  equivalent  to  two  thirds  of  it.  It 
was  understood  that  the  Tycoon  would  still  have  the 
option  of  paying  the  indemnity  or  accepting  the  new 
proposals,  but  in  the  former  case  the  payments  would 
have  to  be  punctually  made.44 

With  this  understanding  effected,  it  became  neces 
sary  to  consider  how  the  new  negotiations  might  best 
be  carried  out.  Parkes  then  suggested  that  as  the 
Tycoon  and  four  of  the  five  members  of  the  Roju 
were  at  that  time  at  Osaka,  and  as  their  return  might 
be  long  delayed  on  account  of  the  Choshiu  operations, 
it  would  be  expedient  for  the  representatives  to  pro 
ceed  there  and  discuss  with  them  the  questions  at 
issue.45  "And  it  also  occurred  to  me,"  he  wrote, 

«  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  64. 

44  As  late  as  November  16  the  French  government  felt'  that 
the  extension  of  time  asked  for  by  the  Shogtmate  should  be 
granted  (P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  59). 

45  Pruyn  had  advised  this  on  June  27,  1863,  and  Alcock  on 
October  6,  1864.     See  Chapters  VIII,  X. 


398  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

"that  whatever  result  might  attend  our  negotiations, 
the  appearance  of  a  fleet  off  Osaca  could  not  fail  to 
exercise  a  beneficial  effect  'both  on  the  Daimios  who 
surround  the  Court  of  Kioto,  and  have  had  little  op 
portunity  of  satisfying  themselves  of  our  power,  and 
also  on  the  people  generally  of  that  vicinity,  whom  it 
is  well  to  begin  to  accustom  to  the  sight  of  foreign 
visitors."46 

His  colleagues  agreed  with  this  proposal,  M.  Roches 
believing  that  their  appearance  at  Osaka  might  give 
the  Tycoon  an  excuse  for  postponing  hostilities 
against  Choshiu  and  thus  afford  another  opportunity 
of  avoiding  the  outburst  of  civil  war.  A  memoran 
dum  to  this  effect  was  promptly  drafted,  and  was 
signed  on  October  30,  on  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Portman 
from  Yedo.47  The  meat  of  this  document  was  the 
statement  that  the  four  representatives  had  agreed  to 
transfer  their  negotiations  to  Osaka  and  to  invite 
the  naval  commanders  to  proceed  there  and  to  re 
main  during  the  negotiations.  A  long  preamble  was 
designed  to  reconcile  the  divergent  instructions  of  the 

46  He  also  explained  to  Russell  "  that  Osaca  at  this  time 
would  present  more  favourable  opportunities  than  Yeddo  for 
acquiring  the  information  which  your  Lordship  instructs  me 
in  your  despatch  of  the  23d  of  August  to  procure  on  the  dis 
puted  question  of  whether  the  opening  of  Hiogo  to  foreign 
trade  involves  danger  to  the  Tycoon's  Government." 

47  For.  Rel,  1865,  III,  266-267.    French  text  in  P.P.  1866, 
Com.  76,  pp.  65-67. 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  399 

representatives  and  to  establish  the  wisdom  of  acting 
upon  the  proposals  put  forward  by  Great  Britain.48 

On  that  day  notes,  similar  in  expression,  were  ad 
dressed  to  the  Roju  by  the  four  representatives  to 
the  effect  that  they  were  about  to  proceed  to  Osaka 
to  negotiate  with  the  ministers  at  present  with  the 
Tycoon  for  the  solution  of  all  that  related  to  the  con 
vention  of  October  22,  i864.49  When  the  news  of 
the  proposed  expedition  reached  Yedo  the  sole  re 
maining  minister  of  the  Roju,  Midzuno  Idzumi-no- 
Kami,  and  a  vice-minister  hurried  to  Yokohama  on 
the  29th  and  called  upon  Parkes  and  Roches,  "  for 
the  professed  purpose  of  dissuading  us  from  the  pro 
posed  movement."50  Parkes  explained  that  "the  ob 
jects  of  the  expedition  were  strictly  of  a  friendly  na 
ture,"  and  the  Japanese  officials,  in  turn,  promised  to 
keep  order  in  Yokohama  during  their  absence.  The 
seriousness  of  the  situation  was  evident,  however, 
from  the  fact  that  this  was  the  first  time  a  member 
of  the  Roju  had  called  upon  a  foreign  minister  at  his 
own  residence. 

It  was  arranged  that  the  joint  expedition  should 
sail  from  Yokohama  on  the  first  of  November.51 

48  It  is  again  asserted  that  France  had  favored  the  settle 
ment  of  this  question  by  the  representatives  in  Japan.  See 
note  39.  Mr.  Portman  had  received  no  instructions  on  this 
subject. 

«  For.  Rel,  1865,  III,  267;  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  68. 

so  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  65. 

« Ibid.,  75-77. 


4OO  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

The  British  furnished  five  ships,  the  French  three, 
the  Dutch  one;  but,  as  had  so  frequently  happened, 
there  was  no  American  ship  of  war  available,  and  so 
the  American  charge  d'affaires  proceeded  to  Osaka 
in  the  British  frigate  Pelorus.  The  squadron  arrived 
off  Hiogo  on  the  4th,  and  the  next  day  letters  were 
sent  ashore  to  the  Japanese  ministers  at  Osaka. 
These  letters  announced  the  arrival  of  the  four  repre 
sentatives  in  the  Bay  of  Osaka  ipr  the  purpose  of 
determining  with  the  Japanese  ministers  "  certain 
questions  of  grave  importance  arising  out  of  the  Con 
vention  of  October  22,  1864."  Sir  Harry  Parkes, 
while  stating  that  the  visit  was  undertaken  in  the  most 
friendly  spirit,  spoke  of  the  long  delay  that  had  oc 
curred  since  the  signing  of  the  convention,  and  an 
nounced  that  he  and  his  colleagues  would  demand  "  a 
prompt  and  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  questions 
referred  to."  He  added : 

It  will  give  the  Undersigned  the  most  sincere  satisfaction 
to  learn  that  the  adjustment  of  these  questions  may  be  greatly 
facilitated  by  their  Excellencies  being  provided  with  the 
formal  approval  of  the  Treaties  by  His  Majesty  the  Mikado, 
which  their  Excellencies  in  October  last  admitted  to  be  essen 
tial  to  the  maintenance  of  a  good  understanding  between 
European  nations  and  Japan,  and  which  they  then  promised 
to  obtain. 

In  closing  he  took  occasion  to  say  that  he  was  accom 
panied  by  Admiral  King,  commander-in-chief  of  all 
the  naval  forces  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty  in  China 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  40! 

and  Japan,  and  that  his  letter  was  dated  from  the  ad 
miral's  flag-ship.52 

In  order  to  avoid  confusion  it  should  be  remem 
bered  that  there  really  were  no  "questions  of  grave 
importance"  arising  out  of  the  convention  of  1864. 
The  Japanese  had  done  everything  they  had  agreed 
to  do.  They  had  even  paid  the  first  instalment  of  the 
indemnity  almost  a  year  before  it  was  due.  They 
had,  to  be  sure,  asked  for  a  delay  of  some  months  in 
making  the  second  payment,  but  until  they  failed  to 
make  that  payment  their  attitude  was  absolutely  cor 
rect.  It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  conven 
tion  said  nothing  about  the  ratification  of  the  treaties 
by  the  Mikado.  The  Yedo  officials  had  agreed  that 
this  was  desirable,  but  they  had  carefully  refrained 
from  doing  more  than  promise  that  they  would  do 
their  best  to  secure  the  ratification.  The  foreign  rep 
resentatives,  backed  by  a  powerful  fleet,  at  a  time 
when  civil  war  was  threatening,  were  going  to  de 
mand  "  a  prompt  and  satisfactory  settlement "  of  new 
questions,  instead  of  any  that  had  arisen  from  the 
late  convention. 

The  Japanese  did  not  question  the  right  of  the  for 
eign  ministers  to  request  a  conference  with  the  Roju 
at  Osaka,  and  it  was  arranged  that  Abe  Bungo-no- 
Kami  would  meet  them  on  shipboard  on  the  Qth. 
He  was  unable  to  keep  the  first  appointment,  but  did 

"  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  78. 


4O2  THE   MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

appear  on  the  nth.  At  that  time  'he  conferred  with 
the  British  minister  and  the  American  and  Dutch  rep 
resentatives  on  board  the  British  flag-ship,53  and  later 
with  the  French  minister  on  his  vessel.  At  the  for 
mer  conference  considerable  discussion  centered  upon 
the  London  protocol  of  1862.  It  was  pointed  out 
that  the  postponement  of  the  opening  of  Hiogo  and 
Osaka  was  granted  on  certain  conditions.  These  had 
not  been  lived  up  to,  and  therefore  Great  Britain 
could  insist  upon  the  immediate  opening  of  those 
places.54  At  the  same  time  the  Shogun  had  asked  for 
a  postponement  of  the  date  of  paying  the  Shimonoseki 
indemnity.  The  powers  would  not  permit  "  these  re 
peated  delays  and  evasions,"  and  would  insist  upon 
punctual  payment  of  the  indemnity.  Therefore  the 
powers  offered  as  an  alternative  the  proposals 

to  remit  to  the  Tycoon  two-thirds  of  the  money  stipulated  in 
the  Convention  of  October  22,  1864,  in  return  for  the  imme 
diate  opening  of  Hiogo  and  Osacca  to  trade,  the  formal  con- 

63  Minutes  of  conference  in  For.  Rel.,  1865,  III,  268-272. 

54  On  December  19,  1863,  Russell  had  instructed  Alcock  that 
the  modifications  set  forth  in  the  London  Convention  "are 
binding  on  Her  Majesty's  Government  until  they  are  ex 
pressly  revoked"  (P.P.  1865,  Com.  57,  p.  i).  No  revocation 
had  since  been  made.  On  July  12,  1865,  Russell  informed  the 
other  powers  that  if  Japan  would  not  grant  the  new  conces 
sions  or  would  not  pay  the  indemnity  promptly,  then  the  modi 
fications  granted  in  1862  should  be  withdrawn.  But  no  action 
was  taken  on  this  proposal.  In  raising  the  question  at  Osaka 
the  representatives  went  beyond  any  instructions  they  pos 
sessed. 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  403 

sent  of  the  Mikado  to  the  treaties  and  the  regularization  of 
the  tariff  on  a  basis  of  five  per  cent.55 

It  was  pointed  out  in  support  of  these  requests  that 

in  virtue  of  the  London  Convention  of  1862,  the  opening  of 
Hiogo  and  Osacca  might  be  demanded  at  any  moment,  and 
a  revision  of  the  tariff  can  be  claimed  under  the  treaty  itself.58 
A  formal  announcement  by  the  Mikado  of  his  approval  of  the 
treaties  is,  therefore,  the  only  additional  measure  that  is  now 
asked,  and  this  is  simply  a  mark  of  friendship,  which  ought 
to  be  granted  without  hesitation,  and  which  the  Japanese  min 
isters  promised  to  obtain  upwards  of  a  year  ago. 

Lord  Abe  pointed  out  the  difficulties  of  the  Sho- 
gun's  position  which  had  caused  his  government  to 
be  unable  to  fulfil  the  conditions  of  the  London  con 
vention,  and  he  craved  the  indulgence  of  the  treaty 
powers.  He  also  maintained  that  the  opening  of 
Hiogo  and  Osaka  was  out  of  the  question  at  the  pres 
ent  time.  To  this  the  ministers  replied  that  if  the 
Shogun  would  not  open  them,  the  powers  might  insist 
upon  this  point  under  the  original  treaty,  and  then 
the  Shogun  would  have  to  open  the  ports  and  lose 
$2,000,000  as  well.  The  suggestion  was  made  that 
there  was  nothing  in  the  treaties  to  prevent  the  powers 
from  opening  trade  with  the  daimyos  at  their  own 

58  It  was  stated  that  the  representatives  had  received  in 
structions  to  insist  upon  either  payment  or  acceptance  of  the 
alternative,  a  statement  which  was  not  correct. 

58 The  tariff  was  subject  to  revision  "if  the  Japanese  Gov 
ernment  desires  it,"  after  July  I,  1863,  but  at  the  desire  of 
foreign  governments  only  after  July  i,  1872. 


404  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

ports,  if  the  Shogun  failed  to  reciprocate  their  friend 
ship  and  consideration.57 

These  demands  naturally  made  a  deep  impression 
upon  the  Japanese  minister,  and  he  asked  that  the 
conference  be  adjourned  to  the  next  day  for  their 
consideration.  At  that  time  a  messenger  reported 
that  in  order  that  the  whole  question  might  be  dis 
cussed  by  the  Tycoon  and  the  Roju  the  minister 
would  have  to  postpone  the  conference  until  the 
I4th.  On  the  latter  day  a  vice-minister  and  the  prin 
cipal  ometsuke  of  the  Tycoon  came  in  the  place  of  Lord 
Abe,  and  announced  that  although  the  Tycoon  agreed 
to  the  justice  of  the  representatives'  demands,  it 
would  take  time  for  him  to  convince  the  Mikado.58 
They  repeatedly  assured  the  ministers  that  the  Tycoon 
was  now  resolved  to  settle  once  and  for  all  the  ratifi 
cation  of  the  treaties.  But  an  audience  with  the 
Mikado  would  be  necessary,  and  so  they  asked  that 
a  delay  of  fifteen  days  be  granted  for  this  purpose. 
To  this  the  representatives  replied  that  at  most  they 
would  wait  for  eight  or  ten  days,  and  in  order  to  in 
duce  the  Shogun  to  come  to  a  prompt  decision  they 
added,  "  In  the  interval  we  may  find  it  convenient  to 
visit  Shimonoseki  or  other  places  in  the  Inland  Sea." 

57  The  treaties   designated   certain   ports  and  cities  which 
were  to  be  opened  for  trade  and  residence.    How  the  repre 
sentatives  could  propose  to  trade  at  other  places  and  still  con 
sider  the  treaties  in  force  is  a  mystery. 

58  Minutes  of  conference  in  For.  Rel.,  1865,  III,  272-274. 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  405 

Here  matters  rested  for  a  few  days.  In  Kyoto 
there  was  great  excitement.59  The  leading  Shogunate 
officials  urged  the  court  to  ratify  the  treaties,  lest  war 
between  Japan  and  the  allied  powers  ensue.60  The 
conservative  party,  however,  was  not  easily  dislodged. 
On  the  i Qth  Abe  Bungo-no-Kami  and  Matsmai  Idsu- 
no-Kami,  two  of  the  Roju,  were  dismissed  by  order 
of  the  Mikado,  and  stripped  of  their  titles.  This  news 
was  confirmed  by  messengers  sent  from  the  Roju  on 
the  2 1  st.  Believing  that  it  meant  a  reactionary  move 
ment  in  Kyoto,  the  four  representatives  promptly  ad 
dressed  identic  notes  to  the  Tycoon,  which  were 
delivered  in  Kyoto  on  the  23d.  These  notes  insisted 
that  unless  a  categorical  reply  to  the  proposals  was 
made,  in  writing,  within  the  allotted  ten  days  (which 
would  expire  on  the  24th),  they  would  consider  "that 
its  absence  denotes  a  formal  refusal  of  our  conditions 
on  your  Majesty's  part,  and  we  shall,  in  that  case,  be 
free  to  act  as  we  may  judge  convenient." 

This  letter,  with  its  scarcely  veiled  threat,  produced 
an  immediate  effect.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  24th  a 
member  of  the  Roju  and  other  officials  came  aboard 
the  flag-ship  to  announce  that  the  Mikado  had  ratified 
the  treaties  and  that  the  Tycoon  had  agreed  to  the 
downward  revision  of  the  tariff,  but  that  instead  of 

59  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  pp.  82-85 ;  For.  Rel.,  1866,  II,  189-191. 

co  Japan,  1853-69,  pp.  77-78.  For  address  of  Shogun  to 
Mikado  praying  for  ratification  of  treaties,  see  Adams,  II, 
24-27. 


406  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

opening  Hiogo  and  Osaka,  the  Tycoon  would  rather 
pay  the  full  indemnity  at  the  times  stated  in  the  con 
vention.61 

Thus  the  foreign  representatives,  acting  either  with 
out  or  in  defiance  of  instructions,  but  under  the  master 
ful  leadership  of  Sir  Harry  Parkes,  gained  two  of 
their  three  demands  without  having  to  relinquish  a 
penny  of  the  Shimonoseki  indemnity.  Naturally  the 
report  of  their  success  was  received  with  great  satis 
faction,  and  their  proceedings  met  with  the  approval 
of  their  governments.62  However,  a  careful  study  of 
the  whole  episode  serves  to  discount  the  achievement, 

61  P.P.   1866,   Com.   76,  p.   86.    The  text  of  the  Mikado's 
assent  as  communicated  by  the  Roju  to  the  foreign  repre 
sentatives  was  as  follows :  "  The  Imperial  consent  is  given 
to  the  Treaties,  and  you  will  therefore  undertake  the  neces 
sary  arrangements  in  connection  therewith"   (ibid.,  86).     In 
Japan,  1853-1869,  it  is  stated  that  at  the  time  the  consent  was 
given  the  Bakufu  was  ordered  to  revise  the  hitherto  existing 
treaties,  and  the  opening  of  the  port  of  Hiogo  was  prohibited 
(p.  78).    This  led  Sir  Ernest  Mason  Satow,  the  translator,  to 
state  in  a  note  (p.  77n)  :  "  With  characteristic  duplicity  they 
omitted  from  this  copy  the  postscript  in  which  the  opening  of 
Hiogo  was   forbidden  and  a  revision  of  the  Treaties  com 
manded.    As  there  is  no  article  in  the  Japanese  language  the 
omission  of  these  two  conditions  made  it  apparent  that  the 
Mikado  had  given  his  consent  to  the  Treaties  as  they  then 
stood,  which  was  not  his  intention."    These  orders  were  an 
nulled  by  an  imperial  decree  on  June  26,  1867,  and  Hiogo  was 
opened  at  the  stipulated  time. 

62  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  87;  For.  Rel.,  1866,  II,  199. 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES    THE   TREATIES  407 

and  leaves  but  little  credit  to  be  divided  among  the 
participants.  Once  more  the  powers  had  imposed  their 
will  upon  Japan.  Is  it  to  be  wondered  at  if  she  re 
membered  some  of  these  bitterly  learned  lessons? 
Nothing  more  was  said  about  the  opening  of  Hiogo 
and  Osaka  under  the  terms  of  the  London  convention, 
and  those  ports  were  opened  in  due  course  on  January 
i,  1868.  The  tariff  was  revised  in  1866  and  remained 
in  force  until  the  long-delayed  revision  of  1894.  Of 
greatest  immediate  value  was  the  ratification  of  the 
existing  treaties  by  the  Mikado ;  but  how  unfortunate 
it  was  that  this  essential  imperial  recognition  should 
have  been  linked  with  a  demand  for  a  downward 
revision  of  the  tariff!  The  indemnity  was  eventually 
paid  in  full,  and  the  United  States,  be  it  said  to  its 
credit,  later  returned  every  penny  of  its  share.63 

With  the  ratification  of  the  treaties  by  the  Mikado 
this  study  of  the  early  diplomatic  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  Japan  comes  to  a  convenient 
close.  As  long  as  the  treaties  remained  unratified  the 
foreign  relations  of  Japan  were  bound  to  be  unsettled. 
Foreign  affairs  could  not  be  determined  on  their  merits, 
but  became  the  football  of  domestic  politics.  Even 
after  many  of  the  daimyos  were  convinced  of  the 
wisdom  of  widening  their  relations  with  the  West, 
they  still  found  political  capital  in  the  Tycoon's  tm- 

63  See  Appendix. 


408  THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES 

authorized  dealings  with  the  foreigners.  Although 
when  Perry  arrived  few  Japanese  would  have  ques 
tioned  the  right  of  the  Shogun  to  deal  with  foreign 
affairs  as  he  pleased,  yet  with  the  weakening  of  the 
Shogunate  and  the  rise  of  the  imperial  power,  there 
were  as  few  in  1865  who  did  not  recognize  the 
Mikado's  supremacy  in  such  fundamental  matters  as 
these.  The  members  of  the  Roju  frankly  admitted 
this.  After  the  Mikado's  sanction  was  won,  the  treaty 
powers  were  freed  from  their  dangerous  dependence 
upon  the  Shogunate.  There  were  still  some  Japanese 
who  yearned  for  the  old  ways,  and  hated  the  foreign 
ers  who  desecrated  the  sacred  land  of  the  Kamis,  but 
there  was  no  powerful  party  in  the  state  whose  motto 
was  "  Honor  the  Mikado  and  expel  the  barbarians." 
So  when  the  restoration  of  the  Emperor  came  in  1868, 
it  was  a  very  easy  matter  for  direct  relations  to  be 
established  between  the  treaty  powers  and  the  new 
government. 

The  most  interesting  period  of  Japanese  foreign  re 
lations  is  that  between  1858  and  1865,  when  the  Sho 
gunate  tried  to  keep  faith  with  the  foreign  powers,  in 
spite  of  a  hostile  court  and  powerful  feudatories  ;  when 
Japan  learned  her  first  lessons  in  modern  diplomacy 
and  international  intercourse ;  and  when  the  foreign 
ministers  groped  their  way  through  the  haze  of  Japa 
nese  politics  until  they  found  in  the  Mikado  the  ulti 
mate  source  of  power  in  the  state.  In  mastering  this 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  409 

truth  American  diplomats  played  a  leading  part. 
Townsend  Harris  was  ready  to  negotiate  at  Kyoto, 
if  the  Yedo  authorities  were  unable  to  grant  his 
requests;  and  it  was  Robert  H.  Pruyn  who  first 
pointed  out  the  absolute  necessity  of  having  the  treaties 
ratified  by  the  Mikado.  And  the  latter  would  have 
made  a  joint  naval  demonstration  at  Osaka,  much  as 
Parkes  finally  arranged;  but  it  may  be  doubted  if  he 
would  have  linked  a  request  of  such  fundamental 
importance  with  demands  for  additional  commercial 
concessions. 

The  policy  of  the  United  States  during  this  period 
was  easy  enough  to  define,  but  difficult  indeed  to  carry 
out  in  the  presence  of  the  uncertainty  which  prevailed 
in  Japan.  The  American  government  insisted  that 
treaty  rights  be  maintained,  sought  no  selfish  ad 
vantage,  and  urged  the  constant  cooperation  of  the 
treaty  powers.  Because  of  the  unity  of  interest  of  all 
foreigners  in  China  and  Japan,  the  United  States 
abandoned  its  traditional  isolation  and  worked  in  con 
cert  with  the  treaty  powers  in  both  countries.  When, 
however,  treaty  concessions  were  prematurely  granted, 
America  was  willing  to  postpone  their  enjoyment.  So 
Harris  was  the  first  diplomat  to  advocate  deferring 
the  opening  of  the  additional  ports  and  cities  and  the 
first  to  receive  discretionary  power  to  grant  the  Japa 
nese  request.  There  were  also  times  when  the  Amer 
ican  representatives  could  not  support  their  colleagues, 


4io 


THE    MIKADO    RATIFIES    THE   TREATIES 


as  when  Harris  stood  alone  in  Yedo  and  when  Pruyn 
sought  to  temper  the  British  ultimatum  in  1863.  If  the 
Americans,  after  the  treaty-making  of  Perry  and 
Harris,  were  forced  out  of  their  position  of  leadership 
by  the  British  ministers,  Alcock  and  Parkes,  it  does 
not  follow  that  their  influence  was  lost.  Both  Harris 
and  Pruyn  stood  consistently  for  a  policy  of  modera 
tion  and  forbearance  in  dealing  with  the  Japanese  dur 
ing  those  troubled  years,  and  there  could  be  no  co 
operation  among  the  foreign  ministers  unless  their 
views  were  recognized.  '  If  Harris,  in  1860,  or  Pruyn, 
in  1863,  had  joined  their  colleagues  of  England  and 
France,  war  between  the  treaty  powers  and  Japan 
would  probably  have  occurred.  Yet,  when  American 
interests  were  openly  attacked  and  the  guilt  was  plain, 
the  American  minister  was  not  afraid  to  strike  with 
the  limited  means  at  his  hand.  It  was  an  American 
ship  which  fired  the  first  shot  in  defence  of  treaty 
rights ;  but  there  was  a  world  of  difference  between 
the  work  of  the  Wyoming  at  Shimonoseki  and  that 
of  the  British  squadron  at  Kagoshima  a  month  later. 

Americans,  therefore,  can  read  the  story  of  these 
days  with  pardonable  pride.  In  Perry,  Harris,  and 
Pruyn  they  find  three  worthy  representatives  of  their 
nation,  in  whose  record  there  is  scarcely  a  line  which, 
after  half  a  century,  one  would  erase.  These  men 
laid  the  foundation  of  what  has  been  termed  the 
" traditional  friendship"  of  America  and  Japan. 


THE    MIKADO   RATIFIES   THE   TREATIES  41! 

Others  builded  upon  it.  Though  some  have  tried  to 
undermine  the  edifice  so  honorably  reared,  yet  may 
it  endure  "  till  the  little  stone  grows  into  a  mighty  rock, 
thick  velveted  with  ancient  moss."  It  will  endure  if 
the  principles  of  respect  for  treaty  obligations,  mutual 
understanding,  and  unselfish  good-will  prevail  on  both 
sides  of  the  broad  Pacific. 


APPENDIX 

THE  SHIMONOSEKI  INDEMNITY 

The  history  of  the  payment  and  the  distribution  of 
the  Shimonoseki  indemnity  is  a  matter  of  some  in 
terest.  The  first  instalment,  of  $500,000,  was  paid  by 
September  4,  1865,  almost  a  year  before  it  was  due, — 
for  the  convention  of  1864  was  not  ratified  by  the 
United  States  until  April  9,  1866.  France,  which 
stood  out  for  the  payment  of  the  indemnity  in  full, 
was  anxious  to  have  the  method  of  distribution  de 
termined  by  the  four  signatories.  On  July  22  M. 
Drouyn  de  Lhuys  instructed  the  French  ministers 
abroad  to  bring  this  matter  to  the  attention  of  the 
governments  to  which  they  were  accredited.1  He  sug 
gested  that  some  consideration  be  given  to  the  moral 
influence  exercised  by  the  joint  action  of  the  powers, 
independently  of  the  force  employed,  and  he  ascribed 
this  proposal  to  "the  Americans."  According  to  Mr. 
Pruyn,  this  suggestion  first  came  from  M.  Roches,  the 
French  minister.2  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  however, 
had  no  thought  of  dividing  the  indemnity  into  four 
equal  shares.  At  most,  he  would  divide  $2,000,000 

1  P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  pp.  30-31. 

2  Pruyn  MSS.,  October  31,  1864. 

412 


THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY  413 

among  the  four  powers  in  proportion  to  the  force  they 
devoted  to  the  proceedings;  he  would  then  deduct 
$140,000  each  for  France,  the  Netherlands,  and  the 
United  States,  for  the  aggressive  acts  committed 
against  their  vessels;  and  would  divide  the  balance, 
$580,000,  among  the  four  powers  equally  on  the  basis 
of  "  moral  influence." 

In  reply  to  this  proposal  Mr.  Seward  offered  the 
suggestion  that  it  would  be  well  to  have  the  adjust 
ment  made  at  Paris,  "  as  both  England  and  France 
are  more  largely  interested  in  this  particular  matter 
than  we  are,  and  the  English  Minister  at  Paris  being  so 
near  home  can  act  under  full  instructions  from  his 
Government."3  Mr.  John  Bigelow,  the  American  min 
ister  at  Paris,  therefore  took  up  the  matter  with  the 
French  minister  for  foreign  affairs  and  with  his  col 
leagues  of  Great  Britain  and  the  Netherlands.4  Earl 
Russell  instructed  the  British  minister  that  no  steps 
could  be  taken  until  Sir  Harry  Parkes  had  reported  his 
action  under  his  instructions  of  August  23*  How 
ever,  a  week  later,  on  October  27,  Russell  gave  his  con 
sent  to  the  discussion  of  the  sole  question  of  the  dis 
tribution  of  the  indemnity.6  But  apparently  nothing 
was  done  at  this  time.  France  continued  to  press  the 
matter,  through  her  ambassador  in  London,  and, 

8  September  8.    For.  Rel,  1865,  II,  345. 

4  October  13.    P.P.  1866,  Com.  76,  p.  52. 

5  October  21.     Ibid.,  53. 
«  Ibid.,  54- 


414  THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY 

finally,  on  January  i,  1866,  the  Earl  of  Clarendon, 
who  had  succeeded  Russell  as  secretary  of  state  for 
foreign  affairs,  penned  a  despatch  to  the  British  min 
ister  in  Paris,  which  outlined  the  final  settlement.  It 
should  be  remembered  that  by  this  time  the  news  had 
reached  England  of  the  successful  negotiations  at 
Osaka,  and  that  not  only  were  two  of  the  three  de 
mands  obtained,  but  the  full  payment  of  the  indemnity 
was  pledged  as  well.  Great  Britain  could  afford  to  be 
generous,  especially  as  she  had  carried  her  point  against 
the  views  of  France. 

Clarendon's  proposal  was  to  make  allowance  for  the 
prior  claims  of  France,  Holland,  and  the  United 
States,  of  $140,000  each,  and  then  divide  the  balance 
equally,  for  the  following  reasons: 

The  United  States'  Minister  ...  is  understood  to  contend 
that  as  the  general  co-operation  of  all  the  four  Powers  must 
necessarily  have  had  great  and  equal  weight  if  not  in  the 
actual  operations  at  all  event's  in  the  measures  which  preceded 
them,  and  afterwards  in  turning  the  result  to  good  account, 
it  would  be  fair  to  look  upon  the  several  Powers  as  contrib 
uting  in  an  equal  degree  to  the  success  of  the  common  cause, 
and  therefore  as  entitled  to  share  equally  in  the  indemnity 
which  the  Japanese  Government  agreed  to  pay. 

Her  Majesty's  Government  are  not  indisposed  to  concur  in 
this  view  of  the  question.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  joint 
action  of  all  the  Powers  collectively  afforded,  and  still  affords, 
the  surest  means  of  producing  a  most  salutary  effect  on  the 
Japanese  Government  and  people,  who  would  be  only  too  glad 
to  detect  and  would  certainly  take  advantage  of  the  slightest 
indication  of  the  existence  of  a  separate  interest  among  them. 


THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY  415 

The  American  principle  of  partition  will  secure  to  France  a 
larger  share  of  indemnity  than  she  would  obtain  under  the 
principle  of  distribution  suggested  by  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys, 
while  Holland  and  the  United  States  would  be  benefited  by 
it  in  a  still  greater  degree.  England  alone  would  be  required 
to  make  a  sacrifice;  but  Her  Majesty's  Government  will  con 
sent  to  do  so,  if  only  to  mark  their  conviction  of  the  com 
munity  of  interest  which  the  four  Powers  have  in  Japan,  and 
as  an  evidence  of  their  hope  and  desire  that  that  community 
of  interest  will  be  the  principle  by  which  the  conduct  of  all 
of  them  will  invariably  be  regulated  in  that  distant  and  pecu 
liar  country.7 

In  other  words  Great  Britain  was  willing  to  waive 
a  few  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  order  to  continue 
the  cooperation  which  had  proved  so  advantageous  for 
British  trade  in  the  past.  The  credit  for  this  proposal 
belongs  to  Downing  Street  and  not  to  the  unnamed 
"United  States'  Minister."  Mr.  Pruyn  was  opposed 
to  this  great  indemnity  in  the  first  place;  M.  Roches 
had  suggested  the  consideration  of  "  moral  influence," 
but  hardly  in  place  of  the  material  force  supplied  in 
the  operations;  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  would  have 
valued  the  "moral  influence"  at  $145,000  for  each 
power;  and  Mr.  Seward  had  no  thought  of  an  equal 
division  when  he  wrote  that  the  matter  more  largely 
concerned  Great  Britain  and  France.  In  the  exchange 
of  verbal  notes  between  M.  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  and  Mr. 
Bigelow  the  credit  is  properly  ascribed  to  "  the  British 
cabinet ; "  in  fact  Mr.  Bigelow  very  properly  speaks  of 

7  P.P.  1866,  Com.  57,  PP-  73-74- 


416  THE   SHIMONOSEKI   INDEMNITY 

it  as  "the  liberal  proposal  of  the  British  cabinet."  In 
reporting  the  matter  to  Mr.  Seward  he  wrote:  "The 
liberality  of  this  proposal  places  the  United  States 
under  greater  obligations  than  any  of  the  other  treaty 
powers,  inasmuch  as  our  equitable  proportion  of  it 
was,  I  believe,  the  smallest."8  The  principle  of  parti 
tion  which  was  adopted  was  not,  therefore,  "the 
American  principle." 

This  method  of  distribution  was  accepted  by  the 
powers.  It  meant  that  $420,000  would  be  deducted 
from  the  $3,000,000,  in  order  to  provide  $140,000  each 
for  France,  Holland,  and  the  United  States.  The 
balance  would  then  be  equally  divided.  This  arrange 
ment  would  mean  that  Great  Britain,  which  furnished 
the  bulk  of  the  ships  and  men  at  Shimonoseki,  would 
receive  $645,000  as  her  share  of  the  indemnity,  while 
France,  Holland,  and  the  United  States  would  re 
ceive  $785,000  each.  No  wonder  the  world  was 
amazed  at  the  unselfishness  of  Great  Britain,  and  no 
wonder  that  within  two  years  Mr.  Seward  spoke  of 
the  first  payments  of  this  sum  as  having  been  received 
"  without  substantial  equivalent,"  and  that  the  effort 
was  inaugurated  to  secure  the  return  to  Japan  of 
America's  share. 

The  payment  of  the  indemnity  proved  to  be  a  more 
difficult  matter  than  the  Tycoon's  officials  believed, 
when  they  preferred  to  pay  the  full  amount  rather  than 

8  For.  Rel.,  1866,  I,  273-275. 


THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY  417 

anticipate  the  opening  of  Hiogo.  Instead,  this  sum, 
which  seemed  so  large  in  those  days,  hung  like  a  mill 
stone  around  the  neck  of  the  government  for  nine  full 
years.  As  the  Japanese  had  voluntarily  agreed  to 
make  the  first  payment  in  the  sixth  month  (ending 
August  20,  1865),  the  other  payments  would  fall  due 
at  three-month  intervals,  approximately  on  November 
17,  1865,  February  15,  May  15,  August  15,  and  No 
vember  15,  1866.  As  we  have  seen,  the  first  payment 
was  made  between  August  22  and  September  i,  and 
the  receipt  was  dated  September  4.  The  money  was 
deposited  in  two  of  the  foreign  banks  in  Yokohama, 
and  the  home  governments  were  consulted.  Acting  on 
the  British  suggestion,  the  sum  was  turned  into  the 
British  commissariat  chest  at  Yokohama  in  April 
following  at  the  British  official  rate  of  exchange,  45. 
3d.  to  the  dollar,  the  $500,000  amounting  to  £106,250.° 
The  sum  was  then  divided  in  London,  and  on  July  21, 
1866,  Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  the  American  min 
ister,  received  a  draft  on  the  British  treasury  for 
£27,802  is.  8d.,  the  amount  due  to  the  United  States, 
which  he  deposited  with  Baring  Brothers  and  Com 
pany  to  the  credit  of  the  secretary  of  state.10 

The  second  instalment,  which  was  due  on  Novem 
ber  17  or  20,  1865,  depending  on  whether  the  Japanese 
or  the  foreign  calendar  was  used,  was  paid  to  the 

9  For.  Rel.,  1866,  II,  201. 

10  Ibid.,  I,  151-152. 


418  THE   SHIMONOSEKI   INDEMNITY 

Oriental  Banking  Company  on  January  8,  1866,  but 
the  representatives  were  not  asked  for  an  official  re 
ceipt  until  April,  which  they  gave,  antedated  to  January 
8.11  The  delay  in  making  the  payment  was  due  in 
part  to  the  absence  of  the  foreign  ministers  from  Yedo, 
and  also  to  the  necessity  of  converting  a  large  quantity 
of  copper  cash  into  silver,  which  was  done  by  sale  in 
China  by  the  Oriental  Bank.12 

When  the  time  came  to  meet  the  third  instalment, 
the  Japanese  were  unable  to  make  payment,  and  in 
stead  gave  their  note,  which  was  paid  on  May  16. 
On  this  date,  therefore,  there  was  $1,000,000  to  the 
credit  of  the  treaty  powers  in  the  Oriental  Bank. 
Instead  of  turning  it  into  the  commissariat  chest,  the 
representatives  Hetermined  to  divide  it  and  remit  di 
rectly,  thus  securing  a  more  favorable  rate  of  ex 
change  than  the  British  official  rate.  The  $250,000 
which  fell  to  the  United  States  bought  sterling  bills 
of  exchange  for  £56,770  i6s.  8d.13  This  equal  divi 
sion  of  the  second  and  third  instalments  made  no 
provision  for  the  special  claims  of  the  United  States, 
France,  and  the  Netherlands.  In  other  words  Great 
Britain  received  $35,000  too  much ;  so  instructions 
were  sent  to  Sir  Harry  Parkes  to  pay  to  each  of  his 
three  colleagues  $11,666.66^3  on  account  of  their 

11  Ibid.,  II,  202. 

12  Ibid,  I,  286. 

"  For.  Rel,  1866,  II,  205-208. 


THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY  419 

special  allowance.14  Mr.  Van  Valkenburgh,  the  new 
American  minister,  received  this  amount  on  October 
23  and  forwarded  a  draft  for  £2673  I2s.  2d.  to 
London.15 

Before  the  third  instalment  was  actually  paid  the 
Japanese  government  applied  to  the  representatives 
for  a  postponement  of  the  remaining  three  pay 
ments.16  It  based  its  request  on  the  third  article  of 
the  convention  of  1864  which  stated  that  the  object 
of  the  treaty  powers  was  not  the  receipt  of  money 
but  the  establishment  of  better  relations  with  Japan. 
The  Mikado's  sanction  of  the  treaties,  and  the  revi 
sion  of  the  tariff  which  was  about  to  be  made,  were 
cited  as  proof  of  improved  conditions.  The  repre 
sentatives  determined  not  to  support  this  application 
until  the  negotiations  regarding  the  tariff  were  com 
pleted.  Sir  Harry  Parkes  intimated  to  the  Roju  "that 
his  recommendation  of  their  proposal  must  greatly 
depend  upon  the  spirit  in  which  they  should  meet  the 
representatives  in  these  negotiation's,"17  and  Mr.  Port- 
man  wrote  to  Mr.  Seward  that  he  would  not  hesitate 
to  recommend  the  application  if  a  fair  equivalent  had 
been  offered,  "or  if  any  equivalent,  yet  to  be  ten 
dered,  denoted  an  adhesion  to  a  permanent  liberal 

14  Ibid.,  I,  258. 

"  Ibid.,  II,  225. 

«  April  13.    Ibid.,  II,  205. 

"  For.  Rel,  1866,  I,  176. 


420  THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY 

and  friendly  policy."18  When  the  application  of  the 
Roju  reached  Mr.  Seward,  without  any  recommenda 
tion  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Portman,  he  determined  to 
take  the  matter  up  with  the  other  powers,  at  the  same 
time  expressing  the  opinion  of  the  President  that  the 
extension  ought  not  to  be  granted,  in  the  absence  of 
any  sufficient  equivalent  and  of  adequate  guarantees 
"  for  a  more  just  and  faithful  execution  of  the  trea 
ties."19  In  reply  to  his  proposal  the  British  govern 
ment  announced  that  it  would  wait  for  the  formal 
recommendation  of  the  representatives  in  Japan.20 

Here  the  matter  rested.  On  June  25  the  tariff  was 
revised  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  powers.  The  Sho- 
gunate  then  became  involved  in  its  unsuccessful  at 
tempt  to  crush  Choshiu.  On  September  19  the  Sho- 
gun  died,  and  was  succeeded  by  Hitotsubashi,  who 
had  been  a  claimant  for  the  office  in  1858.  A  few 
months  later,  on  February  3,  1867,  the  Mikado  died. 
The  representatives  at  Yedo  consulted  together,  and 
determined  to  send  notes  to  the  Roju  demanding  pay 
ment  of  the  moiety  now  long  overdue.  They  were 
willing,  however,  to  receive  the  sum  in  three  instal 
ments  on  May  15,  August  15,  and  September  I5.21 
On  May  15  the  Roju  replied  that  the  many  demands 
upon  the  treasury  had  rendered  them  unable  to  pay 

18  Ibid.,  II,  204. 

19  Ibid.,  210. 

20  For.  Rel.,  1866,  I,  176. 

21  Ibid.,  1867,  II,  29. 


THE   SHIMONOSEKI   INDEMNITY  421 

the  indemnity,  and  they  requested  an  extension  of 
two  years.  At  this  date  the  liberal  policy  manifested 
in  the  preparation  for  opening  the  remaining  treaty- 
ports  so  impressed  the  representatives  that  they  rec 
ommended  that  the  grace  be  afforded.  Thus  the  final 
payment  was  extended  until  May  15,  i869.22 

In  1868  came  the  civil  war  for  the  restoration  of 
the  Mikado,  and  the  Shogunate  passed  away.  The 
new  government  was  poverty-stricken,  nor  could  it 
enjoy  an  adequate  income  until  the  feudal  system  was 
abolished.  It  was  out  of  the  question  to  expect 
that  $1,500,000  could  be  paid  in  May,  1869.  The 
necessity  of  Japan  was  therefore  turned  to  the  ad 
vantage  of  the  powers.  Under  the  tariff  convention 
of  1866  the  duties  on  tea  and  silk  could  be  revised  on 
the  basis  of  five  per  cent  of  the  average  value  of  the 
articles  for  the  three  years  preceding.  On  June  I, 
1869,  the  representatives  admitted  that  the  duties  were 
too  low  and  agreed  that  they  should  be  raised  after 
January  i,  1870.  The  Roju,  therefore,  proposed  that 
if  the  indemnity  payment  might  be  put  over  until 
May  15,  1872,  and  interest  be  waived,  they  would 
wait  until  that  year  for  the  collection  of  the  increased 
duties.  The  sacrifice  in  loss  of  revenue  was  expected 
to  more  than  balance  the  interest  waived.  This  pro 
posal  was  at  length  accepted  by  the  powers,  and  the 
payment  was  again  postponed.23 

22  Ibid.,  37. 

234ist  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  58,  pp.  10-13. 
28 


422  THE   SHIMONOSEKI   INDEMNITY 

The  three  years  of  grace  were  years  of  storm  and 
stress  in  Japan.  The  handful  of  alert  and  forward- 
looking  leaders  who  had  restored  the  Mikado  to  an 
authority  unknown  to  his  predecessors  now  endeav 
ored  to  lay  broad  and  firm  foundations  for  the  new 
government.  In  the  fall  of  1871  feudalism  was  abol 
ished  by  imperial  decree,  and  the  transition  from  a 
feudal  to  a  centralized  state  began.  This  in  itself 
was  enough  to  tax  the  ability  of  the  new  officials. 
On  all  sides  were  demands  for  money  to  meet  the 
expenses  of  the  new  government,  while  the  revenue 
system  was  unequal  to  the  calls  upon  it.  So  in  May, 
1872,  Japan  again  craved  indulgence  in  the  payment 
of  an  indemnity,  on  which  she  had  already  paid  far 
more  than  could  have  been  fairly  claimed.  In  that 
year  took  place  the  famous  mission  of  Lord  Iwakura 
to  the  treaty  powers,  which  seemed  to  confirm  the 
liberal  and  progressive  views  of  the  new  government. 
So  matters  rested  for  over  a  year. 

In  November,  1873,  Sir  Harry  Parkes  asked  Mr. 
Bingham,  the  American  minister,  to  join  in  a  note 
requesting  the  payment  of  the  moiety  due.  Mr.  Bing 
ham  refused  to  do  so,  pending  specific  instructions, 
for  by  this  time  a  strong  movement  had  developed  in 
the  United  States  to  relieve  Japan  of  further  pay 
ments.24  In  reply  to  Bingham's  query  Mr.  Hamilton 
Fish,  secretary  of  state,  replied  that  although  the  bill 

2*  For.  Rel.,  1874,  p.  654. 


THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY  423 

to  release  Japan  from  further  payments  had  failed  in 
one  House,  and  hence  the  department  would  have  to 
consider  it  a  refusal  of  Congress  to  grant  the  remis 
sion,  yet  he  thought  it  best  npt  to  press  unduly  the 
claim  for  the  balance.25  Sir  Harry  Parkes  then  took 
up  the  matter  with  the  Japanese,  offering  a  remis 
sion  of  the  indemnity  in  return  for  further  privileges 
for  foreigners  in  the  country.  But  as  Japan  was  now 
trying  to  secure  a  revision  of  the  old  treaties  she 
was  quite  unwilling  to  grant  further  treaty  conces 
sions.26  So  she  proceeded  to  make  payments,  out  of 
borrowed  money,  to  the  three  powers  who  pressed 
for  a  settlement.  This  time  Japan  paid  the  repre 
sentatives  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  Nether 
lands  directly,  each  receiving  $125,000,  their  share 
of  the  fourth  instalment,  in  February,  1874.  This 
meant  that  Great  Britain  received  more  than  her 
proper  amount,  and  Sir  Harry  Parkes  offered 
$5833.33  to  each  of  the  other  three  representatives. 
Mr.  Bingham  declined  to  receive  this  amount  until 
instructed  to  do  so.27 

In  reply  to  this  new  query  Mr.  Fish,  on  April  20, 
instructed  Mr.  Bingham  to  accept  the  money  from 

25  Ibid.,  659. 

26  For.  Rel.,  1874,  669. 

27  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Bingham,  Sir  Harry  Parkes  stated  that 
Mr.  Bigelow  had  proposed  the  principle  of  equal  division  of 
the  indemnity.    This  was,  of  course,  an  error,  based  on  the 
statement  in  Lord  Clarendon's  despatch  already  discussed. 


424  THE   SHIMONOSEKI   INDEMNITY 

Parkes,  stating  that  if  the  other  powers  had  refrained 
from  collecting  their  portions,  the  United  States 
would  have  done  so ;  'but  as  they  had  been  paid  the 
United  States  must  expect  to  receive  its  portion,  for 
"it  has  been  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  act 
in  concert  with  European  powers  in  Oriental  mat 
ters."28 

Japan  paid  a  second  instalment  to  the  three  powers 
in  May,  and  Parkes  renewed  his  offer  to  Bingham, 
which  was  again  declined.29  On  receipt  of  the  in 
structions  of  April  20,  however,  Mr.  Bingham  ac 
cepted  the  two  sums,  and  also  informed  the  Japanese 
ministers  for  foreign  affairs  that  the  United  States 
would  expect  to  be  paid  so  long  as  the  other  powers 
had  received  their  instalments.30  Mr.  Bingham's  at 
titude  had  encouraged  the  ministers  to  believe  that 
the  United  States  would  not  insist  upon  further  pay 
ments,  'but  they  recognized  its  rights  in  the  matter, 
and  shortly  afterwards,  on  July  7,  paid  $250,000,  and 
on  August  i  paid  $125,000.  On  August  4  Sir  Harry 
Parkes  paid  over  the  excess  due  the  United  States  on 
the  sixth  and  last  instalment,  $5833.33,  and  thus  tftie 
payment  of  the  $3,000,000  was  finally  completed  after 
almost  nine  years.  Mr.  Bingham  remitted  the  vari 
ous  sums  received  from  the  Japanese  and  from 

28  Ibid.,  674- 

29  For.  Rel.,  1874,  682. 
s°  Ibid.,  686. 


THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY  425 

Parkes,  $392,499.99,  in  the  form  of  drafts  on  London 
for  £81,546  i;s.  6d.31 

It  now  becomes  necessary  to  note  what  disposition 
was  made  by  the  United  States  of  its  portion  of  this 
indemnity,  amounting  to  $785,000  Mexican.  As  we 
have  seen,  the  first  three  instalments  were  remitted  to 
London,  and  then  to  New  York.  After  allowing  for 
the  exchange  on  the  two  transactions,  and  for  the 
high  premium  on  gold,  which  ranged  from  thirty- 
four  and  one  half  to  thirty-eight  per  cent,  the  sum  of 
$392,500  Mexican  paid  by  the  Japanese  in  Yoko 
hama  amounted  to  $586,125.87  United  States  cur 
rency  in  New  York.  This  sum  was  invested  on  June 
12,  1867,  'm  United  States  10-40  (five  per  cent)  bonds 
valued  at  $585,000  at  par.32  Why  this  money  was 
not  covered  into  the  treasury  was  never  explained. 
Instead,  it  remained  as  a  special  fund  under  the  con 
trol  of  the  secretary  of  state,  and  a  similar  fund  grow 
ing  out  of  the  unexpended  balance  of  the  Chinese  in 
demnity  of  1858  was  treated  in  the  same  manner. 
As  the  semi-annual  interest  payments  were  made,  the 
sum  was  invested  in  more  bonds.  The  second  moiety 
paid  in  1874  was  invested,  $364,000  in  bonds  and 
$31,860  temporarily  in  coin.33  In  1883  the  bond  in 
vestment  reached  $1,834,600,  in  three,  three  and  a 

31  Ibid.,  694. 

82  40th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  219. 

33  47th  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Kept.  No.  120. 


426  THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY 

half,  and  four  per  cents.  By  preserving  these  in 
demnity  funds  intact  the  money  was  kept  in  mind,  as 
would  not  have  been  the  case  if  it  had  passed  into  the 
treasury.  It  was,  to  be  sure,  in  danger  of  being  used 
to  meet  dubious  claims,  but  it  also  stood  as  a  con 
stant  reminder  of  the  nation's  duty  to  both  Japan 
and  China. 

On  January  8,  1868,  Mr.  Seward  wrote  to  Mr.  N. 
P.  Banks,  dhairman  of  the  House  Committee  on  For 
eign  Affairs,  advising  him  of  the  receipt  of  this  sum 
from  the  Japanese  government,  "  without  substan 
tial  equivalent,"34  and  stating  that  it  awaited  such 
disposition  as  Congress  might  direct.  There  were 
few,  in  Congress  or  out,  who  knew  much  about  the 
origin  of  this  indemnity  fund,  and  some  time  would  be 
required  to  arouse  sufficient  public  interest  to  secure 
its  return.  But  the  presence  of  this  unclaimed  fund 
encouraged  claimants  of  all  kinds,  and  as  a  member 
said,  "the  eagles  from  all  quarters  are  gathered 
around  the  carcass."  It  must  be  said  to  the  credit 
of  Congress  that  although  questionable  measures 
passed  in  each  house,  yet  no  raid  on  the  Japanese 
indemnity  fund  was  successful.  Typical  of  these  at 
tempts  was  the  bill  which  passed  the  Senate  in  April, 
1868,  for  the  adjustment  of  the  claim  of  the  owners 
cxf  the  Monitor  for  damages  received  in  Choshiu  in 
i864.35  This  was  a  thoroughly  discreditable  claim, 

3*  40th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  93. 
as  See  Chapter  IX. 


THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY  427 

and  happily  the  House  failed  to  take  action.  In  1870 
the  House  voted  to  pay  $190,000  out  of  this  fund  to 
the  officers  and  men  of  the  Kearsarge  who  took  part 
in  the  destruction  of  the  Alabama.  The  Senate  Com 
mittee  on  Naval  Affairs  amended  the  bill  to  pay 
$160,000  to  the  crew  of  the  Wyoming  for  their  serv 
ices  at  the  destruction  of  the  Choshiu  vessels  in 
1863,  but  no  action  was  taken.  At  this  session  Ham 
ilton  Fish,  secretary  of  state,  recommended  that  the 
two  funds  be  used  to  build  legations,  post-offices, 
court-houses,  and  jails  in  the  Orient.  It  was  also 
proposed  to  establish  a  college  in  China  or  Japan, 
and  an  attempt  to  have  the  money  covered  into  the 
treasury  failed. 

In  1872  the  House  voted  to  release  Japan  from 
the  payment  of  the  balance  of  the  indemnity,  but  the 
Senate  failed  to  act.  Another  bill  provided  for  pay 
ing  certain  rent,  in  arrears  to  the  Japanese  govern 
ment,  and  also  the  rent  of  a  legation,  a  court-house, 
and  a  jail  in  Japan  out  of  the  income  from  the  fund. 
This  also  failed  in  the  Senate,  which  later  secured 
the  assent  of  the  House  to  a  bill  providing  the  pay 
ments  out  of  moneys  in  the  treasury. 

By  this  time  considerable  interest  had  been 
aroused  in  the  origin  of  the  indemnity  and  in  its 
proper  disposition.  This  was  increased  through  news 
of  the  amazing  developments  in  Japan  and  through 
the  presence  of  Lord  Iwakura's  mission  in  the  United 


428  THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY 

States.  In  1870  Professor  Joseph  Henry,  of  the 
Smithsonian  Institution,  had  advocated  the  return  of 
the  indemnity,  to  be  devoted  to  educational  purposes 
in  Japan.  Two  years  later  a  petition  was  circulated 
among  the  universities  and  in  educational  circles, 
which  was  signed  by  four  hundred  and  fifty-two  edu 
cators,  urging  Congress  to  return  the  unexpended 
balance  of  the  fund,  either  without  conditions  or  to 
be  expended  for  purposes  of  education  in  Japan. 
This  memorial  was  presented  to  the  House  by  Mr. 
Hawley  on  January  27,  1873.  At  this  session  an  at 
tempt  was  made  to  secure  the  Senate's  approval  of 
the  bill  passed  by  the  House  for  the  remission  of  the 
balance  of  the  indemnity,  but  without  success.  The 
House  now  passed  a  bill  to  pay  $125,000  out  of  the 
fund  to  the  crews  of  the  Wyoming  and  the  Tokiang, 
but  the  Senate  failed  to  act.  No  action  was  taken 
by  either  house  in  1874,  although  bills  were  intro 
duced  to  cover  the  money  into  the  treasury  and  to 
release  Japan  from  the  balance. 

In  his  annual  message  on  December  7,  1874,  Presi 
dent  Grant  submitted  the  propriety  of  using  all  or  a 
part  of  the  income  for  training  Americans  to  serve 
as  interpreters,  and  also  for  the  education  of  some 
Japanese  in  English.  As  the  indemnity  had  now  been 
paid  in  full,  the  later  proposals  dealt  with  the  amount 
which  should  be  returned  to  Japan.  In  1875  it  was 
proposed  to  return  one  half  the  amount  received.  In 


THE   SHIMONOSEKI   INDEMNITY  429 

1876  proposals  were  before  both  houses.  In  the 
Senate  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  reported  a  bill  from  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  which  called  for  the 
deduction  of  $125,000  prize  money  and  $19,956  ex 
penses  from  the  $785,000  received  from  Japan,  and 
then  the  remission  of  the  balance  with  five  per  cent 
interest.  A  provision  to  attach  a  condition  that  the 
money  be  held  in  trust  for  education  was  defeated. 
This  would  return  $785,956  to  Japan,  and  cover 
$473,000  into  the  treasury.  In  the  debate  on  this  bill 
Senator  Thurman  made  the  objection  that  the  govern 
ment  never  paid  interest  on  claims ;  and  although  his 
amendment  to  this  effect  was  defeated,  it  was  later 
carried  when  presented  by  Senator  Sherman.  As 
passed  in  the  Senate  this  bill  called  for  the  payment 
to  Japan  of  $640,054.  In  the  House  the  bill  was 
merely  referred  to  the  appropriate  committee. 

Although  various  propositions  were  'before  the  next 
Congresses  there  was  no  legislation.  In  his  message 
on  December  i,  1879,  President  Hayes  recommended 
that  if  any  part  of  the  two  indemnity  funds  was  due 
to  citizens  of  the  United  States,  they  should  receive 
it  promptly,  "and  whatever  may  have  been  received 
by  this  Government  in  excess  of  strictly  just  demands 
should  in  some  form  be  returned  to  the  nations  to 
whom  it  equitably  belongs."  This  recommendation 
he  repeated  the  next  year,  and  President  Arthur 
renewed  it  in  1881  and  1882. 


430  THE    SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY 

In  1 88 1  the  Senate  passed  a  very  liberal  'bill  to  de 
duct  $248,000  from  the  total  fund  and  pay  the  bal 
ance,  $1,463,224,  to  Japan.  The  sum  of  $248,000, 
which  was  arrived  at  by  taking  $140,000,  the  amount 
paid  the  United  States  for  special  damages,  with  in 
terest  at  five  per  cent,  was  to  be  paid  to  the  crews  of 
the  Wyoming  and  the  Ta-kiang.  This  bill  carried  by 
forty-six  to  six. 

The  next  year  the  House  passed,  by  an  almost 
unanimous  vote,  a  bill  of  similar  import,  to  return 
$1,516,364  to  Japan  and  pay  $254,000  to  the  crews. 
When  this  bill  reached  the  Senate  it  was  the  subject 
of  prolonged  debate.  Although  it  was  in  principle 
exactly  similar  to  the  bill  passed  by  the  Senate  at 
the  last  session,  yet  much  opposition  developed. 
Finally  an  amendment  by  Senator  Morrill,  to  pay  the 
amount  received  from  Japan,  without  interest,  and 
to  destroy  the  bonds,  prevailed.  Another  amend 
ment  reduced  the  payment  to  the  crews  to  $140,000, 
on  the  same  principle  that  the  government  did  not 
pay  interest  on  claims.  An  amendment  offered  by 
Senator  Hawley  to  repay  the  original  sum  received 
from  Japan  with  interest  at  five  per  cent  failed  by 
one  vote. 

The  House  was  unwilling  to  give  way  on  a  meas 
ure  '  which  had  won  almost  unanimous  support. 
Three  times  conference  ^committees  tried  to  recon 
cile  the  views  of  the  two  houses,  without  success. 


THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY  43! 

In  the  Senate  an  effort  was  made  to  pass  a  more  lib 
eral  bill,  which  would  meet  the  desires  of  the  House. 
No  action  resulted. 

At  the  next  session  the  conference  committee  met 
again,  and  this  time  the  House  members  receded,  and 
the  bill  as  passed  by  the  Senate  was  enacted  and  was 
signed  by  the  President  on  February  22,  1883.  It 
provided  for  the  payment  to  Japan  of  $7S5,ooo.87,36 
for  the  cancellation  of  the  bonds  known  as  the  Jap 
anese  fund,  and  for  the  payment  of  $140,000  from 
the  treasury  to  the  officers  and  crew  of  the  Wyoming 
and  the  Ta-kiang.  At  this  time  the  indemnity  fund 
amounted  to  $1,839,533.99  (of  which  $1,834,600  was 
in  bonds).  After  making  the  payment  to  Japan  and 
allowing  for  the  prize  money,  the  sum  of  $914,533.12 
remained,  which  was  covered  into  the  treasury.37 

In  this  brief  survey  no  attempt  has  been  made  to 
cite  the  numerous  articles,  in  newspapers  and  period 
icals,  and  the  many  memorials  from  chambers  of 
commerce  and  other  bodies,  which  appeared  in  favor 
of  the  return  of  the  indemnity.  Nor  have  all  the 
proposals  in  Congress  and  the  reports  of  various  com- 

36  47th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  chap.  51.  Where  the  eighty-seven 
cents  came  from  no  man  could  tell.  The  amount  named  was 
not  the  sum,  in  dollars,  received  by  the  United  States,  but  the 
sum,  in  dollars  Mexican,  paid  by  the  Japanese.  Only  the 
eighteen  men  detached  from  the  Jamestown  to  serve  on  the 
Ta-kiang  were  to  receive  the  prize  money. 

87  If  the  bonds  had  been  sold  instead  of  cancelled,  a  pre 
mium  of  about  $250,000  would  have  been  secured. 


432 


THE   SHIMONOSEKI   INDEMNITY 


mittees  been  recorded,  or  any  attempt  made  to  sum 
marize  the  debates  which  occurred  on  the  various 
measures.38  It  may  be  said  that  the  principal  reason 
why  restitution  was  not  made  long  before  was  one 
which  affects  so  much  congressional  legislation, — the 
inability  to  secure  action  in  both  houses  at  the  same 
session.  With  members  of  Congress  keenly  inter 
ested  in  political  issues  or  special  legislation,  it  was 
difficult  to  secure  proper  consideration  for  a  measure 
which  had  small  claim  upon  their  attention.  So  bills 
would  be  passed  in  one  house  and  then  be  set  aside 
for  want  of  time  in  the  other.  Rarely  did  a  member 
deny  the  justice  of  the  proposal  to  return  the  in 
demnity.  A  few,  like  Senator  Morrill,  insisted  that 
the  United  States  had  a  "  clear,  lawful,  equitable  and 
moral  right  to  the  indemnity,"  but  they  were  appar 
ently  very  few.  Most  of  the  discussion  centered  on 
the  amount  to  be  returned :  whether  it  should  be  half 
the  sum  received,  or  all  the  sum  received  without 
interest,  or  with  interest,  or  the  value  of  the  bonds, 
with  or  without  the  premium.  Some  senators  ques 
tioned  the  propriety  of  acting  in  this  matter  without 
consulting  the  other  three  treaty  powers,  but  this 
point  was  never  seriously  considered 

The  bill  which  finally  passed,  while  falling  far  short 
of  measures  which  had  secured  the  approval  of  both 

38  For  a  list  of  congressional  documents  dealing  with  the 
Shimonoseki  indemnity  see  bibliography. 


THE   SHIMONOSEKI   INDEMNITY  433 

houses  at  different  times,  was  a  very  creditable  meas 
ure.  It  represented  the  active  desire  of  Congress  to 
repair  a  wrong.  It  was  just  if  not  liberal,  in  view 
of  the  rule  that  no  interest  could  be  charged  against 
the  government.  Congress  must  be  given  credit  for 
not  diverting  any  portion  of  this  fund  to  meet  dubious 
claims  or  for  any  other  purpose,  and  for  not  relegat 
ing  the  pleas  that  justice  be  done  to  Japan  to  the 
limbo  of  valid  but  unrecognized  claims.39 

Mr.  Frelinghuysen,  secretary  of  state,  promptly 
forwarded  a  draft  to  Mr.  Bingham,  minister  to  Japan, 
and  instructed  him  to  express  to  the  minister  of  for 
eign  affairs 

the  satisfaction  which  the  President  feels  in  being  enabled  by 
this  action  of  Congress  to  carry  out  the  desire  long  enter 
tained  by  this  Government  to  return  this  money  to  Japan,  and 
that  he  does  not  doubt  but  that  it  will  be  accepted  by  that 
Government  as  an  additional  evidence,  if  such  were  needed, 
of  the  friendly  interest  felt  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  in  everything  that  concerns  the  welfare  and  progress 
of  the  people  and  Government  of  that  country.40 

39  At  the  next  Congress  was  passed  the  Act  of  March  3, 
1885,  which  returned  to  China  the  balance  of  the  Chinese  in 
demnity.  In  this  case  the  balance,  after  all  claims  were  paid, 
amounted  to  $239,165.77,  and  on  this  interest  was  allowed  at 
five  per  cent  on  the  ground  that  the  money  really  belonged  to 
China  from  the  moment  the  last  claim  was  paid.  The  amount 
returned  was  $583,400.90.  The  balance  was  covered  into  the 
treasury,  and  a  claim  for  $130,000  against  the  Chinese  gov 
ernment  was  allowed. 

*°  For.  Rel.,  1883,  p.  604. 


434  THE   SHIMONOSEKI    INDEMNITY 

Mr.  Inouye,  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  in  reply  to 
Bingham's  letter,  stated: 

It  is  a  source  of  satisfaction  to  me  to  be  able  to  assure  your 
excellency  in  reply  that  His  Imperial  Majesty's  Government 
regards  the  spontaneous  return  of  the  money  which  was  paid 
by  the  Government  of  Japan  to  that  of  the  United  States 
under  the  Convention  of  October  22,  1864,  not  only  as  an  addi 
tional  proof  of  the  friendly  disposition  of  your  excellency's 
Government,  but  as  a  strong  manifestation  of  that  spirit  of 
justice  and  equity  which  has  always  animated  the  United 
States  in  their  relations  with  Japan,  and  it  will,  I  am  con 
vinced,  tend  to  perpetuate  and  strengthen  the  mutual  confi 
dence  and  the  feeling  of  cordial  good-will  and  friendship 
which  at  present  happily  subsist  between  the  people  of  our 
respective  countries. 

On  April  23,  1883,  Mr.  Bingham  forwarded  the  en 
dorsed  draft  to  Mr.  Inouye,  and  with  this  action  the. 
United  States  returned  what  it  believed  to  be  its  full 
share  of  the  Shimonoseki  indemnity.41 

41 "  After  long  deliberation,  it  was  decided  by  our  people 
that  the  money  you  returned  to  us  should  be  expended  in  some 
work  that  would  perpetuate  in  lasting,  useful  and  visible  form 
the  good-will  of  this  country,  and  to  this  end,  the  breakwater 
in  the  harbor  of  Yokohama  testifies"  (I.  Nitobe,  The  Japa 
nese  Nation,  285).  Following  the  example  of  the  United 
States,  Japan  returned,  on  November  n,  1883,  about  400,000 
yen  of  the  indemnity  of  550,000  yen  payable  to  Korea  under 
the  convention  of  July  27,  1882.  This  sum  was  to  be  used  for 
educational  purposes  in  Korea. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

MANUSCRIPTS 

The  Private  Correspondence  of  Hon.  Robert  H.  Pruyn, 
Minister-Resident  of  the  United  States  in  Japan, 
May  i862-April  1865,  including  some  letters  from 
Sir  Rutherford  Alcock  in  the  summer  of  1864.  In 
the  possession  of  Robert  C.  Pruyn,  Esq.,  Albany, 
New  York.  Cited  as  Pruyn  MSS. 

UNITED  STATES  DOCUMENTS 

Message  from  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
communicating,  in  compliance  with  a  resolution  of 
the  Senate,  certain  official  documents  relative  to  the 
empire  of  Japan,  and  serving  to  illustrate  the  exist 
ing  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Japan. 
Pages  2-44  are  a  reprint  of  Ser.  No.  579,  No.  84. 
32d  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  59  (Ser.  No. 
620,  No.  59). 

Message  from  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
transmitting  copies  of  correspondence  between  the 
State  Department  and  the  late  Commissioner  to 
China.  33d  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  123 
(Ser.  No.  734). 

Message  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  trans- 

435 


436  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

mitting  a  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  in 
compliance  with  a  resolution  of  the  Senate  of  De 
cember  6,  1854,  calling  for  correspondence,  &c.,  rela 
tive  to  the  naval  expedition  to  Japan.  33d  Cong., 
2d  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  34  (Ser.  No.  751,  No.  34). 

Narrative  of  the  Expedition  of  an  American  Squad 
ron  to  the  China  Seas  and  Japan,  performed  in 
the  years  1852,  1853,  and  1854,  under  the  command 
of  Commodore  M.  C.  Perry,  United  States  Navy, 
by  order  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 
Compiled  from  the  original  notes  and  journals  of 
Commodore  Perry  and  his  officers,  at  his  request, 
and  under  his  supervision,  by  Francis  L.  Hawks, 
D.D.,  LL.D.  33d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No. 
79  (Ser.  Nos.  769,  770,  771).  Also  H.  Ex.  Doc., 
Ser.  Nos.  802,  803,  804,  and  Navy  Department  edi 
tion.  Cited  as  Hawks. 

Report  of  the  Commercial  Relations  of  the  United 
States  with  all  Foreign  Nations.  34th  Cong.,  ist 
sess.,  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  47  (Ser.  No.  854). 

Report  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  communicating,  in 
compliance  with  a  resolution  of  the  Senate,  the  cor 
respondence  with  the  United  States  minister  in 
Japan,  concerning  the  proposed  diplomatic  mission 
from  Japan  to  the  United  States.  36th  Cong.,  ist 
sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  25  (Ser.  No.  1031,  No.  25). 

Message  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  com 
municating  in  answer  to  a  resolution  of  the  Senate 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  437 

of  the  3Oth  ultimo,  a  report  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
relative  to  the  building  of  ships-of-war  for  the  Japa 
nese  government.  37th  Cong.,  3d  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc. 
No.  33  (Ser.  No.  1149,  No.  33). 

The  following  serial  numbers  refer  to  the  volumes 
of  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  papers  relating  to  the 
foreign  relations  or  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  United 
States,  which  were  transmitted  to  Congress  with  the 
annual  messages  of  the  Presidents.  A  uniform  cita 
tion  of  "  For.  Rel."  has  been  adopted,  rather  than 
"  Dip.  Cor."  for  the  earlier  and  "  For.  Rel."  for  the 
later  volumes. 
Dip.  Cor.,  1861,  cited  as  For.  Rel.,  1861  (Ser.  No. 

III7). 

Dip.  Cor.,  1862,  cited  as  For.  Rel.,   1862   (Ser.  No. 

1156). 
Dip.  Cor.,  1863,  cited  as  For.  Rel.,  1863   (Ser.  Nos. 

1180,  1181). 
Dip.  Cor.,  1864,  cited  as  For.  Rel.,   1864  (Ser.  No. 

1218). 
Dip.  Cor.,  1865,  cited  as  For.  Rel.,  1865  (Ser.  Nos. 

1245,  1246). 
Dip.  Cor.,  1866,  cited  as  For.  Rel.,  1866  (Ser.  Nos. 

1281,  1282). 
Dip.  Cor.,   1867,  cited  as  For.  Rel.,  1867   (Ser.  No. 

13*3). 

For.  Rel.,  1874  (Ser.  No.  1634). 

29 


438  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

For.  Rel.,  1879  (Ser.  No.  1902). 
For.  Rel.,  1883  (Ser.  No.  2181). 

John  Bassett  Moore,  LL.D.  A  Digest  of  International 
Law,  8  vols.  56th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  H.  Doc.  No.  551 
(Ser.  Nos.  4202,  4203,  4204,  4205,  4206  —  pts.  1-4). 

The  following  Congressional  Documents  deal  with 
the  Shimonoseki  indemnity: 
40th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Mis.  Doc.  No.  52  (Ser.  No. 


40th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  93  (Ser.  No. 

1332). 
40th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  H.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  219  (Ser.  No. 


41  st  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  58  (Ser.  No. 

1406). 

41  st  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Kept.  No.  250  (Ser.  No.  1409). 
41  st  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  H.  Ex.  Docs.  Nos.  51,  69,  77  (Ser. 

No.  1417). 
42d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  H.  Mis.  Doc.  No.  151  (Ser.  No. 

1526). 

42d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  H.  Kept.  No.  79  (Ser.  No.  1542). 
42d  Cong.,  3d  sess.,  H.  Mis.  Doc.  No.  74  (Ser.  No. 

1572). 
44th  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Mis.  Doc.  No.  80  (Ser.  No. 

1665). 
44th  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Kept.  No.  169  (Ser.  No.  1667). 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  439 

44th  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  H.  Mis.  Doc.  No.  24  (Ser.  No. 

1698). 

45th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Kept.  No.  378  (Ser.  No.  1790). 
46th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  H.  Kept.  No.  669  (Ser.  No.  1936). 
46th  Cong.,  4th  sess.,  S.  Rept.  No.  752  (Ser.  No.  1948). 
47th  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  S.  Rept.  No.  120  (Ser.  No.  2004). 
47th  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  H.  Rept.  No.  138  (Ser.  No. 

2065). 
47th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  S.  Mis.  Doc.  No.  20  (Ser.  No. 

2083). 

BRITISH  PARLIAMENTARY  PAPERS 

1856,  Com.  61.  (2014)  Convention  between  Her 
Majesty  and  the  Emperor  of  Japan.  Nagasaki, 
October  14,  1854. 

(2077)  Correspondence  relating  to  the  late  Nego 
tiations  with  Japan. 

1859,  2  sess.  Com.  33.     Correspondence  relating  to  the 
Earl  of  Elgin's  special  mission  to  China  and  Japan, 
1857-1859. 

1860,  Com.  69.     (2589)  Treaty  of  Peace,  Friendship 
and    Commerce    between    Her    Majesty    and    the 
Tycoon  of  Japan,  August  26,  1858. 

(2648)  Correspondence  with  Her  Majesty's  En 
voy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotenti 
ary  in  Japan. 

(2617)  Correspondence  respecting  the  Stoppage 
of  Trade  by  the  Japanese  Authorities. 


440 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


(2694)  Despatches  from  Mr.  Alcock,  Her 
Majesty's  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  in  Japan. 

1861,  Lords  18.     Correspondence  respecting  Affairs  in 
Japan,  March  and  April,  1861. 

1862,  Com.  64.     Correspondence  respecting  Affairs  in 
Japan,  July  to  September,  1861. 

1863,  Com.    74.     (3079)    Correspondence    respecting 
Affairs  in  Japan. 

1864,  Com.    66.     (3242)    Correspondence   respecting 
Affairs  in  Japan. 

(3303)  Japan.  No.  2.  (1864)  Correspondence 
respecting  Affairs  in  Japan. 

1865,  Com.  57.     (3428)  Japan.     No.  I.     (1865)  Cor 
respondence  respecting  Affairs  in  Japan. 

(3429)  Japan.  No.  2.  (1865)  Despatch  from 
Sir  R.  Alcock  respecting  the  Murder  of  Major 
Baldwin  and  Lieutenant  Bird  at  Kamakura, 
in  Japan. 

(3459)  Japan.  No.  3.  (1865)  Further  Papers 
respecting  the  Murder  of  Major  Baldwin  and 
Lieutenant  Bird,  at  Kamakura,  in  Japan. 

1866,  Com.  50.     (513)  Copies  of  Reports  made  by  the 
late  Mr.  Arbuthnot  to  the  Lords  of  the  Treasury  on 
the  subject  of  Japanese  currency,  etc. 

Com.  76.  (3625)  Japan.  No.  i.  (1866)  Cor 
respondence  respecting  Affairs  in  Japan, 
1865-66. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  44! 

TRANSACTIONS  OF  THE  ASIATIC  SOCIETY  OF  JAPAN 

Aston,   W.   G.     Russian   Descents  in   Saghalien   and 

Itorup  in  the  years  1806-1807.     Vol.  I. 
Aston,  W.  G.     H.  M.  S.  " Phaeton"  at  Nagasaki  in 

1808.     Vol.  7,  part  IV. 
Ballard,  S.     Sketch  of  the  Life  of  Watanabe  Noboru. 

Vol.  32. 
Clement,    E.    W.     The    Mito    Civil    War.     Vol.    19, 

part  II. 
Clement,  E.  W.     British  Seamen  and  Mito  Samurai  in 

1824.    Vol.  33,  part  I. 
Greene,  D.   C.     Correspondence  between  William  II 

of  Holland  and  the  Shogun  of  Japan,  A.  D.  1844. 

Vol.  34,  part  IV. 
Gubbins,  J.  H.     The  Feudal  System  in  Japan  under 

the  Tokugawa  Shoguns.     Vol.  15,  part  II. 
Mitsukuri,  K.     The  Early  Study  of  Dutch  in  Japan. 

Vol.  5,  part  I. 

Williams,  S.  Wells.     A  Journal  of  the  Perry  Expedi 
tion  to  Japan.     Vol.  37,  part  II. 

JOURNAL  OF  THE  NORTH-CHINA  BRANCH  OF  THE 
ROYAL  ASIATIC  SOCIETY 

Foote,  Capt.  A.  H.     Visit  to  Simoda  and  Hakodadi  in 

Japan.     Vol.  i. 
Van  Meerdervoort,  Thr.  J.  L.  C.     On  the  Study  of 

the  Natural  Sciences  in  Japan.     Vol.  2. 
Williams,  S.  W.     Lecture  on  Japan.     Vol.  2. 


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Adams,  F.  C.     The  History  of  Japan  from  the  Earliest 

Period  to  the  Present  Time.     2  vols.     London,  1874. 
Akimoto,    Shunkichi.      Lord    li    Naosuke    and    New 

Japan.     Translated  and  adapted  by  Shunkichi  Aki 
moto  from  the  li  Tairo  To  Kaiko  by  Katsumaro 

Nakamura.     [Tokyo]   1909. 
Alcock,  Sir  Rutherford.     The  Capital  of  the  Tycoon : 

a  Narrative  of  a  Three  Years'  Residence  in  Japan. 

2  vols.     London  and  New  York,  1863.     (Citations 

are  to  the  London  edition.) 
[Baba,  Bunyei.]     Japan,   1853-1864,  or  Genji  Yume 

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Harry  Parkes.     2  vols.     London,  1894.       (Japan, 

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Hishida,    Seiji    G.      The    International    Position    of 

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Lane-Poole,  S.     See  Dickins. 

Japan,  1853-1864.     See  [Baba,  Bunyei]. 

Japan,  1853-1869.     See  [Yamaguchi,  Uji]. 

Longford,  Joseph  H.  The  Story  of  Old  Japan. 
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Masaoka,  Naoichi,  editor.  Japan  to  America.  New 
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Michie,  Alexander.  The  Englishman  in  China  dur 
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Moore,  John  Bassett.  A  Digest  of  International 
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Nicolay,  John  G.,  and  Hay,  John.  Abraham  Lincoln : 
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Paullin,  Charles  Oscar.  Diplomatic  Negotiations  of 
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Pumpelly,  Raphael.     Across  America  and  Asia,  etc. 
3d  ed.  revised.     New  York,  1870. 
30 


446  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

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Rein,  J.  J.  Japan:  Travels  and  Researches.  2d  ed. 
New  York,  1884. 

St.  John,  Capt.  H.  C.  Notes  and  Sketches  from  the 
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Satoh,  H.  Agitated  Japan.  The  Life  of  Baron  li 
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Satoh,  Henry.  Lord  Hotta,  the  Pioneer  Diplomat 
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Satow,  Sir  E.  M.  See  Cambridge  Modern  History, 
[Baba,  Bunyei],  [Yamaguchi,  Uji]. 

Shimada,  Saburo.     See  Satoh,  H. 

Taylor,  Bayard.  A  Visit  to  India,  China,  and  Japan 
in  the  year  1853.  New  York,  1855. 

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by  Shuziro  Watanabe.  Tokyo,  1906.  (Cited  as 
Japan,  1853-69.) 


INDEX. 


Abe  Bungo-no-Kami:  374,  401,  403, 
404,  405. 

Abe  Ise-no-Kami:  18,  1911.,  53,  54, 
71,  Q8n. 

Adams,    H.    A.:     35,    50. 

Aidzu,    daimyo   of:    263,    334,    356. 

Alcock,  (Sir)  Rutherford:  British 
consul-general  and  minister,  130; 
establishes  legation  in  Yedo,  132; 
training  and  failings,  132-133; 
protests  against  opening  of  Yoko 
hama,  134;  against  new  cur 
rency,  135;  withdraws  Vyse'a 
notification,  140;  favors  heavy  in 
demnity,  146;  on  conduct  of 
foreigners,  153;  decision  in  Moss 
case,  155;  advocates  withdrawal 
from  Yedo,  162;  correspondence 
with  Harris,  163;  retires  to  Yoko 
hama,  164;  returns  to  Yedo,  167; 
on  attack  on  legation,  175,  178- 
180;  favors  postponement,  183; 
demands  reparation  for  attack  on 
legation,  185;  returns  to  Eng 
land,  1 86;  on  validity  of  treaties, 
200;  returns  to  Japan,  315;  de 
velopment  of  policy  against 
Choshiu,  317-326,  336-338;  re 
called,  338,  372n. ;  defends  con 
duct  362-363;  plan  for  con 
ciliating  Mikado  and  daimyos, 
348n.,  367;  proposes  expedition 
to  Osaka,  368. 

American:  ships  visit  Japan,  9;  com 
merce  with  China,  10;  treaty 
with  China,  10,  22;  expeditions 
to  Japan,  10;  shipwrecked  sea 
men,  n,  12,  13,  23,  25,  224; 
whalers,  n;  ships  seek  trade,  48; 


status  under  treaty  of  1857,  66; 
citizens  assaulted  by  Japanese, 
257;  ship  in  Shimonoseki  expedi 
tion,  350,  357,  361.  See  United 
States,  Legation. 

Amur:    valley,    n;    river,    76,    137. 

Ando  Tsushima-no-Kami:  wounded, 
184,  199,  234;  punished,  2i7n., 

220. 

Anglo-Chinese  war:  1839-1842,  10, 
31,  51,  76,  152;  1857-1862,  76, 
78,  38511. 

Arbitration:  proposed  by  Pruyn,  249; 
agreed  to  in  American  claims,  345, 
385;  Maria  Luz  case,  346n. 

Arisugawa;    Prince:    296. 

Armstrong,   Commodore,   76. 

Ashikaga:  family  which  held  Shogun- 
ate,  4,  263. 

Assaults:  on  Europeans,  137,  257, 
309,  321;  on  Japanese,  154;  on 
Lord  Ando,  184,  199,  234.  See 
Assassinations. 

Assassinations:  two  Russians,  138, 
154;  Chinese  servant,  139,  i43n.; 
Dankirche,  143;  two  Dutch  cap 
tains,  145;  Lord  li,  146;  Heus- 
ken,  159;  British  marines,  203; 
Richardson,  207;  at  Kyoto,  222, 
293,  296;  Japanese  guard  at 
British  legation,  229;  Lieut. 
Camus,  300;  at  Osaka,  321; 
Baldwin  and  Bird,  375. 

Aulick,    Commodore:    12. 

Awa  province:  34. 

Bakufu:  the  shogunal  government, 
see  Shogunate. 

Baldwin,  Major  George  Walter:  375, 
385- 


447 


448 


INDEX. 


Bellecourt,  Duchesne  de:  French 
minister,  supports  Alcock's  com 
plaints,  142;  on  validity  of 
treaties,  201;  believes  Shogun 
would  be  deposed,  236;  in  ac 
cord  with  British  policy,  247;  on 
expulsion  edict,  275. 

Betto:   a   groom,    196. 

Biddle,    Commodore   James:    10,    12. 

Bingham,  John  A. :  American  min 
ister  to  Japan,  422,  423,  424,  434. 

Bird,  Lieut.  Robert  Nicholas:  375, 
385. 

Bitchiu:   see   Hotta. 

Bonin    Islands:    15,    310. 

Borrodaile,    Mrs. :    207. 

Bowring,   Sir  John:   78,   83. 

British:  explorers,  9;  surveying 
ships,  10 ;  treaty  with  Siam,  56; 
indemnity  demands,  184,  227, 
238;  offer  aid  to  Shogun,  257, 
266;  demands  may  cause  war, 
263;  bombard  Kagoshima,  289; 
troops  at  Yokohama,  33$n.  See 
Great  Britain,  Legation. 

Camus,   Lieut.:  300,   305,  352. 

Censors:    49,    58,    149. 

Cheralie:    wreck    of,    224. 

Chikuzen,    daimyo  of:    219,    379. 

China:  trade  with  west,  10;  war  with 
Great  Britain,  10,  31,  51,  76, 
1S2>  38sn. ;  treaties,  10,  22; 
threatened  by  Russia,  76;  rela 
tions  with  west,  80,  no;  Tientsin 
treaties,  91,  106;  treaty  with 
Russia,  137;  merchants  from, 
152- 

Chinese:  at  Nagasaki,  2,  4,  7,  24,  41; 
hostile  to  foreigners,  49;  serv 
ants,  58;  Japanese  dislike  of,  72n. 

Choshiu  (Nagato) :  daimyo  of,  122; 
leads  anti-foreign  party,  199,  217, 
262;  war  with  Shogunate  feared, 
232;  Shogun  would  welcome 
pressure  on,  242,  282;  defends 
ronins,  263;  attacks  foreign 


vessels,  280-283;  approved  by 
Court,  294,  295;  fires  on  Sho- 
gun's  ship  and  murders  envoys, 
295;  coup  d'etat  against,  296,  302; 
fires  on  Satsuma  ship,  319;  plans 
for  punishment  of,  286,  317-326, 
335-343.  346-351;  punishment  de 
creed  by  Mikado,  331,  333; 
Russell  forbids  attack  on,  339; 
obeys  orders  in  attack  on  foreign 
ers,  342,  358,  369;  coup  at  Kyoto, 
355-357;  allied  expedition  against, 
357-361;  defence  of,  369;  puni 
tive  expedition  against,  379; 
agreement  with  Satsuma,  386; 
second  punitive  expedition  against, 
387,  420. 

Christianity:  3;  Dutch  may  practise, 
67 ;  introduction  of,  forbidden, 
68;  an  evil  religion,  147. 

Civil  War:  in  Japan,  danger  of,  232, 
259,  276,  303,  401;  attitude  of 
United  States  toward,  233,  259; 
in  1868,  421;  in  United  States, 
158,  171,  193,  196,  282,  306,  328n. 

Clarendon,  Earl  of:  394n.,  414. 

Clarke,   W.    C.:    207,    210. 

Commerce:  under  Perry's  treaty,  24; 
of  West  with  China,  29,  31;  re 
stricted  under  Russian  treaty, 
43;  in  1857,  70;  Harris  advo 
cates  free,  76,  82;  unrestricted, 
agreed  to,  84,  88,  92;  treaty 
provision  to  be  published,  129; 
official  interference  with,  166, 
206,  368;  bad  effects  of,  on  Japa 
nese,  152,  173,  301. 

Consuls:  may  be  appointed,  24,  47, 
87;  rights  of,  63,  65;  criticism 
of,  154;  refuse  to  leave  Kana- 
gawa,  159;  remove  to  Yokohama, 
169,  269. 

Cooperation  of  western  powers:  naval 
demonstration  proposed,  171,  278; 
American  ministers  instructed  to 
act  in  concert  with  colleagues, 


INDEX. 


449 


172,  203,  248,  256,  306;  at 
Osaka,  399-406;  see  Choshiu. 

Court,  imperial:  orders  expulsion  of 
Perry,  18;  receives  copies  ot 
Harris's  advice,  79;  Yedo  offi 
cials  visit,  97-103,  120-122;  dis 
pute  at,  over  heir  to  Shogunate, 
1 06;  controversy  at,  over  Shogun- 
ate  policy,  119;  temporary  con 
ciliation  of,  with  Shogunate,  123, 
125;  demand  at,  that  intercourse 
cease,  126,  213,  223,  262,  294; 
indignant  at  temporizing  policy 
of  Shogunate,  277,  294;  ap 
proves  conduct  of  Satsuma  and 
Choshiu,  295;  approves  second 
Kyoto  conference,  329. 

Court  noble;   see   Kuge. 

Crimean   war:    40. 

Currency:  Japanese  discount  Ameri 
can,  58;  Harris's  negotiations, 
61-63;  provisions  in  treaty,  88; 
export  of  Japanese,  93,  155-157; 
new,  131,  135,  152;  difficulties 
with,  166. 

Curtius,  J.  H.  Donker:  Dutch  diplo 
mat,  32,  ssn. ;  signs  treaties,  45, 
67;  seeks  new  treaty,  95,  116. 

Customs  duties:  see  Tariff. 

Daimyo:  feudal  lord,  5;  number,  6; 
fudai,  6;  tozama,  6;  compulsory 
residence  at  Yedo,  7;  favor  ex 
pulsion  of  foreigners,  17,  18; 
conference  of,  18;  to  defend 
coasts,  34,  267;  some  encourage 
western  studies,  36;  respect  old 
laws,  52;  receive  copies  of 
Harris's  advice,  79,  97;  oppose 
Harris's  treaty,  85,  96,  97;  to  "be 
consulted  about  Harris's  treaty, 
101,  102;  opinions  requested,  105, 
in,  119;  denounce  signing  of 
treaty,  125;  guard  British  lega 
tion,  159,  204;  guard  American 
legation,  196,  203;  purchase  war 
ships,  212;  demand  restriction 


of  concessions,  213;  five,  to  be 
appointed  Tairo,  215;  relieved  of 
residence  at  Yedo,  217,  221, 
364n. ;  flock  to  Kyoto,  218,  295; 
pro-foreign  punished,  220;  me 
morial  of  seven  leading,  221,  258, 
323n. ;  war  with  Shogunate  feared, 
232,  236;  must  not  escape  penal 
ties,  240;  foreign  aid  offered 
against  hostile,  257;  to  defend 
Mikado  against  British,  263; 
visited  by  court  nobles,  295; 
warned  by  Shogunate,  295,  306; 
Mikado  orders,  to  obey  Shogun, 
298,  306;  desire  trade,  382;  re 
side  at  Yedo,  364^  See  West 
ern  Daimyos. 

Dairo:   regent,   6.     See   Tairo. 

Dankirche:    Japanese   interpreter,    143. 

Deshima:  Dutch  trading  post  at  Na 
gasaki,  7,  33,  45,  62,  130,  169. 

Dual  government:  described,  4. 

Dutch:  at  Nagasaki,  2,  3,  7,  16,  24, 
31,  45,  214;  present  draft  treaty, 
15;  furnish  information  about 
West,  31-32;  influence  on  open 
ing  of  Japan,  32;  medicine,  stu 
dents  of,  35;  treaties  (1855, 
1856),  45-46,  62,  66,  92;  treaty 
(1857),  67,  85;  treaty  (1858), 
116;  merchants  at  Yokohama, 
134;  merchant  captains  slain,  145. 
See  Netherlands. 

East  India  Companies:   2,    10. 

East  India  Squadron:    12,    14,  21. 

Ebara   Soroku:    170. 

Echizen:  daimyo  of,  8r,  97,  105,  113, 
115,  215,  216,  221,  267,  334;  re 
tainers  of,  122,  356. 

Elgin,  Lord:  81,  nsn.,  116,  i29n., 
136,  160. 

Embassy,  Japanese:  to  United  States, 
127-129,  149-151,  160;  to  Europe, 
184;  signs  London  Protocol,  186; 
second,  to  Europe,  304-306,  319; 


450 


INDEX. 


signs  Paris  convention,  351; 
third  proposed,  354. 

England:  see  Great  Britain. 

Eulenburg,  Count  von:   160. 

Eusden,  Mr.:  Japanese  secretary,  245. 

Exclusion  laws:  27,  52,   126,  186,  331. 

Exclusion  policy:  adoption  of,  2; 
without  Imperial  approval,  5; 
Harris  urges  abandonment  of, 
76-79;  involved  with  domestic 
politics,  123-126;  to  be  restored, 
274;  height  of  agitation,  296. 

Expulsion  of  foreigners:  demanded  by 
ronins,  221;  decreed,  264,  272, 
274,  294,  297;  date  fixed,  267; 
cannot  be  enforced,  277;  at 
tempted  by  Choshiu,  280,  284; 
agitation  for,  weakens,  297,  328; 
letter  announcing,  recalled,  304, 
319;  not  to  be  recklessly  entered 
upon,  332;  abandoned,  408. 

Extraterritoriality:  crude  provision  in 
additional  regulations  to  Perry's 
treaty,  24n. ;  in  British  treaty 
(1854),  41;  complete  criminal,  in 
Russian  treaty  (1855),  43;  in 
Dutch  treaties  (1855-1856),  46; 
Harris  secures,  62,  65;  in  Dutch 
treaty  (1857),  67;  in  American 
treaty  (1858),  89,  92;  in  Siamese 
treaty,  s6n. 

Fisher,   Col.   George   S. :   225,   250. 

France:  in  Crimean  war,  40;  war  with 
China,  76,  38sn. ;  said  to  desire 
Korea,  76;  Tientsin  treaty,  106; 
treaty  (1858),  116;  offers  naval 
aid  to  Shogun,  257,  259,  266; 
agrees  to  policy  of  forbearance, 
325;  convention  (1864),  351; 
share  of  indemnity,  371,  392,  416; 
favors  indemnity,  382,  390,  392, 
412. 

French:  explorers,  9;  warships  visit 
Japan,  10,  20;  ship  visits 
Shimoda,  47. 

Fudai  daimyo:  6. 


Fujiwara:  a  kuge  family,  4;  Sane- 
tomi,  331. 

Fukuoka,    daimyo   of:    18. 

Fukuzawa  Yukichi:   150. 

Fuzhiwara:  officer  at  Hakodate,   49. 

Glynn,  Commander  James:   n. 

Golownin,  Captain:  34. 

Gorihama:    21. 

Gorogio:    see   Roju. 

Goten-yama:  site  of  legations,  233, 
368. 

Gotiro:    see   Tairo. 

Grand    Council:    see    Roju. 

Great  Britain:  defeats  China,  31,  51, 
76;  aggressive  designs,  76;  trade 
with  Japan,  2;  in  Crimean  war, 
40;  treaty  (1854),  41,  43;  seeks 
new  treaty,  76;  desires  Formosa, 
76;  conquers  India,  78;  cited  by 
Harris,  79;  Tientsin  treaty,  106; 
treaty  (1858),  116.  See  British. 

Gros,  Baron:  concludes  treaty  (1858), 
106,  136. 

Hakodate  (Hakodadi):  treaty  port, 
23»  87;  visited  by  Laxman,  33; 
right  of  residence  at,  65;  threat 
ened  by  Russia,  76. 

Hara-kiri:   see   Seppuku. 

Harris,  Townsend:  early  life,  55;  con 
sul  for  Japan,  56;  opinion  of 
Japanese,  57-60;  negotiations, 
1856-1857,  60-64;  isolation  of,  63; 
convention,  1857,  64;  refuses  to 
present  President's  letter  at 
Shimoda,  71;  audience  of  Sho 
gun,  73;  interview  with  Hotta, 
75-79;  advises  Japanese,  82; 
offers  draft  treaty,  84;  negotia 
tions,  1857-1858,  84-86;  treaty, 
1858,  87;  signs  treaty,  io8;{  per 
ceives  rising  influence  of  Mikado, 
124;  \  arranges  for  mission  to 
United  States,  127;  seeks  re 
ligious  toleration,  128;  minister 
resident,  129;  insists  upon  open 
ing  of  Kanagawa,  130,  134;  estab- 


INDEX. 


451 


lishes  legation  in  Yedo,  132; 
training  and  temperament,  133; 
protests  against  new  currency, 
135;  second  audience  of  Shogun, 
1 40 ;/ says  foreign  representatives 
may  negotiate  with  Mikado,  142;^ 
advises  delay  in  opening  Yedo, 
151;  on  conduct  of  foreigners, 
153;  fcvarns  colleagues,  158;!  re 
fuses  to  leave  Yedo,  162-165; 
confidence  in  Japanese  govern 
ment,  170;  advises  postponement, 
173;  on  attack  on  British  lega 
tion,  176;  secures  reparation  for 
Heusken,  183;  resigns,  188;  serv 
ices  of,  189-192,  196. 

Hatamonto:  a  direct  vassal  of  the 
Shogun  ranking  below  the 
daimyo,  149,  217,  264,  269. 

Hayashi   Daigaku-no-Kami :   98,    no. 

Hayasahi   Shibei:   33,   3sn. 

Heco,  Joseph:    143,   282n. 

Heusken,  Henry  C.  J. :  interpreter, 
American  legation,  56,  73;  mur 
der  of,  159-162,  171,  181;  repa 
ration  for  murder  of,  174,  182, 
256. 

Hideyoshi    (Toyotomi    Hideyoshi) :    5. 

Higo,    daimyo   of:    379. 

Hikone:  daimyo  of,  see  li  Naosuke, 
castle  of,  199. 

Hiogo:  treaty  port,  87,  92;  opening 
of,  381,  382,  406.  See  Post 
ponement. 

Hitachi  province:   224. 

Hitotsubashi  (Keiki,  Yoshinobu), 
Lord,  54;  claimant  for  Shogun- 
ate,  103,  105,  112;  punished,  115, 
148;  regent,  215;  goes  to  Kyoto, 
221,  232,  262,  329;  against  ex 
pulsion  of  foreigners,  222;  at 
Kyoto  conference,  262-268;  can 
not  expel  foreigners,  277;  at 
second  Kyoto  conference,  329; 


protector  of  Imperial  palace,  334; 
Shogun,  420. 

Hojo:  family  whose  members  served 
as  regents,  4. 

Hokkaido    (Yezo) :    33,    76,    80,    265. 

Holland:    see   Netherlands. 

Hori   Oribe-no-Kami:    i6on.,    i84n. 

Horton,  George:  deported  from 
Bonin  Islands,  309,  344. 

Hotta  Bitchiu-no-Kami  (Masayoshi) : 
favors  foreign  intercourse,  19,  53, 
113,  124;  encourages  western 
studies,  36;  president  of  Roju, 
54,  97;  favors  Shogun's  audi 
ence  with  Harris,  71;  interview 
with  Harris,  77-79,  83;  seeks 
Mikado's  approval  of  treaty,  99; 
favors  Hitotsubashi,  105;  dis 
missed  by  li,  112;  credit  due, 
191;  punished,  220. 

Ichibu:    silver    coin,    131,    156. 

Ido    Iwami-no-Kami:    16. 

lemitsu:  third  Tokugawa  Shogun,  in 
augurates  policy  of  exclusion, 
4;  visits  Kyoto,  215,  219,  264; 
makes  daimyos  reside  at  Yedo, 
217. 

lemochi:  fourteenth  Tokugawa  Sho 
gun,  105,  114. 

lesada:  thirteenth  Tokugawa  Shogun, 
54,  105,  115. 

leyasu:  founds  Tokugawa  Shogunate, 
3;  liberal  commercial  views,  3; 
classifies  daimyos,  6,  96. 

Iga  (Matsudaira  Iga-no-Kami) :  97, 
112. 

li  Naosuke,  Kamon-no-Kami,  daimyo 
of  Hikone:  favors  foreign  inter 
course,  19,  53,  124;  feud  with 
Lord  Nariaki,  54,  103,  148,  198; 
tairo,  104;  opposes  Hitotsubashi, 
1 06;  advocates  delay  in  signing 
treaty,  107;  assumes  responsi 
bility  for  signing  treaty,  109-112; 
dismisses  Hotta,  112;  interview 
with  Nariaki,  113;  punishes  op- 


452 


INDEX. 


ponents,  115,  197;  sends  Manabe 
to  Kyoto,  114,  118;  suggests  trial 
of  foreign  intercourse,  118;  re 
fuses  to  permit  Kujo  to  resign, 
120;  seeks  unequivocal  endorse 
ment  of  foreign  policy,  123,  125; 
hostility  to,  125;  favors  port  of 
Yokohama,  130,  134;  assassinated, 
146-149;  credit  due,  191;  estate 
reduced,  220. 

Import    duties:    see    Tariff. 

Indemnities:  Heusken,  174,  256;  Oli- 
phant  and  Morrison,  185;  British 
marines,  227,  246;  Richardson, 
238-240,  260,  268,  270,  288; 
paid,  274,  291;  for  burning 
American  legation  and  assaults, 
308-313,  345;  Lieut.  Camus,  352; 
Kienchang,  352.  See  Shimono- 
seki. 

Inland  Sea:  Shogun  to  fortify,  331; 
closed  to  commerce,  336,  338; 
navigation  not  necessary  to  for 
eign  commerce,  314,  339;  Shogun 
to  open,  338;  foreigners  to  open, 
339»  34°-  See  Shimonoseki. 

Inouye  Kaoru  (Bunda) :  235,  342, 
359,  434- 

Inouye  Shinano-no-Kami:  83,  96, 
108,  128. 

Inshiu,   daimyo  of:   219. 

Ise:    shrine   at,    103,   296. 

Ito  Hirobumi  (Shunske) :  35n.,  235, 
342,  359- 

Iwakura,    Lord:    422,    427. 

Iwase  Higo-no-Kami:   84,   99,    108. 

Japanese:  shipwrecked,  10,  33,  47, 
143;  impressed  by  Perry's  squad 
ron,  16;  alarmed  by  Russians, 
34,  355  grant  only  letter  of 
treaties,  47;  attitude  after 
Perry's  treaty,  48;  eagerness  to 
learn,  50;  Harris's  opinion  of, 
57-60;  knew  of  wars  in  China, 
81;  apparently  violate  treaty, 
134;  hostile  element  among,  136; 


regret  at  murder  of  Russians, 
138;  opposition  to  foreign  rela 
tions,  151,  173,  202;  kindly  dis 
posed  toward  Americans,  196. 

Jaures,  Rear- Admiral  C. :  248,  283, 
305,  347- 

Jo-i:    anti-foreign  party,    109. 

Kaga,    daimyo    of:    379. 

Kagoshima:  capital  of  Satsuma  fief, 
247;  bombarded  by  British,  287- 
290,  316,  323,  385. 

Kakizaki:  village  near  Shimoda,  58, 
72. 

Kamakura:    22,   375. 

Kamchatka:    33,    40. 

Kamo:   shrines  at,   264. 

Kanagawa:  treaty  port,  87,  passim; 
opening  of,  132;  Mikado  orders 
closing  of,  214. 

Karafuto  (Saghalien):  n,  34,  76,  80, 
137- 

Karo:  chief  retainers  of  a  clan,  355, 
359- 

Katsu  Awa,  Count:   149. 

Kawaji   Sayemon   no  jo:    99. 

Kawakami   Tajima:    2 ion. 

Keiki:    see    Hitotsubashi. 

Kii  (Kishiu),  daimyo  of:  54,  105, 
"3- 

King,    Admiral:    400. 

Kobang:   gold  coin,    135. 

Koku:  of  rice,  about  five  bushels,  220. 

Kokura:    clan,    284. 

Konoye:  a  court  noble,    119. 

Kuge:  court  noble,  119,  121,  122, 
214,  262,  298,  379.  , 

Kujo  Hisatada:  99,  102,  119,  120,  216. 

Kuper,  Rear-Admiral  Augustus  L. : 
236,  242,  284n.,  287-289,  3O4n., 
342,  347,  36o. 

Kurile  (Chishima)  Islands:  n,  33, 
34- 

Kuwana:  clansmen  of,  356. 

Kuze   Yamato-no-Kami:    2i7n.,    220. 

Kwambaku:  prime  minister  at  Kyoto, 
119,  214,  262. 


INDEX. 


453 


Kyoto:  residence  of  Mikado,  4, 
passim;  conference  between 
Mikado  and  Shogun  at,  262-268; 
anti-Choshiu  coup  at,  296;  second 
conference  at,  329;  second  Cho- 
shiu  coup  at,  355. 

Laxman,   Lieut.:   9,   33. 

Lease  ground,   right  to:   45,   62,  92. 

Legations:  American — established  at 
Yedo,  132;  guards  increased, 
149;  described,  195;  Japanese 
guards  at,  203;  new  site,  233, 
368;  burned,  261;  removed  to 
Yokohama,  261;  returned  to 
Yedo,  386;  indemnity  for  burn 
ing  of,  308-313,  345;  to  be  re 
built,  345;  British — established  at 
Yedo,  132;  interpreter  of,  slain, 
143;  guards  increased,  149,  159; 
attack  on,  175;  British  guards 
at  176;  reparation  for  attack  on, 
185;  new  site  for,  185,  233,  368; 
second  attack  on,  203 ;  indemnity 
for  attack  on,  227,  246;  paid, 
274;  unfinished,  burned,  234. 

Lew-Chew:    see    Ryukyu. 

Lhuys,  Drouyn  de:  French  minister 
of  foreign  affairs,  351,  39on.,  392, 
395n.,  412,  415. 

London  Protocol:  186-188,  316,  341, 
391,  402,  403,  407. 

Loo-Choo:   see  Ryukyu. 

McCluney,  Captain:  42n. 

McDougal,  Commander:  281,  283. 

Manabe  Shimosa-no-Kami :  114,  118, 
120-122,  220. 

Manchuria:    76,    80,    137. 

Marr,  Captain  de:   347. 

Marshall,    W. :    207,    210. 

Massot,   Captain:    247. 

Matsmai    Idsu-no-Kami :    405. 

Matsudaira    Hoki-no-Kami:    220.      „*•;.' 

Matsudaira    Idzumi-no-Kami:     22,0. 

Matsudaira   Iga-no-Kami:    97,    H'e^" 

Matsudaira  Shungaku:  see  Echizen. 


Matsudaira  Tamba-no-Kami:  204,  226, 
228. 

Matsumae,   daimyo   of:    34. 

Matsusaki    Michitaro:    23. 

Maxwell,    Charles    D. :    50. 

Miako:  see  Kyoto. 

Midzuno    Idzumi-no-Kami:    399. 

Mikado  (Tenno),  the  Emperor:  with 
draws  from  administration,  4; 
spoken  of  as  spiritual  emperor, 
5;  sanctions  early  treaties,  53; 
approval  of,  sought  for  Harris's 
treaty,  85,  97-103,  114,  120-122; 
(treaty  signed  without  approval  of, 
107-112;  I  approval  obtained 
(1865),  405;  approves  Kii  as  heir 
to  Shogun,  113;  conditional  ap 
proval  of  treaties,  122;  sister  of, 
marries  Shogun,  123,  198;  (grow 
ing  influence  of,  143;)  prohibits 
opening  of  ports,  214;  instruc 
tions  to  Shogun,  215,  219;  de 
sires  to  expel  foreigners,  236, 
258;  conference  with  Shogun, 
264-268;  mandate  for  expulsion 
of  foreigners,  264,  267,  297; 
forbids  payment  of  indemnity, 
271;  urged  to  take  the  field,  296; 
(Choshiu  tries  to  seize,  297,  356; 
orders  clans  to  obey  Shogun, 
298,  306;  *  approves  Shogun's 
policy,  331;  desires  punishment 
of  Choshiu,  331;  confers  full 
powers  on  Shogunate,  333;  re 
fuses  to  pardon  Choshiu,  333;) 
sanction  of  treaties  by,  desired, 
365-368,  382;  death  of,  420. 

Missionaries:    6sn.,    134,    269. 

Mito:  daimyo  of,  103,  113,  118,  119, 
145,  267,  270;  imperial  letter  to, 
119,  i2i,  148;  party,  103,  119; 
princes,  103;  claimant  to  Shogun 
ate,  105;  samurai,  147,  148; 
civil  war,  148,  378;  ronins,  147, 
158;  clan,  222,  225;  senior  prince 
of,  see  Nariaki. 


454 


INDEX. 


Mori  Daizen-no-Daibu:  daimyo  of 
Choshiu,  199;  hostile  to  Shogun- 
ate,  213;  urges  expulsion  of  for 
eigners,  262;  defends  ronins,  263; 
punished  by  Mikado,  357;  hostile 
acts  of,  370.  See  Choshiu. 

Moriyama  Yenoske:  interpreter,  60, 
63,  186. 

Morrison:   American    ship,    10,    27. 

Morrison,  Mr.:  British  consul,  174, 
184,  185. 

Moss,    Mr.:     155. 

Most  favored  nation  clause:  in 
Perry's  treaty,  24;  in  British 
treaty  (1854),  41,  92;  in  Rus 
sian  treaty  (1855),  43;  in  Dutch 
treaties  (1855-1856),  46  (1857) 
67. 

Muragake    Awaji-no-Kami:     149. 

Muravieff  (Amursky),  Count:  137, 
139. 

Nagasaki:  trade  at,  2,  7,  44-46; 
knowledge  of  west  entered  through, 
8,  31,  36;  Perry  refuses  to  visit, 
16;  Japanese  offeree  open,  28; 
under  direct  rule  of  Shogunate, 
36;  treaty  port,  41,  passim;  right 
of  residence  at,  47,  68;  Perry 
refuses  to  accept  as  treaty  port, 
62;  abandonment  suggested,  315. 

Nagato:   see  Choshiu. 

Naito    Kii-no-Kami:    2i7n.,    220. 

Nakatsu,    daimyo   of:    18. 

Nariaki,  Lord:  senior  prince  of  Mito, 
!8,  53,  54,  7i,  97,  "2,  113,  114, 
148,  198,  216,  222. 

Nariyuki:    lord    of    Kii,    105. 

Neale,  Lt.  Col.  Edward  St.  John: 
British  charge  d'affaires,  203;  on 
attack  on  legation,  205;  moderate 
measures  at  murder  of  Richard, 
son,  208;  complains  of  lack  of 
information,  224;  demands  in 
demnity,  228;  on  burning  of 
legation,  235;  asks  for  ships,  236; 
demands  indemnity  for  Richard 


son,  241-246;  extends  ultimatum, 
252,  258;  defends  British  policy, 
254;  offers  aid  to  Shogun,  257; 
initiates  coercive  measures,  272: 
on  expulsion  edict,  275;  al 
Kagoshima,  288;  moderate  views, 

Netherlands:  ship  attacked  by  Cho 
shiu,  283;  favors  attack  on  Cho 
shiu,  325;  share  of  indemnity, 
37 1»  392,  416;  on  payment  of  in 
demnity,  382,  390,  391.  Sec 
Dutch. 

Niigata:  treaty  port,  87,  92.  See 
Postponement. 

Nobunaga   (Oda  Nobunaga) :   5. 

Obama,   daimyo  of:    18. 

Ogasawara  Dzusho-no-Kami:  221,  273, 
274,  277,  293,  301,  303. 

Oguri   Bungo-no-Kami:    149. 

Ohara  Jiu-sammi:   214. 

Oliphant,  Laurence:  175,  i8in.,  183, 
184,  185. 

Opium:  importation  forbidden,  67-69, 
88;  Harris  shows  danger  of,  77; 
war,  see  Anglo-Chinese  war. 

Orders  in  Council:  183,  316,  325, 
388. 

Osaka:  open  to  residence,  87,  92; 
Mikado  forbids  opening,  214; 
Shogun's  castle  at,  199,  268,  294; 
naval  demonstration  at,  proposed, 
278;  opening  advocated,  382; 
demonstration  at,  400-406; 
opened,  407.  See  Postponement. 

Otokoyama:    shrines   at,    266. 

Ounkovsky,    Captain:    139. 

Owari,  daimyo  of:  113,  115,  118,  357, 
379,  387- 

Parkes,  Sir  Harry  Smith:  British 
minister,  389;  instructions,  393; 
arranges  for  Osaka  demonstra 
tion,  396;  on  recall  of  Alcock, 
373n. ;  at  Osaka,  400-406. 

Pembroke:   attack  on,   280;   indemnity 


INDEX. 


455 


demanded  for,  281,  310;  paid, 
345- 

Perry,  Commodore  Mathew  Calbraith: 
see  chap.  I. 

Polsbroeck,  D.  de  Graeff  van: 
Netherlands  consul-general,  301, 
302. 

Popoff,    Commodore:    139. 

Portuguese,  2,  3,  68. 

Possiet,   Commodore:   61. 

Postponement  of  opening  of  ports:  of 
Yedo,  151,  170;  requested  by 
Japanese,  173,  179;  views  of 
ministers,  183;  Japanese  refuse 
to  make  concessions  for,  185; 
agreed  to  in  London  protocol, 
1 86,  207;  agreed  to  by  United 
States,  312. 

Poutiatine,  Admiral  Count  C.  E.: 
visits  Nagasaki,  20,  34;  negotiates 
treaty  (1855),  35,  42;  (1857),  69; 
(1858),  116. 

Portman,  A.  L.  C. :  American  charge 
d'affaires,  i9Sn.,  386,  396,  398, 
419. 

President  of  the  United  States:  letter 
to  emperor,  16,  27,  29,  74;  warns 
Perry,  27;  would  insist  on  treaty 
rights,  63;  desires  treaty,  77; 
good  offices  of,  78;  to  act  as 
friendly  mediator,  87;  opposed  to 
postponement,  170;  grants  Harris 
power  to  postpone,  174;  urges 
punishment  of  assassins,  230;  ap 
proves  Pruyn's  conduct,  231. 

Price,   Capt.  Cicero:  346,  350. 

Prices:  rise  in,   152,   173. 

Prussia:    treaty  with  Japan,    160,   312. 

Pruyn,  Robert  H. :  shows  necessity 
of  securing  Mikado's  approval  of 
treaties,  124,  201,  278-279;  ap 
pointed  minister  resident,  189; 
early  life,  193;  audience  of  Sho- 
gun,  195;  difficulties  faced  by, 
196;  character  of,  201-203;  on 
attack  on  British  legation,  205; 


on  postponement,  207;  on  murder 
of  Richardson,  208;  asked  to 
purchase  ships  of  war,  212;  on 
kindness  of  Japanese,  224;  co 
operates  with  Japanese,  229;  con 
duct  approved,  229,  231;  advice 
to  Japanese,  231;  refuses  to  join 
colleagues,  232;  says  United 
States  would  aid  Shogun,  233; 
would  accept  another  legation 
site,  234;  refuses  to  leave  Yedo, 
235;  believes  Shogun  can  main 
tain  position,  236;  on  justice  of 
British  demands,  248;  urges  com 
pliance  by  Japanese,  249;  would 
recommend  arbitration,  249;  on 
military  strength  of  Japan,  250; 
enjoins  neutrality  on  Americans, 
250;  seeks  extension  of  British 
ultimatum,  251;  on  wisdom  of 
coercive  measures,  253;  reply  to 
Neale,  255;  on  the  allies'  offer 
of  aid  to  Shogun,  259;  on  burn 
ing  of  legation,  261;  suggests 
permanent  naval  force,  270;  on 
expulsion  edict,  275;  on  attack  on 
Pembroke,  281;  signs  memoran 
dum  for  joint  action  against 
Choshiu,  286;  on  conditions  at 
Yokohama,  299;  will  not  consent 
to  close  Yokohama,  302;  urges 
treaty  observance,  303;  on  em 
bassy  to  Europe,  304;  on  in 
demnities  for  burning  of  legation, 
309;  counsels  forbearance,  313, 
322;  in  accord  with  Alcock,  318; 
hopes  for  ships,  334;  signs  pro 
tocol,  336;  signs  memorandum, 
340;  settles  claims,  343~346; 
justifies  conduct,  364;  sympathy 
for  Choshiu,  369^ ;  frames  pre 
amble  for  convention,  370;  on 
division  of  indemnity,  371;  pre 
fers  new  port  to  an  indemnity, 
380,  382;  services  of,  383-386. 
Religion:  western,  factor  in  causing 


456 


INDEX. 


seclusion  policy,  2;  books  on, 
forbidden,  50,  68;  Dutch  may 
practice  Christian,  67,  92;  toler 
ance  in  United  States,  78;  free 
exercise  by  Americans,  89;  Harris 
seeks  toleration  of,  among  Japa 
nese,  128. 

Resanoff,   Count:   9,   34. 

Residence:  right  of,  47,  63,  65;  of 
daimyos  at  Yedo,  7,  218,  221, 
36411. 

Richardson,  C.  L. :  murder  of,  207, 
3?6,  385;  indemnity  for,  238-240, 
260,  268,  270,  288;  paid,  274, 
291. 

Roches,  Leon:  French  minister,  397, 
399,  412. 

Roju  (Gorogio) :  senior  ministers  of 
Shogunate,  cabinet,  council  of 
state,  grand  council,  5,  passim. 

Ronin:  literally  a  "  wave-man,"  a 
samurai  who  has  left  his  clan, 
144,  147,  158,  175,  184,  191,  197, 

198,     199,    214,    217,    221,    222,    229, 

263,  269,  296,  297,  300,  333,  355, 

375,   377- 

Russell,  Lord  (Earl)  John:  British 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  warns  Alcock,  14111.,  164; 
on  attack  on  legation  and  post 
ponement,  183;  indemnity  for 
attack  on  legation,  227;  indem 
nity  for  Richardson,  236-240,  289; 
instructs  Alcock  to  maintain  de 
fensive  policy,  315,  324,  362;  for 
bids  military  operations,  325;  re 
calls  Alcock,  338;  approves  Al- 
cock's  conduct,  363;  on  payment 
of  indemnity,  389-393;  instruc 
tions  to  Parkes,  393-394;  on  dis 
tribution  of  indemnity,  413. 

Russia:  in  Crimean  war,  40;  treaties 
(1855),  43;  (1857),  69,  92; 
(1858),  116;  Tientsin  treaty,  106; 
Emperor  of,  249,  345;  no  minister 
in  Japan,  305. 


Russians:  reach  Pacific,  8,  76;  ex 
peditions  to  Japan,  9,  20,  32-35; 
murdered  at  Yokohama,  137. 

Russian    American    Company:    9,    4on. 

Ryukyu  (Loo-Choo,  Lew-Chew)  Is 
lands:  8,  15,  20,  26,  28,  289. 

Saghalien:    see  Karafuto. 

Saigo    Kichinosuke:    386. 

Saisho:    minister  of  state,   331 

Sakai   Wookionoske:    167,   220. 

Sakai    Hida-no-Kami:   285,   369. 

Sakuma    Shozan:    35n. 

Samurai:  hereditary  warriors,  favor 
expulsion  of  foreigners,  17,  81, 
199. 

Sanction  of  treaties:  necessity  for, 
124,  201;  requested  by  Alcock, 
186,  201;  views  of  ministers,  201; 
questioned,  276;  Pruyn  urges 
Mikado's,  278;  urged  by  min 
isters,  365-367;  not  mentioned  in 
convention,  371,  401;  not  ob 
tained,  375;  suggested  in  lieu  of 
indemnity,  381;  Mikado  grants, 
405;  effect  of,  407. 

Sanjo:  Sanetsumu  (Naidaijin),  g8n., 
119,  216;  Sanetomi,  331. 

Sanke:  the  three  branches  of  the 
Tokugawa  family,  18,  53,  101, 
102,  105,  114,  118. 

San-Kin    Ko-tai    system:    218,    221. 

Saris,    Captain:    71. 

Sat-Cho-To:    217. 

Satsuma:  trade  with  Ryukyu,  8; 
daimyo  of,  81,  97,  105,  207,  240, 
267,  379;  samurai,  147;  murder 
Richardson,  207;  murder  court 
noble,  293;  leads  anti-foreign 
party,  199;  war  with  Shogunate 
feared,  232;  indemnity  from,  for 
Richardson,  239,  288;  paid,  291; 
British  attack  on,  287-290;  effect 
of,  291;  loses  favor  at  Kyoto, 
293J  approved  by  Court,  295; 
breach  with  Choshiu,  297;  de- 


INDEX. 


457 


fends  Mikado,  356;  agreement 
with  Choshiu,  386. 

Seclusion:    see    Exclusion. 

Seppuku    (hara-kiri):   97,    102. 

Seward,  William  H. :  senator,  56; 
secretary  of  state,  proposes  naval 
demonstration,  171,  248,  255,  259, 
278;  on  postponement,  174;  on 
attack  on  British  legation,  181; 
on  Harris,  190;  instructions  to 
Pruyn,  194;  on  second  attack,  230; 
on  Richardson  murder,  256;  on 
cooperation  of  treaty  powers,  306; 
on  British  demands,  306;  on  as 
saults  on  Americans,  307;  on  in 
demnity  for  burning  legation, 
308;  approves  defensive  policy, 
326;  approves  Pruyn's  conduct, 
365. 

Shimadzu  Idzumi  (Saburo) :  father 
of  daimyo  of  Satsuma,  at  Kyoto, 
199;  at  murder  of  Richardson, 
207,  209,  238;  hostile  to  Shogun- 
ate,  213;  escorts  Ohara  to  Yedo, 
214;  advocates  second  Kyoto  con 
ference,  329. 

SWmmei  Buzen-no-Kami:    149. 

Shimoda:  treaty  port,  23,  passim; 
right  of  residence  at,  48,  65; 
closed,  87;  may  be  offered  for 
Kanagawa,  214. 

Shimonoseki,  straits  of:  attack  on 
foreign  ships  at,  280;  expeditions 
against,  282-284;  closed,  284,  314; 
British  vessels  may  be  forbidden 
to  enter,  316;  allies  to  open, 
347;  Shogun  to  open,  352;  allied 
expedition  to,  357-360;  proposal 
to  open  port  there,  353,  366,  367, 
371,  380;  indemnity  for  attack  at, 
345,  352,  353,  36o,  370,  389-407, 
412-434;  illicit  foreign  trade  in, 
387. 

Shinano-no-Kami:    see    Inouye. 

Shogun:  literally  general,  the  admin 
istrative  ruler  of  Japan,  origin, 


4;  temporal  ruler,  5;  reply  to 
King  of  Holland,  15;  death  of, 
21,  115;  influence  at  Kyoto,  53; 
receives  Harris,  73,  140;  letter  to 
President,  95,  173;  appointment 
of  heir  to,  103-106,  113,  147; 
appoints  li,  Tairo,  104;  to  take 
temporary  measures  in  foreign 
affairs,  122;  marries  sister  of 
Mikado,  123,  198;  power  to  con 
clude  treaties,  123;  pledges 
security  of  ministers,  167;  re 
quests  postponement,  173,  179; 
must  go  to  Kyoto,  215,  221; 
delays  visit,  219;  promises  to 
obey  Mikado,  221;  visit  to  Kyoto, 
264-268;  United  States  would 
aid,  233;  threatened  by  Mikado, 
236;  British  and  French  offer  aid 
to,  257;  usurps  Mikado's  power, 
263;  accepts  expulsion  edict,  264; 
moderate  commission  to  Mito, 
268;  wishes  to  observe  treaties, 
273;  detained  at  Kyoto,  267,  278, 
285,  293;  returns  to  Yedo,  294; 
warned  by  court,  294;  at  second 
Kyoto  conference,  329-334;  to 
punish  Choshiu,  333,  361,  387; 
expedition  against  Choshiu  to 
strengthen,  349;  to  open  straits, 
352;  annuls  Paris  convention, 
3535  negotiations  at  Osaka,  405. 
Shogunate  (Bakufu) :  the  shogunal 
government,  5;  weakness  in  deal 
ing  with  Perry,  17;  administers 
half  of  Hokkaido,  34;  influence 
at  Kyoto,  53,  98;  pro-foreign 
policy  of,  96,  112;  to  use  own 
discretion  in  foreign  affairs,  101; 
its  foreign  policy  denounced  by 
Mikado,  102,  119;  growing  criti 
cism  of,  109;  humiliated  by 
court,  120;  seeks  understanding 
with  court,  122;  embarrassed  by 
foreign  relations,  124-126;  tem 
porizes,  125,  222,  303,  327,  365; 


458 


INDEX. 


desires  to  protect  foreigners,  126, 
151,  162,  166,  168,  178,  202,  212, 
229,  230,  268;  seeks  postpone 
ment,  173,  179;  tribute  to  Harris, 
189;  unable  to  quiet  agitation, 
199;  unable  to  arrest  Shimadzu, 
208,  211,  242;  beginning  of  end 
of,  215;  punishes  pro-foreign 
daimyos,  220;  punishes  legation 
guards,  226;  indemnity  de 
manded  of,  for  Richardson,  239; 
declines  foreign  aid,  260;  to 
negotiate  for  expulsion,  274; 
disavows  action  of  Choshiu,  281; 
envoys  murdered  by  Choshiu, 
295;  warns  daimyos  against 
hostilities,  295;  rising  influence 
at^  Kyoto,  298;  seeks  to  close 
Yokohama,  301,  304,  305;  sends 
embassy  to  Europe,  305;  receives 
full  power  from  Mikado,  333; 
secretly  approves  Shimonoseki 
expedition,  349,  351;  punishes 
assassins,  377;  sends  expedition 
against  Choshiu,  379. 

Shoshidai:  Shogun's  representative  at 
Kyoto,  263. 

Spain:    2,    3. 

Stirling,  Admiral  Sir  James:  40,  43, 
75- 

Taikun:    see    Shogun. 

Taiping  Rebellion:  20,  385^,  387. 

Tairo  (Dairo):  regent,  6,  See  li 
Naosuke,  Echizen. 

Takadzukasa:  a  court  noble,  119. 

Takano   Choei:   35. 

Takemoto  Kai-no-Kami:  348n.,  365, 
366. 

Ta-Kiang:  at  Shimonoseki,  350,  361; 
prize  money  for,  36 in.,  428,  430, 
43i. 

Tamarizume:  lords  of  the  ante 
chamber,  Yedo,  53,  54. 

Tariff:  67,  78,  88,  90-91,  93,  117,  188, 
206,  312;  revision  of,  313,  381, 
403,  405,  419,  420. 


Tatnall,   Commodore:    106,   127. 

Tenno:   the   Emperor,    see   Mikado. 

Three  Families:  see  Sanke. 

Tientsin:  treaties  of,  91,    106,    i28n. 

Toda   Idzu-no-Kami:    16. 

Tokaido:  highway  between  Kyoto  and 
Yedo,  72,  130,  203,  207,  209. 

Tokugawa:  family  which  held  Sho- 
gunate.  See  Shogunate. 

Tokyo:    formerly  Yedo,    51. 

Tosa,    daimyo    of:    217,    219,    242. 

Tozama  daimyo:  6. 

Trampling  on  images:  68,  89,  92,  147. 

Treaties:  American,  with  China,  10, 
22;  Perry's,  23-24;  British 
(1854),  41,  43;  Russian  (1855), 
43;  Dutch  (1855),  455  (1856), 
45;  Mikado  sanctions  early,  53; 
conditional  sanction  of  later, 
122;  American,  with  Siam,  56; 
British,  with  Siam,  57;  Harris's 
(1857),  64;  Dutch  (1857),  67; 
Russian  (1857),  69,  92;  Harris's 
(1858),  87;  Tientsin,  91,  106, 
i28n.;  British  (1858),  116; 
Dutch  (1858),  116;  French 
(1858),  116;  Russian  (1858),  116; 
validity  of,  123,  276;  Russo- 
Chinese,  137;  Prussian  (1861), 
1 60;  London  protocol  (1862), 
186;  denounced  by  Japan,  274; 
United  States  demands  observ 
ance  of,  308;  Swiss  (1863),  312; 
of  1866,  313,  407,  420;  Russell 
demands  observance  of,  315; 
Paris  convention  (1864),  351; 
Shimonoseki  convention  (1864), 
370. 

Tsuda    Hanzaburo:     98. 

Tsushima:  daimyo  of,  i8on. ;  occu 
pied  by  Russians,  i88n.;  open 
ing  proposed,  188,  207. 

Tsuyama,   daimyo   of:    18. 

Tycoon :   see    Shogun. 

United  States:  interest  in  opening 
Japan,  u;  naval  warehouse  in 


INDEX. 


459 


Japan,  88;  Japanese  embassy  to, 
127-129,  149-151;  proposes  naval 
demonstration,  171;  insists  upon 
safety  of  foreigners,  230;  attitude 
toward  civil  war  in  Japan,  233, 
259;  peaceful  relations  with 
Japan,  250,  254;  will  not  sur 
render  treaty  rights,  275 ;  strikes 
first  blow  in  defence  of  treaty 
rights,  283 ;  would  receive  em 
bassy,  305;  attitude  in  1863,  306; 
agrees  to  postponement,  312; 
agrees  to  policy  of  forbearance, 
325;  accepts  British  proposal  on 
indemnity,  392;  share  of  indem 
nity,  371,  392,  416;  policy  of, 
409;  returns  Shimonoseki  indem 
nity,  426-434.  See  American, 
Legations,  Treaties. 

Uraga:    15,   22,    147. 

Uwajima,   daimyo   of:    18. 

Van   Twist,    Duymaer:    21. 

Van  Valkenburgh,  R.   B. :  419. 

Vyse,    Captain:    145. 

Waka-doshiyori:   junior   council,  6. 

War:  see  Anglo-Chinese,  Crimean, 
France,  Civil. 

Watanabe    Kwazan:    35. 

Western  daimyos:  198,  213,  219,  241, 
292,  360. 

William  II.,  King  of  Holland:  15, 
32. 

Williams,    Dr.    S.    Wells:    interpreter 


with  Perry,  24n.;  estimate  of 
Perry,  30;  on  Japanese  officials, 
37n.,  49;  on  opium,  68. 

Winchester,  Charles  A.,  British 
charge  d'affaires:  380,  381,  383. 

Wit,  J.  K.  de:  Dutch  consul-general: 
158,  175,  208. 

Wyoming:  at  Shimonoseki,  281;  in 
demnity  for,  310;  prize  money, 
427-431. 

Yaconin:  a  Japanese  officer,  160,  168, 
196,  261. 

Yamato:  spirit,   no;  shrines,  296. 

Yedo  Tokugawa  capital,  5,  passim; 
right  of  residence  in,  88,  92; 
bay  of,  15,  21,  33,  159,  237; 
withdrawal  from,  162-165.  See 
Postponement. 

Yendo   Matazayemon:    49. 

Yokohama:  treaty  negotiations  at,  22; 
opening  of,  130,  134;  treaty  port, 
134,  passim;  ministers  retire  to, 
164;  trade  of,  166;  consulates  re 
moved  to,  169;  idle  rumors  at, 
202,  225;  security  cannot  be  guar 
anteed,  253;  Japanese  residents 
leave,  257;  to  be  closed,  274,  301, 
304,  305,  329,  331,  333,  334,  338; 
defence  of,  339,  347;  powers  re 
fuse  to  consider  closing  of,  341, 
351;  not  to  be  closed,  366. 

Yoritomo    (Minamoto  Yoritomo) :  4. 

Yoshinobu:    see    Hitotsubashi. 


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